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I am writing this on the day that I acquire Dutch nationality. It wasn't planned that 
way, but it is a thought-provoking coincidence. After I attend the “naturalisation 
ceremony” this afternoon (i.e. share cheese and wine with a local civil servant and 
the other aspirant-Dutchies), I will be a dual national. British and Dutch. And I 
cannot deny that this moment has gained added significance thanks to the 
understanding that I now have of the value of citizenship. As you can see, the PhD 
manuscript to which I have just put the finishing touches is on statelessness. An 
entire study devoted to those who have not two nationalities, not even one, but 
none.   
 Statelessness is a fascinating anomoly - the idea that a person can be denied 
membership of every one of the world's states, cast into an officially-sanctioned, 
legal limbo is somehow incredible. It is a phenomenon that readily captures both 
the imagination and the heart. My own first encounter with statelessness certainly 
raised many questions, like how does statelessness come about, how does it impact 
people's lives and what are we doing to tackle it? It is a good thing that I found (and 
still find) the topic so compelling because it meant that these and other questions 
kept me very happily occupied for the last four years.  
 I feel very privileged to have had the opportunity to devote so much time to 
what really began as a personal interest. This would not have been possible without 
my supervisor, Willem van Genugten, putting his faith in my ability to turn my 
personal interest into a worthy academic study. His unrelinquishing encouragement 
helped me to keep up the momentum in my research and gave me the confidence to 
take on all sorts of other activities alongside working on my manuscript. I would 
also like to thank my second supervisor, Helen Oosterom, for her  enthusiasm for 
my research and her continuing willingness to discuss trouble spots and comment 
on draft texts. I am indebted to the further members of the reading committee, Cees 
Flinterman, Pieter Boeles and Anton van Kalmthout, for taking the time to read and 
assess this sturdy document. And I would like to thank my sister, Sarah Hayward, 
for crafting the perfect cover illustration to accompany my manuscript. 
 The last four years were made all the more enjoyable by two things: the fact 
that I was able to participate in several practical projects to satisfy my idealistic 





debt of gratitude to Philippe Leclerc and Mark Manly of UNHCR, as well as Simon 
Heap of Plan International, for allowing me to get involved in the “real world” of 
statelessness. This offered me insights that I would not have gained purely within 
the academic setting and gave me great satisfaction. Then to all the kind and 
committed people who I have had the privilege to work with through Books 4 Life 
over the years – thank you, you have been a true inspiration. Please keep up the 
fabulous work.  
 So I come to those colleagues with whom I have shared so many cups of tea, 
slices of cake, beers and laughs with. There is nothing that boosts your morale quite 
like “melige woensdag” or a spontaneous trip to the Efteling. Jeroen, Christophe, 
Vera, Tamara, Nicola, Conny and Femke – you have kept me sane in this otherwise 
oh-so-lonely profession, thanks. Thank yous also to those friends outside of work 
who have added so much colour to my life; to my parents, for many things, among 
which their winning decision to ensure that English is my mother tongue - it has 
been a real help; and of course Mark, who makes me smile and laugh most of all 
and with whom I cannot wait to embark on the next adventure. 
 
 
Laura van Waas 
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“Nationality matters” seems a curious title for an academic study. The phrase is 
vague and ambiguous; indeed it carries a double meaning. This is in contradiction 
to the usual nature of scholarly work that strives for clarity and precision. Yet it is 
for precisely this ambiguity that the words were carefully chosen to lead this text. 
The reader is (hopefully) intrigued as to whether this work discusses nationality 
matters by focussing on issues, problems and perspectives relating to nationality 
law and practice. Or, the reader may ponder, perhaps the main argument defended 
here is that nationality matters: that the legal bond of nationality is of real 
significance to the state and the individual involved. In fact, as alluded-to above, 
these questions that the title conjures in the mind of the reader are both equally 
valid and indeed both addressed in this book. 
 The two dimensions of the phrase “nationality matters” reflect the dual aspects 
of the problem of statelessness. On the one hand, an investigation into the issue of 
statelessness necessitates an analysis of matters relating to nationality - its 
acquisition and loss – whereby circumstances may arise through which an 
individual is left stateless. In order to prevent or resolve cases of statelessness, a full 
understanding is required of what constitutes the link between the individual and a 
state that results (or should result) in the legal bond of nationality. On the other 
hand, the statelessness phenomenon obliges us to discover to what extent 
nationality matters in today’s world. By discerning whether nationality is relevant 
for the enjoyment of certain fundamental rights and thereby whether a stateless 
person is rendered at a disadvantage because of his lack of any nationality, then we 
can determine if and where international law is required to fill this protection gap.  
These dual aspects can be traced in the international community’s response to 
the worldwide problem of statelessness. There are two separate, yet complimentary, 
conventions aimed at addressing statelessness: the 1961 Convention on the 
Reduction of Statelessness and the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of 
Stateless Persons.1 The first addresses matters relating to nationality and aims to 
limit the number of cases of statelessness occurring. The second offers stateless 
persons a corresponding legal status and a number of rights, thus aspiring to fill any 
protection gap that statelessness creates in areas of the law where nationality 
                                                           
1 Referred to collectively hereinafter as the Statelessness Conventions. The full text of these instruments 





matters. As will be explained, this dual nature is also reflected in the approach 
taken to the study of statelessness in this book. 
 
1 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
In the following work I intend to discover whether the international community has 
reacted adequately to address the complex issue of statelessness. The 
aforementioned Statelessness Conventions are taken as the point of departure 
because they are specifically designed to be the legal regime dealing with 
statelessness at the international level and together they address the two dimensions 
of the statelessness question. These will be set off against other sources of 
international obligations relevant to the problem of statelessness, in particular those 
found in the area of human rights law. In essence, the overall research question 
posed in this work is the following: 
 
How can the way in which international law deals with the issue of statelessness 
be improved so as to ensure optimal protection of the individual and his rights? 
 
Once again, the dual aspects of the issue of statelessness must be reflected, which 
necessitates splitting this research question in two: 
 
1) How can the way in which international law deals with the prevention of 
statelessness be improved so as to ensure optimal protection against 
statelessness for the individual (i.e. the realisation of the right to a 
nationality)? 
 
2) How can the way in which international law deals with the legal status and 
entitlements of stateless persons be improved so as to ensure optimal 
protection of the individual’s rights in the absence of nationality? 
 
The separation of these questions facilitates the approach taken, namely that of 
using the existing Statelessness Conventions as a point of departure in the search for 
optimal legal solutions. An assessment will be made as to whether the conventions 
are relevant and effective in meeting the goal of protection of individuals or, then 
again, whether they have become superfluous in view of more recent developments 
in international (human rights) law. This will provide a basis for recommending 
improvements, whether this involves the further promotion, implementation and 
supervision of the existing Statelessness Conventions or the use of alternative or 
creation of new instruments. 
 
2 RESEARCH APPROACH 
 
In conjunction with the title of this Part of the book - “Why statelessness?” - it is 
important to first discuss the extent to which the world is blighted by statelessness 
and determine whether it is indeed a problem worthy of detailed research. This brief 
investigation will be guided by such questions as: What is statelessness? How 
severe is the global problem of statelessness? Why is it an issue deserving of 
international attention? And what reason is there to question the international 
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community’s response to the issue? Chapter II is devoted to answering these basic 
questions as well as providing a brief introduction to the two Statelessness 
Conventions that are centre-stage in this study.  
Part 2 then takes a closer look at the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of 
Statelessness, while Part 3 analyses the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of 
Stateless Persons.2 The investigation is guided by the research questions presented 
above. Therefore, Part 2 will identify the various causes of statelessness before 
advising on the effectiveness of instruments designed to prevent its occurrence and 
ensure that everyone enjoys the right to a nationality. Similarly, Part 3 will first 
uncover to what extent a protection gap is created by statelessness before 
proceeding with the search for optimal solutions. In each case, the content and 
scope of the Statelessness Conventions themselves are investigated, before attention 
is turned to alternative sources of norms that offer similar or perhaps broader 
protection. Once the totality of international legal sources which address 
statelessness has been uncovered, it becomes possible to determine whether 
statelessness is dealt with effectively; what additional measures – if any – are 
needed; and what the position of the Statelessness Conventions is within this 
picture. In line with this approach, a conclusion to the first research question is 
presented in chapter VIII and an answer to the second is given in chapter XIII. 
Thereafter, in Part 4 the findings of this research will be drawn together and 
final observations will be made on the suitability and effectiveness of the 
international response to the issue of statelessness to date. Guided by the question 
“What future for the Statelessness Conventions?” the conclusions from the previous 
sections will be reviewed in order to determine what role the 1961 Convention on 
the Reduction of Statelessness and the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of 
Stateless Persons can play in the protection of individuals worldwide. Lastly, some 
more general reflections will be offered on how to tackle the challenges that remain 
in the field of statelessness.   
                                                           
2 Please note that, rather than considering the instruments in chronological order, the 1961 Convention 
on the Reduction of Statelessness will be dealt with first because the primary aim of the international 
community is the avoidance of statelessness and this is the universal instrument that was devised to that 
effect.  A secondary question – and one that only becomes relevant when the avoidance of statelessness 
cannot be guaranteed – is that of the protection of stateless persons, as provided for by the 1954 
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Immediately embarking on the quest to answer the research questions that were put 
forward in the previous chapter would be overly hasty as it would disregard the 
vital query which heads this part of the book: why statelessness? For if statelessness 
is not in fact a “problem” at all, then no matter how interestingly or creatively this 
work tries to present “solutions”, it would not be worth its weight in paper let alone 
the time and energy spent in producing it. This second introductory chapter 
therefore considers a series of basic questions: What is statelessness? How many 
people are currently affected and what impact does statelessness have on their 
lives? What has been the international community’s response to date? And how is 
statelessness actually defined for the purposes of applying the relevant international 
standards? The answers to these questions, as presented below, offer an introduction 
to the statelessness phenomenon and simultaneously illustrate that it is indeed an 
issue that is worthy of further attention and detailed study. 
 
1 DISCOVERING STATELESSNESS 
 
Generally speaking, each of us has one nationality - no more, no less - and as we 
grow up we do not naturally question this state of affairs. For a long time, I felt that 
my nationality was among those characteristics that were fundamental and 
immutable such as my name, eye colour and gender. Yet time has since shed light 
on the hidden complexities of nationality and the discovery of statelessness was a 
particular eye-opener. So, since I feel that the best way to set the scene and to offer 
some sense of the phenomenon of statelessness is to put forward a concrete, real-
life example, I would like to open this chapter by relating my own discovery of 
statelessness. This is the story of the first stateless person I knew:1 
 
Once upon a time, in a town in the Southeast of the Netherlands, a baby boy was 
born. His parents were thrilled and named him Omar, seeing this extension of their 
family as a good sign for the future and a fresh start for them all. Omar’s parents 
had been forced to flee their homes in the Middle East some years before, leaving 
everything that they had behind. They eventually won the right to settle in the 
Netherlands and were making the most of it. Omar’s father found a job and quickly 
picked up the language. As soon as he was eligible, he successfully applied for the 
                                                     
1 The name has been changed and details somewhat simplified but the story is accurate.  
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Dutch nationality in order to affirm his new link with the country. But what he most 
dearly wanted was to be able to marry Omar’s mother. Sadly, they did not have the 
documents required by Dutch law to do so. Instead, they muddled along in the hope 
that one day they would be able to afford to send for the right documents or pay for 
the replacements in order to get married.  
 
Then Omar was born and they were overjoyed. Omar’s father went straight from 
the hospital to the town hall to register the birth, all the while oozing the pride of a 
man who has newly become a father. Omar was registered: his name, date and place 
of birth recorded. But when the registrar logged “unknown” in the box marked 
“nationality”, Omar’s father grew worried. After all, he was Dutch and his son was 
born on Dutch soil, so surely Omar would also be Dutch.  
 
Little did he know that just a few months previously a new law had come into 
force. This law required him to register the imminent birth of his son while his 
girlfriend was still pregnant. Failing to do so - and because he and Omar’s mother 
were not married - he would not automatically be recognised as the boy’s father and 
his son would not acquire his nationality. 
 
Omar’s father quickly made the necessary arrangements at the local court to be 
legally recognised as the father, but this procedure did not grant Omar the Dutch 
nationality. Nor could Omar acquire the nationality of his mother, as she was the 
national of a country that did not allow women to pass on their nationality to their 
children. Omar’s nationality was therefore more than unknown: it was absent. He 
was stateless. 
 
After they had recovered from the shock, Omar’s parents began to discover the 
consequences of his statelessness. Omar could not obtain a passport, or be included 
in the passport of either of his parents, he could only apply for a foreigners’ travel 
pass at substantial cost. Omar was also registered by the immigration service as “a 
foreigner who entered the country for family reunification purposes” – an interesting 
feat for a baby just a few days old. His parents would have to pay a sizeable fee for a 
residence permit for Omar, without which he could, in theory, be subject to 
expulsion.  
 
Later, in order to have any hope of resolving his plight, Omar’s parents would 
have to fight for his formal recognition as a stateless person. This may then allow 
Omar to benefit from provisions in the Dutch law that offer nationality to a stateless 
child after three year, so long as he remains within the country in that time and 
under the care of his Dutch father. 
 
This initial experience of statelessness provides much food for thought and one 
possible answer to the question “why statelessness?” can arguably already be found 
in the personal struggle of this family. Statelessness presents a real, human dilemma 
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2 THE WORLDWIDE SEVERITY OF STATELESSNESS: MAGNITUDE AND 
CONSEQUENCES 
 
When I “discovered” statelessness, it was in a random, individual and apparently 
largely isolated case - one that formed a clear exception to the norm for children 
born in the Netherlands (as evidenced by the public outcry in response to a similar 
case later the same year).2 However, further investigation uncovers many more 
stories of statelessness, in many more countries, springing from many more 
different causes and resulting in many more troublesome consequences. This 
section therefore offers a brief introduction to the severity of statelessness while 
over the course of this book we will see plenty of further examples of the gravity of 
this phenomenon.  
To begin with then, it is generally agreed that statelessness is a substantial, 
rather than a one-off, anomaly. Disappointingly however, when trying to gain a 
clearer picture of the scope of the phenomenon by assessing the magnitude of 
statelessness across the globe, there is a distinct absence of concrete and reliable 
information. The only fact about which there is any certainty is that no one really 
knows the full extent of the problem. There are several reasons for the varying 
approximations of the number of stateless persons,3 not least of which is the 
ongoing discussion surrounding the definition of statelessness.4 Continuing 
contention as to what qualifies an individual as stateless means that different 
organisations and states often still adopt their own approach – not only to the 
definition itself, but also to procedures for the recognition of “stateless person 
status”5 and requirements surrounding the establishment of proof of statelessness.6 
Without a universal interpretation and application of the term “stateless”, it comes 
as no surprise that statistics on the matter are hazy. In cases where there is an 
opportunity to identify a person as stateless, for example in the event of a census or 
where an individual statelessness-status determination procedure does exist, there is 
no guarantee that they will be (correctly) registered as such. To register a stateless 
                                                     
2 See on the response to this issue in the Netherlands Één Vandaag, IND wil baby uitzetten 
[Immigration and Naturalisation Service wants to deport baby], news broadcast, 6 December 2004, 
http://www.tweevandaag.nl/index.php?module=PX_Story&func=view&cid=2&sid=28947.   
3 For instance, estimations by United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) over the past 
few years have ranged from one million to nine million, seeming at one point to admit defeat and 
simply state that there are “millions” of stateless persons worldwide. According to UNHCR’s annual 
Global Appeal, in 2002 the estimate was 8.9 million stateless persons, in 2003 and 2004 the estimate 
was 1 million and in 2005 it was the less-specific “millions”; UNHCR Global Appeal 2002 – 2005.  
4 As discussed in detail in section 4 below. 
5 Indeed, according to the 2004 Final Report on a statelessness survey performed by the UNHCR, only 
51.4% of the respondent states indicated that there was even a procedure in place to identify cases of 
statelessness, therefore many states have no standard method of identifying stateless persons on the 
territory of their state; UNHCR, Final report concerning the Questionnaire on statelessness pursuant to 
the Agenda for Protection, Geneva: March 2004, page 26 
6 It can be very difficult to provide satisfactory evidence of statelessness as it requires proving a 
negative, proving the absence of a nationality. This means that agreement on the burden of proof and on 
the weighing of evidence are of utmost importance. See further Nehemiah Robinson, Convention 
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person as a person of “unknown nationality”7 or simply as a “non-citizen”8 is to 
further obscure the statistics and add to the invisibility of this group.9 Finally there 
is the consideration that statelessness is often a highly politicised issue.10 Therefore, 
the absence of any data in some states on the magnitude of the statelessness plight 
may imply that the authorities may have chosen to ignore the problem rather than 
publicise it.11 Moreover, the quality and reliability of any statistical data that is 
offered by governments and institutions is by no means beyond question – it may be 
heavily influenced by an underlying agenda. 
Although it is, therefore, unlikely that the precise figure will ever be known, 
all estimates point towards statelessness being an issue of global proportions and 
reach. In 2005, a comprehensive international report on statelessness by the non-
governmental organisation Refugees International gave the estimate of 
approximately 11 million stateless persons worldwide.12 During 2006, UNHCR 
made renewed efforts to identify and tally stateless populations and by the end of 
the year put the total global figure at 5.8 million. This number however, included 
only those populations about which some statistics were available and the data has 
been described as “provisional, incomplete, subject to change and [including] 
estimates”.13 In fact, the agency currently “believes the true total may be closer to 
15 million”14 – a hefty number.15 Meanwhile, UNHCR’s Global Questionnaire on 
Statelessness confirmed that statelessness is an issue that spans the world.16 Of the 
countries that completed the questionnaire, 59.4% admitted to encountering 
problems of statelessness.17 Therefore, more than half of the respondent states have 
actually identified cases of statelessness within their territory, despite the many 
difficulties mentioned above. The survey shows that statelessness is a truly global 
issue as there is no region of the world that is exempt from this problem. 
Statelessness has arisen in every area of the world, regardless of whether there had 
recently been a case of state succession and independently of the question as to 
                                                     
7 Such was the way in which the nationality of Omar in the story described in section 1 was recorded in 
the municipal records in the Netherlands. 
8 For example, Latvia labels Ex-USSR nationals who fulfil certain criteria as “non-citizens”, a separate 
category to “stateless” under Latvian law, even though these individuals are without a nationality; See 
both the Law on the Status of Former USSR Citizens Who Are Not Citizens of Latvia or Any Other 
State, May 1995 and the Law of Stateless Persons, March 2004. 
9 UNHCR, Statistical Yearbook 2001, Geneva, October 2002, page 23; Maureen Lynch, Lives on hold: 
The human cost of statelessness, Washington: 2005, page 7.  
10 UNHCR, The World's Stateless - Questions and Answers, Geneva: 2004, page 12. 
11 Hannah Arendt, "The Decline of the Nation-State and the End of the Rights of Man" in The origins of 
totalitarianism, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York: 1948, page 279 
12 According to Refugees International, 11 million is a “low end estimate”; Maureen Lynch, Lives on 
hold: The human cost of statelessness, Washington: 2005, page 1. 
13 UNHCR, Global Trends 2006, Table 14 – Stateless Persons. 
14 UNHCR, “The World’s Stateless People” in Refugees Magazine, Number 147, Issue 3, 2007. 
15 By way of comparison, UNHCR’s figures on refugees at the time showed a population of just under 
10 million. UNHCR, Global Trends 2006, Table 1 – Refugees, asylum seekers, IDPs, returnees, 
stateless persons and others of concern to UNHCR. 
16 The survey was undertaken in 2003 with the results published in UNHCR, Final report concerning 
the Questionnaire on statelessness pursuant to the Agenda for Protection, Geneva: March 2004. 
17 UNHCR, Final report concerning the Questionnaire on statelessness pursuant to the Agenda for 
Protection, Geneva: March 2004, page 11. 
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whether the jus soli or jus sanguinis nationality doctrine is the preferred method of 
attributing nationality at birth.18 
Also worth mentioning at this point is the finding that statelessness is not 
only the plight of random individuals, but whole groups can suffer from a sort-of 
collective statelessness. Here are a few examples:  
 
- in Latvia and Estonia there is a population of 393,000 and 119,000 
Russian “non-citizens” respectively, persons who were rendered 
stateless following the independence of these Baltic states and the 
dissolution of the USSR; 
 
- other former soviet republics, including the Russian Federation, 
Kazakhstan and Ukraine, also host tens of thousands of stateless 
persons; 
 
- in Africa, Kenya is home to a stateless population of 100,000 and other 
states such as Zimbabwe and the Democratic Republic of Congo are 
also known to host large stateless groups; 
 
- other states where statelessness is a widespread problem include 
Kuwait (88,000), Syrian Arab Republic (300,000), Nepal (400,000), 
Bangladesh (300,000) and Myanmar (670,000); and 
 
- even in states where the problem is relatively low-key, recent estimates 
show that there may still be several thousands of stateless persons – for 
example the Netherlands (4,461) and Sweden (5,571).19  
 
Again, these numbers may be unreliable due to the difficulty of definition and 
identification of statelessness, but they provide a general picture of the problem. In 
later chapters these and other examples will occasionally be drawn upon as 
illustrations or test cases in the discussion of specific aspect of statelessness.  
For now it suffices to say that the existence of these large groups of stateless 
persons, as well as the global occurrence of sporadic cases, provides a strong 
argument for taking a closer look at the issue. Indeed, the widespread and large-
scale nature of the phenomenon suggest, at the very least, that efforts to prevent 
statelessness through the adoption and implementation of international norms are 
not yet thoroughly effective. Therefore, through the first of my two research 
questions I propose to pursue an in depth study of the international community’s 
                                                     
18 State succession and the strict application of the jus sanguinis nationality doctrines are two well-
known potential causes of statelessness. What this survey shows is that there are other factors that may 
also play a part in causing statelessness, heightening the universality of this problem. The causes of 
statelessness are discussed in depth in part 2, with an introduction to the jus soli and jus sanguinis 
doctrines provided in chapter III. 
19 These figures are taken from UNHCR’s Global Trends 2006 and from the 2005 global report on 
statelessness by Refugees International; Maureen Lynch, Lives on hold: The human cost of 
statelessness, Washington: 2005, pages 27-46. 
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approach to the prevention of statelessness in order to uncover areas in which 
improvements can be made to optimise the avoidance of statelessness in future.20 
Meanwhile, if we conceive that there are up to 15 million – if not more – 
stateless persons dispersed across the globe, the question that naturally follows is 
what consequences statelessness has for these individuals and their families; the 
communities and the states involved; and the international community as a whole. 
The first impression garnered from the literature on the subject, is that the impact of 
statelessness can be dramatic. UNHCR has described the stateless as “unclaimed” 
and their situation as being “outcasts from the global political system of states 
which has evolved in the last century”.21 Indeed, as statelessness is an exceptional 
phenomenon in a world where having a nationality is the norm, the stateless find 
themselves excluded from the normal legal regime. More than that, the stateless 
“outcasts” are susceptible to increased marginalisation, discrimination and 
insecurity, as we will see. 
For individuals, statelessness can result in an inability to effectuate a range of 
rights and an increased vulnerability to abuse in both the public and private sphere. 
According to the UNHCR publication What would life be like if you had no 
nationality? if you are stateless, you may not be able to  
 
go to university; get a job; get medical care; own property; travel; register the 
birth of your children; marry and found a family; enjoy legal protection; have a 
sense of identity and belonging; [or] participate fully in developments in a 
world composed of states, in which nationality is key to membership.22 
 
The stateless thus “often have minimal, if any, access to the kind of basic political 
and social rights that most civilians take for granted”.23 The lack of a nationality 
forms an enormous obstacle when it comes to even the simplest of administrative 
procedures. Stateless persons are generally unable to obtain travel documents or 
even any form of identity document.24 This, in turn, leads to an increased risk of 
becoming a victim of human trafficking or other forms of exploitation – particularly 
for women and children. One poignant example that has been identified is the 
problem that stateless women may seek marriage with a national in the hope of 
resolving their statelessness or improving their legal status, only to become trapped 
in an abusive relationship: 
 
In the United States, prior to the 1994 Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), 
only a permanent US resident or citizen spouse could petition for a stateless or 
foreign spouse to become a resident; and the petitioner controlled if and when the 
residency application was filed. All too frequently, this control over if and when 
                                                     
20 The research question was elaborated in chapter I. Part 2 is devoted to answering this question. 
21 UNHCR, The Problem of Statelessness has Become a Live Issue Again, 2001, accessible via 
http://www.unhcr.org.  
22 UNHCR, What would life be like if you had no nationality? Information booklet, March 1999, page 
3. 
23 UNHCR, The World's Stateless - Questions and Answers, Geneva: 2004, page 4. 
24 Guy Goodwin Gill, "The rights of refugees and stateless persons" in Saksena (ed) Human rights 
perspectives & challenges (in 1900's and beyond), Lancers Books, New Delhi: 1994, page 379. 
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the residency application was filed allowed physically abusive spouses, 
predominantly men, inordinate control over their non-resident spouses.25 
 
Another aspect of the problem of statelessness is that the registration of births, 
marriages and deaths becomes much more difficult,26 when such registration can, in 
fact, also be vital in the reduction or prevention of statelessness. As we will see 
later, for this and other reasons, “many stateless people are condemned to pass on 
their statelessness to their children – as if it were some sort of genetic disease”.27 
Then, already excluded from the legal regime, stateless persons often find 
themselves excluded from society: the long-term (immigration) detention of 
stateless persons is a serious issue.28 This is usually due to a lack of documentation 
or the inability to return the individuals to their country of origin. Such 
circumstances may result in “indefinite family separation”,29 as well as leading to a 
general and continuing uncertainty in any dealings with state authorities.30 Finally, 
the rejection that statelessness implies and the dire consequences that it can have 
contribute to a debilitating “sense of worthlessness”31 among the stateless and this 
can lead to depression, alcoholism, violence and suicide.32 
The individual insecurity experienced by stateless persons becomes a 
communal, national or even international issue when it escalates into collective 
insecurity of a large stateless group. UNHCR has, for instance, traced a link 
between statelessness and mass displacement. There are many examples of stateless 
groups that have fled the country of former nationality or habitual residence: the 
Bidoons from Kuwait and the Rohingyas from Myanmar are but two such cases.33 
Incidents of mass expulsion of stateless persons from their country of habitual 
                                                     
25 David Weissbrodt; Clay Collins, 'The Human Rights of Stateless Persons', in Human Rights 
Quarterly, Vol. 28, 2006, page 270. See also UN Division for the Advancement of Women, Women, 
Nationality and Citizenship, New York: 2003. On the vulnerability of stateless children to abuse and 
trafficking, see for instance Youth Advocate Program International, Stateless Children - Youth Who are 
Without Citizenship, Washington DC: 2002. 
26 Carol Batchelor, "The International Legal Framework Concerning Statelessness and Access for 
Stateless Persons", European Union Seminar on the Content and Scope of International Protection: 
Panel 1 - Legal basis of international protection, Madrid: 2002, page 4. 
27 Philippe Leclerc and Rupert Colville, “In the Shadows”, in Refugees Magazine, No. 147, Issue 3, 
2007, page 6. 
28 UNHCR, Stateless persons: a discussion note, EC/1992/SCP/CRP.4, Geneva: 1 April 1992; David 
Weissbrodt; Clay Collins, 'The Human Rights of Stateless Persons', in Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 
28, 2006, page 267; Refugees International, “Refugee Voices: Detained Stateless People in Kuwait”, 24 
September 2007; Stefanie Grant, “The Legal Protection of Stranded Migrants” in International 
Migration Law, R. Cholewinski, R. Perruchoud and E. MacDonald [Eds.], TMS Asser Press, The 
Hague 2007, pages 29-47. 
29 UNHCR, Statelessness in Canadian Context – A Discussion Paper, Ottawa, July 2003, page 3. 
30 Guy Goodwin Gill, "The rights of refugees and stateless persons" in Saksena (ed) Human rights 
perspectives & challenges (in 1900's and beyond), Lancers Books, New Delhi: 1994, page 379. 
31 Feelings expressed by a stateless woman as cited in Philippe Leclerc and Rupert Colville, “In the 
Shadows”, in Refugees Magazine, No. 147, Issue 3, 2007, page 6. 
32 Advisory Board on Human Security (prepared by Constantin Sokoloff), Denial of Citizenship: A 
Challenge to Human Security, February 2005.  
33 UNHCR, "Statelessness and Citizenship" in The State of the World's Refugees - A Humanitarian 
Agenda, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 1997, page 244-245.  
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residence add to the numbers of stateless living in exile – think of the ethnic Nepali 
minority in Bhutan who were both stripped of their nationality and expelled from 
the country.34 The creation of large groups that flee across international borders puts 
a heavy strain on the resources of the reception country as well as on the relations 
between the states involved. The continuing existence of statelessness can, 
therefore, contribute to instability in international relations.35  
Not only has a link been traced between statelessness and forced migration, 
which can lead to international insecurity, but a more direct connection has been 
made between nationality issues and armed conflict. Indeed,  
 
when a community resides for many years in a State and, in practice, functions as a 
community but its members are not given the full right to become citizens, the 
outcome is a population of second-class persons. This result is unjustified, immoral 
and dangerous to democracy, and has the potential for engendering uprisings and 
civil revolt.36 
 
With this in mind, the Advisory Board on Human Security has chosen to take a 
closer look at the denial of citizenship and how this relates to human (in)security. 
Each of the individual and societal consequences of statelessness introduced above 
gains a mention in the Advisory Board’s 2005 report.37 Where it goes one step 
further is in expounding a number of cases where nationality disputes have more or 
less directly contributed to internal and even international conflict.38 While the 
report emphasises that this connection is very real, giving as examples the conflicts 
in the Great Lakes Region of Africa and in the Balkans, it admits that the links are 
also complex. Nevertheless, addressing nationality issues is generally recognised as 
an important element of conflict prevention efforts and can also be a vital aspect of 
post-conflict peace-building.39  
These findings confirm that statelessness is not only a pervasive issue, but 
also one that warrants – even demands - international attention. From the accounts 
given of the experiences of stateless persons, it would seem that the international 
community also has some way to go in ensuring the optimal protection of the rights 
                                                     
34 UNHCR, Stateless persons: a discussion note, EC/1992/SCP/CRP.4, Geneva: 1 April 1992; Maureen 
Lynch, Lives on hold: The human cost of statelessness, Washington: 2005, page 37. 
35 UNHCR, Progress report on UNHCR activities in the field of statelessness, EC/49/SC/CRP.15, 
Geneva: 4 June 1999. 
36 Emphasis added. Yaffa Zilberschats, "Chapter 3 - The Horizontal Aspect of Citizenship" in The 
Human Right to Citizenship, Transnational Publishers, Ardsley, NY: 2002, page 95. 
37 Advisory Board on Human Security (prepared by Constantin Sokoloff), Denial of Citizenship: A 
Challenge to Human Security, February 2005, pages 3-5. 
38 UNHCR has also explained that two of the motivations for states and concerned organisations to 
tackle statelessness are to “strengthen national solidarity and stability by providing all people with a 
sense of belonging and identity” and to “improve international relations and stability by resolving 
disputes related to nationality”. UNHCR, What would life be like if you had no nationality? Information 
booklet, March 1999, page 11. 
39 Advisory Board on Human Security (prepared by Constantin Sokoloff), Denial of Citizenship: A 
Challenge to Human Security, February 2005, pages 21-23. See also Gay McDougall, Promotion and 
Protection of all Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the 
Right to Development – Report of the Independent Expert on Minority Issues, A/HRC/7/23, 28 
February 2008, paras. 47 - 48. 
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of the stateless. It appears that the existing international legal framework has, as yet, 
failed to stave off all of the detrimental consequences of a person being left 
unclaimed by any state and this is causing various severe knock-on effects. Through 
the second of my research questions, I will therefore endeavor hope to uncover the 
gaps and weaknesses in the international community’s approach to the protection of 
stateless persons in order to also recommend ways to optimise this aspect of the 
response to statelessness.40 
 
3 THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO STATELESSNESS 
 
The conclusion that was drawn from the foregoing comments on the severity of 
statelessness worldwide was that, to date, the international response to the issue has 
failed to fully and effectively prevent cases of statelessness or offer adequate 
protection to stateless persons. This is not to suggest that the international 
community has not been engaged in efforts to tackle statelessness. In fact, 
statelessness did, at one time, command the full attention of the world’s 
governments and over the past century, numerous efforts have actually been taken 
to tackle this issue in one way or another. The most notable outcome of these efforts 
is the pair of Conventions adopted in the wake of the Second World War: the 1961 
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness and the 1954 Convention relating to 
the Status of Stateless Persons. These are tailor-made instruments designed, 
respectively, to prevent statelessness and protect stateless persons. So, as we 
undertake an assessment of the international response to statelessness, these 
Statelessness Conventions will take centre-stage - we will consider their 
effectiveness and determine their place and value within the broader setting of 
international law as it stands today. At the same time, it is important to realise early-
on that these instruments are not the only source of international standards relating 
to statelessness. In particular, developments in the field of human rights law41 and 
the promulgation of a number of instruments that address specific (sub)topics 
relating to the problem of statelessness42 have contributed to an expanding set of 
relevant standards. By way of introduction to this overall international legal 
framework, what follows is a brief overview of the international community’s 
response to statelessness to date, starting with the advent of the Statelessness 
Conventions. This account will offer its own insight into the question “why 
statelessness?” 
Shortly after World War II, a study commissioned by the newly formed 
United Nations highlighted a number of protection issues regarding persons who 
had, in some way, become disconnected from their own state.43 This group included 
                                                     
40 The research question was elaborated in chapter I. Part 3 is devoted to answering this question. 
41 In particular the adoption of universal instruments such as the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child themselves to “everyone” as well as the promulgation of 
numerous regional human rights conventions that take a similar approach. 
42 These include the European Convention on Nationality, the Council of Europe Convention on the 
avoidance of statelessness in relation to State succession, the International Law Commission’s Draft 
Articles on Nationality of Natural Persons in relation to the Succession States and Draft Articles on 
Diplomatic Protection – all of which will be considered in the chapters to come. 
43 UN, A Study of Statelessness, E/1112, New York: August 1949. 
 
 
The Statelessness Phenomenon and a first encounter with the International Response 
 16 
both “stateless persons” and “refugees” – terms that were, as yet, undefined. On the 
basis of the study, the decision was taken to formulate a multilateral agreement to 
respond to the problem. And so, work began towards formulating an international 
convention to protect the basic rights of these “unprotected persons” – again 
including both stateless persons and refugees. In the end, two separate international 
instruments were adopted, each addressing a specific sub-category of persons in 
need of protection. The first was the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees.44 The application of this convention is limited to persons who fulfil the 
criteria set by the definition of a “refugee” offered in article 1 of the instrument. 
The nationality – or lack of it – is not a crucial factor in the refugee definition. As a 
consequence, while some stateless persons would be able to claim protection on the 
basis of the Refugee Convention, others would not satisfy the criteria and would 
need to rely on another source for the protection of their rights.45 In 1954, a second, 
similarly worded convention was agreed upon: the Convention relating to the Status 
of Stateless Persons.46 Article 1, which housed the definition of a refugee in the 
Refugee Convention, now contained a definition of a “stateless person”, which will 
be considered in depth in section 4 of this chapter. Having established who is a 
stateless person, the 1954 Statelessness Convention offers a catalogue of rights and 
benefits to be enjoyed by those individuals who qualify under the definition. The 
1954 Statelessness Convention was thus deemed to provide for a number of 
improvements to the legal status and situation of stateless persons. Still, the 
avoidance of statelessness and the (re)instatement of nationality remained the 
ultimate goal.47 To this end, another Statelessness Convention was adopted: the 
1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness.48 The aim was to prevent 
statelessness from arising by prohibiting states from withdrawing nationality if that 
would result in statelessness as well as by placing a positive obligation on states to 
grant nationality to individuals who would otherwise be stateless. Together then, the 
1954 and 1961 Statelessness Conventions were designed to offer distinct yet 
complimentary approaches to the statelessness phenomenon - aspiring to allocate 
rights directly to stateless persons and avoid statelessness respectively.  
In the half-century since the adoption of the Statelessness Conventions, two 
important trends can be traced that corroborate the aptness and timeliness of an in 
depth study of statelessness today (“why statelessness?”). The first, is the long 
period of neglect suffered by the Statelessness Conventions after their adoption and, 
indeed, the virtual abandonment of any efforts to further study or respond to the 
phenomenon of statelessness itself. The second is the resurgence of interest in and 
                                                     
44 The 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees entered into force on the 22nd of April 1954. 
Hereinafter commonly referred to as the 1951 Refugee Convention. Note that a protocol to the 1951 
Refugee Convention followed in 1967 and entered into force on the 4th of October of that year. 
45 Guy Goodwin Gill, "The rights of refugees and stateless persons" in Saksena (ed) Human rights 
perspectives & challenges (in 1900's and beyond), Lancers Books, New Delhi: 1994, page 382. 
46 The 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons entered into force on the 6th of June 
1960; hereinafter commonly referred to as the 1954 Statelessness Convention. 
47 Carol Batchelor, "The International Legal Framework Concerning Statelessness and Access for 
Stateless Persons", European Union Seminar on the Content and Scope of International Protection: 
Panel 1 - Legal basis of international protection, Madrid: 2002, page 6. 
48 The 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness entered into force on the 13th of December 
1975; hereinafter commonly referred to as the 1961 Statelessness Convention. 
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debate on the problem of statelessness since the early 1990s. We will consider the 
significance of each in turn.  
For many years following the formulation of the Statelessness Conventions, 
while existing cases of statelessness remained unresolved and new cases continued 
to surface, it was not an issue with which the international community was actively 
engaged. Instead, mass displacement and the battle to deal with ever-increasing 
numbers of refugees took priority. The Statelessness Conventions which lay in wait 
for ratifications attracted very few, while the number of state parties to the Refugee 
Convention took flight. By 1980, the Refugee Convention had 76 parties, while the 
1954 and 1961 Statelessness Conventions just 31 and 9 respectively. This severely 
limited the geographical scope of application of the provisions of the Statelessness 
Conventions and was evidence of the overall lack of attention to the issue.49 In that 
period, nationality was still largely regarded as a strictly sovereign matter. 
Statelessness was also seen as an internal – rather than an international – concern 
and it was therefore felt to be a delicate political issue, blocking discussion at both 
levels.50 Further evidence of the disinterest in statelessness (in contrast, again, to the 
attention and funds devoted to refugees) can be found in the allocation of resources 
within the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Charged with a 
mandate on both refugee and statelessness issues, the organisation employs over 
6,000 members of staff worldwide but, even today, less than a handful of full-time 
staff are specifically devoted to the problem of statelessness. 
The failure by states to adopt and implement the standards outlined in the 
Statelessness Conventions as well as the concomitant stagnation of discussion and 
activity on the issue has had a clear impact on the enduring enormity and harshness 
of the statelessness phenomenon - as illustrated by the findings in the previous 
section.51 Moreover, existing literature on the subject has raised the suggestion that 
the international community’s failure to effectively tackle statelessness is not only 
to be blamed on neglect of the Statelessness Conventions, but also on the content of 
the instruments themselves. Thus, on the one hand, the Conventions have been 
criticised as being “promulgated more from the view of a state’s prerogatives and 
                                                     
49 By the time of writing, the rate of accession to the conventions had improved slightly. The 1954 and 
1961 Conventions have now drawn a total of 62 and 34 state parties respectively as compared to the 
142 parties to the 1951 Refugee Convention. See further UNHCR, "Statelessness and Citizenship" in 
The State of the World's Refugees - A Humanitarian Agenda, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 1997, 
page 257. 
50 UNHCR, Final report concerning the Questionnaire on statelessness pursuant to the Agenda for 
Protection, Geneva: March 2004, page 12 
51 See section 2 above. Note also that in 1947, a report on Stateless Children by the International Union 
for Child Welfare warned that “one of the outstanding problems of our time is that created by the 
thousands of persons whom no state recognises as its nationals”. International Union for Child Welfare, 
Stateless Children - A Comparative Study of National Legislation and Suggested Solutions to the 
Problem of Statelessness of Children, Geneva: 1947, foreword. All evidence points to an increase in the 
number of stateless persons since the Second World War. – a fact that has been blamed in part on 
“political upheavals and armed conflict”; Ruth Donner, "Chapter 3: The Imposition and Withdrawal of 
Nationality" in The Regulation of Nationality in International Law, Transnational Publishers, New 
York: 1994. With the global stateless population now estimated to be somewhere in the millions and 
reports describing the detrimental conditions in which stateless persons continue to live, the 
Statelessness Conventions have certainly not been meeting their aim. 
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sovereignty than an individual’s rights”52 – thereby espousing standards that were 
not forceful enough to fulfil their purpose. On the other hand, with few states and 
even less international resources committed to implementing or monitoring the 
terms of the Statelessness Conventions, the standards themselves have also had 
little opportunity to be tried, tested or further developed – again, this stands in stark 
contrast to other fields of international law such as human rights or refugee law that 
has continued to evolve over the same period. There is now a genuine concern that 
the norms espoused in the Statelessness Conventions have been outrun by practical 
and legal developments since the promulgation of these instruments. If this is the 
case, then even the recent spate of accessions to the two instruments offers little 
hope for an improvement of the situation on the ground.53 Either way, it is arguable 
that an assessment of the actual content of the Statelessness Conventions is overdue 
- particularly since, for some reason, the instruments never really took flight while 
statelessness continues to present itself as a problem. By taking a careful look at the 
terms of the Statelessness Conventions and weighing their strengths and 
weaknesses, some comment can be made on their true potential and whether they 
present an appropriate way forward for the international response to statelessness. 
The second trend that was mentioned above is the recent revival of interest in 
statelessness – following decades of disregard. Events of the late 1980s and early 
1990s brought about new and grave situations of statelessness that alerted the world 
community anew to the need to address this problem. For starters there was the 
disintegration of a number of federal states, in particular the former USSR and 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.54 These cases of state succession gave 
rise to difficult questions surrounding the nationality of those affected and problems 
of statelessness ensued. A related issue that drew attention to statelessness was the 
emergence of a new form of insecurity: inter-ethnic, communal conflicts sprung up 
in many regions.55 In a number of cases, nationality became an issue or even a 
weapon in the dispute, with statelessness the detrimental result. A third reason for 
statelessness being viewed with a renewed sense of urgency is the aforementioned 
realisation that there is an intimate connection between statelessness and forced 
displacement. Still battling to cope with high numbers of refugees, the international 
community began to take interest in the finding that statelessness can not only lead 
to large scale population movements, but that the resolution of these situations also 
                                                     
52 Quote by Independent Commission on International Humanitarian Issues, taken from UNHCR, 
"Statelessness and Citizenship" in The State of the World's Refugees - A Humanitarian Agenda, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford: 1997, page 256. 
53 Since the mid-1990s, the number of state parties to the Statelessness Conventions has steadily 
expanded, thanks largely to a promotional campaign by UNHCR that commenced in 1994. However, 
the number of accessions remains relatively low when compared to the 1951 Refugee Convention or 
many of the major human rights instruments. See note 49 above. 
54 UNHCR, "Statelessness and Citizenship" in The State of the World's Refugees - A Humanitarian 
Agenda, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 1997, page 229 
55 Carol Batchelor, 'Statelessness and the Problem of Resolving Nationality Status', in International 
Journal of Refugee Law, Vol. 10, 1998, page 157; UNHCR, Information and accession package: the 
1954 Convention relating to the status of stateless persons and the 1961 Convention on the reduction of 
statelessness, Geneva: January 1999, page 2. 
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relies on providing an answer to any unresolved nationality disputes.56 And finally, 
with the penetration of multi-party democracy into ever more countries, new 
citizenship disputes and cases of statelessness have surfaced – especially in Africa:  
 
Ironically, the growing number of elections being held in African states has in 
some cases inflamed the debate over nationality [...] some regimes find it 
difficult to resist the temptation to manipulate nationality issues in order to 
erase political opposition.57 
 
These last two reasons in particular have ensured that statelessness retained its place 
on the international agenda as we moved into the new century.  
The overall result was that, from the mid 1990s onwards, states, 
international organisations (including UNHCR) and human rights institutions began 
to pay greater attention to nationality matters and statelessness in their activities and 
reports. Interest in the Statelessness Conventions is on the up, with a small surge in 
the number of state parties and an increasing variety of actors petitioning states to 
accede to the instruments.58 At the same time, the true potential of the broader 
human rights framework to offer protection from and in statelessness is now 
beginning to come to light and a number of new international instruments have also 
been developed with a focus on (an aspect of the problem of) statelessness.59 This 
means that it is not only pertinent to consider the potential utility of the 
Statelessness Conventions in answering the statelessness challenge, but that this is 
also an opportune and appropriate moment to undertake such a study. The aim is to 
reappraise the value of the tailor-made Statelessness Conventions within the setting 
of the 21st century international legal framework as well as to discover where the 
framework as a whole still needs some work to ensure that statelessness receives a 
more effective response in the future.  
 
4 A FIRST CONCRETE DILEMMA: DEFINING STATELESSNESS 
 
The first critical and compelling dilemma to be dealt with, before we can even 
progress to consider the substantive protection offered from and in statelessness, is 
that of actually defining statelessness. As with any (international) legal concept, it is 
important to be clear as to the meaning of “statelessness” in order to determine 
which situations are covered by the expression and which fall beyond its reach. 
Only once the question of definition has been satisfied is the scope of application of 
norms specifically relating to statelessness established and can the task of 
identifying cases of statelessness for the purpose of applying such norms begin. 
Thus, in a work that resolves to undertake a thorough assessment of the way in 
                                                     
56 UNHCR, "Statelessness and Citizenship" in The State of the World's Refugees - A Humanitarian 
Agenda, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 1997, page 227 
57 Cécile Pouilly, “Africa’s Hidden Problem”, in Refugees Magazine, Number 147, Issue 3, 2007, pages 
29-30. See also James Goldston, 'Holes in the Rights Framework: Racial Discrimination, Citizenship, 
and the Rights of Noncitizens', in Ethics and International Affairs, Vol. 20, 2006. 
58 See on the newer accessions note 47 above. Among those bodies and organisations that are now 
regularly calling upon states to sign up to the conventions are the UN treaty bodies, UNHCR and non-
governmental organisations such as Refugees International and Open Society Justice Initiative.  
59 See note 42 above.  
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which international law deals with statelessness, the appropriateness and adequacy 
of the definition employed by the international community – decisive as it is for the 
enjoyment of relevant legal standards – is something that must be included in the 
investigation. The purpose of this section is therefore to present and elucidate the 
definition of statelessness as elaborated under international law as well as to offer 
some reflection upon its aptness. And it is in undertaking this basic exercise that the 
first potential, concrete “problem” with the international response to statelessness is 
uncovered. As we will see, it appears that ongoing contention and debate 
surrounding the meaning of statelessness60 – in spite of the existence of a formal, 
internationally acknowledged definition – may be jeopardising the implementation 
of norms that address the prevention of statelessness and the protection of stateless 
persons.  
In delineating standards that are applicable to situations of statelessness, the 
international community has tackled the accompanying and vital task of defining 
this term. According to international law, in particular as expressed in article 1 of 
the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, 
 
the term “stateless person” means a person who is not considered a national by any 
state under the operation of its law.61   
 
Whether an individual qualifies under this definition is purely dependent on a point 
of law – an arguably unremarkable approach since nationality is itself a legal 
connection between a person and a state. The focus is on the existence (or absence) 
of a formal bond of nationality, without pausing to consider the quality or 
effectiveness of citizenship.62 To reflect this approach, the persons qualifying under 
this definition are commonly referred to as “de jure stateless”. The definition 
excludes persons who may, in reality, live in very similar circumstances: those who 
lack protection de facto (in fact) as opposed to de jure (in law) because, although 
they do retain the formal bond of nationality, they are unable to rely on their 
country of nationality for protection. And it is on this point that the subsequent 
contention rests. 
The international community’s decision to include only de jure cases within 
the definition of statelessness was greatly influenced by the drafting history of the 
                                                     
60 This is evidenced by the differing definitions of statelessness and descriptions of stateless cases in 
such sources as Paul Weis, “The United Nations Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, 1961” 
in International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 11, No. 4, 1962, pages 1073-1096; Carol 
Batchelor, 'Stateless Persons: Some Gaps in International Protection', in International Journal of 
Refugee Law, Vol. 7, 1995; Carol Batchelor, 'Statelessness and the Problem of Resolving Nationality 
Status', in International Journal of Refugee Law, Vol. 10, 1998; Maureen Lynch, Lives on hold: The 
human cost of statelessness, Washington: 2005; David Weissbrodt; Clay Collins, 'The Human Rights of 
Stateless Persons', in Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 28, 2006; and Abbas Shiblak, Citizens, Sub-citizens 
and Non-citizens: Statelessness in the Arab Region, unpublished paper 
61 See also article 1, paragraph c of the Council of Europe Convention on the avoidance of statelessness 
in relation to State succession (2006) as well as the Explanatory Memorandum to the European 
Convention on Nationality (1997), paragraph 33. 
62 Please note that the terms “nationality” and “citizenship” (as well as “national” and “citizen”) will – 
unless specific reference to the contrary - be used interchangeably throughout this work to denote the 
legal bond between an individual and a state. 
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1954 Statelessness Convention. The fact that the instrument started life as a 
protocol to the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees had a particular 
impact. The line of thought was that, together, the Refugee Convention and 
Statelessness Protocol would offer protection to both categories of “unprotected” 
person – the de facto and the de jure.63 Indeed, when the Refugee Convention was 
adopted in 1951 (without the accompanying Statelessness Protocol) the 
international community did establish a protection regime for those lacking 
protection de facto: the definition of a refugee, the basis for the personal scope of 
the Refugee Convention, relies on a question of fact rather than of law. However, 
the definition does not encompass all persons who de facto lack national protection, 
but rather only those who  
 
owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside 
the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to 
avail himself of the protection of that country.64 
 
States considered a simple lack of protection to be insufficient to qualify for the 
benefits espoused under the 1951 Refugee Convention and determined that 
additional criteria must also be met. As such, this definition of a refugee reflects the 
extent to which the international community was willing to offer protection to those 
who suffered from de facto “unprotection”.65  
So, when it came to the ensuing discussion of the definition of statelessness, 
there was a tendency to consider the de facto issue as closed and concentrate on the 
problem of a de jure absence of protection – as evidenced by the definition 
adopted.66 Yet, even as the definition was being debated, some representatives 
raised their voices in favour of expanding the definition of statelessness – and 
thereby the personal scope of the 1954 Statelessness Convention – to include so-
called “de facto stateless persons”.67 The apprehension that some individuals would 
qualify neither for protection as a refugee nor as a “de jure stateless person”, yet 
still be in a situation of concern was persistent. In the end, a non-binding 
recommendation was adopted in an attempt to address such cases. Thus, through the 
Final Act of the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons,  
 
the Conference recommends that each Contracting State, when it recognises as valid 
the reasons for which a person has renounced the protection of the State of which he 
                                                     
63 As recommended by the “Study of Statelessness” that was carried out in 1949 to investigate the 
problem of persons lacking national protection. UN, A Study of Statelessness, E/1112, New York: 
August 1949 
64 Article 1 of the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951 (read together with the 1967 
Protocol). 
65 A statement to this effect was also made by the British representative in discussions surrounding the 
draft statelessness convention, Nehemiah Robinson, Convention relating to the status of stateless 
persons - Its history and interpretation, UNHCR, Geneva: 1955, page 12. 
66 Carol Batchelor, 'Statelessness and the Problem of Resolving Nationality Status', in International 
Journal of Refugee Law, Vol. 10, 1998, page 172.  
67 Nehemiah Robinson, Convention relating to the status of stateless persons - Its history and 
interpretation, UNHCR, Geneva: 1955, pages 11-13. 
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is a national, consider sympathetically the possibility of according to that person the 
treatment which the Convention accords to stateless persons.68 
 
This recommendation has since been seized upon as evidence of the recognition of 
“de facto statelessness”. For instance, according to the joint UNHCR and IPU 
Handbook on statelessness, “this recommendation was included on behalf of de 
facto stateless persons who, technically, still hold a nationality but do not receive 
any of the benefits generally associated with nationality”.69 Yet the 
recommendation does not refer to de facto statelessness and actually clearly 
enunciates that those persons to whom governments choose to extend the protection 
of the Convention on the basis of this recommendation are not stateless persons.70 
The 1954 Statelessness Convention then, clearly and unambiguously, limits the 
definition of stateless persons to those individuals who lack protection de jure. 
Notwithstanding these observations, debate on the problem of “de facto 
statelessness” continued as scholars and practitioners grappled with the 
reconciliation of the official definition of statelessness with what they perceived to 
be the widespread difficulties experienced in practice.71 This, in itself, signals the 
potential inadequacy of the definition and thereby a potential first problem in the 
approach taken to the issue of statelessness under international law. In essence, the 
question that has fed an enduring discussion on the sidelines to this day is this: 
should the de facto lack of protection also be addressed as an issue of statelessness?  
The concerns raised are threefold. Firstly, as mentioned above, there is the 
argument that a narrow focus on the de jure unprotected ignores the reality that de 
jure and de facto unprotected persons live side by side and share the same needs. 
Since “the crucial question [is] one of protection”,72 to address only the fact and not 
the quality of nationality is to create an arbitrary and unjust distinction between 
these two similarly situated groups. In other words, “persons with no effective 
                                                     
68 Article 1 of the Final Act of the Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, UN, 1954. 
69 UNHCR and IPU, Nationality and statelessness. A handbook for parliamentarians, 2005, page 25. 
See also UNHCR, Information and accession package: the 1954 Convention relating to the status of 
stateless persons and the 1961 Convention on the reduction of statelessness, Geneva: January 1999, 
page 13.  
70 Moreover, it can be questioned whether the recommendation has any added value whatsoever when 
placed in the proper context: when read in conjunction with both the 1954 Statelessness Convention 
and the 1951 Refugee Convention, it seems fair to assume that, once again, it is the “well-founded fear 
of persecution” to which the definition of a refugee refers that reflects the international consensus on 
which reasons are “valid” for refusing to avail oneself of national protection. This is in line with the 
aforementioned argument made by the British against expanding the protection of the Statelessness 
Convention to cases of de facto “unprotection”. See note 65 above. 
71 Including in Paul Weis, “The United Nations Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, 1961” in 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 11, No. 4, 1962, pages 1073-1096; Carol 
Batchelor, 'Stateless Persons: Some Gaps in International Protection', in International Journal of 
Refugee Law, Vol. 7, 1995; Carol Batchelor, 'Statelessness and the Problem of Resolving Nationality 
Status', in International Journal of Refugee Law, Vol. 10, 1998; Maureen Lynch, Lives on hold: The 
human cost of statelessness, Washington: 2005; David Weissbrodt; Clay Collins, 'The Human Rights of 
Stateless Persons', in Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 28, 2006; and Abbas Shiblak, Citizens, Sub-citizens 
and Non-citizens: Statelessness in the Arab Region, unpublished paper. 
72 Carol Batchelor, 'Stateless Persons: Some Gaps in International Protection', in International Journal 
of Refugee Law, Vol. 7, 1995, page 252 
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nationality are, for all practical purposes, stateless, and should be labelled and 
treated as such”.73 A second, related concern is that, if a case of “unprotection” is 
considered to be resolved the moment that a bond of nationality is (re)established de 
jure, there is a severe risk of producing a shift from a de jure to a de facto lack of 
protection without achieving any real improvement in the status or treatment of the 
person concerned.74 Finally, it was pointed out that differentiating between a de jure 
and de facto lack of protection may be unworkable in practice:   
 
There are many cases where a person’s nationality status cannot be established, 
where it is doubtful, undetermined or unknown […] The borderline between what is 
commonly called de jure statelessness and de facto statelessness is sometimes 
difficult to draw.75 
 
With this in mind, some organisations that are engaged on the issue of statelessness 
have elected to adopt a pragmatic, flexible approach to the question of definition. 
For their protection and advocacy work, rather than attempting to distinguish 
exactly between de jure and de facto cases, these organisations focus more broadly 
on the treatment of – or problems faced by – the persons involved, using this as a 
means of identifying situations of concern.76   
On the basis of these credible and ostensibly persuasive arguments, the term 
“de facto statelessness” has entered “common use and has acquired a meaning”.77 
However, this has not been reflected in the international legal framework and the 
term has no legal significance.78 How can these two facts be reconciled? I would 
                                                     
73 David Weissbrodt; Clay Collins, 'The Human Rights of Stateless Persons', in Human Rights 
Quarterly, Vol. 28, 2006, page 251. 
74 Manley Hudson, Report on Nationality, including Statelessness, A/CN.4/50, 21 February 1952, page 
49. 
75 Statement by Paul Weis to the United Nations Conference on the Elimination or Reduction of Future 
Statelessness, 25 August 1961, as cited in Carol Batchelor, 'Stateless Persons: Some Gaps in 
International Protection', in International Journal of Refugee Law, Vol. 7, 1995, page 252. 
76 See in particular Maureen Lynch, Lives on hold: The human cost of statelessness, Washington: 2005. 
For instance, this report mentions Afghans among the stateless persons identified in Indonesia although 
the actual description of the situation of these Afghans does not explain why this group is stateless or 
address the subject of nationality at all. It simply refers, without any further explanation, to the Afghan 
asylum seekers who attempted to reach Australia but were deported to Indonesia. The same report 
determines that “40,000 to 50,000 Roma in Bosnia and Herzegovina are exposed to abuses of civil, 
political, economic and social rights” before admitting that “an unknown number of them are stateless” 
and carrying on to describe the treatment experienced by “individuals who lack personal documents” or 
simply “many Roma”. See also the discussion of several situations of “statelessness” in UNHCR, 
"Statelessness and Citizenship" in The State of the World's Refugees - A Humanitarian Agenda, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford: 1997. 
77 Statement by Paul Weis to the United Nations Conference on the Elimination or Reduction of Future 
Statelessness, 25 August 1961, as cited in Carol Batchelor, 'Stateless Persons: Some Gaps in 
International Protection', in International Journal of Refugee Law, Vol. 7, 1995, page 252. 
78 In spite of the arguments raised in favour of the inclusion of de facto cases in the concept of 
“statelessness”, there are just two places in which this inclusive approach to statelessness receives any 
corroboration in the field of international law. The first is in the recommendation included in the final 
act of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness: “The Conference recommends that 
persons who are stateless de facto should as far as possible be treated as stateless de jure to enable them 
to acquire an effective nationality”. But even here, de facto statelessness is only the subject of another 
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argue: perhaps more readily than may be expected. I base this conclusion on two 
key points. The first is that, while it may have been astute at the time that the 1954 
and 1961 Statelessness Conventions were adopted to fear for a protection gap for 
those who could benefit from neither the guarantees offered to the de jure 
unprotected nor to refugees, advances in the field of human rights law have since 
appeased this concern. The second point relates to the fine line that exists between 
the question of definition, or substance, and the problem of identification, or 
procedure. Thus, concerns expressed about the difficulty of detecting cases of de 
jure “unprotection” and distinguishing these from the de facto unprotected do not 
necessarily warrant a new or more inclusive approach to defining statelessness, but 
rather a clear agreement on rules of procedure and evidence.  
To illustrate these arguments, let us consider the three scenarios that are now 
widely considered to be encapsulated within the expression “de facto statelessness”:  
 
- where a person is deprived of the enjoyment of those rights that are generally 
attached to nationality;  
 
- where a person’s nationality is contested or disputed by one or more states; 
and  
 
- where a person is unable to establish or prove his or her nationality.79  
 
The first situation describes the problem of an ineffective nationality, whereby a 
certain sub-section of nationals “do not enjoy the rights of citizenship enjoyed by 
other non-criminal citizens of the same state”.80 Such treatment contravenes 
international human rights standards that delineate the rights to be enjoyed by 
everyone as well as the rights to be enjoyed by citizens on an equal basis.81 There is 
                                                                                                                                  
non-binding recommendation so the definition of statelessness offered under international law remains 
in tact. See further chapter III, section 3. The second place in which the phenomenon of de facto 
statelessness is clearly alluded to is in a 2005 ruling by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. The 
court stated that the condition of statelessness “arises from the lack of a nationality, when an individual 
does not qualify to receive this under a State’s laws, owing to arbitrary deprivation or the granting of a 
nationality that, in actual fact, is not effective”. Emphasis added. Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights, Case of Yean and Bosico v. Dominican Republic, 8 September 2005, paragraph 142. 
79 See Carol Batchelor, 'Stateless Persons: Some Gaps in International Protection', in International 
Journal of Refugee Law, Vol. 7, 1995; UNHCR, "Statelessness and Citizenship" in The State of the 
World's Refugees - A Humanitarian Agenda, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 1997; Carol Batchelor, 
'Statelessness and the Problem of Resolving Nationality Status', in International Journal of Refugee 
Law, Vol. 10, 1998; Maureen Lynch, Lives on hold: The human cost of statelessness, Washington: 
2005; David Weissbrodt; Clay Collins, 'The Human Rights of Stateless Persons', in Human Rights 
Quarterly, Vol. 28, 2006; UNHCR Executive Committee, Conclusion on Identification, Prevention and 
Reduction of Statelessness and Protection of Stateless Persons, No. 106, 57th Session, Geneva, 2006. 
80 David Weissbrodt; Clay Collins, 'The Human Rights of Stateless Persons', in Human Rights 
Quarterly, Vol. 28, 2006, page 263. 
81 It is possible that where an individual’s nationality has become entirely ineffective through the 
cumulative violation of numerous rights that are generally accorded to citizens, the violation of the right 
to a nationality could be added to the list of complaints because the legal status is thereby deprived of 
all substance. Even then though, this keeps the problem of so-called “de facto statelessness” within the 
realms of general human rights law. 
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no need for a special regime, based on the notion of de facto statelessness or 
otherwise, to address the plight of these individuals because their situation simply 
falls within the ambit of general human rights law and is subject to the regular 
system of implementation and supervision.82 By contrast, the de jure absence of a 
nationality has the effect of throwing an individual into a legal vacuum because 
international (human rights) law accords certain functions to citizenship: as we will 
see in more detail later,83 the lack of access to rights and benefits is in some 
instances a direct consequence of the fact that the human rights system admits 
certain privileges in the treatment of citizens. The absence of the legal bond of 
nationality with any state results in exclusion from these rights. This group is 
therefore reliant on additional legal measures - a specialised regime – to redress 
their plight.84  
The other two scenarios of “de facto statelessness”– where citizenship is 
disputed or cannot be established – call for a (re)think about how cases of 
statelessness are to be identified, but do not require the definition itself to be 
revisited. The task of identification raises such questions as what type of procedure 
should be followed and what evidence is required to establish the nationality or, by 
default, the absence of a nationality of an individual? Weis addresses this question 
in detail, reflecting upon the practice of states and international tribunals.85 He 
suggests that 
 
since nationality is determined by the law of the country whose nationality is 
claimed, evidence – usually of a documentary nature – that the person was 
considered as a national by an authority qualified under municipal law to determine 
or to certify nationality will, as a rule, be the best evidence.86 
 
                                                     
82 It is true that in the resolution of cases of statelessness (de jure), the aim should be for the individual 
to acquire not just a nationality de jure, but one that is effective. To minimise the risk of acquisition of 
an ineffective nationality it can be important to promote the conferral of nationality by a state with 
which the individual has a real connection. However, if upon the (re)establishment of the formal bond 
of nationality with a state, the individual is nevertheless (still) denied the rights that are generally 
accorded to citizens, it falls to the broader system of human rights law to ensure that this situation is 
remedied. The enduring problem of an ineffective nationality is simply evidence of a continuing need to 
address the non-compliance of states with their human rights obligations. 
83 In Part 3. 
84 Just which rights need to be included in such a specialised regime – and the extent to which this need 
is met – is one of the matters that will be investigated in depth in Part 3 of this study. Meanwhile, the 
ongoing necessity of a specialised regime to deal with refugees can be seen in the context of the 
severity of their situation. If the system of human rights protection breaks down so dramatically as to 
allow the persecution and corresponding forced displacement of individuals, additional protections 
must be in place to ensure at least the non-penalisation of such persons in the event of unlawful entry 
into another country to seek refuge and the non-return of these persons to the state in which they fear 
for their lives or safety (non-refoulement). The 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees 
deals with both of these matters as well as a elaborating a minimum standards of treatment for refugees 
in their host state. 
85 Paul Weis, Nationality and Statelessness in International Law, Kluwer Academic Publishers Group, 
Dordrecht: 1979, chapter 13 on “Proof of Nationality”, pages 204-236. 
86 Paul Weis, Nationality and Statelessness in International Law, Kluwer Academic Publishers Group, 
Dordrecht: 1979, page 215. 
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However, such evidence may not always be readily available and proof of 
statelessness – the absence of a bond of nationality – is an even trickier question 
than proof of nationality.87 Thus, if a state disputes the citizenship of an individual 
or the person is unable to produce or acquire confirmation of his status as a national 
from the authorities of any country with which he has some factual connection, it 
may be possible to put this forward as evidence of the fact that the person is “not 
considered a national by any state under the operation of its law” and therefore 
stateless for the purpose of international law. Similarly, the contested or ambiguous 
citizenship status of the parents may contribute to the determination that a child 
“would otherwise be stateless” for the purpose of applying the fall-back provisions 
of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. Moreover, the problem 
of an ineffective nationality, as described above, may also contribute to the 
identification of cases of de jure “unprotection”: the denial of rights that are 
generally accorded to citizens can be taken into account as evidence of the fact that 
a state does not consider a person to be its national “under the operation of its law”. 
According to Weis, among the secondary evidence of nationality admitted by 
international tribunals are “certain facts from which nationality may be inferred, 
such as voting in elections, holding public office, etc”.88 It is conceivable that, in 
the reverse situation, the clear denial of such privileges without further justification 
could be taken as evidence of the lack of the bond of nationality – although it is 
important to be aware of the constraints inherent in the use of such evidence, such 
as the inapplicability of these particular elements of proof in cases involving 
children.  
The central question is nevertheless how the definition of statelessness is to be 
applied and what factors can practicably be taken into account in proving the 
absence of a nationality. Rules on evidence are needed to establish to what extent 
the refusal to confirm an individual as a citizen (or non-citizen) or the denial of 
rights generally accorded to citizens carry weight in identifying statelessness. 
Through the application of such rules it becomes possible to determine which cases 
of “de facto statelessness” in fact fall within the scope of the internationally-
recognised definition of statelessness. It will also be possible to establish, on the 
other hand, which persons retain the bond of nationality with a state and are owed 
treatment as a citizen accordingly. 
In sum, once the full picture has been uncovered, defining statelessness is a 
less contentious question than an initial perusal of the literature may suggest. 
“Statelessness” as a concept of international law refers only to the situation in 
which a person lacks the legal bond of nationality – cases commonly referred to as 
de jure statelessness. In today’s human rights environment, this approach - 
criticised on occasion for being too narrow and for failing to adequately reflect the 
                                                     
87 Thus, “documentary evidence from a responsible State authority certifying that the person concerned 
is not a national is normally a reliable form of evidence for the purposes of establishing statelessness. 
However, such documentary evidence will not always be available, in part precisely because States will 
not readily feel accountable for indicating which persons do not have a legal bond of nationality”. 
Carol Batchelor The 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons: Implementation 
within the European Union Member States and Recommendations for Harmonisation 2004, pages 14-
15. 
88 Paul Weis, Nationality and Statelessness in International Law, Kluwer Academic Publishers Group, 
Dordrecht: 1979, page 216. 
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situation on the ground89 - can actually be deemed to pass muster. It addresses those 
instances in which the international legal framework itself creates a need for special 
measures. And, while concern continues for the problem of so-called “de facto 
statelessness”, closer inspection showed that the scenarios presented under this 
notion do not demand specialist treatment. The “de facto stateless” are either the 
victims of (multiple) human rights violations and should be able to assert their 
rights under that regime or may actually qualify for protection as stateless persons 
(de jure) if the rules of evidence were clarified and implemented effectively. 
Indeed, the continued use of the term “de facto statelessness” (and alongside it the 
expression “de jure statelessness” as though it indicated a subset of stateless 
persons) may be counterproductive since it has no legal significance. Moreover, 
ongoing disagreement on the scope of the term “statelessness” can have a highly 
disruptive impact on the implementation of the relevant international standards. The 
continuing divergent practices in the use of this label is obscuring efforts to actually 
identify cases of statelessness that warrant the applicable legal protection. It would 
be far more fruitful to concentrate efforts on the implementation of the existing 
definition of statelessness – on the identification of statelessness – as well as on 
measures to ensure that states honour their human rights commitments to their 
nationals so as to preclude the problem of an ineffective nationality.90  
As far as the approach to defining and identifying statelessness in this 
manuscript goes: in looking at how international law deals with “statelessness”, the 
focus is on an assessment of the guarantees offered against – and the protection 
offered in the event of – the formal absence of any legal bond of nationality. As I 
have explained, there is in fact no good reason not to stick to the existing official 
definition of statelessness. However, one of the questions that will necessarily be 
posed in the context of this study is how the identification of statelessness has been 
dealt with in the context of both prevention and protection. In view of the foregoing 
discussion, this is an area in which the international standards may well be found 
wanting. 
 
5 CONCLUSION: WHY STATELESSNESS? 
 
There are, in fact, many possible answers to the question “why statelessness?” one 
of which is that it is an issue that I have personally been drawn to and find 
fascinating. Another argument is that a quick perusal of (legal) publications 
uncovers scant and scattered attention for the subject to date, suggesting that an in 
depth study may well be overdue. Yet, what this chapter really has shown is that 
statelessness is (still) an international problem of significant magnitude and severe 
consequence: two facts that immediately imply that the international response to the 
issue is failing in some way. Moreover, a brief look at that international response  
confirmed that the approach to the statelessness phenomenon to date may indeed be 
questionable. A particular concern is that the tailor-made standards have enjoyed 
too little attention and support for too long so there has been no opportunity to try, 
                                                     
89 As evidenced by the adoption of a wider definition by many scholars and organisations engaged on 
the issue of statelessness. Recall notes 73 and 77 above. 
90 This latter problem is beyond the scope of this study since it does not address issues of statelessness 
but deals more generally with the question of compliance of states with human rights law. 
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test and further develop them. Interestingly though, when we actually took a close 
look at the first concrete dilemma in tackling statelessness – the problem of 
definition – we came to a somewhat unexpected conclusion. Despite criticism being 
directed towards the definition of statelessness adopted under international law, we 
found that the real threat comes not from this legal framework but from the 
ongoing, unproductive debate on the issue of definition which may in fact be further 
hampering the implementation of existing legal standards by obstructing discussion 
on the identification of statelessness. It is therefore far too premature to conclude 
that the international framework for tackling statelessness is entirely inappropriate. 
Further study is plainly needed to pin-point where exactly the gaps are that are 
letting the system down.  
What is certainly clear, to borrow a phrase from one of the few articles that has 
been devoted to the subject is that 
 
hitherto, international co-operation in improving the status of stateless persons, or in 
reducing or eliminating statelessness, has enjoyed limited success, often disappearing 
down relatively unproductive paths. The time has come for a revision of such 
arrangements, deconstruction of earlier analytical approaches and their substitution 
with practical arrangements which reflect the principles generally shared by the 
community of nations.91  
 
With the re-emerging international interest in the question of statelessness, now is a 
suitable moment to conduct an in depth study into the plight of the stateless. More 
importantly, at a time when numerous different bodies and institutions are calling 
for states to accede to the Statelessness Conventions in order to take on the problem 
of statelessness, an assessment of the appropriateness of this legal regime is called 
for: is it (still) relevant and does it (still) suffice? Through the following analysis of 
the international legal framework, first for the prevention of statelessness (part 2) 
and then for the protection of stateless persons (part 3), I hope to contribute to 
current discussion on this subject and offer some recommendations to guide the 






                                                     
91 Guy Goodwin Gill, "The rights of refugees and stateless persons" in Saksena (ed) Human rights 
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In order to kick off the consideration of the problem of prevention of statelessness it 
is important to look at how individuals can acquire and lose the esteemed legal 
status of nationality - nationality matters. To know how nationality is attributed is 
key to tracing the origins of the statelessness phenomenon and divining ways to nip 
it in the bud. Armed with an understanding of the causes of statelessness, it 
becomes possible to assess the effectiveness of the international community’s 
reaction to the issue. Chapters three to eight, which together make up Part 2 of this 
work, aspire to do just that by first outlining the circumstances under which 
statelessness may be created and then considering whether international law 
prescribes an adequate remedy to ensure the prevention of statelessness in each 
case: both through the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness and 
under broader human rights commitments. This introductory chapter therefore 
provides not only a background to the 1961 Convention, but also some general 
observations on the attribution of nationality and the role of international law in that 
context.1  
 
1 THE ATTRIBUTION OF NATIONALITY: DOCTRINES AND COMPETENCES 
 
A fundamental, centuries-old issue underlies the whole question of the attribution of 
nationality: inclusion vs. exclusion. Who can be considered a member of one’s own 
community? Who belongs? And who is an outsider? This problem of defining who 
is “us” and who is “them” has been challenging societies throughout the ages, from 
determining who were citizens of the polis in Ancient Greece to deciding who are 
nationals of the modern nation-state.2 As we will see in detail later, membership of 
such a political entity is not unimportant – it brings with it all manner of rights and 
duties.3 The question here is, with a running total of over 190 nation-states 
worldwide, how do we decide who belongs where? How do we determine who is 
Estonian or Ethiopian, Japanese or Jamaican – what criteria are or should be used? 
                                                           
1 The full text of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness can be found in Annex 1. 
2 Mija Zagar, "Citizenship - Nationality: A Proper Balance Between the Interests of States and those of 
Individuals" in Council of Europe's First European Conference on Nationality, Strasbourg: 1999, pages 
94-95.  
3 Part 3 of this book uncovers the full significance of drawing this line of membership and the meaning 





Furthermore, who is authorised to take that decision and grant or deprive an 
individual of a particular nationality?  
 The formal acceptance of an individual as a member of a state through the 
bestowal of the legal bond of nationality is not a random act - it is the recognition of 
an existing factual link with that state. The International Court of Justice described 
it thus: 
 
Nationality is a legal bond having as its basis a social fact of attachment, a 
genuine connection of existence, interests and sentiments. 4 
 
There are many different factors that may serve as evidence of this “social fact of 
attachment” - the so-called genuine link - for the purposes of nationality attribution. 
Among them: place of birth, descent, residence, family ties, language and ethnicity. 
States employ one or more of these components of nationality in delineating the 
original make-up of their body of nationals and thereafter in the course of 
determining who is worthy of this legal status.5 Although endless permutations and 
combinations are imaginable, in general states adhere to doctrines based closely on 
one or more of the following principles: jus soli, jus sanguinis and jus domicilli. 
Any additional, secondary factors that are taken into consideration serve merely to 
offer variations on the same theme.  
 The birth of a child is one of the pivotal events that nationality policy must 
deal with since it entails the arrival of a new human life which must be given its 
place in the global political system. If left “unclaimed” by any state as its national, 
the child will be stateless. The factors that are considered to constitute the required 
genuine link between a state and a newborn baby are place of birth and parentage. 
Thus the first two principles mentioned above – jus soli and jus sanguinis – govern 
the question of attribution of nationality at birth. Following the jus soli principle or 
“law of the soil”, nationality is acquired at birth by virtue of being born on the 
territory of the state. Historically, its roots can be traced to the feudal era, when in 
Great Britain for example, all “natural-born British subjects […] owed loyalty to the 
King and were entitled to his protection”.6 Thereafter, it was widely adopted by the 
immigration states of the New World because recent arrivals were viewed as 
potential citizens and the jus soli doctrine was a way of solidifying their bond with 
the state of destination: the second generation of immigrants automatically become 
nationals of the state in which their parents choose to settle. The rationale for this 
mode of nationality attribution is that  
 
                                                           
4 International Court of Justice, "Nottebohm Case" (Liechtenstein v. Guatamala), 1953, page 23. 
5 It should be noted that “to a larger extent than is the case with the territory of a State, the body of 
nationals – since it is in a perpetual state of flux owing to births, deaths, migration and similar factors – 
is in constant need of determination”. This necessitates a continuous and ongoing string of decisions 
about who is a citizen and who is not. Haro van Panhuys, "Chapter VII: Restrictions Imposed by 
International Law upon the Competence of Ctates to Lay Down Nationality Rules" in The Role of 
Nationality in International Law, A.W. Sijthoff's Uitgeversmaatschappij, Leiden: 1959, page 150. 
6 Verena Stolcke, "The 'Nature' of nationality" in Bader (ed) Citizenship and exclusion, Macmillan 
Press, London: 1997, page 70; Rainer Bauböck, Transnational Citizenship. Membership and Rights in 
International Migration, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham: 2002, page 35. 
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it is with the territory on which he is born that any individual is the most 
closely connected and that, since he grows up and lives in that territory, he 
assimilates the customs and habits of thought of its inhabitants and gradually 
merges into their community.7  
 
To this day, the jus soli principle is particularly prevalent in states which have 
traditionally been countries of immigration, although it has also spread to other 
areas of the world. 
 The competing jus sanguinis principle, otherwise known as the “law of the 
blood”, recognises descent or parentage as the indication of a genuine link. 
Accordingly, nationality is granted by a particular state to a child at birth if one or 
both of his parents are nationals of that state themselves – it is handed down from 
one generation to the next through the bloodline. The origin of the principle can be 
traced back to ancient Greece8 and the first European nationality codes contained 
jus sanguinis provisions.9 Initially, the determination of nationality in this way was 
justified on the grounds of a shared race or culture. Later, this argument was 
replaced with notion that jus sanguinis recognises the role of the family in the 
upbringing of the child and the importance of family unity.10 To this day, jus 
sanguinis is the preferred doctrine of the so-called emigration states – mainly 
European, Asian and Arab nations – as a way of retaining the allegiance of 
populations that have moved abroad.11 
 These two doctrines can be traced in one shape or another – nowadays usually 
in a mixed form – in the policy of all states on attribution of nationality at birth.12 
However, it is also possible to acquire a (different) nationality later in life, in 
recognition of a more recently established genuine link with a state. The most 
important principle in this respect is that of jus domicilli, or the “law of residence”. 
This principle is the most common ground for naturalisation where the nationality 
of the state is granted upon application to the competent authorities. Jus domicilli 
recognises the bond that an individual develops with a state after a significant 
period of habitual or permanent residence, often determined to be in the region of 
five to ten years.13 The reasoning behind jus domicilli is similar to that of jus soli 
and has been expressed as follows:  
                                                           
7 International Union for Child Welfare, Stateless Children - A Comparative Study of National 
Legislation and Suggested Solutions to the Problem of Statelessness of Children, Geneva: 1947, page 
19. 
8 Rainer Bauböck, Transnational Citizenship. Membership and Rights in International Migration, 
Edward Elgar, Cheltenham: 2002, page 39. 
9 An example is the 1804 Napoleonic Code; Verena Stolcke, "The 'Nature' of nationality" in Bader (ed) 
Citizenship and exclusion, Macmillan Press, London: 1997, pages 66-67. 
10  International Union for Child Welfare, Stateless Children - A Comparative Study of National 
Legislation and Suggested Solutions to the Problem of Statelessness of Children, Geneva: 1947, page 9. 
11 Stephen Castles; Alastair Davidson, Citizenship and Migration. Globalisation and the Politics of 
Belonging, Macmillan Press, London: 2000, page 85. 
12 The two doctrines are both fully developed and are considered to be equally legitimate. Carol 
Batchelor, 'Statelessness and the Problem of Resolving Nationality Status', in International Journal of 
Refugee Law, Vol. 10, 1998, 1998, page 169. 
13 The exact conditions that must be met to qualify for naturalisation, such as the period of habitual 
residence required and additional criteria (e.g. knowledge of the national language), are set by domestic 






It is the persons living in the State who take part in shaping its experiences, 
developing its economy, and fashioning its social life, and, accordingly, they 
are the ones who are primarily entitled to become full members of it.14  
 
An individual can also forge a bond with a state later in life through adoption by or 
marriage to a national.15 This is usually recognised as a ground for (at least 
facilitated) naturalisation, for access to nationality by option, registration or 
declaration, or even for automatic acquisition of nationality by operation of the law.  
 Having introduced the principles underlying the conferral of nationality, it is 
important to mention the possibility of loss, deprivation or renunciation of an 
existing nationality. In short the legal bond of nationality, once acquired, can be 
forfeited – there is no lifetime guarantee. An individual may voluntarily renounce 
his nationality, an act which is often linked to the acquisition of a new nationality 
by naturalisation. As to loss or deprivation of nationality, it is not always clear 
where the line is drawn between these two phenomena, but the essence is that it 
concerns the withdrawal of nationality in circumstances other than at the request of 
the individual himself.16 Another term for this practice is “denationalisation” or – 
where the nationality had been acquired through naturalisation – “denaturalisation”. 
A number of the reasons for the loss or deprivation of nationality are: a prolonged 
period of residence in a foreign state (seen as allowing the connection with the state 
of nationality to decay, eventually forfeiting the legal bond); deliberate (mass) 
denationalisation by decree (usually linked to discriminatory policies targeted 
towards a particular population group); denaturalisation where nationality was 
acquired through fraudulent means; or deprivation of nationality as a punitive 
measure or in reaction to acts committed by the individual that are considered 
disloyal to the interests of the state (for example serving in the armed forces of a 
foreign state). This by way of introduction - the legitimacy of such measures, 
particularly when resulting in statelessness - will be considered later. 
 Armed with a basic notion of the conditions under which nationality is 
conferred and withdrawn, we can move on to the question of competence: who is 
authorised to grant or deprive an individual of a particular nationality? Borrowing 
again from the words of Manley Hudson, the answer is: 
 
                                                                                                                                               
"Link" in Nationality Law" in The Regulation of Nationality in International Law, Transnational 
Publishers, New York: 1994, pages 33-34. 
14 Yaffa Zilberschats, "Chapter 3 - The Horizontal Aspect of Citizenship" in The Human Right to 
Citizenship, Transnational Publishers, Ardsley, NY: 2002, page 94. 
15 The rationale here is similar to that underlying the jus sanguinis principle. Rainer Bauböck, 
Transnational Citizenship. Membership and Rights in International Migration, Edward Elgar, 
Cheltenham: 2002, page 43. 
16 One possible means of differentiation is to interpret “loss of nationality” as the automatic withdrawal 
of nationality, ex lege, while “deprivation of nationality” is at the initiative of the state party (although 
the conditions for this should also be set down in the law). This is suggested by the phrasing used in 
article 7 of the European Convention on Nationality, 1997, a provision which is said to deal with both 
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In principle, questions of nationality fall within the domestic jurisdiction of 
each state.17 
 
One of the manifestations of the sovereignty of nation-states is this right to 
“determine the rules governing the attribution of their own nationality in accordance 
with their interests”.18 Indeed the authority to confer or withdraw nationality is an 
essential element of a state’s sovereignty for it is this act which delineates the scope 
of personal supremacy of that state.19 With the arrival of democracy, “the people” 
became sovereign (i.e. they were no longer subjected to the rule of a supreme 
monarch) and the significance of being a member of a particular nation-state 
grew.20 So too did the vested interest of the state to regulate its own membership as 
nationals gained the right to exert influence over state affairs and politics. At this 
stage in history – the late 19th and early 20th century – the freedom of states to 
determine who are and who are not their nationals was considered virtually 
unfettered.21 As we will see, there have since been significant developments in the 
field of international (human rights) law which have impacted on this freedom. 
However, the authority to settle questions of membership remains at the heart of 
state sovereignty making it a jealously guarded competence to this day.22 In fact, 
one principle of international law has even strengthened states’ claims to the power 
to regulate matters of nationality: “the principle of self-determination, which holds 
that citizens of a state have the right to determine their destiny, including the right 
to decide the terms and conditions of membership of their community”.23 Moreover, 
because nationality is entwined with such issues as sovereignty, the ascription of 
rights and duties (among which the tools for political empowerment) and the very 
identity of the state, it remains a controversial topic and one that must be 
approached with a certain delicacy.24 It is important to be conscious of such 
                                                           
17 Manley Hudson, Report on Nationality, including Statelessness, A/CN.4/50, 21 February 1952, page 
12. States regulate nationality attribution through the codification and implementation of nationality 
legislation. 
18 Ruth Donner, "Chapter 3: The Imposition and Withdrawal of Nationality" in The Regulation of 
Nationality in International Law, Transnational Publishers, New York: 1994, page 121.  
19 Just as the construction of borders between territories determines the range of the state’s territorial 
supremacy. Paul Weis, Nationality and Statelessness in International Law, Kluwer Academic 
Publishers Group, Dordrecht: 1979, page 65. 
20 Mija Zagar, "Citizenship - Nationality: A Proper Balance Between the Interests of States and those of 
Individuals" in Council of Europe's First European Conference on Nationality, Strasbourg: 1999, page 
99. 
21 Johannes Chan, 'The Right to a Nationality as a Human Right - The Current Trend Towards 
Recognition', in Human Rights Law Journal, Vol. 12, 1991, page 1; Yaffa Zilberschats, "Chapter 2 - 
Citizenship and International Law" in The Human Right to Citizenship, Transnational Publishers, 
Ardsley, NY: 2002, page 8. 
22 Johannes Chan, 'The Right to a Nationality as a Human Right - The Current Trend Towards 
Recognition', in Human Rights Law Journal, Vol. 12, 1991, page 1. 
23 James Goldston, 'Holes in the Rights Framework: Racial Discrimination, Citizenship, and the Rights 
of Noncitizens', in Ethics and International Affairs, Vol. 20, 2006, page 338. 
24 Verena Stolcke, "The 'Nature' of nationality" in Bader (ed) Citizenship and exclusion, Macmillan 
Press, London: 1997, page 61; UNHCR and IPU, Nationality and statelessness. A handbook for 





sensitivities when assessing the part that international law does or should play in 
nationality matters. 
What implications do the foregoing observations have for the problem of 
statelessness? The answer is simple. The existence of different doctrines for the 
attribution of nationality – along with a multitude of variations through the 
introduction of secondary components – combined with the basic autonomy of 
states to regulate the conferral and withdrawal of their nationality opens the door to 
both the deliberate and inadvertent creation of statelessness.25 The inherent mobility 
of people puts the compatibility of these divergent yet coexisting doctrines under 
added pressure. Since people may cross borders, marry nationals of other states or 
bare children in a state in which they are not themselves a citizen, if states do not 
communicate or cooperate on nationality matters then conflicts between their 
individual policies may leave some individuals entirely overlooked and without the 
nationality of any state. In addition, unless limits are placed on the freedom of states 
to determine who is worthy of citizenship, certain persons may be singled out and 
rendered stateless. Clearly then, there is a role for international law in preventing 
and resolving cases of statelessness - and so to the question of how international 
law treats the problem of nationality attribution.   
 
2 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ATTRIBUTION OF NATIONALITY 
 
International law, as created in the main by states themselves, respects the 
principles of sovereignty and equality of states. Generally speaking, without the all-
important “consent to be bound”, a state cannot be compelled to accept new 
obligations under international law.26 Nor is interference in the domestic 
jurisdiction of another state acceptable.27 It therefore comes as no surprise that the 
initial approach to nationality under international law was not to meddle with the 
competence of states to regulate the attribution of this legal bond of membership. 
As mentioned, this was a carefully guarded sovereign privilege. However, the 
possibility was never ruled out that nationality matters could be the subject of 
international law, if states so decided. This was the gist of the most commonly cited 
case concerning the influence of international law on nationality: the Tunis and 
Morocco Nationality Decrees case, decided by the Permanent Court of International 
Justice in 1923. The court was asked to determine whether the disputed French 
Nationality Decrees were purely a matter of domestic jurisdiction and, as such, 
beyond the advisory competences of the League of Nations. 28 It decided as follows: 
                                                           
25 The same factors also contribute to the existence of dual or even multiple nationality.  
26 With the important exception of the peremptory norms of international law (jus cogens), from whose 
binding character no state can escape as well as, in certain cases, customary law and general principles 
of international law. 
27 Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 2003, pages 
18-19 and 288-289. 
28 Great Britain claimed that the French Decrees were unlawful as they imposed French citizenship on 
the children of British subjects, born in the French Protectorate areas of Tunis and Morocco. The Court 
had to advise as to the competence of the League of Nations since Article 15 (8) of the Covenant of the 
League of Nations decrees that the League is not competent to advise on matters that fall solely within 
the domestic jurisdiction of states. See further Paul Weis, Nationality and Statelessness in International 
Law, Kluwer Academic Publishers Group, Dordrecht: 1979, chapter 5.  
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The question of whether a certain matter is or is not solely within the 
jurisdiction of a State is an essentially relative question; it depends upon the 
development of international relations. Thus, in the present state of 
international law, questions of nationality are, in the opinion of this court, in 
principle within this reserved domain.29 
 
This case confirmed that, at the time, the attribution of nationality was a matter for 
each individual state to settle, but admitted that if international law were to develop 
along those lines, then nationality matters would no longer fall under this domaine 
réservé.30 The question of just how free states are to determine who are their 
nationals, untouched by international obligations, can therefore only be answered 
by analysing the developments in international law in that field and the current state 
of play.31 Then it becomes clear that, in the eighty-odd years since the Permanent 
Court of Justice considered the problem, much has changed.   
 To begin with, in 1930, under the auspices of the League of Nations, the 
Hague Convention on Certain Questions relating to the Conflict of Nationality 
Laws was drafted.32 This was the first serious attempt by states to agree on a 
number of basic rules relating to nationality matters.33 While reaffirming the 
sovereignty of states to regulate nationality attribution, the Convention does not rest 
there, as its purpose was to resolve some of the conflicts of laws that spore precisely 
from the freedom of states to determine who their nationals are - to address 
statelessness and dual nationality. This explains the Convention’s approach as, set 
out in its first provision: 
 
It is for each State to determine under its own law who are its nationals. 
This law shall be recognised by other States in so far as it is consistent with 
international conventions, international custom, and the principles of law 
generally recognised with regard to nationality.34 
 
This article focuses on the international effects of an individual’s nationality. Rather 
than determining that nationality may not be attributed in contravention of 
                                                           
29 Permanent Court of International Justice, Tunis and Morocco Nationality Decrees case, 1923, p.24. 
30 Paul Weis, Nationality and Statelessness in International Law, Kluwer Academic Publishers Group, 
Dordrecht: 1979, page 66 
31 Johannes Chan, 'The Right to a Nationality as a Human Right - The Current Trend Towards 
Recognition', in Human Rights Law Journal, Vol. 12, 1991, page 2; UNHCR, Information and 
accession package: the 1954 Convention relating to the status of stateless persons and the 1961 
Convention on the reduction of statelessness, Geneva: January 1999 page 5. 
32 Hereafter the 1930 Hague Convention. 
33 Still earlier, in 1885, the Institute for International Law formulated a number of principles concerning 
the attribution of nationality such as “No one shall be without a nationality”, “No one shall have two 
nationalities simultaneously” and “Everyone shall have the right to change nationality”. Ruth Donner, 
"Chapter 2: The Principle of the "Link" in Nationality Law" in The Regulation of Nationality in 
International Law, Transnational Publishers, New York: 1994, page 44. 
34 Here it of course echoes Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice which also 
defines these to be the primary sources of international law. 1930 Convention on Certain Questions 





international law, it provides that any case of attribution of nationality that is 
inconsistent with international law will not be recognised on the international 
playing field. Just in case there is any residual doubt as to the freedom of states to 
determine who are their nationals, for good measure Article 2 states:  
 
Any question as to whether a person possesses the nationality of a particular 
state shall be determined in accordance with the law of that state.35 
 
In drafting this document, governments deliberately chose to enunciate once more 
the principle that it is municipal law of individual states that actually confers 
nationality on individuals.  
Yet the 1930 Hague Convention also recognises what has been put so 
eloquently by Weis, that “while questions of nationality are normally determined by 
municipal law, this legislative competence does not amount to omnipotence”.36 
Indeed state parties to the Convention commit to a number of principles that should 
be enshrined in domestic nationality acts. For example, that “a child whose parents 
are both unknown shall have the nationality of the country of birth”.37 International 
law thereby left its first real mark on the rules for the attribution of nationality and 
the adoption of the 1930 Hague Convention heralded the onset of a gradual trend 
towards the acceptance of limitations to the exclusive competence of states in this 
matter. At the time, the fabled evils were both statelessness and dual nationality. 
States were slowly coming to realise that such problems can only be combated 
effectively through cooperation and as such, “common standards should be sought 
at international level”.38  
In the decades that followed, as international law developed at a rapid pace 
in many fields, this idea of cooperating to resolve nationality conflicts resurfaced a 
number of times.39 It found expression in the 1957 Convention on the Nationality of 
Married Women, the 1963 Convention on the reduction of cases of multiple 
nationality and on military obligations in cases of multiple nationality and, of 
course, the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. Provisions relating 
to nationality can also be found in a multitude of human rights instruments – both 
regional and universal - following the spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and its Article 15: “Everyone has the right to a nationality”.40 Most recently, 
                                                           
35 1930 Convention on Certain Questions relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws, Article 2. 
36 Paul Weis, Nationality and Statelessness in International Law, Kluwer Academic Publishers Group, 
Dordrecht: 1979, page 241. 
37 Article 14, 1930 Convention on Certain Questions relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws. 
38 Carol Batchelor, 'Stateless Persons: Some Gaps in International Protection', in International Journal 
of Refugee Law, Vol. 7, 1995, page 249. 
39 UNHCR, Information and accession package: the 1954 Convention relating to the status of stateless 
persons and the 1961 Convention on the reduction of statelessness, Geneva: January 1999, page 1. 
40 These include article 24 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; article 7 of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child; article 29 of the International Convention on the Protection of 
the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families; article 9 of the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women; article 5 of the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; article 18 of the Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities (not yet entered into force); article 6 of the African Charter on the Rights and 
Welfare of the Child; article 20 of the American Convention on Human Rights; article 4 of the 
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the adoption of two conventions that deal explicitly with nationality attribution 
within the Council of Europe is evidence of the progress that is now being made in 
this field.41 
 The “present state of international law”, upon which the freedom of states to 
determine the attribution of nationality rests, is very different now from what it was 
at the time that the Tunis and Morocco Nationality Decrees case was brought before 
the Permanent Court of International Justice. In 1959, Van Panhuys already 
contended that “conceptions about nationality may have changed”.42 In the time that 
has since elapsed, there is absolutely no doubt that this is the case and it is now 
agreed that nationality matters no longer fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of 
states.43 It is currently held that international law “favour[s] human rights over 
claims to State sovereignty”44 in the question of nationality attribution.45 Certainly, 
the codification and further elaboration of the right to a nationality in global and 
regional human rights instruments has had an enormous influence on the perception 
of nationality matters. In the specific context of statelessness, these developments 
have contributed to the progressive acceptance of an overall prohibition against 
statelessness.46 There is a general onus on states to refrain from creating 
statelessness and take efforts to resolve cases of statelessness. Where states are 
called upon “to adopt and implement nationality legislation with a view to 
                                                                                                                                               
European Convention on Nationality; and article 7 of the Covenant on the Rights of the Child in Islam. 
See also article 6 of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples; paragraph 55 of chapter 
VI on The Human Dimension of the Concluding Document of Helsinki, Conference for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe, 1992; and paragraph 19 of the Charter for European Security of the 
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1999.  
41 Although the European Convention on Nationality, 1997 (and the Council of Europe Convention on 
the avoidance of statelessness in relation to State succession, 2006) is a regional instrument, its 
influence may extend beyond the European continent: “It can encourage other regional or international 
organisations to take similar initiative in developing declarations or conventions, introduce new 
principles into international law, or influence the development of nationality law in countries around the 
world […] The convention lays out basic principles of nationality law that can guide governments in 
their negotiations, cooperations and interactions”. Norman Sabourin, "The relevance of the European 
Convention on Nationality for non-European states" in Council of Europe's First Conference on 
Nationality, Strasbourg: 1999, pages 114 and 123.  
42 Haro van Panhuys, "Chapter VII: Restrictions Imposed by International Law upon the Competence of 
Ctates to Lay Down Nationality Rules" in The Role of Nationality in International Law, A.W. Sijthoff's 
Uitgeversmaatschappij, Leiden: 1959, chapter VII, page 154. 
43 “The manner in which states regulate matters bearing on nationality cannot today be deemed within 
their sole jurisdiction”. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion on the Proposed 
Amendments to the Naturalisation provision of the Constitution of Costa Rica, OC-4/84, 19 January 
1984, para. 32; See also UNHCR, "Statelessness and Citizenship" in The State of the World's Refugees - 
A Humanitarian Agenda, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 1997, page 251. 
44 UNHCR and IPU, Nationality and statelessness. A handbook for parliamentarians, 2005, page 9 
45 The preamble to the 1997 Draft Articles on the Nationality of Natural Persons in Relation to the 
Succession of States confirms this view. 
46 Johannes Chan, 'The Right to a Nationality as a Human Right - The Current Trend Towards 
Recognition', in Human Rights Law Journal, Vol. 12, 1991, page 11; Open Society Justice Initiative, 
Citizenship and Equality in Practice: Guaranteeing Non-Discriminatory Access to Nationality, 
Protecting the Right to be Free from Arbitrary Deprivation of Nationality and Combating Statelessness, 





preventing and reducing statelessness”47 this clearly impacts on their freedom to 
attribute nationality however they deem fit.48 It has even been suggested that 
wherever the nationality of an individual is withdrawn with the effect of rendering 
him stateless, this may amount to arbitrary deprivation of nationality which is 
prohibited by numerous international instruments.49 However, this interpretation is 
not beyond dispute.50 Nevertheless, states are certainly under an overall duty to 
promote the right to a nationality and prevent statelessness. But what concrete 
obligations exist to compel states to adapt their policies of nationality attribution? 
This question is central to the investigation in the following chapters.  
 
3 THE 1961 CONVENTION ON THE REDUCTION OF STATELESSNESS 
 
The most obvious and comprehensive source of concrete international agreements 
on the prevention of statelessness is the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of 
Statelessness. Since it is the utility and effectiveness of this instrument that is being 
evaluated against the backdrop of alternative sources of obligations under 
international law, some explanation of its development, scope and basic content is 
of value here. The 1961 Statelessness Convention is not the first international 
instrument to deal with the problem of statelessness. As we have seen, the 1930 
Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality 
Laws introduced some limits on the autonomy of states in nationality matters and 
one of its aspirations was to ensure that everyone held a nationality.51 However 
revolutionary it may have seemed at the time, the 1930 Hague Convention was not 
rigorous enough to seriously impact on the existence of statelessness. Nor has it 
                                                           
47 UN Commission on Human Rights, Resolution on Human rights and arbitrary deprivation of 
nationality, Human Rights Resolution 2005/45. 
48 Similar considerations have been expressed by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: “States 
have the obligation not to adopt practices or laws concerning the granting of nationality, the application 
of which fosters an increase in the number of stateless persons”. Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights, Case of Yean and Bosico v. Dominican Republic, 8 September 2005, para. 142. The Human 
Rights Committee mentions a similar obligation upon states in the specific context of preventing 
statelessness at birth: “States are required to adopt every appropriate measure, both internally and in 
cooperation with other States, to ensure that every child has a nationality when he is born”. Human 
Rights Committee, General Comment No. 17 on the Rights of the Child, 1989. 
49 Open Society Justice Initiative, Citizenship and Equality in Practice: Guaranteeing Non-
Discriminatory Access to Nationality, Protecting the Right to be Free from Arbitrary Deprivation of 
Nationality and Combating Statelessness, November 2005, page 9. Ruth Donner, "Chapter 4: Human 
Rights Conventions and other Instruments" in The Regulation of Nationality in International Law, 
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Goldston, 'Holes in the Rights Framework: Racial Discrimination, Citizenship, and the Rights of 
Noncitizens', in Ethics and International Affairs, Vol. 20, 2006. 
50 See Paul Weis, Nationality and Statelessness in International Law, Kluwer Academic Publishers 
Group, Dordrecht: 1979, page 125. 
51 For this reason, the 1930 Hague Convention has been dubbed the “first international attempt to 
provide everyone with a nationality”. Carol Batchelor, 'Stateless Persons: Some Gaps in International 
Protection', in International Journal of Refugee Law, Vol. 7, 1995, page 249; UNHCR, "Statelessness 
and Citizenship" in The State of the World's Refugees - A Humanitarian Agenda, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford: 1997, page 25; UNHCR and IPU, Nationality and statelessness. A handbook for 
parliamentarians, 2005, page 8. 
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ever attracted many state parties.52 Nevertheless, what this Convention did 
accomplish was to show that multilateral agreements could provide a way forward 
in resolving nationality problems and combating statelessness. 
 Thus, some thirty years later, when nationality matters were back on the 
international agenda, the idea of an international convention was again taken up. It 
was becoming abundantly clear that more assertive action was needed to address 
the mounting statelessness plight. There was an immediate need to improve the 
legal status and secure the enjoyment of basic rights for the existing stateless 
populations around the globe. The 1954 Convention relating to the Status of 
Stateless Persons was designed for this purpose.53 However, the elimination of 
statelessness was considered an integral aspect of “conflict prevention, of post-
conflict resolution, reduction of cases of displacement, and as part of the protection 
of the human rights of individuals”.54 So the ultimate aim remained the reduction 
and indeed eradication of statelessness itself. This required a further concretisation 
of the aspiration expressed in Article 15 of the Universal Declaration,55 for this 
provision is not designed to be legally binding56 and, as such, it left vital questions 
such as “which nationality?” unanswered.57 The International Law Commission was 
invited to compile a suitable text, building upon relevant provisions and principles 
                                                           
52 The number of state parties now stands at 20. See also Manley Hudson, Report on Nationality, 
including Statelessness, A/CN.4/50, 21 February 1952, page 32. 
53 As we will see in Part 3, the rights provided in the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless 
Persons were not designed to replace nationality. See also Carol Batchelor, "The International Legal 
Framework Concerning Statelessness and Access for Stateless Persons", European Union Seminar on 
the Content and Scope of International Protection: Panel 1 - Legal basis of international protection, 
Madrid: 2002, page 6; UNHCR and IPU, Nationality and statelessness. A handbook for 
parliamentarians, 2005, page 10. 
54 Carol Batchelor, "The International Legal Framework Concerning Statelessness and Access for 
Stateless Persons", European Union Seminar on the Content and Scope of International Protection: 
Panel 1 - Legal basis of international protection, Madrid: 2002, page 5. 
55 Where article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights espoused that “Everyone has the 
right to a nationality” it cannot be denied that it reflected the ideal of eradicating statelessness. 
56  The Universal Declaration “was meant to precede more detailed and comprehensive provisions [...] 
when approved or adopted, it is hortary and aspirational, recommendatory rather than, in a formal 
sense, binding”. Henry Steiner; Philip Alston, International Human Rights in Context. Law, Politics 
and Morals, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 2000, pages 139 and 142. It should be noted that in spite 
of this technical limitation, the Declaration is an influential text with great moral force and some of the 
norms it contains are now considered to belong to customary international law or constitute general 
principles of law. See also Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford: 2003, pages 534-535. 
57 It is interesting to note that the original draft provision on the right to a nationality, as presented by 
Professor Lauterpacht in May 1948, contained much greater detail and actually specified concrete 
obligations for states: “Every person shall be entitled to the nationality of the State where his is born 
unless and until on attaining majority he declares for the nationality open to him by virtue of descent. 
No one shall be deprived of his nationality by way of punishment or deemed to have lost his nationality 
except concurrently with the acquisition of a new nationality. The right of emigration and expatriation 
shall not be denied”; Article 10 of the Rapporteur’s Draft of the International Bill of the Rights of man, 
as found in the report of the Human Rights Committee entitled “Human Rights, the charter of the 






that had been formulated to date - including those of the 1930 Hague Convention.58 
Conscious of the delicacy of the issue, two alternative documents were drafted for 
consideration by state governments: the Draft Convention on the Elimination of 
Future Statelessness and the Draft Convention on the Reduction of Future 
Statelessness.59 Substantively, the two drafts were similar, but the text on the 
reduction of future statelessness included a number of additional clauses whereby 
states would not be required to totally eradicate statelessness under all 
circumstances. Both draft instruments dealt with the issue of conflict of nationality 
laws (similarly to the 1930 Hague Convention) as well as broaching on other causes 
of statelessness such as state succession.  
 When government representatives convened at the 1959 Conference, the 
decision as to which draft to proceed in discussing was quickly taken. They found 
the draft on the elimination of future statelessness “too radical” since its provisions 
were formulated in very absolute terms – thus encroaching further on their 
sovereignty in nationality matters - so opted instead to debate the Draft Convention 
on the Reduction of Future Statelessness.60 The debate on this text filled the time 
reserved for the conference without any conclusive progress. A particular sticking 
point, for example, was disagreement over provisions relating to the deprivation of 
nationality.61 Only when the delegates reconvened for a second conference two 
years later did the text make it over the finishing line, to be adopted as the 1961 
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. This was eleven years after the 
International Law Commission started work on drafting the document and it would 
take a further 12 years for the Convention to attract the six ratifications required for 
entry into force.62 This in itself is proof of the fact that governments were dealing 
with a sensitive issue, nationality being an area in which they would not readily 
surrender their sovereignty. To date, the level of accession remains poor: at the time 
of writing, the Convention has just 34 state parties.63 
 What is perhaps the most surprising feature of the 1961 Statelessness 
Convention is the absence of idealistic preambles and loftily formulated general 
principles as was very much the rage with multilateral texts of this sort at the time. 
Instead, after mentioning that it is considered “desirable to reduce statelessness by 
international agreement”,64 the Convention opens immediately with the substantive 
                                                           
58 Upon request of the Economic and Social Council in its resolution 319B III (XI) of the 11th of August 
1950. 
59 UNHCR and IPU, Nationality and statelessness. A handbook for parliamentarians, 2005, page 12. 
60 Carol Batchelor, 'Stateless Persons: Some Gaps in International Protection', in International Journal 
of Refugee Law, Vol. 7, 1995, page 250; UNHCR and IPU, Nationality and statelessness. A handbook 
for parliamentarians, 2005, page 12. 
61 The Final Act of the Convention mentions the following resolution that was adopted by the first 
Conference in 1959: “The Conference, being unable to terminate the work entrusted to it within the 
time provided for its work, proposes to the competent organ of the United Nations to reconvene the 
Conference at the earliest possible time in order to continue and complete its work”; Paragraph 3, Final 
Act of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness; Paul Weis, Nationality and Statelessness 
in International Law, Kluwer Academic Publishers Group, Dordrecht: 1979, page 166. 
62 The sixth party to accede was Australia on the 13th of December 1973. In accordance with its article 
18, the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness then entered into force two years later. 
63 The most recent accessions were by Romania and Rwanda in 2006 and Brazil in 2007. 
64 This declaration is made in the only substantive preamble to precede the text of the Convention itself. 
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provision of article 1 which prescribes granting nationality under certain 
circumstances to a child born on state territory.65 This is very different to the 1930 
Hague Convention which clarifies its aspirations in its preambles before opening 
with a series of articles pertaining to general principles rather than real substance.66 
It is especially peculiar that the 1961 Statelessness Convention neglects to reiterate 
that “everyone has the right to a nationality” while claiming to be a concretisation 
of Article 15 of the Universal Declaration.67 Of equal interest is the notable absence 
of the basic rule that it is for each state to determine who is considered a national. 
 Even so, the instrument has been described in the following terms by the 
“Information and Accession Package” that accompanies it: 
 
The 1961 Convention may be seen as consolidating principles of equality, 
non-discrimination, protection of ethnic minorities, rights of children, 
territorial integrity, the right to a nationality and the avoidance of 
statelessness.68 
 
Rather than repeating such principles, the Convention indeed consolidates them: 
transforming idealistic notions into concrete obligations that can be implemented 
directly by state parties. On the basis of the description given in the “Information 
and Accession Package”, the Convention would seem to cover a very broad 
spectrum of issues. However, its scope is definitively narrowed by the 
determination that it is only applicable to cases of statelessness. For example:  
 
A contracting state shall grant its nationality to a person born in its territory 
who would otherwise be stateless…69 
 
Thus the Convention does not purport to prescribe a general policy of nationality 
attribution, but deals only with situations in which statelessness threatens.70 It is not 
                                                           
65 The Draft Conventions put forward for debate by the International Law Commission did include a 
short series of preambles which included a reference to the right to a nationality in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. These phrases were obviously dropped during the consideration of the 
text by the government representatives during the codification conference. UN Yearbook 1954, page 
421. 
66 Similarly, the 1954 Statelessness Convention includes a short series of preambles explaining the 
background to its adoption and opens with articles that provide definitions and general principles to 
clarify the scope of application of the Convention; 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless 
Persons. 
67 The Draft Convention submitted by the International Law Commission for discussion did include a 
number of preambles, among which a reaffirmation of the right to a nationality as proclaimed by the 
Universal Declaration. These paragraphs obviously disappeared at some point in the course of the 
debate although it is unclear why. 
68 UNHCR, Information and accession package: the 1954 Convention relating to the status of stateless 
persons and the 1961 Convention on the reduction of statelessness, Geneva: January 1999, page 7. 
69 The first phrase of article 1, emphasis added; 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness 
70 Paul Weis, Nationality and Statelessness in International Law, Kluwer Academic Publishers Group, 





an international law on nationality but simply what the title depicts: a Convention 
on the Reduction of Statelessness.71  
The substantive articles of the 1961 Statelessness Convention attempt to tackle 
the prevention of statelessness in three specific situations: the creation of 
statelessness at birth where a child fails to acquire the nationality of any state; the 
creation of statelessness later in life where a person loses, renounces or is deprived 
of his nationality without gaining another; and the creation of statelessness in the 
specific circumstance of state succession. In approaching these situations, the 
Convention does not ask states to grant nationality to just any person who is (at risk 
of being) stateless. The obligations have been carefully formulated, taking into 
consideration factors like birth, descent and residence in ascertaining whether there 
is an appropriate link with the state upon which to base the attribution of 
nationality.72 Moreover, state parties are not permitted to lodge any reservations 
against these articles and limit the scope of the treaty obligations regarding the 
attribution of nationality in the event of statelessness.73 After a few further 
comments on the general approach of the 1961 Statelessness Convention here, a full 
discussion of its substantive provisions will be undertaken in the following chapters 
as we look at the way in which international law deals with each of the root causes 
of statelessness.  
Although the Convention’s norms are only applicable where there is a risk of 
statelessness, the instrument does not offer any further guidance on either the 
definition of statelessness or the identification of situations where statelessness 
threatens. As to definition, it is generally understood that by refraining from 
offering its own perspective on the question, the 1961 Statelessness Convention 
defers the matter back to the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless 
Persons:74 “the term ‘stateless person’ means a person who is not considered a 
national by any state under operation of its law”.75 We can, however, recall from the 
discussion of the question of definition in chapter II, section 4, that the 1961 
Statelessness Convention includes a resolution on the subject of “de facto 
statelessness” in its Final Act: 
 
                                                           
71 In this respect it is narrower in application than the 1930 Hague Convention which also deals with the 
question of dual nationality. Yet it is also broader in scope in that it addresses situations that arise from 
other circumstances than a conflict of nationality laws. 
72 UNHCR, Information and accession package: the 1954 Convention relating to the status of stateless 
persons and the 1961 Convention on the reduction of statelessness, Geneva: January 1999, page 7; 
Carol Batchelor, 'Statelessness and the Problem of Resolving Nationality Status', in International 
Journal of Refugee Law, Vol. 10, 1998, page 162. 
73 States may only make a declaration under article 8, paragraph 3 of the Convention when they accede 
to the instrument, by which they specify the inclusion of one or more additional grounds for deprivation 
of nationality under their municipal law. Beyond this, the Convention explicitly permits reservations to 
Article 11 (regarding the supervisory mechanism of an international agency), Article 14 (granting 
jurisdiction to the ICJ for the settlement of disputes) and Article 15 (relating to territories for which the 
state party is responsible) and then just to be absolutely clear – expressly prohibits reservations in 
respect of all other articles. Article 17, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of 
Statelessness.  
74 Carol Batchelor, 'Stateless Persons: Some Gaps in International Protection', in International Journal 
of Refugee Law, Vol. 7, 1995, page 250. 
75 Article 1 of the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons.  
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The Conference recommends that persons who are stateless de facto should as 
far as possible be treated as stateless de jure to enable them to acquire an 
effective nationality.76 
 
What is to be understood here under the expression “de facto stateless” is not 
precisely elucidated although it can be inferred from the reference to the acquisition 
of an effective nationality that some degree of ineffectiveness of citizenship is 
implied. Yet, even with this inference in mind and even if states were to take this 
non-binding recommendation to heart, it is not clear how it could be implemented 
in practice. For instance, where the Convention compels states to offer nationality 
ius soli to a child who would “otherwise be stateless”, the recommendation would 
seem to call upon states to also confer citizenship ius soli to a child who would 
otherwise acquire an ineffective nationality. Quite how a state should go about 
making such a prediction is not explained. Similarly, where nationality is not to be 
deprived, in certain circumstances, where the individual would thereby be rendered 
stateless, the recommendation would appear to prohibit the deprivation of 
nationality from a dual national whose second nationality is ineffective. Again, 
exactly how this fact should be ascertained – or indeed how often such a scenario 
may come up in practice – is not addressed.77 
This brings us to the wider problem of the identification of (the risk of) 
statelessness for the purposes of applying the guarantees housed in the 1961 
Statelessness Convention. As mentioned, the text of the instrument offers no 
indication as to how state parties are to determine an imminent risk of statelessness 
– establishing the fact, for instance, that a child would “otherwise be stateless” to 
prevent statelessness at birth or ascertaining that a person does not possess or 
acquire another nationality in order to avoid statelessness upon loss, deprivation or 
renunciation of nationality. The Convention thus fails to address such questions as 
where the burden of proof lies (with the individual concerned or with the state), 
what types of evidence may be accepted and what weight is to be given to different 
forms of proof. Nor are state parties compelled to cooperate with a view to 
confirming the nationality – or statelessness – of an individual. The absence of 
clarity on how to undertake the task of identification is highly regrettable since it 
can seriously jeopardise the implementation of the Convention. As evidenced by the 
widely-publicised “baby Andrew” case in Japan, the problem of identification of 
situations in which the Convention’s terms are applicable is a very real dilemma.78 
                                                           
76 Resolution I of the Final Act of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. It is likely 
that the inclusion of this recommendation was due in part to a final plea by the then United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees to address the plight of the “de facto stateless”. Carol Batchelor, 
'Stateless Persons: Some Gaps in International Protection', in International Journal of Refugee Law, 
Vol. 7, 1995, page 251. 
77 Recall from chapter II, section 4 that other instruments that attempt to deal with the avoidance of 
statelessness limit themselves to the definition of statelessness as the de jure absence of a nationality. 
See article 1, paragraph c of the Council of Europe Convention on the avoidance of statelessness in 
relation to State succession (2006) as well as the Explanatory Memorandum to the European 
Convention on Nationality (1997), paragraph 33. 
78 The “baby Andrew” case involved a dispute as to the applicability of a provision in the Japanese 
Nationality Act that aims to prevent statelessness at birth. The article in question determined that a 





So, by leaving it entirely to states parties to identify situations in which the 
Convention guarantees are applicable, there remains a significant threat that the 
effectiveness of the instrument will be undermined as states – deliberately or 
inadvertently – exclude individuals from the protection of the Convention through 
their approach to the question of proof.  
With the foregoing comments in mind, the availability of an enforcement 
mechanism or procedure to ensure the comprehensive and correct implementation 
of the 1961 Statelessness Convention becomes all the more relevant. On this point, 
the Convention earns a somewhat mixed appraisal. To begin with, similarly to 
many other international treaties – including the 1954 Convention relating to the 
Status of Stateless Persons -  the instrument grants jurisdiction to the International 
Court of Justice to settle any disputes arising over its interpretation or application.79 
However, to date, no such referral has been made to the Court. In fact, it seems an 
unlikely scenario that state parties would ever challenge each other before the Court 
on the basis of this Convention as stateless persons are renowned for being 
voiceless – having no government to espouse their claim is precisely the crux of 
their problem.80 Conscious of this peculiarity of the statelessness phenomenon, 
when the Convention was being prepared: 
 
The draft of the International Law Commission had provided for the 
establishment within the framework of the United Nations of an agency to act 
on behalf of stateless persons before governments and the establishment also 
within this framework of a tribunal competent to decide on claims presented by 
the agency on behalf of individuals claiming to have been denied nationality in 
violation of the provisions of the Convention.81 
 
When the text was eventually adopted, only the reference to an international agency 
remained. Thus article 11 stipulates that, as a means of monitoring the instrument’s 
implementation by state parties, a body shall be established “to which a person 
claiming the benefit of this Convention may apply for the examination of his claim 
                                                                                                                                               
nationality. Initially, the Ministry of Justice determined that this provision did not apply to Andrew 
because his mother was not unknown but was considered – by the Japanese authorities – to be a 
national of the Philippines. Throughout the litigation process, all the way to the Supreme Court, the 
interpretation of the terms of the article and the problem of the burden of proof that formed the central 
questions. This case is evidence of how contentious these matters can be and how crucial to the 
outcome of the case – and to the prevention of statelessness in practice. For a discussion of the case, see 
Stacey Steele, “Comments on Okuda, Statelessness and the Nationality Act of Japan: Baby Andrew 
Becomes a Teenager and other Changes?” Journal of Japanese Law, Volume 9, Number 18, 2004, 
pages 178-192. Similar issues arose in European Court of Human Rights, Decision as to the 
admissibility of Karassev v. Finland, Application No. 31414/96, 12 January 1999, that will be discussed 
in more detail later. 
79 This is provided for in article 14 of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. 
80 Paul Weis, Nationality and Statelessness in International Law, Kluwer Academic Publishers Group, 
Dordrecht: 1979, page 255; Carol Batchelor, 'Stateless Persons: Some Gaps in International Protection', 
in International Journal of Refugee Law, Vol. 7, 1995, page 253; UNHCR and IPU, Nationality and 
statelessness. A handbook for parliamentarians, 2005, page 13. 
81 Paul Weis, “The United Nations Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, 1961” in 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 11, No. 4, 1962, pages 1084-1085. 
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and for assistance in presenting it to the appropriate authority”.82 This approach 
reverts the question of the legitimacy of an individual’s claim to the relevant 
domestic authorities. Nor has the agency mandated to exercise this advisory task on 
behalf of persons seeking a remedy under the 1961 Convention, the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees, issued any concrete guidelines on the most 
pressing questions associated with the implementation of the Convention, such as 
the issues raised above.83 Regardless of the outcome of the assessment of its 
substantive provisions, these limitations inherent in the approach of the 1961 
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness must be kept in mind when it comes 
to the evaluation of the instrument’s overall value. 
 
4 PURPOSE AND METHOD OF PART 2 
 
For now, having introduced the basic doctrines involved in nationality attribution 
and having provided a background on the main international instrument to deal with 
the reduction of statelessness, it is time to commence the investigation into the 
origins of statelessness itself and how these are addressed under the 1961 
Convention and broader international law. This study will be guided by the research 
question presented in chapter I:  
 
How can the way in which international law deals with the prevention of 
statelessness be improved so as to ensure optimal protection against 
statelessness for the individual (i.e. the realisation of the right to a 
nationality)? 
 
The analysis has been broken down into four chapters each dealing with a different 
category of root causes of statelessness: technical causes of statelessness (chapter 
IV), statelessness in the context of state succession (chapter V), denial of 
citizenship resulting in statelessness (chapter VI) and the so-called “new” causes of 
statelessness (chapter VII). It will be followed by a chapter in which the findings 
are consolidated and compared, enabling the determination of the precise 
obligations states have in countering statelessness, the role is - or could be - cast for 
the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness and the overall way in 







                                                           
82 Emphasis added. Article 11 of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. 
83 When the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness entered into force in 1975, the UN 
General Assembly requested UNHCR to fulfil this task. Thereafter, the agency’s statelessness mandate 
has been reaffirmed, clarified and expanded through subsequent General Assembly resolutions as well 
as thanks to the conclusions adopted by UNHCR’s own Executive Committee. See UN Docs. 
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When asked how statelessness comes about – often the first question to come up 
when talking about this research – I have found that people are most fascinated by 
its so-called “technical causes”. Indeed, the first stateless person to draw my own 
attention lacked a nationality due entirely to a “technicality”. I refer here to the tale 
of Omar, who was born in the Netherlands to a Dutch father and foreign mother and 
failed to acquire a nationality at birth due to a conflict of nationality laws.1 While 
other causes of statelessness are connected to more dramatic or exciting events, this 
story continues to compel. It just does not seem possible (or excusable) that a 
newborn child can fail to acquire a nationality simply because the countries with 
which he is connected have neglected to ensure that their nationality regulations are 
compatible. However, this is but one example. The technical causes of statelessness 
are many and varied, creating statelessness both from birth and later in life. They 
are “technical causes” because statelessness is the unintentional result of the acts of 
individuals or the operation of particular municipal laws or policies. 
As the story of Omar demonstrates, it is possible for a baby that has just been 
brought into the world to remain “unclaimed” by any state due to a glitch in law or 
policy. It can be caused by conflicts in the application of the law of two or more 
states, but also by unilateral state (in)action. The result is the same: original or 
absolute statelessness, where a child lacks a nationality from birth. The causes of 
original statelessness will be dealt with under two sub-headings: “jus sanguinis 
versus jus soli” (section 1) and “abandoned or orphaned children” (section 2). If a 
child escapes all of the pitfalls that can result in statelessness from birth, he is still 
not necessarily home free. Over the course of a lifetime there are a number of – not 
particularly earth-shattering – events that can also result in an individual being 
rendered stateless. Similarly to original statelessness, this subsequent statelessness 
has a number of different technical causes. Many of these are related to conflict of 
laws situations where the cumulative effect of the application of the domestic 
                                                           
1 A brief reminder: Although his father was Dutch and he was born on Dutch soil, Omar failed to 
acquire Dutch nationality at birth because his father and mother were unmarried and his father did not 
take the necessary steps during his partner’s pregnancy to ensure that he was legally recognised as 
Omar’s father from the very start. Meanwhile, Omar had no right to his mother’s nationality as the laws 
of that country did not provide for the passing on of nationality from mother to child. The full story of 





nationality provisions of two or more different states is the creation of a new case of 
statelessness. Again, there are two main categories of problems which will be 
discussed in turn: “marriage (or divorce) and adoption” (section 3) and “loss, 
deprivation or renunciation of nationality” (section 4). Once these origins of 
statelessness have been traced in greater detail, the next step is to put the 1961 
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness and other international instruments to 
the test and see whether they copes sufficiently with each of the trouble spots.  
 
1 JUS SANGUINIS VERSUS JUS SOLI 
 
As a direct consequence of the autonomy of states to stipulate their own 
nationality regulations, statelessness may be the unintentional result of a conflict 
between the domestic legislation of two or more countries. In particular, the 
existence of two contradicting principles on which to base the attribution of 
nationality to a child at birth – jus sanguinis and jus soli – has inadvertently led to 
many cases of statelessness.2 It can be this simple: a child who is born to parents 
who are nationals of a state that grants nationality jus soli on the territory of a state 
that grants nationality jus sanguinis fails to acquire any nationality at birth. The 
child cannot acquire the nationality of the parents, as this is not passed on by 
descent and the child was born on foreign soil. Similarly, he does not qualify for the 
nationality of the state in which he was born because this country only grants 
nationality by descent. This is a “negative” conflict of laws.3 While the laws of the 
states involved may be perfectly correct and acceptable individually, when 
implemented together, problems nevertheless occur.4 In the absence of a remedy in 
these exceptional circumstances, the child is stateless from birth. 
Although it has long been recognised as a problem, the incidence of 
statelessness arising from this type of conflict of laws situation is growing 
worldwide. According to a UNHCR progress report on statelessness in 1999: 
 
In a world of global interaction, frequent movement across borders, mixed 
marriages, and increased numbers of people living outside their country of 
nationality, it is no longer possible for states to avoid the creation of 
statelessness solely through independent application of national laws.5  
 
While it might once have been fair to assume that every child would be born on the 
territory of the state of which his parents are also nationals - discounting the 
possibility of a conflict of laws situation - this is certainly no longer the case. 
Moreover, in reaction to the increasing mobility of populations, some states have 
adapted their nationality laws in such a way as to actually aggravate the risk of 
statelessness. For example, a number of countries that grant nationality jus 
                                                           
2 See chapter III, section 1 for an explanation of these doctrines. 
3 In the opposite circumstances, the result is a “positive” conflict of laws, creating cases of dual 
nationality; International Union for Child Welfare, Stateless Children - A Comparative Study of 
National Legislation and Suggested Solutions to the Problem of Statelessness of Children, Geneva: 
1947, page 22. 
4 UNHCR and IPU, Nationality and statelessness. A handbook for parliamentarians, 2005, page 27. 
5 UNHCR, Progress report on UNHCR activities in the field of statelessness, EC/49/SC/CRP.15, 
Geneva: 4 June 1999 
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sanguinis at birth have amended their legislation to prevent nationality being passed 
down continuously, from one generation to the next, once the actual tie with the 
country has been severed. This is considered to be the case when the individual 
emigrates permanently to another state, forfeiting the genuine link in the eyes of the 
state of nationality. For instance, under British law the first generation of children 
born abroad to a British national will still automatically acquire British nationality 
jus sanguinis. However, these individuals are termed “British citizens by descent”6 - 
a status which impacts on their right to pass on their British nationality jus 
sanguinis. The child of a “British citizen by descent”, if born outside the United 
Kingdom, is not automatically entitled to British nationality. In the event that both 
of the child’s parents are similarly situated, rendering them unable to transmit their 
nationality jus sanguinis and the state upon whose territory the child is born does 
not grant nationality jus soli, then statelessness may result. 7 Placing this type of 
limitation on the conferral of nationality jus sanguinis can thus heighten the risk of 
statelessness. 
 The example outlined above is just one of the known weaknesses of the jus 
sanguinis doctrine in countering statelessness. A major point of contention in 
relation to this principle is the distinction often made between legitimate and 
illegitimate children. The issue of attribution of nationality to children born out of 
wedlock was highlighted in the 1947 report on “Stateless Children” by the 
International Union for Child Welfare.8 Fifty years on, this is still a problem today.9 
                                                           
6 As opposed to a “British citizen otherwise than by descent”, who is for example an individual born in 
the United Kingdom of a British parent or naturalised; Information leaflet BN4 on the British 
Nationality Act 1981, “Children born outside the United Kingdom”, issued by the Home Office, 2002, 
pages 1-2. 
7 In the particular case of the British Nationality Act, if the child is born abroad to a “British citizen by 
descent” and is thereby rendered stateless, the child can be registered as a British national as long as 
certain criteria are met; Information leaflet BN4 on the British Nationality Act 1981, “Children born 
outside the United Kingdom”, issued by the Home Office, 2002, pages 3-5. 
8 International Union for Child Welfare, Stateless Children - A Comparative Study of National 
Legislation and Suggested Solutions to the Problem of Statelessness of Children, Geneva: 1947, page 
10. 
9 In fact, in Europe at least, “in many states the number of marriages is reducing and the number of 
children “born out of wedlock” is consequently increasing”. Committee of Experts on Nationality, 
Report on Conditions for the Acquisition and Loss of Nationality, Strasbourg: 14 January 2003, page 6.  
Furthermore, the nationality status of children fathered by members of a foreign military engaged in a 
conflict or peacekeeping mission in a state is a particular and enduring cause for concern:  “The 
children fathered by U.S. soldiers who had been sent to Korea [during the war in the 1950s and 60s] 
were called ‘children of the dust’. They were shunned in Korean society, where interracial relationships 
are traditionally unaccepted. Already abandoned by their fathers who returned to the United States, 
most of these children were later abandoned by their mothers because of social pressure or lack of 
resources to care for them […] When news of the impoverished lives of these children reached the 
international community, there was increased pressure from both within the United States and the 
Korean government for the U.S. government to recognise these children as American citizens. The 
resulting U.S. legislation regarding the status of Amerasian children was woefully inadequate […] 
After 50 years, only a small number of those American children have been granted U.S. citizenship”. 
Youth Advocate Program International, Stateless Children – Children who are without citizenship, 
Booklet No. 7 in a series on International Youth Issues, 2002, page 19. Today, similar issues are being 
raised surrounding the right to nationality of illegitimate children born ot members of UN peacekeeping 





Referring once more to the story of Omar, we see that the reason that he did not 
gain his father’s Dutch nationality is because his parents were unmarried and were, 
therefore, required to take additional steps to ensure the recognition from birth of 
the paternal bond. Having failed to do so, even the subsequent legal recognition of 
this bond acquired through the local court was not enough to rectify the situation as 
regards Omar’s nationality. Where the law only allows for the bestowal of 
nationality jus sanguinis to legitimate children and prevents the father (or even both 
parents) from passing on their nationality to children born out of wedlock, 
statelessness may result.  
 The problem is compounded when the jus sanguinis principle has been laid 
down in gender-sensitive legislation. A number of states that adhere to the jus 
sanguinis doctrine provide only for the transmission of nationality from father to 
child – the mother does not hold the same right even if the child is born on the 
territory of the mother’s state.10 This has the effect of dramatically multiplying the 
risk of statelessness, for the child can rely on just one parent – the father – for the 
acquisition of a nationality. If the child is illegitimate, or the father unknown, 
stateless, deceased or unwilling to take the necessary steps to ensure that the child 
acquires a nationality, statelessness is inevitable unless there are special provisions 
in place to prevent it. The complaint that gender-sensitive nationality legislation 
creates a large number of stateless children every year is echoed in many reports.11 
Today, despite signs of change, the problem remains particularly prevalent in the 
regions of North-Africa, the Middle East and Asia.12  
 A final criticism which is often voiced about the jus sanguinis principle is its 
role in the perpetuation of statelessness. Not only can jus sanguinis nationality laws 
contribute to the creation of entirely new cases of statelessness, they can also – if 
applied strictly – be responsible for the inheritance of statelessness.13 Just as the 
nationality of the child is determined according to the nationality of the parents, 
where the parents’ nationality is lacking the child will simply inherit this status. The 
result, statelessness at birth, can be identical if the parents’ nationality is unknown 
or undetermined.14 
                                                           
10 UNHCR, "Statelessness and Citizenship" in The State of the World's Refugees - A Humanitarian 
Agenda, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 1997, page 226; UNHCR and IPU, Nationality and 
statelessness. A handbook for parliamentarians, 2005, page 32. 
11 These include Maureen Lynch, Lives on hold: The human cost of statelessness, Washington: 2005, 
pages 27-32; UN Division for the Advancement of Women, Women, nationality and citizenship, June 
2003, pages 8-10; Youth Advocate Program International, Stateless Children – Youth who are without 
citizenship, Booklet No. 7 in a series on International Youth Issues, 2002, pages 9-10; and UNHCR, 
UNHCR Handbook for the Protection of Women and Girls, January 2008, page 187. 
12 Mark Manly, “Sorry, wrong gender” in Refugees Magazine, Number 147, Issue 3, 2007, pages 24-27. 
13 UNHCR, Information and accession package: the 1954 Convention relating to the status of stateless 
persons and the 1961 Convention on the reduction of statelessness, Geneva: January 1999, page 3; 
UNHCR, "Statelessness and Citizenship" in The State of the World's Refugees - A Humanitarian 
Agenda, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 1997, page 226; UNHCR, The World's Stateless - Questions 
and Answers, Geneva: , page 9. 
14 Furthermore, a child born to stateless parents de facto who cannot establish their nationality may then 
become stateless de jure himself. International Union for Child Welfare, Stateless Children - A 
Comparative Study of National Legislation and Suggested Solutions to the Problem of Statelessness of 
Children, Geneva: 1947, page 15;  
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 The considerations outlined above with respect to the jus sanguinis principle 
have motivated a number of scholars to suggest that universal adoption of the jus 
soli doctrine would be desirable in the fight against statelessness.15 Their argument: 
every child is born somewhere and this place of birth is usually relatively easy to 
establish.16 The place of birth remains unaffected whether the child is legitimate or 
illegitimate and whether the parents are nationals, (irregular) foreigners or even 
stateless. The opposing argument is readily raised that birth on the territory of a 
state may be of a more coincidental nature and not, in fact, illustrative of any 
genuine link.17 Indeed, the jus soli doctrine has been considered vulnerable to 
“abuse by expectant mothers engaged in ‘forum shopping’”18 or “birth tourism”.19 
The jus soli doctrine also raises its own questions, for example as to the definition 
of territory and thus the nationality of children born aboard a ship or aircraft. 
Moreover, original statelessness has been identified in states whose legislation is 
based on the jus soli principle, so this is not necessarily a ready-made solution.20 
Thus, although scholars have been grappling with the idea for many decades, 
advocating for the adoption of just one and the same doctrine for the attribution of 
                                                           
15 The Independent Commission on International Humanitarian Issues has reported called for the 
adoption of an instrument that prescribes the jus soli doctrine for all states; UNHCR, "Statelessness and 
Citizenship" in The State of the World's Refugees - A Humanitarian Agenda, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford: 1997, page 256. 
16 International Union for Child Welfare, Stateless Children - A Comparative Study of National 
Legislation and Suggested Solutions to the Problem of Statelessness of Children, Geneva: 1947 
17 Jus soli may result in the acquisition of nationality through purely incidental circumstances; Haro van 
Panhuys, "Chapter VII: Restrictions Imposed by International Law upon the Competence of Ctates to 
Lay Down Nationality Rules" in The Role of Nationality in International Law, A.W. Sijthoff's 
Uitgeversmaatschappij, Leiden: 1959 
18 Andrew Grossman, "Birthright Citizenship as Nationality of Convenience", 3rd European 
Conference on Nationality - Nationality and the Child, Strasbourg: 2004, page 3. 
19 This is the situation where: “Pregnant women [enter] the territory of a state in order to give birth to 
their child and thereby enabled the child to acquire the nationality of that State, [possibly enabling the 
mother] to remain in the territory of the state when she would otherwise not have qualified to do so, and 
perhaps later acquire the nationality of that State along with other members of the family”. Committee 
of Experts on Nationality, Report on Misuse of Nationality Laws, Strasbourg: 20 April 2004, paragraph 
7.  Some states have now moved away from automatic jus soli precisely in order to avoid the situation 
of the “anchor babies”. Consider the case of Ireland where the law was changed in 2004 (following the 
Baby Chen case before the European Court of Justice and a national referendum) when additional 
criteria were introduced to supplement the jus soli doctrine and curtail access to birthright citizenship 
for children of irregular immigrants. Andrew Grossman, "Birthright Citizenship as Nationality of 
Convenience", 3rd European Conference on Nationality - Nationality and the Child, Strasbourg: 2004, 
page 4. 
20 International Union for Child Welfare, Stateless Children - A Comparative Study of National 
Legislation and Suggested Solutions to the Problem of Statelessness of Children, Geneva: 1947, page 
20; Manley Hudson, Report on Nationality, including Statelessness, A/CN.4/50, 21 February 1952, 
page 44; Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 2003, 
page 380. The Dominican Republic is an example of a state that adheres to the jus soli doctrine but 
where large-scale statelessness remains an issue, see Laura van Waas, Is Permanent Illegality 
Inevitable? The Challenges to Ensuring Birth Registration and the Right to a Nationality for the 





nationality at birth by all states is neither a realistic nor a desirable solution.21 Yet it 
is certainly worthwhile building an understanding of the strengths and weaknesses 
of the two doctrines for attributing nationality at birth in order to assess the 
approach taken by international law. The extent to which there is an obligation 
under international law to extend nationality either jus sanguinis or jus soli under 
certain conditions will be investigated in the next two sections. 
 
1.1 The 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness 
 
The 1961 Statelessness Convention is a joint production of both jus sanguinis and 
jus soli states, meaning that it reflects a compromise between these principles. The 
convention does not compel states to adopt one doctrine or the other, but seeks a 
balance in their application, accepting both birthplace and descent as evidence of a 
genuine link.22 Thus article 1 requires states to grant nationality jus soli to a child 
born on their territory who would otherwise be stateless while article 4 prescribes 
the attribution of nationality jus sanguinis to a child born outside the territory of the 
state who would otherwise be stateless, if one of his parents is a national: 
 
 Article 1 
A Contracting State shall grant its nationality to a person born on its territory 
who would otherwise be stateless. 
 
Article 4 
A Contracting State shall grant nationality to a person, not born in the territory 
of a Contracting State, who would otherwise be stateless, if the nationality of 
one of his parents at the time of the person’s birth was that of that State.23 
 
The technique chosen is therefore to prescribe legislative amendments for both jus 
sanguinis and jus soli countries. States that adhere to a strict jus sanguinis doctrine 
are compelled by article 1 to introduce the possibility of attributing nationality jus 
soli in the particular case of a child who would otherwise be stateless – for example 
a child born on the state’s territory to parents who hold the nationality of a jus soli 
state. States that attribute nationality jus soli must add an exception clause to their 
nationality regulations, allowing for attribution jus sanguinis to a child born abroad 
if he would otherwise be stateless – for example if he is born on the territory of a 
jus sanguinis state. 
If contracting states were simply required to adopt such additional provisions 
in their nationality acts, a conflict of laws may still arise. A newborn child that 
                                                           
21 Richard Flournoy, 'International Problems in Respect to Nationality by Birth', in American Society of 
International Law Proceedings, Vol. 20, 1926; William Samore, 'Statelessness as a consequence of the 
conflict of nationality laws', in American Journal of International Law, Vol. 45, 1951; Andrew 
Grossman, "Birthright Citizenship as Nationality of Convenience", 3rd European Conference on 
Nationality - Nationality and the Child, Strasbourg: 2004. 
22 UNHCR, "Statelessness and Citizenship" in The State of the World's Refugees - A Humanitarian 
Agenda, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 1997, page 256; Carol Batchelor, "Developments in 
International law: The Avoidance of Statelessness Through Positive Application of the Right to a 
Nationality" in Council of Europe's First Conference on Nationality, Strasbourg: 2001, page 56. 
23 First lines of articles 1 and 4 of 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. 
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would otherwise be stateless would now most likely be claimed by at least two 
states through the implementation of article 1 and article 4 of the Statelessness 
Convention. This may herald a dispute as to which state is required to grant 
nationality to the child or lead to cases of dual nationality - still considered 
undesirable by a number of states. However, a closer reading of article 4 unearths 
the astuteness of the drafters in pre-empting this problem. The conferral of 
nationality jus sanguinis prescribed by this provision is made conditional on the 
child not being born on the territory of another contracting state. Where a newborn 
would otherwise be stateless, the Convention thereby gives precedence to the 
attribution of nationality jus soli since every contracting state is required to grant 
nationality jus soli in the event that the child would otherwise be stateless. 
Thus far it would seem that the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of 
Statelessness has adopted an appropriate and effective approach to preventing 
original statelessness from arising due to a conflict of jus sanguinis and jus soli 
doctrines. However, this conclusion must be tempered because articles 1 and 4 of 
the Convention have a major drawback that has yet to be mentioned: the obligations 
are not expressed in unequivocal terms but are watered down by allowing additional 
criteria to be set for the attribution of nationality. Nationality shall be granted “at 
birth, by operation of the law” or “upon an application being lodged with the 
appropriate authority”. In the latter case, the contracting states may make the grant 
of nationality “subject to one or more conditions”.24 The conditions that may be set 
relate to: the period during which the application for nationality may be lodged, 
substantiation of the genuine link with the state through a certain length of habitual 
residence, the criterion that the person must be free from particular criminal 
convictions and the requirement that the individual has always been stateless.25 If 
the conditions are met, an application for nationality may not be rejected.26 
Introducing the possibility of setting such additional criteria for the attribution of 
nationality to persons who would otherwise be stateless was a conscious choice of 
state representatives when the draft convention was being discussed.27 The absence 
of such escape clauses in the Draft Convention on the Elimination of Future 
Statelessness was the reason why it was not taken up for discussion by states who 
preferred the alternative Draft Convention on the Reduction of Future 
Statelessness.28 The effect of these additional sub-paragraphs in articles 1 and 4 is 
already explained by the difference in title between the two International Law 
Commission’s drafts: without such clauses the provisions would (if adopted by all 
states) eliminate statelessness in future,29 while the best that can be achieved if such 
                                                           
24 Article 1, paragraph 1 and article 4, paragraph 1; 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. 
25 These conditions are housed in article 1, paragraph 2 and article 4, paragraph 2; 1961 Convention on 
the Reduction of Statelessness. 
26 Article 1, paragraph 1b and article 4, paragraph 1b; 1961 Convention on the Reduction of 
Statelessness. 
27 In particular this move was a concession to the jus sanguinis states. Paul Weis, Nationality and 
Statelessness in International Law, Kluwer Academic Publishers Group, Dordrecht: 1979, page 166. 
28 As explained in chapter III, section 3, the Draft Convention on the Eradication of Future 
Statelessness was simply considered too radical; Carol Batchelor, 'Stateless Persons: Some Gaps in 
International Protection', in International Journal of Refugee Law, Vol. 7, 1995, page 250; UNHCR and 
IPU, Nationality and statelessness. A handbook for parliamentarians, 2005, page 12. 





additional conditions are set is a reduction in the number of cases that will arise.30 
In fact, the text of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, in the 
form that it was eventually adopted, allows many more conditions to be set for the 
attribution of nationality than the Draft Convention included.31 At the time, states 
were clearly not ready to make such drastic changes to their municipal nationality 
acts. These limitations in the effect of the 1961 Convention reaffirm the need to 
look elsewhere in the international legal framework for comparable or even stronger 
obligations upon states to address this problem with the required clout. This will be 
done shortly, but first we must see how the 1961 Convention deals with the 
weaknesses in the unilateral application of the jus sanguinis and jus soli doctrines 
that may also lead to statelessness.  
In section 1 above, four situations that may lead to statelessness under a jus 
sanguinis system were discussed: the restrictions posed on continuous transferral of 
nationality jus sanguinis after taking up residence abroad, the treatment of 
illegitimate children, gender-sensitive jus sanguinis regulations and the inheritance 
of statelessness. The first case involved the relatively recent development in a 
number of countries – the example given was Britain – of preventing nationality 
from being passed on indefinitely from one generation to the next through the jus 
sanguinis doctrine if the family has long since taken up permanent residence 
abroad. This practice heightens the risk of a newborn being overlooked by the 
nationality acts of all relevant states. The 1961 Statelessness Convention does not 
explicitly deal with this type of policy – it was adopted before these restrictions 
were imposed by Britain and others – yet the general provision of article 1 provides 
a remedy. If the parents are prevented from transmitting their nationality jus 
sanguinis due to this type of restriction with the result that their child would be 
stateless, the state upon whose territory the child is born is simply required to grant 
nationality. If this is not a state party, but the country of nationality of the parents is, 
article 4 prescribes the attribution of nationality jus sanguinis after all, as an 
exception to the restriction imposed, because the child would otherwise be stateless. 
The Statelessness Convention thereby offers the same level of protection against 
statelessness in these particular circumstances as in the case of a general conflict of 
nationality laws – subject to the same conditions. An identical conclusion can be 
drawn about the way in which the 1961 Convention works to prevent the 
inheritance of statelessness (the fourth of the concerns mentioned in relation to the 
jus sanguinis doctrine). No explicit reference is made to the strategy to be employed 
by jus sanguinis countries in the event of statelessness of the parents, but if the 
child would thereby “otherwise be stateless” then nationality must be attributed by 
the Contracting States according to article 1 or 4.  
This leaves us with the two other jus sanguinis trouble spots: the distinction 
made in some jus sanguinis states between legitimate and illegitimate children and 
gender-sensitive nationality acts. They will be considered together as they are 
closely related since in both scenarios the risk of statelessness is heightened in that 
                                                           
30 The child in question will also remain stateless from his birth until such a time as such requirements 
can be met. 
31 For example, articles 1 and 4 of the Draft Convention on the Reduction of Future Statelessness as put 
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a child can rely on only one parent for the acquisition of nationality through the 
bloodline.32 Looking at the 1961 Statelessness Convention, we could simply refer 
once more to the general obligation under article 1 and 4 to grant nationality jus soli 
(and failing that jus sanguinis) to a child who would otherwise be stateless. 
However, there are a few details in these provisions that should not be overlooked. 
Article 1, paragraph 3 is of particular interest: 
 
Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 1 (b) and 2 of this article, a child 
born in wedlock in the territory of a Contracting State, whose mother has the 
nationality of that State, shall acquire at birth that nationality if it otherwise would 
be stateless.33  
 
The effect of this provision is to prescribe an absolute obligation to grant nationality 
jus soli to a legitimate child who would otherwise be stateless, if the child’s mother 
also possesses the nationality of the state. In such cases, nationality must be 
attributed automatically at birth by operation of the law and no additional 
conditions may be set. This provision tells us two things. Firstly, in requiring that 
the child be born in wedlock, it copies the differentiation of treatment found in 
many municipal regulations between legitimate and illegitimate children. The 
Convention thereby accepts the legitimacy of such a distinction. Secondly, this text 
hints that gender-sensitive legislation may not be acceptable. It did not appear 
necessary to compose a provision of this sort for the case in which the father holds 
the nationality of the state. This is because, if the father holds the nationality, the 
legitimate child will almost without exception simply acquire that nationality 
automatically through the jus sanguinis doctrine. The provision is only relevant in 
states where the nationality act is gender sensitive and would not normally prescribe 
the attribution of nationality through the maternal bloodline.  
An additional indication that the 1961 Convention does not approve of a 
gender imbalance can be traced in article 1, paragraph 4 and article 4, paragraph 1. 
There it states that if a child’s parents do not possess the same nationality, “the 
question of whether the nationality of the person concerned should follow that of 
the father or that of the mother shall be determined by the national law of that 
contracting state”.34 It has moved away from the original Draft Convention as 
presented by the International Law Commission which determined that “the 
nationality of the father shall prevail over that of the mother”35 to be more 
conducive of the principle of equality of men and women. All this being said, there 
is no outright prohibition of gender-sensitive nationality acts, so some problems 
                                                           
32 Recall that in the case of illegitimate children, the paternal bond is often not (automatically) 
recognised by the state, meaning that the child must rely on the mother for inheritance of nationality. 
Where a state has promulgated gender-sensitive legislation, nationality can generally be transmitted 
through the paternal bond only, meaning that the child is reliant on the father for his nationality. In a 
state that combines these two policies, an illegitimate child will be unable to acquire a nationality jus 
sanguinis as the paternal bond is not formally recognised and the maternal bond is irrelevant for 
transferral of nationality. 
33 Article 1, paragraph 3 of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness.  
34 Article 1, paragraph 4 and article 4, paragraph 1 of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of 
Statelessness. 





may still arise. Moreover, the additional condition in article 1, paragraph 3 that the 
child be born in wedlock means that illegitimate children will still fall prey to 
gender-sensitive jus sanguinis legislation.  
The final issue to be considered under the heading of jus sanguinis vs. jus soli 
is the difficulty of defining the precise territory of the state for the purposes of 
attribution of nationality jus soli. Recall that in the absence of an effective answer to 
this question, births in particular locations such as on board a ship or aircraft, may 
fall outside of the range of application of jus soli and produce cases of original 
statelessness. The 1961 Statelessness Convention affirms what has repeatedly been 
suggested as the most appropriate approach: 
 
For the purpose of determining the obligations of Contracting States under 
this Convention, birth on a ship or in an aircraft shall be deemed to have 
taken place in the territory of the State whose flag the ship flies or in the 
territory of the State in which the aircraft is registered, as the case may be.36 
 
While this provision is only applicable to situations governed by the Convention – 
the Convention was formulated to prevent statelessness, not as an international code 
of nationality37 - it may be informative in guiding states as to how the definition of 
territory for the purposes of the attribution of nationality jus soli should be 
undertaken. Furthermore, if a contracting state that grants nationality jus soli has 
not adopted this as a blanket approach, it will nevertheless be forced to do so where 
the child would otherwise be stateless on the basis of article 1 and this article 3 of 
the Convention. Overall then, the assessment of the 1961 Statelessness 
Convention’s approach to jus sanguinis and jus soli issues has produced mixed 
results, dealing effectively with some of the situations, but allowing some cases of 
original statelessness to slip through the net. The next task is to perform a similar 
evaluation of international human rights instruments. 
 
1.2 International human rights law 
 
During the formulation of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) – one of the instruments designed to transpose the ideals in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights into binding legal obligations – the 
provision relating to nationality underwent an interesting transformation. Where the 
Universal Declaration proclaimed a general right to a nationality, the Covenant 
refers only to the nationality of children: “Every child has the right to acquire a 
nationality”.38 It appears that nationality issues and statelessness were still 
considered too complex to enable states to reach a consensus on a general 
affirmation of the right to a nationality. States agreed, however, that every child 
                                                           
36 Article 3 of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. 
37 Paul Weis, Nationality and Statelessness in International Law, Kluwer Academic Publishers Group, 
Dordrecht: 1979, page 253. 
38 Article 24, paragraph 3, 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
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should acquire an original nationality, even if no firm decision could be made on 
the right of an individual to be protected against statelessness later in life.39 
Although this brief mention of the right of every child to acquire a nationality 
does not seem to provide enough detail for a substantive, concrete obligation on 
state parties, the interpretation provided by the Human Rights Committee charged 
with monitoring the implementation of the Covenant suggests otherwise in its 
General Comment 17: 
 
While the purpose of this provision is to prevent a child from being 
afforded less protection by society and the State because he is stateless, it 
does not necessarily make it an obligation for States to give their 
nationality to every child born in their territory. However, States are 
required to adopt every appropriate measure, both internally and in 
cooperation with other States, to ensure that every child has a nationality 
when he is born.40 
 
These few lines provide us with a much better understanding of the substance of the 
obligation. There is indeed a very concrete obligation on states to adopt measures to 
prevent statelessness at birth, including mechanisms to prevent statelessness from 
arising from a conflict of jus sanguinis and jus soli doctrines. The most interesting 
segment of the text cited above is this: “it does not necessarily make it an obligation 
for States to give their nationality to every child born in their territory”. While 
clearly, the Covenant does not prescribe universal adoption of the jus soli doctrine, 
the Human Rights Committee seems to suggest that states – if failing to secure 
another solution - may well be obliged to grant nationality to a child born on the 
territory of the state if the child would otherwise be stateless.41 In the years since 
the adoption of this General Comment, the Human Rights Committee has clarified 
its views on the obligations of states still further in the Concluding Observations of 
a number of country reports. For example, in the consideration of Colombia’s report 
in 1997, the Committee reminded the state of its duty to ensure that every child 
born in Colombia enjoys its right to acquire a nationality. It went on to declare that 
“the State party should consider conferring Colombian nationality on stateless 
children born in Colombia”.42 More recently, Syria was urged to provide a 
nationality to the Syrian-born children of stateless Kurds.43 Clearly then, the 
Committee is advocating the application of jus soli as an exceptional measure 
where the child would otherwise be stateless – such as in the event of a conflict of 
laws - in order to substantiate the obligation laid down in article 24 of the Covenant. 
                                                           
39 Johannes Chan, 'The Right to a Nationality as a Human Right - The Current Trend Towards 
Recognition', in Human Rights Law Journal, Vol. 12, 1991, page 4. 
40 Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment No. 17: Rights of the Child (Art. 24), Geneva: 7 
April 1989, paragraph 8. 
41 Johannes Chan, 'The Right to a Nationality as a Human Right - The Current Trend Towards 
Recognition', in Human Rights Law Journal, Vol. 12, 1991, page 5. 
42 Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations: Colombia, A/52/40 vol.1, Geneva: 1997,  
paragraph 306. 
43 Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations: Syrian Arab Republic, A/60/40 vol. 1, Geneva: 





Almost 25 years after the adoption of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) was settled. In its 
article 7 it copies the Covenant by including the right of a child to “acquire a 
nationality”.44 The second paragraph of this provision takes things a step further by 
reminding states that particular care must be taken to avoid statelessness - this being 
considered a worthy enough goal to receive special mention. Sadly, the Committee 
on the Rights of the Child has yet to issue a General Comment on this article of the 
Convention, so we must rely on the reading of its Concluding Observations to 
country reports to unearth the proper interpretation of this treaty provision.45 While 
these documents provide ample references to the right of children to a nationality, 
there is no indication that the Committee would favour the attribution of nationality 
jus soli where the child would otherwise be stateless. In fact, the Committee does 
not express any preference with regards to the mechanisms to be adopted by states 
to prevent statelessness or deal with a conflict of nationality laws, it merely calls for 
“expedited” or “facilitated” procedures for the acquisition of citizenship to reduce 
the number of stateless children.46  
Looking at how regional instruments have approached this question, we see 
that historically there has been a considerable divergence in approach which in 
recent years has been undergoing significant harmonisation. In 1950, the European 
Convention on Human Rights was established, but this instrument does not include 
a right to a nationality. When the Organisation of American States formulated the 
American Convention on Human Rights – its answer to the European Convention - 
in 1969, they included the most far-reaching right to a nationality in a legally 
binding human rights document to date. When a conflict of laws would result in 
original statelessness, the American Convention clearly prescribes the adoption of 
jus soli to ensure that those individuals acquire a nationality: “Every person has the 
right to the nationality of the state in whose territory he was born if he does not 
have the right to any other nationality”.47 The adoption of this radical but 
commendable and simple solution to the problem of statelessness at birth can be 
explained through the observation that jus soli is already the preferred method of 
                                                           
44 It should be noted that the wording chosen for the Convention on the Rights of the Child – the right 
to “acquire a nationality” – deviated from the UN Declaration on the Rights of the Child which 
enunciated a child’s entitlement from his birth to “a nationality”. This choice has been explained with 
the reasoning that states were unwilling to accept any general obligation to implement jus soli. Jaap 
Doek, 'The CRC and the Right to Acquire and to Preserve a Nationality', in Refugee Survey Quarterly, 
Vol. 25, 2006, page 26. 
45 The Committee on the Rights of the Child has requested that states include in their periodic reports 
information on “measures adopted pursuant to article 7, paragraph 2, to ensure the child’s right to 
acquire a nationality, in particular where the child would otherwise be stateless”. UN Committee on the 
Rights of the Child, General guidelines regarding the form and contents of periodic reports to be 
submitted by state parties, CRC/C/58, 20 November 1996, para. 53. 
46 This may involve attributing nationality to children born on state territory, but need not take the form 
of automatic jus soli conferral of citizenship – it is sufficient to provide facilitated naturalisation. 
Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations: Czech Republic, CRC/C/15/Add.201, 
Geneva: 18 March 2003, para. 38; Estonia, CRC/C/15/Add.196, Geneva: 17 March 2003, para. 29; 
Kazakhstan, CRC/C/15/Add.213, Geneva: 10 July 2003, para. 33; Romania, CRC/C/15/Add.199, 
Geneva: 18 March 2003, para. 33; Syrian Arab Republic, CRC/C/15/Add.212, Geneva: 10 July 2003, 
para. 33. 
47 Article 20, paragraph 2, American Convention on Human Rights, 1969. 
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nationality attribution in the Americas.48 Meanwhile, on the African continent, 
another regional human rights document was composed. Adopted in 1981, the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights is – just like the European 
Convention – entirely silent on the question of nationality.49 
However, newer European and African instruments are illustrative of a more 
proactive approach to the problem of statelessness at birth. The European 
Convention on Nationality was drafted under the auspices of the Council of Europe 
and opened for signature on the 6th of November 1997.50 Although not strictly a 
human rights document, but rather a consolidation of developments in municipal 
and international law with regard to nationality,51 it aims to ensure the respect of a 
number of basic human rights principles in the field of nationality.52 Many of the 
Convention’s provisions are therefore of importance in preventing statelessness, 
including statelessness at birth. In dealing with original statelessness it provides for 
jus soli attribution of nationality to children either automatically at birth or later, 
upon application to the appropriate authority. In the event of the latter, the European 
Convention also allows the state party to impose the additional conditions of 
“lawful and habitual residence on its territory for a period not exceeding five years 
immediately preceding the lodging of the application” and that the child has 
“remained stateless”.53 It is interesting to note that despite being inspired by the 
1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, this provision in the European 
Convention on Nationality differs substantively from its counterpart on a number of 
points, not all of them positive. While the European Convention does not permit the 
imposition of a condition linked to criminal convictions,54 the time limit for 
application for nationality is less favourable as are the residence requirements.55 For 
                                                           
48 Carol Batchelor, 'Statelessness and the Problem of Resolving Nationality Status', in International 
Journal of Refugee Law, Vol. 10, 1998, page 170. 
49 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 1981. 
50 At the time of writing, the European Convention on Nationality counted 17 Contracting States; 
Council of Europe Treaty Office, http://conventions.coe.int  
51 Council of Europe, European Convention on Nationality: Explanatory report, Strasbourg: 1997. 
52 Article 4 of the European Convention on Nationality determines that “The rules on nationality of 
each State Party shall be based on the following principles: 
a. everyone has the right to a nationality; 
b. statelessness shall be avoided; 
c. no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his or her nationality; 
d. neither marriage nor the dissolution of a marriage between a national of a State Party and an 
alien, nor the change of nationality by one of the spouses during marriage, shall 
automatically affect the nationality of the other spouse.” 
53 Article 6, paragraph 2 of the European Convention on Nationality, 1997. On the impact of the 
condition of lawful residence on access to nationality for irregular migrants, see chapter VII. 
54 The 1961 Statelessness Convention allows states to make the attribution of nationality conditional 
upon the person “neither being convicted of an offence against national security nor […] sentenced to 
imprisonment for a term of five years or more on a criminal charge”, see article 1, paragraph 2 c) of the 
1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. 
55 The 1961 Statelessness Convention determines that in delineating the period in which applications 
for nationality may be lodged, this period may begin no later than when the individual reaches the age 
of 18 years and end no earlier than when he attains the age of 21. The applicant must moreover be 
assured at least one full year upon reaching the age of majority in the relevant state in which they can 
submit the application of their own accord. The European Convention on Nationality on the other hand 





approximately half of the state parties to the European Convention on Nationality, 
these remarkable differences between the two texts will be of little consequence for 
they have also acceded to the 1961 Statelessness Convention and are obliged to 
offer individuals the most favourable treatment available.56  
Turning back to Africa, we see that the concept of granting nationality jus soli 
to children who would otherwise be stateless has now also permeated that region. 
The 1999 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child proclaims not 
only a general right of every child to acquire a nationality, but also specifies that: 
 
State Parties to the Charter shall undertake to ensure that their Constitutional 
legislation recognises the principles according to which a child shall acquire 
the nationality of the State in the territory in which he was born if, at the 
time of the child’s birth, he is not granted nationality by any other State in 
accordance with its laws.57 
 
These recent developments at regional level, combined with what has already been 
said of the universal human rights obligations, attest to a conclusion that was 
already drawn well over a decade ago by a number of scholars: that there is 
evidence of a general obligation under international law for states to grant 
nationality to children born on their territory who would otherwise be stateless.58 
                                                                                                                                               
person “below the age of 18 years unless, under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained 
earlier”. Once the person has reached the age of majority, the window of opportunity to acquiring 
nationality closes. This provision means, in effect, that the stateless child be dependent on the action of 
his parents to acquire a nationality since it is likely that they will have to submit the application on his 
behalf. With regard to the residency requirements, the 1961 Statelessness Convention allows states to 
set a qualifying period of habitual residence, not exceeding 5 years immediately preceding the 
application for nationality or 10 years in total. By contrast, the European Convention on Nationality 
clearly demands lawful and habitual residence for a period not exceeding 5 years immediately prior to 
submitting an application for nationality. These conditions are harder to meet because they ignore the 
duration of residence accrued overall, taking into account only the period immediately prior to 
application and render ineligible any children who are irregularly present in the state. See for an 
explanation of the terms in the European Convention on Nationality Council of Europe, European 
Convention on Nationality: Explanatory report, Strasbourg: 1997, page 34.  The significance of the 
requirement of lawful residence is investigated further in chapter VII, section 2.1. 
56 See article 26 of the European Convention on Nationality, 1997 and article 13 of the 1961 
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. 
57 Article 6, paragraph 4 of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, 1999. Note that 
the phrase “undertake to ensure” weakens the obligation enunciated here. 
58 See for example Ruth Donner, "Chapter 4: Human Rights Conventions and other Instruments" in The 
Regulation of Nationality in International Law, Transnational Publishers, New York: 1994, page 230; 
Johannes Chan, 'The Right to a Nationality as a Human Right - The Current Trend Towards 
Recognition', in Human Rights Law Journal, Vol. 12, 1991, page 11; and more recently David 
Weissbrodt, Final Report on Prevention of Discrimination - The Rights of Non-Citizens, 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/23, 26 May 2003, page 6. Recent instruments on nationality and statelessness in the 
context of state succession also prescribe jus soli attribution of nationality to children who would 
otherwise be stateless thanks to the effect that the succession of states had on the nationality of their 
parents. See chapter VI, section 3. Meanwhile the recently adopted Covenant on the Rights of the Child 
in Islam emphasises the importance of both jus soli and jus sanguinis measures where it calls upon 
states to “resolve the issue of statelessness for any child born on their territories or to any of their 
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While I feel that the arguments put forward in the past have not always been 
entirely convincing,59 I would – particularly in view of these most recent 
developments – agree with their conclusion. The obligation emanating from the 
human rights field thereby reinforces the strategy adopted in the 1961 Convention 
on the Reduction of Statelessness, although no further guidance is provided on how 
this commitment should be implemented and whether additional conditions may be 
set. 
Alongside a general duty to avoid creating statelessness at birth, human rights 
instruments and their guardians have also addressed some of the particular 
deficiencies of municipal laws and policies that heighten the risk of statelessness, 
providing in some cases strong and explicit obligations for states. As to restrictions 
placed on continued inheritance of nationality jus sanguinis after several 
generations of residence abroad, only the Human Rights Committee has expressed 
concern at this practice. It did so in its Concluding Observations on Zimbabwe’s 
state report in 1998: “it is also of concern that children born to Zimbabweans 
abroad may not acquire Zimbabwean citizenship”.60 The Constitution of the 
Republic of Zimbabwe and the Citizenship of Zimbabwe Act provide for the 
attribution of two main categories of citizenship: “citizenship by descent” and 
                                                                                                                                               
citizens outside their territory”. Article 7, paragraph 2 of the Covenant on the Rights of the Child in 
Islam. 
59 For example, I do not agree that the near universal ratification of the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child is in itself enough to testify to the existence of an international norm prescribing the application 
of jus soli to the children of non-citizen parents as suggested by Weissbrodt in David Weissbrodt, Final 
Report on Prevention of Discrimination - The Rights of Non-Citizens, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/23, 26 May 
2003. This is not laid down as such in the Convention, nor – as we have seen - has it been prescribed by 
the Committee on the Rights of the Child. Indeed records of the drafting process of the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child show that a deliberate move was made away from prescribing jus soli attribution 
of nationality to a child who would otherwise be stateless towards a more open provision that 
recognises the equal validity of jus sanguinis regimes. See Sharon Detrick, The United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht: 1992, pages 123-131; Sharon 
Detrick, A commentary on the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, Kluwer, The 
Hague: 1999, page 151. A General Comment would be warmly welcomed on the right to acquire a 
nationality under the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Rather, evidence of universal acceptance 
of the attribution of nationality jus soli to a child who would otherwise be stateless is to my mind 
provided by the inclusion of this principle in a number of important regional instruments and the 
interpretation of article 24 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights by the Human Rights 
Committee. Nor can I agree with the contention in “The Human Rights of Stateless Persons”, that 
article 5 of the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination precludes jus sanguinis laws 
altogether as this article is simply a restatement of the right to equal enjoyment – free from 
discrimination – of the right to a nationality. It does not in any way give precedence to either the jus 
soli or the jus sanguinis doctrine. Nor can it be maintained that the adherence to jus sanguinis is of 
itself a violation of the right to a nationality, it is simply one - widely accepted and utilised – method of 
attributing nationality at birth by equating the genuine link with the state to the parentage of the child. 
David Weissbrodt; Clay Collins, 'The Human Rights of Stateless Persons', in Human Rights Quarterly, 
Vol. 28, 2006, page 256. 
60 Human Right Committee, Concluding Observations: Zimbabwe, A/53/40 vol. 1, Geneva: 1998,  
paragraph 221; Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations: Lithuania, 





“citizenship otherwise than by descent”.61 Similarly to the British example given 
earlier, citizens by descent (those already born outside the territory of Zimbabwe) 
are restricted in their right to pass on that citizenship to their children. The Human 
Rights Committee picked out this policy in the consideration of Zimbabwe’s report 
because it may lead to statelessness. Moreover, the principle of non-discrimination 
between nationals in the enjoyment of rights may stand in the way of such 
policies.62 As to the inheritance of statelessness, both the Human Rights Committee 
and the Committee on the Rights of the Child have expressed concern at any policy 
which allows the children of stateless parents to be deprived of a nationality of 
origin, hinting that nationality should then be granted jus soli by the state upon 
whose territory the child is born.63 The Committee on the Rights of the Child even 
makes it clear that the residence status of the parents cannot influence the 
acquisition of nationality of a child in this way if the parents are stateless.64 These 
statements point to a general condemnation of the practice of allowing statelessness 
to be inherited.65  
Next we come to the difficulties associated with illegitimate children and 
gender-sensitive nationality acts. This is an area in which we saw that the 1961 
Statelessness Convention was less forthcoming. Interestingly, the human rights 
field is very much outspoken on these issues. To begin with, the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights determines that children are entitled to equal 
protection of their rights whether born in or out of wedlock.66 Furthermore, the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child provides that the rights which it houses are to 
be enjoyed by all children “irrespective of the child’s or his or her parent’s or legal 
guardian’s race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national, 
ethnic or social origin, property, disability, birth or other status”.67 While the 
marital status of the parents is not mentioned explicitly as an unlawful ground for 
discrimination, the enumeration of grounds is not exhaustive, so discrimination 
between legitimate and illegitimate children may be prohibited under the general 
reference to “other status”. It can therefore be argued that the enjoyment of the right 
to acquire a nationality as proclaimed in article 7 of the convention should be 
protected equally for children born in and out of wedlock. The Concluding 
Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child on a number of state 
                                                           
61 See articles 5 and 6 of the Constitution of the Republic of Zimbabwe, 18 April 1980 and the 
preliminary paragraphs of the Citizenship of Zimbabwe Act [Chapter 4:01], 1 December 1984. 
62 These policies in effect differentiate between persons who acquired citizenship by descent and those 
who gained nationality otherwise than by descent in the enjoyment of the ability to pass on nationality 
jus sanguinis, thus in effect creating two classes of citizenship. Discrimination between nationals 
should be avoided. Article 5, paragraph 2 of the European Convention on Nationality. 
63 Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations: Kuwait, Geneva: 27 July 2000, paragraph 481; 
Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations:Liechtenstein, CRC/C/103, Geneva: 
2001, paragraph 89; Lithuania, CRC/C/103, Geneva: 2001, paragraphs 274 and 275; Syrian Arab 
Republic, CRC/C/132, Geneva: 2003, paragraph 558. 
64 CRC, Concluding Observations: Lithuania, CRC/C/103, Geneva: 2001, paragraph 274. 
65 Such sentiments can also be traced in, for example, article II, paragraph a of Recommendation R 
(1999) 18 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on the Avoidance and Reduction of 
Statelessness, Council of Europe, 1999. See also the explanatory memorandum accompanying this 
recommendation, paragraph 65. 
66 Article 25, paragraph 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948. 
67 Emphasis added; article 2, paragraph 1 of the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
 
 
Addressing the Technical Causes of Statelessness 
 65 
party reports confirm this interpretation. The Committee has expressed concern at 
the discrimination between legitimate and illegitimate children in the field of 
nationality and in particular at the restrictions imposed on the transmission of 
nationality from father to child in the case of illegitimate children.68 Thus while the 
1961 Statelessness Convention itself distinguished between children born in and out 
of wedlock for the enjoyment of the rights promulgated, this differentiation has in 
recent years been interpreted as unlawful discrimination under the most widely 
accepted human rights instrument in existence.69 The other UN instruments and 
treaty bodies and the regional human rights mechanisms have not addressed this 
specific problem. At the regional level, the messages are mixed. The American 
Convention on Human Rights prescribes equal rights for children born in and out of 
wedlock.70 Meanwhile the European Convention on Nationality appears to admit to 
the possibility of different treatment by determining that the conferral of nationality 
“to children whose parenthood is established by recognition, court order or similar 
procedures” may be subject to the procedure set out under domestic law.71 Further 
guidance is needed as to how this provision should be implemented with a view to 
avoiding statelessness and respecting the aforementioned concern for non-
discrimination between children on the basis of the parent’s marital status.72 
Where gender-imbalanced nationality acts are concerned there is ample 
evidence that this amounts to prohibited discrimination on the grounds of gender. In 
fact, there are so many references to that effect that to mention them all would be to 
fill countless pages with text; therefore what follows is a carefully selected 
overview. Firstly, it cannot be ignored that the principle of non-discrimination, 
including on the grounds of gender, has become a matter of customary international 
law.73 This is evidenced not only by the inclusion of this principle in the preambles 
and among the fundamental principles espoused by the Charter of the United 
Nations, but also by its affirmation in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
and every important human rights instrument adopted to date.74 Moreover, the 
international community has devoted an entire Convention to the realisation of this 
principle: the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
                                                           
68 See for example the Concluding observations on the United Kingdom where reference is made to 
article 2 together with article 7, in Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations: 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, CRC/C/38, Geneva: 1995, paragraph 214 and 
again in CRC, Concluding Observations: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 
CRC/C/121, Geneva: 2002, paragraph 114. See also CRC, Concluding Observations: Lebanon, 
CRC/C/54, Geneva: 1996, paragraph 39; Japan, CRC/C/137, Geneva: 2004, paragraphs 626 and 627. 
69 The Convention on the Rights of the Child has been ratified by all by 2 of the world’s states. 
70 Article 17, paragraph 5 of the American Convention. 
71 Article 6, paragraph 1(a) of the European Convention on Nationality. 
72 Committee of Experts on Nationality, Report on Conditions for the Acquisition and Loss of 
Nationality, Strasbourg: 14 January 2003, page 6. 
73 Malcolm Shaw, International Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 2003, page 257; 
Vladimir Kartashkin, The rights of women married to foreigners, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/34, 30 June 2003, 
page 6. 
74 The prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of sex is included in article 1 of the UN Charter; 
article 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; article 2 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; article 2 





against Women.75 States are thereby compelled to eradicate discriminatory 
legislation and policy, which would include such instruments as nationality 
regulations. In fact, this issue is considered of such great importance that the 
convention explicitly prohibits gender-sensitive nationality acts in article 9: “States 
Parties shall grant women equal rights with men with respect to the nationality of 
their children”.76 The Committee responsible for overseeing the implementation of 
the convention has been very active in pushing states to incorporate this obligation 
into their municipal nationality acts.77  
As mentioned, all of the major human rights instruments adopted under the 
auspices of the United Nations contain a clause prohibiting gender discrimination in 
the enjoyment of the rights set out in that document – including, where applicable, a 
child’s right to acquire a nationality. Clearly this prohibits discrimination between 
boys and girls in the attribution of nationality to a child at birth. However, it also 
outlaws discrimination between the mother and the father’s ability to transmit their 
nationality where the state has adopted the jus sanguinis doctrine. This point has 
been made repeatedly in the responses to country reports by the Human Rights 
Committee, under article 24 and article 2 of the ICCPR78 and the Committee on the 
Rights of the Child under article 7 and article 2 of the CRC.79  
More surprising is the discovery that the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights has also taken up the cause. In response to numerous state reports 
over the past decade, this committee has noted any gender imbalance identified in 
nationality legislation. At first, these references were relatively neutral in tone, such 
as in the concluding observations on the report from the Republic of Korea in 1996: 
“Notice is also taken of such anachronistic rules as the legal inability of a woman in 
                                                           
75 Aopted on the 18th of December 1979, entered into force on the 3rd of September 1981 and now 
boasting an impressive 180 State Parties. 
76 Article 9, paragraph 2 of the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women. It should however be noted that, while the Convention itself has been widely ratified, 
this article on the equality of men and women with respect to nationality matters (both paragraphs 1 and 
2) has been the subject of a substantial number of reservations and interpretative declarations by state 
parties. For a discussion of this phenomenon, see UN Division for the Advancement of Women, 
Women, nationality and citizenship, June 2003, pages 15-16. 
77 See the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Concluding Observations: 
Morocco, A/52/38/Rev.1 part I, New York: 1997, paragraph 63; Turkey, A/52/38/Rev.1 part I New 
York: 1997, paragraph 200; Algeria, A/54/38/Rev.1 part I, New York: 1999, paragraph 83; India, 
A/55/38 part I, New York: 2000, paragraph 50; Jordan, A/55/38 part I, New York: 2000, paragraph 
172; Maldives, A/56/38 part I, New York: 2001, paragraph 127; Singapore, A/56/38 part II, New York: 
2001, paragraph 75; Sri Lanka, A/57/38 part I, New York: 2002, paragraph 275.  
78 Some examples can be found in the following reports: Human Rights Committee, Concluding 
Observations: Jordan, A/49/40 vol. I, Geneva: 1994, paragraph 232; Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, A/54/40 
vol. I, Geneva: 1999, paragraph 137; Monaco, A/56/40 vol. I, Geneva: 2001, paragraph 84; Yemen, 
A/57/40 vol. I, Geneva: 2002, paragraph 83 (11); Egypt, A/58/40 vol. I, Geneva: 2003, paragraph 
77(10); Morocco, A/60/40 vol. I , Geneva: 2005, paragraph 32. 
79 For example in Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations: Iraq, CRC/C/80, 
Geneva: 1998, paragraph 76; Kuwait, CRC/C/80, Geneva: 1998, paragraph 138; Egypt, CRC/C/103 , 
Geneva: 2001, paragraphs 224-225; Saudi Arabia, CRC/C/103, Geneva: 2001, paragraph 397; Bhutan, 
CRC/C/108, Geneva: 2001, paragraph 459; Lebanon, CRC/C/114, Geneva: 2002, paragraph 81; Brunei 
Darussalam, CRC/C/133, Geneva: 2003, paragraphs 359-360; Indonesia, CRC/C/137, Geneva: 2004, 
paragraphs 58 and 60; Togo, CRC/C/146, Geneva: 2005, paragraph 547. 
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certain cases to vest her nationality in her child”.80 Similar terms are used in respect 
of Cyprus’ report in 1999.81 With the new millennium came a more stern approach 
by the Committee which began to “express concern” at such discriminatory 
nationality regulations.82 It is not only this gradual introduction of stronger 
language by the Committee which is interesting, but the very reference to 
nationality acts at all. The legal basis in the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights for this step is not immediately obvious. One possibility 
would be an expansive reading of article 10, paragraph 1 which deals with the 
protection of the family, in particular in the care of dependent children.83 This can 
be read in combination with article 2, paragraph 2 which contains the general 
prohibition of discrimination and article 3 which clearly espouses the equal right of 
men and women to the enjoyment of the rights contained in the Covenant. On the 
other hand, it is feasible that the Committee simply felt compelled to respond to the 
finding of discriminatory laws in any field in its role as a human rights body and in 
view of the fundamental nature of the prohibition of gender discrimination.  
 Since the consideration of universal instruments has already provided 
sufficient evidence of an internationally accepted prohibition of gender-
discrimination, including in the formulation of nationality acts, we need only briefly 
look at regional documents. Unsurprisingly, we find that all relevant instruments 
have included a general non-discrimination clause as one of the first provisions in 
the text.84 In the African context, the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa contains not only a general 
equality clause, but also a specific provision on the matter. This article states that “a 
woman and a man shall have equal rights, with respect to the nationality of their 
children”, going on, however, to qualify this by adding “except where this is 
contrary to a provision in national legislation or is contrary to national security 
interests”.85 This last phrase is at the very least questionable for it appears to nullify 
                                                           
80 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations: Republic of Korea, 
E/1996/22, New York and Geneva: 1995, paragraph 73.  
81 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations : Cyprus, E/1999/22 
New York and Geneva: 1998, paragraph 291. 
82 In the field of UN diplomacy and human rights, “expresses concern” finds itself somewhere in the 
middle of the scale of language used, with “notes” being at the milder end and “condemns” at the 
stronger. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations:Jordan, 
E/2001/22, New Yorka and Geneva: 2000, paragraph 234; Nepal, E/2002/22, New York and Geneva: 
2001, paragraph 533. 
83 The provision reads as follows: “State Parties to the present Covenant recognise that […] the widest 
possible protection and assistance should be accorded to the family, which is the natural and 
fundamental group unit of society, particularly for its establishment and while it is responsible for the 
care and education of dependent children”, article 10, paragraph 1 of the 1966 International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
84 Article 1 of the American Convention on Human Rights, 1969; article 2 of the African Charter on the 
Rights and Welfare of the Child, 1999 and article 5 of the European Convention on Nationality, 1997.  
85 Article 6, section h of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the 
Rights of Women in Africa, 2003. The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights also prescribes 
the “elimination of every discrimination against women” and the “protection of the rights of women 
and the child as stipulated in international declarations and conventions”, which would include the 
universal human rights instruments already discussed; article 18, paragraph 3 of the African Charter on 





the effect of the entire provision. After all, where else would the attribution of 
nationality be regulated if not in national legislation? Moreover, this clause is in 
contradiction with earlier agreements into which many of the state parties have 
entered, among which the clearly formulated article 9 of the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination again Women.86 The prohibition of 
discrimination belongs to the group of human rights which cannot be derogated, 
even in an emergency, meaning that allowing national security considerations to 
retain precedence is equally disputable.87 In the event of a conflict, states will 
nevertheless be held by the prohibition of discrimination as a principle of customary 
international law.88 It has already been made clear that this principle is applicable to 
nationality legislation and that a gender imbalanced jus sanguinis act is 
unacceptable – whether there is a threat of ensuing statelessness or not. Here, 
international human rights law clearly goes a step further in the protection offered 
than the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness was able to achieve. 
 We have come to the last problem relating to the mechanisms for attributing 
nationality at birth: the definition of state territory for the purposes of the jus soli 
system. According to legal doctrine on the subject, states generally equate births on 
board a ship or aircraft registered under their flag to births on the territory proper of 
a state for the purposes of applying the jus soli doctrine. It is even suggested that 
this is a principle of customary international law.89 However, in the field of human 
rights this principle has not been included for codification. None of the universal or 
regional conventions discussed above prescribe a particular territorial application of 
the jus soli doctrine. Even the European Convention on Nationality remains entirely 
silent on the matter, despite being specifically designed as a consolidation of 
principles related to nationality. Since international law does provide for the 
acquisition of birth jus soli by a child who would otherwise be stateless, the 
definition of a state’s territory is of utmost importance - although births on board an 
aircraft or ship can be deemed to be very rare. It would therefore be advisable for 
the Human Rights Committee or the Committee on the Rights of the Child to 
include this question in a general comment on the right of a child to acquire a 
nationality in order to clarify the application of the jus soli principle where a child 
would otherwise be stateless. 
 
2 ABANDONED OR ORPHANED CHILDREN 
 
A category of children that is particularly vulnerable to statelessness, right from the 
very start, is that of abandoned or orphaned children.90 Children may be 
 
                                                           
86 Which as cited above has been ratified by 180 states.  
87 As stated in Ruth Donner, "Chapter 4: Human Rights Conventions and other Instruments" in The 
Regulation of Nationality in International Law, Transnational Publishers, New York: 1994, page 236 
and; Carmen Tiburcio, "Chapter IV. Fundamental Rights" in The human rights of aliens under 
international and comparative law, Kluwer Law International, The Hague: 2001, page 75. 
88 Malcolm Shaw, International Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 2003, page 257. 
89 Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 2003, page 
384. 
90 Maureen Lynch, Lives on hold: The human cost of statelessness, Washington: 2005, page 5; UNHCR 
and IPU, Nationality and statelessness. A handbook for parliamentarians, 2005, page 32. 
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Abandoned for political or economic reasons, or as a result of social practices and 
traditions. Examples of such situations include the following: preferences for 
male children, bias against interracial marriages, fear and shame of children with 
birth defects, and stigmas against women who are sexually active outside of 
marriage.91 
 
Whenever a baby is found having been abandoned, perhaps in an alleyway, at a 
train station, medical clinic, or orphanage, a problem of establishing identity arises. 
How do we know where this child was born or when? Even more problematic is the 
question: who are the baby’s parents? Without the answers to these questions, the 
legal status of the child remains undetermined and - in the absence of any special 
arrangement in the law dealing with the nationality of foundlings - he will be 
stateless. This is the case regardless of whether the state where the child is found 
attributes nationality jus soli or jus sanguinis because neither the bond by soil nor 
blood can be proven. With regards to orphaned children, particularly those who are 
orphaned at a very young age, similar problems may arise as the identity or 
nationality of their parents may be unknown. According to Carol Batchelor, 
“UNHCR has encountered thousands of stateless children in orphanages”.92 
Moreover, the problem is likely become more acute in years to come because the 
number of orphans worldwide is on the increase as the AIDS pandemic claims more 
lives.93  
 
2.1 The 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness 
 
After a lengthy discussion in section 1.1 of this chapter of articles 1, 3 and 4 of the 
1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, we now turn our attention to 
article 2, the last article to deal with original statelessness. It reads as follows: 
 
A foundling found in the territory of a Contracting State shall, in the 
absence of proof to the contrary, be considered to have been born within 
that territory of parents possessing the nationality of that state.94 
 
Once more, the wording of this provision is evidence of the compromise reached 
between jus soli and jus sanguinis countries. Rather than determining that a child 
found abandoned on the territory of the state will automatically acquire the 
nationality of that state, it declares that the child will be assumed to have both the 
necessary jus soli and jus sanguinis links with the state: born on the territory to 
                                                           
91 Youth Advocate Program International, Stateless Children – Youth who are without citizenship, 
Booklet No. 7 in a series on International Youth Issues, 2002, page 18. 
92 Carol Batchelor, "The International Legal Framework Concerning Statelessness and Access for 
Stateless Persons", European Union Seminar on the Content and Scope of International Protection: 
Panel 1 - Legal basis of international protection, Madrid: 2002, page 4. 
93 By 2003, 15 million children worldwide had been orphaned by AIDS; AVERT, Aids Orphans, 2006, 
accessible via www.avert.org/aidsorphans.htm  
94 Article 2 of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. This text uses the accepted term 





parents possessing the nationality of the state.95 This means that the child will then 
simply acquire nationality ex lege under the normal operation of the state’s 
nationality regulations - the effect being the same in both jus soli or jus sanguinis 
regimes. No attempt is made to further define the type of evidence that may be 
accepted as “proof to the contrary”, this being left to the discretion of the 
contracting states.  
 
2.2 International human rights law 
 
Beyond what has already been said in section 1.2 on a general obligation of states to 
provide a nationality to children born on their territory who would otherwise be 
stateless, international human rights instruments provide little solace in dealing with 
abandoned or orphaned children. Neither the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, nor the Convention on the Rights of the Child, mention the 
particular situation of foundlings. However, many states have recognised the 
vulnerable position of foundlings and adopted specific provisions in their domestic 
legislation to deal with their nationality status.96 Whether this was inspired by the 
poorly ratified 1961 Statelessness Convention or the older, even more poorly 
ratified 1930 Hague Convention is impossible to determine.97 Either way, there is 
evidence of a widespread state practice, carried out over a significant period of 
time, of providing foundlings with the nationality of the state on which they are 
found by special constructions in the law of both jus soli and jus sanguinis states. 
The UNHCR global questionnaire provides some quantification of this general 
practice: 86.5% of participating states reported that they provide for a legal status or 
nationality for abandoned children and orphans.98  
In order to contend that a rule of customary international law has thereby been 
established, we must also prove that states are legislating in this way due to the 
conviction that they are legally compelled to do so – the opinio juris sive 
necessitatis.99  The codification of the obligation to grant nationality to foundlings 
in the 1930 Hague Convention and the 1961 Statelessness Convention cannot be 
taken as sufficient evidence due, mainly, to the low number of state parties to both 
                                                           
95 This is a change from the Draft Convention put forward by the International Law Commission which 
simply stated that a foundling will be presumed to have been born on the territory of the state in which 
he is found, nationality then being granted jus soli under article 1 of the same draft convention if the 
child would otherwise be stateless. United Nations Yearbook of the United Nations 1954, page 421. 
96 Hudson for example already claimed this to be the case in his 1952 report. Manley Hudson, Report 
on Nationality, including Statelessness, A/CN.4/50, 21 February 1952, page 44. More recently, 
Brownlie attests to the same in Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford: 2003, page 383.  
97 The 1930 Hague Convention determines in article 14 that “A child whose parents are both unknown 
shall have the nationality of the country of birth […] A foundling is, until the contrary is proved, 
presumed to have been born on the territory of the State in which it is found”. League of Nations The 
Hague Convention on Certain Questions relating to Conflict of Nationality Laws 1930.  
98 UNHCR, Final report concerning the Questionnaire on statelessness pursuant to the Agenda for 
Protection, Geneva: March 2004, page 23. 
99 International custom is established through “evidence of a general practice accepted as law”; article 
38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, 1945. 
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instruments.100 However, it can be argued that the acceptance of a general 
obligation upon states to prevent statelessness, particularly of children, can be seen 
as the foundation for the opinio iuris: states feel compelled to address the situation 
of foundlings who would otherwise be stateless. Moreover, in the most recent 
international instrument dealing with nationality – albeit a regional convention – we 
find the following provision: 
 
Each State Party shall provide in its internal law for its nationality to be 
acquired ex lege by […] foundlings found in its territory who would 
otherwise be stateless.101 
 
Clearly, at least within the context of the Council of Europe, it was felt that this 
principle belonged among the developments in internal and international law that 
the Convention was designed to reflect. The specific right of foundlings to a 
nationality can also be found in the Covenant on the Rights of the Child in Islam, 
although this text does not specify which state is required to fulfil this right.102 
Overall then, it would seem safe to conclude that this treatment of foundlings has 
truly become a matter of international custom. Nevertheless, for the purposes of 
ensuring its universal application, increased accession to the 1961 Convention on 
the Reduction of Statelessness would be desirable and would also add to the 
supporting evidence of a customary international norm. 
 
3 MARRIAGE (OR DIVORCE) AND ADOPTION 
 
The first of the technical causes of subsequent statelessness – statelessness arising 
in later life - that we will look at here relates to a change in civil status through 
marriage, divorce or adoption. Familial ties have long been recognised by states as 
an indication of a “genuine link”. Thus, if a foreigner marries a national, this is seen 
as a ground for (at least facilitated) acquisition of the nationality of the spouse’s 
state. As an elective process, these days such (facilitated) naturalisation is usually 
open to either spouse.103 However, historically in the event of marriage it was the 
woman’s legal status which was affected as her status was considered to be 
dependent on that of her husband’s.104 She was seen to forge a bond with her 
husband’s state through the vows of matrimony and lose her genuine link with her 
state of original nationality. This perspective was translated by many states into 
laws which prescribed an automatic change of nationality of the female spouse 
                                                           
100 It is, however, important to note that the provision on foundlings was not singled out as being 
particularly controversial in the debate on the 1961 Convention and is therefore likely to be one of the 
more widely accepted of its articles. 
101 Article 6, paragraph 1 b) of the European Convention on Nationality, 1997. 
102 Article 7, paragraph 3 of the Covenant on the Rights of the Child in Islam. 
103 For example, according to the Law on Dutch Nationality, the naturalisation procedure for the non-
national spouse of a Dutch citizen is facilitated. After three years of marriage and residence under one 
roof with the Dutch spouse, the requirement of 5 years of habitual residence on Dutch soil prior to the 
application for naturalisation is waived. Article 8, paragraph 2 of the Rijkswet op de Nederlanderschap 
[Law on Dutch nationality], 1984. 
104 Lung-chu Chen, 'The Equal Protection of Women in Reference to Nationality and Freedom of 





upon marriage to a non-national.105 Some such domestic laws are still in force 
today, 106 despite the - well-recognised - danger that they may be a source of 
statelessness.107 Specifically, if the wife’s state of nationality assumes a change of 
nationality following the unity of the spouses and prescribes the automatic loss of 
that nationality upon marriage to a non-national, while the husband’s state does not 
in fact automatically grant nationality through marriage to a national, she is 
rendered stateless.108 Women may also be at risk of statelessness in the event of a 
divorce. When the marriage is dissolved, the nationality acquired through her 
husband may be automatically lost while there is no guarantee that her original 
nationality will be restored.109 This has recently been flagged as a substantial 
problem for “economic brides” from Vietnam: more than 3,000 Vietnamese women 
have ended up stateless after marrying a non-national, renouncing their Vietnamese 
citizenship in order to apply for the nationality of their husband and then failing to 
complete the naturalisation proceedings before the marriage breaks down.110 With 
an increasing mobilisation of people across international borders comes a 
corresponding increase in the number of marriages between nationals of different 
states.111 This issue is thereby likely to remain a considerable source of statelessness 
unless there is a change in state policy. 
 A negative conflict of laws leading to statelessness may arise not only in the 
event of marriage, but can also be brought about by the process of inter-country 
adoption in which the nationality of the child differs from the nationality of the 
prospective parents. In much the same way as marriage, adoption can affect the 
                                                           
105 UN Division for the Advancement of Women, Women, nationality and citizenship, June 2003, pages 
5-7.  
106 UNHCR’s 2003 Global Questionnaire on Statelessness found that of the respondent states, 6.8% 
have laws prescribing an automatic change of nationality in the event of marriage or the dissolution of 
marriage. UNHCR, Final report concerning the Questionnaire on statelessness pursuant to the Agenda 
for Protection, Geneva: March 2004, page 20. 
107 Laws relating to marriage are cited as a source of statelessness in numerous recent publications, 
including UNHCR, "Statelessness and Citizenship" in The State of the World's Refugees - A 
Humanitarian Agenda, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 1997page 226; UNHCR, Information and 
accession package: the 1954 Convention relating to the status of stateless persons and the 1961 
Convention on the reduction of statelessness, Geneva: January 1999, page 3; Vladimir Kartashkin, The 
rights of women married to foreigners, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/34, 30 June 2003, page 3; UN Division for 
the Advancement of Women, Women, nationality and citizenship, June 2003, page 5; Maureen Lynch, 
Lives on hold: The human cost of statelessness, Washington: 2005, page 5; Mark Manly, “Sorry, wrong 
gender” in Refugees Magazine, Number 147, Issue 3, 2007, pages 24-27; UNHCR, UNHCR Handbook  
for the Protection of Women and Girls, January 2008, pages 186-187. Of course the same laws are also 
a source of dual nationality. 
108 She will be similarly affected if she automatically loses her nationality and her husband has no 
nationality himself as there will be no state to provide her with a new nationality; UNHCR and IPU, 
Nationality and statelessness. A handbook for parliamentarians, 2005, page 33. 
109 UNHCR, "Statelessness and Citizenship" in The State of the World's Refugees - A Humanitarian 
Agenda, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 1997, page 226; UNHCR and IPU, Nationality and 
statelessness. A handbook for parliamentarians, 2005, page 33. 
110 UNHCR, Divorce leaves some Vietnamese women broken-hearted and stateless, 14 February 2007,  
accessible via http://www.unhcr.org; Mark Manly, “Sorry, wrong gender” in Refugees Magazine, 
Number 147, Issue 3, 2007, pages 24-27.  
111 Vladimir Kartashkin, The rights of women married to foreigners, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/34, 30 June 
2003, page 11. 
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legal status, including the nationality, of an individual.112 With the automatic 
change of nationality comes the risk of statelessness if the approach of states is not 
harmonised. There is currently a tendency towards automatically granting the child 
the nationality of the adoptive parent in the case of inter-country adoption, but this 
is not the case in all countries. Meanwhile a number of states provide for the 
automatic loss of nationality by a child who is adopted abroad.113 Therefore 
adoption is also a known source of statelessness.114  
 
3.1 The 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness 
 
The effect on nationality of a change in personal status – such as marriage, divorce 
or adoption – is addressed in article 5 of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of 
Statelessness. Its first paragraph houses a fluent and straightforward obligation for 
state parties: 
 
If the law of a Contracting State entails loss of nationality as a consequence 
of any change in the personal status of a person such as marriage, 
termination of marriage, legitimation, recognition or adoption, such loss 
shall be conditional upon possession or acquisition of another nationality.115 
 
This provision does not judge the overall lawfulness of prescribing the loss of 
nationality in conjunction with a change of personal status, it is aimed solely at the 
prevention of statelessness in those circumstances. It covers “any change in the 
personal status of a person” - the list that follows provides merely examples of 
situations in which this provision applies.116 Moreover, the article employs gender-
                                                           
112 Hudson mentions adoption, legitimation, recognision by affiliation and marriage as the different 
changes in civil status that can automatically effect nationality, Manley Hudson, Report on Nationality, 
including Statelessness, A/CN.4/50, 21 February 1952, page 15; See also International Union for Child 
Welfare, Stateless Children - A Comparative Study of National Legislation and Suggested Solutions to 
the Problem of Statelessness of Children, Geneva: 1947, pages 27-28. 
113 The example given is Korea; William Duncan, "Nationality and the Protection of Children Across 
Frontiers: The Case of Intercountry Adoption", 3rd European Conference on Nationality - Nationality 
and the Child, Strasbourg: 2004, page 9. 
114 See for instance UNHCR and IPU, Nationality and statelessness. A handbook for parliamentarians, 
2005, page 32. 
115 Article 5, paragraph 1 of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. “Possession or 
acquisition” in this case should be taken to mean prior possession or assurance of acquiring another 
nationality; UNHCR Information and Accession Package, page 14. 
116 Paragraph 2 of the same article provides additionally for the recovery of previous nationality by a 
child born out of wedlock who lost that nationality due to recognition of affiliation. This paragraph 
appears superfluous in view of the fist paragraph in which loss of nationality in the event of recognition 
is already prohibited if the child would be rendered stateless. It could then be argued that paragraph 2 
allows the child to opt for his original nationality or even dual nationality, however the contracting 
states are allowed to set additional conditions, including that the child is stateless. It is in fact worrying 
that states are free to lay down a number of conditions for recovery of nationality here because the 
person involved would have been rendered stateless in contravention of paragraph 1 of this article in the 
first place. It could be argued that the prohibition of the loss of nationality in the event of a change in 
personal status, where the person would become stateless, includes an obligation to redress the situation 





neutral terms meaning, for example, that it is equally applicable in the case of loss 
of nationality of the male or female spouse at the time of marriage or dissolution of 
marriage.117 It also covers cases of inter-country adoption. If implemented correctly 
– with states running a thorough check to ensure that the individual involved has or 
indeed will receive another nationality before allowing the original nationality to be 
lost – the provision should be sufficient to prevent statelessness from arising in 
these circumstances.  
 
3.2 International human rights law 
 
Where the 1961 Statelessness Convention has – thanks to its focus on the 
prevention of statelessness - tucked all obligations relating to marriage, adoption or 
another change in personal status neatly away into one provision, the same cannot 
be said of international human rights instruments. In particular, we discover that 
most texts deal with either the problem of nationality in the event of marriage (or 
divorce) or the situation of adoption or recognition of a child, but few address both. 
We will therefore consider them separately, starting with the question of marriage 
since this has been dealt with most extensively under human rights law - the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights taking the first step.  
Article 16 of the Universal Declaration protects the right of men and women to 
marry and found a family. It goes on to espouse equal rights of men and women “as 
to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution”.118 The International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights has adopted a similar text ensuring “equality of rights 
and responsibilities of spouses as to marriage, during marriage and at its 
dissolution”.119 It is true that this general restatement of the prohibition of 
discrimination does not directly preclude the creation of statelessness in the event of 
marriage or the dissolution of marriage. However, it does prohibit the adoption of a 
discriminatory nationality policy which, for example, provides for automatic loss of 
nationality for a woman marrying a non-national but not for a man, or facilitating 
access to nationality for the female non-national spouse but not for the male. It also 
illustrates that laws relating to changes in status, rights and duties of individuals 
when they marry or divorce are not free from influence by international human 
rights law. 
Fortunately, more concrete provisions relating to marriage and nationality can 
be found in a number of other instruments, clarifying the obligations of states with 
regard to this particular question. In fact, a separate document exists to deal with 
                                                                                                                                               
5, paragraph 2 read together with article 1, paragraph 2 of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of 
Statelessness. 
117 Although in practice only the female spouse has been reported to be adversely affected by an 
automatic change of nationality in the event of marriage or dissolution of marriage, gender-neutral 
provisions are to be welcomed as a general recognition of the principle of non-discrimination. 
However, the unbiased nature of this provision could in fact be explained by its broad scope, which 
includes not only marriage, but also adoption or recognition in the events to which it is applicable – 
hence the unspecific reference to “a person”. 
118 Article 16, paragraph 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
119 Article 23, paragraph 4 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The 
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precisely this issue: the Convention on the Nationality of Married Women. Adopted 
in 1957 – thereby predating the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness 
– this Convention has been reasonably well-received with 70 contracting parties to 
date.120 Article 1 of this convention has the following to say about the effect of 
marriage on nationality: 
 
Each Contracting State agrees that neither the celebration nor the dissolution 
of a marriage between one of its nationals and an alien […] shall 
automatically affect the nationality of the wife.121 
 
This means that the simple act of marriage or divorce may not – in and of itself – 
render a woman stateless. States are prohibited from prescribing the automatic loss 
of nationality for a woman who marries a non-national or divorces a national. The 
younger and more widely ratified Convention on the Elimination of All 
Discrimination Against Women also prohibits the automatic change of nationality 
of the wife in the event of marriage, adding expressly that marriage to an alien shall 
not “render her stateless”.122 These two instruments are designed to ensure at the 
very least that statelessness is not an automatic result – ex lege - of marriage due to 
a conflict of nationality laws. However, it seems that states may allow for voluntary 
loss of original nationality or voluntary acquisition of the nationality of the spouse. 
It is therefore conceivable that such acts – if uncoordinated - may still lead to 
isolated cases of statelessness. From the sole point of view of the prevention of 
statelessness, the approach taken in the 1961 Statelessness Convention therefore 
seems more appropriate in this case: making loss of nationality (whether automatic 
or voluntary) in the event of marriage or dissolution of marriage conditional upon 
the possession or acquisition of another.  
The European Convention on Nationality takes the same approach as these two 
universal instruments. One of the four basic principles espoused in article 4 of the 
Convention is the prohibition of automatic change of nationality by marriage or the 
dissolution of marriage.123 Gender is not specified and the principle is equally valid 
for the male and female spouse – a deliberate move away from the formulation in 
the Convention on the Nationality of Married Women in order to recognise the 
principle of gender equality.124 The Convention also prescribes facilitated 
acquisition of nationality for the non-national spouse of one of the Contracting 
States’ nationals.125 The American Convention on Human Rights states simply the 
basic principle of equality of the rights of spouses “as to marriage, during marriage 
                                                           
120 UN Treaty Collection, Status of ratifications, reservations and declarations as of 2 February 2002. 
121 Article 1 of the Convention on the Nationality of Married Women, 1957. Together with article 2, 
this article forms the core of the obligations on states under this Convention, as evidenced by the non-
acceptance of reservations to these two provisions. 
122 Article 9, paragraph 1 of the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women. 
123 Article 4, section d) of the European Convention on Nationality, 1997. 
124 Explanatory Memorandum of the European Convention on Nationality, page 32. Substantively this 
makes little difference for traditionally it is the status of the wife that is effected but the use of gender 
neutral terminology send an important message on overall intolerance of gender discrimination. 





and in the event of its dissolution”.126 While this compels states to outlaw gender 
discrimination in the context of any effect that marriage may have on the nationality 
of the spouses, it does not prescribe or prohibit any particular measures relating to a 
change of nationality in the event of marriage.127 The Protocol to the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on women’s rights takes things a step 
further: it states that “a woman shall have the right to retain her nationality or to 
acquire the nationality of her husband”.128 At first glance this appears to be an 
excellent provision. It makes clear that if the woman has no right to acquire the 
nationality of her husband, she must be able to hold onto her original nationality, 
thereby preventing her from becoming stateless. This seems very straightforward 
indeed. However, upon further consideration we see that the wording used will 
actually make the article difficult to implement and statelessness may not always be 
successfully avoided. The Protocol presents a choice: either the woman has the right 
to keep her original nationality or she has the right to acquire the nationality of her 
husband, she does not necessarily have both. States are therefore free to provide for 
the loss of nationality of the wife upon marriage to a non-national so long as the 
state of nationality of the husband provides a right to acquire that nationality. But, 
the difference between having a right to acquire a nationality and acquiring a 
nationality can be great. The phrase employed is therefore unfortunate, for a state 
which provides for the loss of nationality of the woman could argue that she has the 
right to acquire the nationality of the husband, even if actual conferral of that 
nationality is not guaranteed: for example where the wife of a national has 
facilitated access to naturalisation or even where the wife may automatically be 
eligible for the nationality of the husband but this is perhaps subject to national 
security considerations. She may have the right to acquire the nationality of the 
husband yet still be rendered stateless if she is unable to effectuate this right. Here 
again, the approach of the 1961 Statelessness Convention is preferable as it permits 
loss of nationality only where there is prior possession or the guarantee of 
acquisition of an alternative nationality. Moreover, the African Protocol does not 
elaborate on the effect of the dissolution of marriage on nationality, while the 
provision in the 1961 Statelessness Convention is applicable to any change in 
personal status. 
Moving on to the subject of adoption and its influence on the nationality of the 
adopted child, we turn our attention once more to the Convention on the Rights of 
                                                           
126 Article 17, paragraph 4 of the American Convention on Human Rights, 1969. 
127 In its case law, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights was called upon to consider the 
compatibility with the American Convention of a naturalisation policy that would allow a spouse who 
was rendered stateless through the loss of nationality by act of marriage (by the laws of another state), 
to remain stateless for at least a period of two years, if not indefinitely. Although there are signs of 
criticism for this policy, the Court did not find in it a violation of article 20 (right to a nationality) of the 
Convention. However, the Court hinted that it would find fault with the policy which entailed the loss 
of nationality through the act of marriage, resulting in statelessness. In this it referred to the Convention 
on the Nationality of Married Women and the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion on the 
Proposed Amendments to the Naturalisation provision of the Constitution of Costa Rica, OC-4/84, 19 
January 1984, paras. 46-51. 
128 Article 6, section g) of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the 
Rights of Women in Africa, 2003. 
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the Child and its monitoring Committee. We have already looked at article 7 on the 
acquisition of a nationality in some detail. In this section we will consider article 8 
through which “State Parties undertake to respect the right of the child to preserve 
his or her identity, including nationality”.129 The point of departure in nationality 
matters for a child who has been adopted by a non-national (couple) must therefore 
be the retention of original nationality as a form of preservation of the identity of 
the child. To find out more about the duties of states in relation to the attribution of 
nationality to a child who has been adopted, we browse the convention for 
additional clauses relevant to the adoption process. Article 21 of the CRC covers 
the rights of the child in the context of an adoption procedure, but is silent on the 
topic of nationality. The only provision in this article that may have some 
application to nationality questions can be found in section c where state parties 
proclaim to “ensure that the child concerned by inter-country adoption enjoys 
safeguards and standards equivalent to those existing in the case of national 
adoption”.130 Seeing as a child would not be rendered stateless in the context of a 
purely national adoption procedure, it could be argued that states are hereby 
required to prevent a child who is involved in inter-country adoption from 
becoming stateless. The Committee on the Rights of the Child has considered the 
issue of nationality of children involved in inter-country adoption a number of times 
and has recognised the danger that such adoption procedures may lead to 
statelessness. The Committee’s approach to these cases is to encourage the 
acquisition of the nationality of the adoptive parents.131 No mention is made of the 
need to prevent the loss of the nationality of origin. It should also be noted that the 
Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry 
Adoption is entirely silent on the question of the effect that such adoption has on the 
nationality of the child.132 
 Instruments that have been adopted within the Council of Europe are more 
specific in their delineation of the duties of states in the context of inter-country 
adoption. In 1967, the European Convention on the Adoption of Children was 
formulated to regulate all aspects of international adoption procedures.133 Article 11 
deals with the impact of adoption on the nationality of the child. It prescribes 
facilitated acquisition by the child of the nationality of the adoptive parent(s), but – 
more importantly – also makes any loss of nationality resulting from adoption 
“conditional upon possession or acquisition of another nationality”.134 According to 
the explanatory report on the convention, this provision was designed to ensure the 
avoidance of statelessness which it considered not only to be reflective of a general 
                                                           
129 Article 8 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989. 
130 Article 21, section c) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989. 
131 This problem has been discussed in Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding 
Observations: Palau, CRC/C/103, Geneva: 2001, paragraph 458; Switzerland, CRC/C/118, Geneva: 
2002, paragraphs 340-341; Canada, CRC/C/133, Geneva: 2003, paragraphs 76-77. 
132 The Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption 
entered into force on the 1st of May 2005 and is designed to regulate the procedure for intercountry 
adoption with a view to protecting the best interests of the child. 
133 The European Convention on the Adoption of Children entered into force on the 26th of April, 1968 
and had 18 state parties on the 28th of February 2006. 





principle but also in the best interests of the child.135 The European Convention on 
Nationality copies this dual approach: prescribing facilitated access to nationality 
for children adopted by a national of the state and prohibiting loss of nationality in 
the adoption of a child if the child would thereby be rendered stateless.136 In this 
way, these two European instruments back up the 1961 Convention on the 
Reduction of Statelessness in its approach to the prevention of statelessness in the 
adoption process. They also incorporate what is considered to be the best interests 
of the child affected by inter-country adoption – access to the nationality of the 
adoptive parents, reflecting the link with the new state which is formed through 
adoption and helping to promote family unity.137 
 
4 LOSS, DEPRIVATION AND RENUNCIATION OF NATIONALITY  
 
When municipal legislation prescribes the automatic loss of nationality for an 
individual who marries a foreigner, it is a reflection of the idea that by the act of 
marriage the genuine link with the original state is eroded and a bond of allegiance 
with a new state formed. Using an identical motivation, some states prescribe the 
automatic loss of nationality for individuals who emigrate and take up long-term 
residence on foreign soil.138 In chapter III, section 1 we discovered that jus 
domicilli, or the law of residence, is a recognised ground for the attribution of 
nationality. The most common legal basis for naturalisation is therefore a certain 
period of permanent residence on the territory of a state. The automatic loss of 
nationality due to long-term residence abroad is the inverse situation. Thus 
numerous states have adopted provisions in their domestic legislation enabling them 
to revoke the nationality of persons who leave the country to reside abroad. This has 
also been described as “giving effect to the national’s desire for expatriation”139 and 
is indeed seen by some countries as a form of voluntary renunciation of nationality 
rather than the withdrawal of citizenship at the initiative of the state. Such practices 
are not limited to any particular region of the world: examples of states that 
currently provide for the loss of nationality in this way are Haiti, Malawi, Sudan 
and India.140 
                                                           
135 Explanatory Report on the European Convention on the Adoption of Children, accessible via 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Reports/Html/058.htm.  
136 Article 6, paragraph 4d) and article 7 paragraphs 1g) and 3 of the European Convention on 
Nationality, 1997. 
137 This is considered to be important for “the integration of the child into the adoptive family” and 
there is now  “a clear trend in favour of according automatically to the adopted child the nationality of 
the receiving state”; William Duncan, Nationality and the Protection of Children across Frontiers, 2004, 
pages 8-9. 
138 This is similar to automatic loss of nationality by an individual who naturalises abroad which is 
prescribed in the laws of many countries, for example in China, under article 9 of the Nationality Law 
of the People’s Republic of China 1980. However, automatic loss of the original nationality once a 
person has been naturalised abroad does not lead to statelessness as the old nationality is simply traded 
in for a new one. 
139 Manley Hudson, Report on Nationality, including Statelessness, A/CN.4/50, 21 February 1952, page 
45. 
140 Haiti, under article 13 of the Constitution of the Republic of Haiti 1987; Malawi, under article 25 of 
the Citizenship Act 1966; Sudan, under article 13 of the Citizenship Act 1957; and India, under article 
10 of the Citizenship Act 1955. 
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In some instances, this loss of nationality can be prevented by regular 
registration of the intention to remain a national at the embassy of the state of 
nationality. However, individuals are not always properly informed of this option 
and such procedural protections are not in place in all countries – particularly to the 
benefit of those who gained their nationality by naturalisation.141 There are also 
some circumstances in which the use of such procedural guarantees is hampered, 
such as in the case of refugee populations.142 Meanwhile, the state in which the 
individual has taken up residence is free to determine the criteria under which a 
person can be naturalised. This will often include a significant period of permanent 
and lawful residence (whereas loss of nationality may be prescribed within just a 
few months of departure)143 and additional conditions such as knowledge of the 
national language and culture. The revocation of nationality for those taking up 
residence abroad therefore in no way coincides with conferral of the nationality of 
the new state of residence. Statelessness may be the direct consequence of 
legislative provisions prescribing automatic loss of nationality in this way.144 
Closely related to loss of nationality – to the extent that differentiation is not 
always possible – is individual deprivation of nationality.145 Here, again, nationality 
is withdrawn when an individual has behaved in a particular way. The most 
common grounds for such deprivation of nationality are: a change of allegiance 
which may be evidenced by the pledging of a formal oath of allegiance to a foreign 
state146 or voluntary service in the armed forces or government of a foreign state;147 
committing acts which are in contravention with the vital interests of the state;148 a 
prison sentence within a certain period after naturalisation in the country of 
                                                           
141 Procedural protection against “denaturalisation” (withdrawal of nationality acquired by 
naturalisation) is usually weaker than against “denationalisation” (withdrawal of nationality acquired at 
birth); International Union for Child Welfare, Stateless Children - A Comparative Study of National 
Legislation and Suggested Solutions to the Problem of Statelessness of Children, Geneva: 1947, page 
29; see also UNHCR and IPU, Nationality and statelessness. A handbook for parliamentarians, 2005, 
page 33. 
142 In the event that an individual has been forced to flee persecution in the state of nationality, 
compelling him to contact the state authorities in order to declare his intention to remain a national is a 
particularly difficult or indeed dangerous condition to meet. 
143 UNHCR and IPU, Nationality and statelessness. A handbook for parliamentarians, 2005, page 33. 
144 UNHCR, Information and accession package: the 1954 Convention relating to the status of stateless 
persons and the 1961 Convention on the reduction of statelessness, Geneva: January 1999, page 3; 
UNHCR, "Statelessness and Citizenship" in The State of the World's Refugees - A Humanitarian 
Agenda, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 1997, page 226; Carol Batchelor The 1954 Convention 
relating to the Status of Stateless Persons: Implementation within the European Union Member States 
and Recommendations for Harmonisation 2004, page 11; UNHCR and IPU, Nationality and 
statelessness. A handbook for parliamentarians, 2005, page 33. 
145 This is a separate question to collective deprivation of nationality which is usually linked to 
discriminatory policies and will be dealt with in Chapter V under the title “Arbitrary deprivation of 
nationality”. 
146 This is for example the case in Belize where it is prescribed in article 22, paragraph 1f) of the 
Belizean Nationality Act 1981. 
147 For example, Haitian nationality is lost by “Holding a political post in the service of a foreign 
country”; article 13, subsection c of the Constitution of the Republic of Haiti, 1987. 
148 Examples can be found in: Section 19, paragraph 3 of the Thai Nationality Act, 2508; article 25, 
paragraph 2, subsection a of the Citizenship Act of Malawi, 1966; and article 10, paragraph 2, 





nationality;149 and acquisition of nationality by misrepresentation or fraud (for 
example during the naturalisation procedure).150 In this sense, deprivation of 
nationality may be employed as a punitive measure by the state, perhaps alongside 
criminal or civil proceedings against the individual.151 Again, persons who have 
obtained their nationality by naturalisation are generally more vulnerable to 
deprivation of nationality.  
Not only can an individuals lose or be deprived of their nationality without 
necessarily acquiring another, some countries also grant people the freedom to 
renounce their nationality, without any safeguards against statelessness. The ability 
to renounce one’s nationality is a vital element of the right to change allegiance and 
adopt the nationality of another state. It is certainly not uncommon for people who 
take up residence in a different country to consolidate their newly formed bond with 
that state by applying for naturalisation. Often, naturalisation is granted on the 
condition of renunciation of the original nationality, in order to avoid dual 
nationality, therefore an individual must be free to do so. The ideal scenario is one 
whereby the renunciation of nationality either coincides with or follows shortly 
after naturalisation. However, not all states require the prior acquisition of a new 
nationality before allowing the individual to be released from his original 
nationality.152 He may renounce his nationality before applying for naturalisation, 
resulting in temporary statelessness that becomes a permanent state of affairs if the 
naturalisation procedure is not successfully completed.153 Even though it is clear 
that the renunciation of nationality prior to the acquisition of another is a source of 
statelessness, some states nevertheless make the prior renunciation of one’s original 
nationality a requirement for entering an application for naturalisation.154 The 
                                                           
149 Examples can be found in: article 13, paragraph 1, subsection c of the Sudanese Nationality Act, 
1957; article 10, paragraph 1, subsection d of the Citizenship Act of India, 1955; and article 33, 
paragraph 4 of the Tunisian Nationality Act, 1963. 
150 Examples can be found in: article 37 of the Tunisian Nationality Act, 1963; article 10 of the 
Canadian Citizenship Act, 1985; article 17, paragraph 2 of the Citizenship Act of New Zealand, 1977; 
and article 13, paragraph 1, subsection a of the Sudanese Nationality Act, 1957.  
151 Throughout history, exile has been used as a penalty for criminal acts. This is closely related to the 
concept of deprivation of nationality as a punitive measure for both enable the state to exclude the 
“undesired” individual. See for example Ruth Donner, "Chapter 3: The Imposition and Withdrawal of 
Nationality" in The Regulation of Nationality in International Law, Transnational Publishers, New 
York: 1994, pages 152-153. 
152 For example, China allows its citizens to renounce their nationality if “they are near relatives of 
foreign nationals, they have settled abroad or they have other legitimate reasons”; articles 10 and 11 of 
the Nationality Law of the People’s Republic of China, 1980. 
153 The applicant may be considered to fall short of the further criteria for naturalisation - for example 
due to an insufficient knowledge of the local language. Alternatively, the naturalisation procedure itself 
may be unduly stringent, requiring excessive fees or documentation, or prescribing unrealistic 
deadlines. This contributes to the likelihood of an application failing, or perhaps not even being lodged, 
even though the individual may be perfectly eligible - increasingly the likelihood that the individual 
will fail to complete the change of nationality to which he has aspired. UNHCR and IPU, Nationality 
and statelessness. A handbook for parliamentarians, 2005, pages 28 and 32; UNHCR, "Statelessness 
and Citizenship" in The State of the World's Refugees - A Humanitarian Agenda, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford: 1997, page 226; Maureen Lynch, Lives on hold: The human cost of statelessness, 
Washington: 2005, page 5. 
154 UNHCR and IPU, Nationality and statelessness. A handbook for parliamentarians, 2005, page 28. 
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incongruity of being able or even required to lose or renounce your nationality 
without the guarantee of acquiring an alternative nationality thereby causes 
statelessness.155 This is a fact that may even be taken advantage of by those who 
desire access to facilitated naturalisation procedures that may exist for stateless 
persons and therefore deliberately renounce their only nationality.156 Of the 
respondent states to the 2003 UNHCR Questionnaire on statelessness, 16.2% 
admitted to the absence of safeguards in their municipal legislation to combat this 
source of statelessness.157 Furthermore, where a nationality is lost, deprived or 
renounced by an individual, this action may automatically affect the person’s 
spouse or children, whose own nationality may also be withdrawn.158 
 
4.1 The 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness 
 
So far we have looked at articles 1 to 5 of the 1961 Statelessness Convention - half 
of the substantive articles housed in the document. In this section we will be 
assessing articles 6, 7 and 8 which deal collectively with loss, deprivation and 
renunciation of nationality. We will also conduct a preliminary reading of article 9 
on arbitrary deprivation of nationality, although this issue is the subject of the next 
chapter. As the provisions of the 1961 Convention are rather disorganised, we will 
take the individual issues in the order that they were introduced above, starting with 
the problem of loss of nationality ex lege as a result of long-term residence on 
foreign soil.  
The general principle is that loss of nationality shall not be effectuated “unless 
the person concerned possesses or acquires another nationality”.159 Where loss of 
nationality is prescribed due merely to residence rather than naturalisation abroad, 
the individual would not possess or acquire another nationality, therefore such 
action would be prohibited.160 However, the 1961 Convention differentiates in its 
approach to this question between naturalised persons and persons who have 
acquired their nationality other than by naturalisation.161 As far as naturalised 
persons are concerned an exception is made to the general rule:  
                                                           
155 See also Betty de Hart; Kees Groenendijk, "Multiple Nationality: The Practice of Germany and the 
Netherlands" in R. Cholewinski (ed) International Migration Law, TMC Asser Press, The Hague: 2007, 
pages 96-100. Here the example is given of a case that presented itself in the Netherlands “of an 
Egyptian national who had not renounced his nationality, although the IND [Immigration and 
Naturalisation Service] had urged him to do so several times. After a third letter requesting renunciation 
remained unanswered, the IND withdrew his Dutch nationality. They did so despite the fact that by then 
the applicant had provided proof of his renunciation of Egyptian nationality. The IND claimed it was 
too late. The applicant had now lost both nationalities and had become stateless”. 
156 Committee of Experts on Nationality, Report on Misuse of Nationality Laws, Strasbourg: 20 April 
2004, paragraphs 10 and 24. 
157 UNHCR, Final report concerning the Questionnaire on statelessness pursuant to the Agenda for 
Protection, Geneva: March 2004, page 16. 
158 For example, in Belize, the nationality of the minor children or spouse of a naturalised individual 
whose nationality has been lost or deprived under the nationality act may also be lost or deprived at the 
discretion of the minister; article 22, paragraph 3 of the Belizean Nationality Act 1981. 
159 Article 7, paragraph 1a) of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. 
160 This is also contained in an express prohibition in paragraph 3 of article 7 of the 1961 Convention. 
161 According to the Information and Accession Package to the Convention, the concept of a 






A naturalised person may lose his nationality on account of residence 
abroad for a period, not less than seven consecutive years, specified by the 
law of the Contracting State concerned if he fails to declare to the 
appropriate authority his intention to retain his nationality.162 
 
It is therefore possible, under the 1961 Convention, to prescribe the loss of 
nationality in the simple event of long-term residence abroad, but only if a number 
of cumulative conditions are met. The person must have acquired nationality by 
naturalisation, must have lived abroad for at least 7 years (no shorter term may be 
set by the municipal law of the state concerned) and he must have neglected to re-
register in order to retain his nationality.163 This provision goes at least some way to 
limiting the freedom of states to provide for the loss of nationality ex lege when a 
person has chosen to move abroad but does not entirely pre-empt the creation of 
statelessness.164 Paragraph 5 of the same article contains another exception to the 
general rule: where a child is born outside the territory of the state it is possible for 
him to lose that nationality when he reaches adulthood if he has not taken up 
residence in that state or registered his desire to retain his nationality with the 
appropriate authority. The final paragraph of the same article repeats the prohibition 
of loss of nationality where the person would be rendered stateless other than in the 
circumstances expressly provided for – these are therefore the only permitted 
exceptions.165 
 Article 8 of the 1961 Statelessness Convention adopts the same approach: 
prohibiting deprivation of nationality that would result in statelessness except in a 
handful of circumstances which are explicitly laid down in the text.166 The first 
situation in which deprivation is still permissible is in fact identical to that for 
which loss of nationality is permitted: reference is simply made to article 7, 
paragraphs 4 and 5.167 The Convention thereby allows states the option to choose 
                                                                                                                                               
which the Contracting State concerned, in its discretion, could have refused”. It does not include 
persons who have acquired nationality ex lege later in life. See UNHCR, Information and accession 
package: the 1954 Convention relating to the status of stateless persons and the 1961 Convention on 
the reduction of statelessness, Geneva: January 1999, page 14. 
162 Article 7, paragraph 4 of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. 
163 The Final Act of the Convention defines a naturalised person for the purposes of the application of 
the instrument as “a person who has acquired nationality upon an application which the contracting 
State concerned may in its discretion refuse”. Resolution 2 of the Final Act of the 1961 Convention on 
the Reduction of Statelessness. Meanwhile, Resolution 3 of the Final Act recommends “Contracting 
States making the retention of nationality by their nationals abroad subject to a declaration or 
registration to take all possible steps to ensure that such persons are informed in time of the formalities 
and time-limits to be observed if they are to retain their nationality”. 
164 The fact that – under the 1961 Statelessness Convention - a refugee would be subjected to the same 
requirements in order to retain his nationality when resident abroad is highly unsatisfactory in view of 
the precarious situation of refugees. 
165 Article 7, paragraph 6 of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness.  
166 Article 8 opens by determining that “a Contracting State shall not deprive a person of his nationality 
if such deprivation would render him stateless”, a statement which is followed in paragraph 2 by the 
introduction of a number of exceptions. 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. 
167 Which covered loss of nationality for naturalised persons who take up residence abroad and loss of 
nationality for children born abroad upon attaining majority. 
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whether nationality is lost ex lege in such circumstances or whether it requires an 
act on the part of the state authority to take effect in the individual case.168 The 
second situation in which states may deprive a person of their nationality is “where 
the nationality has been obtained by misrepresentation or fraud”.169 The most 
obvious case to spring to mind would be where a person has provided false 
information in support of their application for naturalisation and has thereby 
acquired nationality under false pretences. Interestingly, this provision does not 
specify that it is applicable to “naturalised persons” as we saw in the event of loss 
of nationality due to long-term residence abroad. There remains therefore, the 
possibility of providing for the deprivation of a nationality that has been obtained 
otherwise than by naturalisation. Consider the theoretical situation whereby an 
individual produces a forged marriage licence or contracts a so-called “marriage of 
convenience” in order to claim nationality ex lege in a state where this is provided 
for through marriage to a national. Another conceivable case would be where 
parents ensure the conferral of nationality on their child by producing documents 
establishing a false place of birth or misrepresenting their own nationality or 
residence status. In any of these situations, the state would retain the right to 
withdraw the nationality which had been obtained in a fraudulent manner.  
 The 1961 Statelessness Convention goes on to introduce various additional 
exceptions to the general rule which forbids deprivation of nationality resulting in 
statelessness. Specifically, it allows states that have already prescribed a number of 
other grounds for deprivation of nationality in their municipal legislation to retain 
those provisions as long as they make a declaration to that effect when they become 
Contracting States to the Convention.170 There are thus three further acceptable 
grounds for deprivation of nationality, even where this would lead to statelessness, 
namely where the person: 
 
Inconsistently with his duty of loyalty to the Contracting State […] has, in 
disregard of an express prohibition by the Contracting State rendered or 
continued to render services to, or received or continued to receive 
emoluments from, another State; or has conducted himself in a manner 
seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the State; [or] has taken an oath, 
or made a formal declaration, of allegiance to another State, or given 
definite evidence of his determination to repudiate his allegiance with the 
Contracting State.171 
 
This list is also limitative, although it leaves some room for manoeuvre in the 
interpretation of what is “seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of states”. Other 
grounds for deprivation of nationality are forbidden. This is made very clear in the 
phrasing of the provision and is confirmed by the reactions of a number of state 
parties to the declaration made by Tunisia at the time of accession to the instrument 
in 2000. The Tunisian declaration included a long list of grounds which it would 
continue to uphold in its municipal legislation for the deprivation of nationality. 
                                                           
168 The presumed difference between “loss” and “deprivation”. 
169 Article 8, paragraph 2b) of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. 
170 An option that Austria, France, Ireland, the United Kingdom and Tunisia all took advantage of. 





Among them, for example, the possibility of depriving a person of his nationality 
“if he is convicted in Tunisia or abroad for an act held to be a crime under Tunisian 
law and carrying a sentence of at least five years’ imprisonment” or “if he is 
convicted of evading his obligations under the law regarding recruitment into the 
armed services”.172 Other contracting states found this declaration to be 
unacceptable and incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention, 
confirming that the list of grounds in article 8, paragraph 3 is indeed limitative.173 
 Therefore, with regards to depriving an individual of his nationality, the 1961 
Statelessness Convention clearly sets out a general prohibition of statelessness 
followed by a number of permissible exceptions. The fact that Contracting States 
were presented with the option of retaining some of their domestic provisions on 
deprivation of nationality appears to be evidence of yet another compromise 
reached during the drafting process of the instrument. The Draft Convention on the 
Elimination of Future Statelessness – considered too radical by state parties – did 
not permit any exceptions and the Draft Convention on the Reduction of Future 
Statelessness which formed the basis for discussion by governments included fewer 
permissible grounds for deprivation that would lead to statelessness.174 Article 8 of 
the 1961 Convention closes with a provision that is designed to ensure proper 
application of the exception clauses. It determines that deprivation of nationality on 
one of these grounds may only be effectuated in accordance with the law and 
accompanied by procedural guarantees like the right to a fair hearing by a court or 
independent body.175  
Finally, on the subject of deprivation of nationality, article 9 declares that there 
may be no deprivation of nationality – individually or collectively – on racial, 
ethnic, religious or political grounds. This is the only provision in the convention 
that is not directly aimed towards the prevention of statelessness, but is an 
expression of a more general nationality principle: the prohibition of arbitrary 
deprivation of nationality. It is irrelevant whether such deprivation leads to 
statelessness, it is an outright prohibition and any such act of the state is unlawful 
under the Convention. The application of this principle is relevant to cases which 
involve a policy of discrimination on the part of the state, something that will be 
covered in chapter V.  
 At this stage it is appropriate to also take a brief look at article 6 of the 1961 
Convention since it deals with the effect of the loss or deprivation of nationality on 
the nationality of a person’s spouse and children. This article provides, 
unconditionally, that “if the law of a Contracting State provides for loss of its 
nationality by a person’s spouse or children as a consequence of that person losing 
or being deprived of that nationality, such loss shall be conditional upon their 
possession or acquisition of another nationality”.176 Under no circumstances is it 
therefore acceptable that statelessness results from the automatic withdrawal of 
                                                           
172 Extracts from the declaration by the state of Tunisia upon accession to the 1961 Convention on the 
Reduction of Statelessness on the 12th of May 2000. 
173 Objections were raised by Germany on the 15th of May 2001, Norway and Sweden on the 23rd of 
May 2001 and The Netherlands on the 6th of June 2001. 
174 UN Yearbook 1954, pages 420 and 422. 
175 Article 8, paragraph 4 of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. 
176 Article 6 of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. 
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citizenship from the dependents of someone who has lost or been deprived of his 
nationality.  
 This brings us to the final issue in this section: the freedom to renounce one’s 
nationality. Article 7 of the Convention is unequivocal on this matter, determining 
that renunciation of nationality may not be allowed to take effect unless the person 
possesses or is assured of acquiring another nationality.177 Moreover, the 
Convention does not permit states to prescribe the loss of nationality merely on the 
grounds of him having submitted an application for naturalisation in a foreign 
state.178 From this it can also be deduced that, where the conditions for 
naturalisation are concerned, it would incompatible with the object and purpose of 
the Convention for states to require an individual to renounce his nationality before 
entering an application for naturalisation. After all, this is a feat that – on the basis 
of this Convention – he would be unable to perform. The instrument is clearly 
attempting to ensure that no individual is rendered stateless in the process of 
attempting to change his nationality.  
Generally then, the way in which the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of 
Statelessness deals with the creation of statelessness from loss, deprivation or 
renunciation of nationality, is illustrative of the compromises that had to be reached 
between states involved in the drafting process. Where the “radical” Draft 
Convention on the Elimination of Future Statelessness did not allow states to create 
statelessness under any circumstances, the text that was eventually adopted permits 
a range of carefully delineated exceptions whereby new cases of statelessness will 
continue to arise. It is time to look at alternative obligations under international 
human rights law to see if there has since been any change in the attitude of states 
towards this question. 
 
4.2 International human rights law 
 
After the expansive way in which the 1961 Statelessness Convention has dealt with 
the subject, human rights instruments appear deafeningly silent with regard to the 
permissibility of municipal nationality acts that allow for loss, deprivation or 
renunciation of nationality even where the individual would be rendered stateless. 
There is certainly no overall prohibition of the loss of nationality in later life – in 
fact this is part of the right to change one’s nationality, recognised in a number of 
instruments.179 Nevertheless, there is one important norm that has great bearing on 
this question: the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of nationality.180 Explicit 
references to this rule can be found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
as well the American and European Conventions on human rights, but it is also 
considered to be an implicit counterpart to the right to a nationality. As mentioned 
                                                           
177 Article 7, paragraph 1a) of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. See also 
UNHCR, Information and accession package: the 1954 Convention relating to the status of stateless 
persons and the 1961 Convention on the reduction of statelessness, Geneva: January 1999, page 14. 
178 He must first acquire either the new nationality itself or an assurance that his application will be 
honoured. Article 7, paragraph 2 of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. 
179 For example in article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, article 9 of the Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women and article 20 of the American 
Convention on Human Rights. 





in the previous chapter,181 an increasingly feasible interpretation of this norm, in 
combination with the general principle of the avoidance of statelessness, is that any 
withdrawal of an existing nationality that would result in statelessness for the 
individual is by definition arbitrary and therefore prohibited.182 This would mean 
that a person may not lose, be deprived of or renounce his nationality unless he 
already holds (or is guaranteed of acquiring) the citizenship of another state. 
However, there is insufficient evidence as yet to establish this position as an 
absolute and irrefutable interpretation of the international norm. 
There are two further provisions in universal conventions that may be relevant 
here. Firstly, article 8 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child provides – as we 
have already seen – for the right of a child to preserve his identity, including 
nationality. It has been argued that where a child’s parents lose, renounce or are 
deprived of their nationality, this provision is relevant for the effect that such loss, 
renunciation or deprivation will have on the nationality of the child. Indeed this 
article stands in the way of the automatic loss of nationality by that child,183 
particularly when read in conjunction with the more general obligation to take 
measures against the statelessness of children under article 7, paragraph 2 of the 
same Convention. Secondly, article 9 of the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women provides that the change of nationality by 
the husband during a marriage will not automatically affect the nationality of the 
wife nor render her stateless.184 If a man loses, renounces or is deprived of his 
nationality (i.e. there is a change in his nationality status), this must not result in the 
statelessness of his wife.  
Yet these provisions are only applicable in relation to the dependents of a 
person who has lost, renounced or been deprived of their nationality, they do not 
judge the validity of the act itself. The only instrument to do so is the 1997 
European Convention on Nationality. This text determines under precisely which 
circumstances a state party may provide for nationality to be lost or deprived. There 
are a total of 7 scenarios in which loss or deprivation of nationality may be 
prescribed by law, listed in article 7 of the Convention. These include loss of 
nationality in the event of “voluntary acquisition of another nationality” or where 
there is a “lack of a genuine link between the State Party and a national habitually 
                                                           
181 See chapter III, section 2. 
182 See for example Johannes Chan, 'The Right to a Nationality as a Human Right - The Current Trend 
Towards Recognition', in Human Rights Law Journal, Vol. 12, 1991; Ruth Donner, "Chapter 4: Human 
Rights Conventions and other Instruments" in The Regulation of Nationality in International Law, 
Transnational Publishers, New York: 1994; Open Society Justice Initiative, Citizenship and Equality in 
Practice: Guaranteeing Non-Discriminatory Access to Nationality, Protecting the Right to be Free 
from Arbitrary Deprivation of Nationality and Combating Statelessness, November 2005, page 9; 
James Goldston, 'Holes in the Rights Framework: Racial Discrimination, Citizenship, and the Rights of 
Noncitizens', in Ethics and International Affairs, Vol. 20, 2006. 
183 Jaap Doek, 'The CRC and the Right to Acquire and to Preserve a Nationality', in Refugee Survey 
Quarterly, Vol. 25, 2006, page 30. 
184 Article 9, paragraph 1 of 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women. Similar obligations can be found in articles 1 and 2 of the 1957 Convention on the 
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residing abroad”.185 Deprivation of nationality may be prescribed when nationality 
has been acquired by fraud or where the individual serves in a foreign military force 
or acts to jeopardise of the vital interests of the state.186 The Convention also 
accepts the possibility of loss of nationality by the child of a person whose 
nationality has been lost or deprived.187 However, paragraph 3 of this article is the 
most important in the context of the prevention of statelessness. It prohibits the loss 
or deprivation of nationality – even on the grounds which are listed as permissible – 
if the person concerned would thereby be rendered stateless. There is but one 
exception to this anti-statelessness clause: where nationality has been acquired 
through “fraudulent conduct, false information or concealment of any relevant fact 
attributable to the applicant”.188 Moreover, the principle of non-discrimination 
between nationals stands in the way of such policies that are allowed by the 1961 
Statelessness Convention whereby a naturalised citizen is more vulnerable to loss of 
nationality.189 As to renunciation of nationality, this is outlawed under article 8 of 
the Convention where the individual would become stateless – also implying a lack 
of tolerance for laws that would require an individual to undertake this act prior to 
submitting an application for naturalisation. Indeed, if an individual has renounced 
his nationality but subsequently fails to acquire another nationality (despite a 
guarantee to that effect), the state should declare the act of renunciation void.190 
In sum then, the European Convention on Nationality outlaws any loss, 
deprivation or renunciation of nationality that would result in statelessness, with the 
sole exception of the deprivation of a nationality acquired by fraud. And where 
fraudulent conduct has been ascertained, “the gravity of the facts, as well as other 
relevant circumstances, such as the genuine and effective link of these persons with 
the state concerned, should be taken into account”.191 Thus the retention of 
nationality may nevertheless be justified. Moreover, all efforts should be made to 
avoid the interpretation of “fraud” so expansively as to effectively re-introduce 
other grounds for the deprivation of nationality through this back-door.192 In this 
strict stance to the withdrawal of nationality, the European Convention on 
                                                           
185 The simple fact of residence abroad may not be enough, there must also be evidence of erosion of 
the genuine link. Article 7, paragraph 1, sections a, e, f and g determine the circumstances in which 
nationality may be lost; 1997 European Convention on Nationality. 
186 Article 7, paragraph 1, sections b, c and d of the 1997 European Convention on Nationality. 
187 With the exception of when that nationality was deprived for voluntary service in a foreign military 
force or acts against the vital interests of the state; article 7, paragraph 2 of the European Convention on 
Nationality.  
188 Article 7, paragraph 3 read together with paragraph 1 b) of the European Convention on Nationality. 
According to the Explanatory Memorandum to the Convention, statelessness will also be tolerated for 
the children of such persons who lose their nationality along with their parents. 
189 Article 5, paragraph 2 of the European Convention on Nationality provides that discrimination 
between nationals should be avoided.  
190 Section II, article C, paragraph a of the Council of Europe, Recommendation of the Committee of 
Ministers to Member States on the Avoidance and Reduction of Statelessness, No. R (1999) 18, 
Strasbourg, 15 September 1999. 
191 Section II, article C, paragraph c of the Council of Europe, Recommendation of the Committee of 
Ministers to Member States on the Avoidance and Reduction of Statelessness, No. R (1999) 18, 
Strasbourg, 15 September 1999. 
192 Ruth Donner, "Chapter 3: The Imposition and Withdrawal of Nationality" in The Regulation of 





Nationality clearly takes one step further towards the ideal of the eradication of 
statelessness than the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness was able 
to. If international law is indeed progressing in the direction of an almost outright 
ban of withdrawal of nationality resulting in statelessness – as has been argued by 
numerous scholars193 - then the 1961 Statelessness Convention is in need of an 





An attempt has been made in this chapter to deal with each of the technical causes 
of statelessness and uncover how the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of 
Statelessness and international human rights instruments address these problems. 
This objective has resulted in a voluminous treatise from which it is difficult to 
draw a singular conclusion. Instead, a number of findings must be commented upon 
and their greater relevance exposed. Firstly, it has become clear that the bulk of the 
provisions in the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness were designed 
to tackle technical causes of statelessness. We are left with just two substantive 
provisions to discuss in the upcoming chapters on statelessness resulting from 
arbitrary deprivation of nationality and state succession – one each.194 This can be 
explained by both the variety and complexity of the technical causes of 
statelessness and the need that states obviously felt to address these problems in 
detail. The compromises that evidently had to be reached between jus sanguinis and 
jus soli states coupled with a notable lack of real decisiveness further contributed to 
the quantity of provisions needed to deal with these issues. Thanks to the apparent 
volume and detail of relevant provisions, expectations based solely on first-sight of 
the Convention were high.  
However, these very compromises and lack of strength of decision are 
responsible for introducing a number of substantial weaknesses into the Convention 
in its dealings with the technical causes of statelessness. In particular, we have 
discovered a selection of additional conditions and exception clauses that water 
down the strength of the general rules expounded in the document. For example, 
although articles 1 and 4 provide for the attribution of nationality at birth to a child 
who would otherwise be stateless, this conferral may be realised only later, upon 
application to the competent authorities and a number of conditions may be set.195 
Original statelessness is thereby reduced, but not eradicated. Similarly, the 
Convention determines that no-one shall lose or be deprived of their nationality 
unless they hold or acquire another nationality. Thereafter, several exceptional 
circumstances are outlined in which a person may after all be rendered stateless by 
loss or deprivation of nationality – for example in the case of a naturalised person 
who has resided abroad for over 7 years and failed to register his intention of 
retaining his nationality. In sum, “both the grant and the loss of citizenship may be 
                                                           
193 See note 182 above. 
194 Thereafter, chapter VII which deals with the “new” causes of statelessness, addresses issues that 
have not been dealt with in the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness.   
195 Although we also saw that these conditions were to some extent less stringent than those that were 
later laid down in the European Convention on Nationality. 
 
 
Addressing the Technical Causes of Statelessness 
 89 
made conditional on the person concerned meeting certain basic criteria, hence, the 
drafters of the Convention recognised that there may be isolated and exceptional 
instances in which a person will be stateless”.196 Moreover, it is necessary to recall 
the observation made in chapter III, that the Convention does not prescribe 
measures or procedures for the identification of cases of (potential) statelessness. 
No guidance is given to state parties as to how to deal with the problem of evidence 
of nationality or of the absence of nationality for the purposes of applying the 
guarantees espoused in the text and successfully ensuring the avoidance of 
statelessness.197 
This was sufficient reason to spur on the search for alternative obligations 
under international human rights law - a search that also yielded mixed results. As 
to the prevention of statelessness at birth, we found evidence of a growing 
consensus among states that nationality should be granted jus soli to a child who 
would otherwise be stateless. This conclusion is particularly reinforced by recent 
developments on the African and European continents which are joining step 
behind the American Convention on Human Rights in providing for jus soli 
attribution of nationality to avoid original statelessness. The 1961 Statelessness 
Convention appears to be becoming superfluous on this point. With regards to 
statelessness resulting from loss, renunciation or deprivation of nationality, 
international human rights law does no better job than the 1961 Statelessness 
Convention. The only instrument to take one step closer to eradicating statelessness 
from these sources is the 1997 European Convention on Nationality which accepts 
withdrawal of nationality resulting in statelessness only when that nationality was 
originally obtained under false pretences. This is not necessarily illustrative of an 
international consensus on the subject, however a number of scholars claim that  
 
although a general right to a nationality has not become part of customary 
international law, the current trend of development in international law 
suggests a strong presumption in favour of the elimination of statelessness 
in any change of nationality. While there may be no positive duty on a state 
to confer its nationality on an alien, there is a negative duty not to create 
statelessness.198  
 
It is certainly true that to permit the loss or deprivation of nationality in the 
knowledge that this will lead to statelessness is becoming increasingly unacceptable 
and is deemed by some to amount to (prohibited) arbitrary deprivation of 
nationality.199 However, until an international convention, treaty body or court 
                                                           
196 Carol Batchelor, "The International Legal Framework Concerning Statelessness and Access for 
Stateless Persons", European Union Seminar on the Content and Scope of International Protection: 
Panel 1 - Legal basis of international protection, Madrid: 2002, page 7 
197 See chapter III, section 3. 
198 Emphasis added; Johannes Chan, 'The Right to a Nationality as a Human Right - The Current Trend 
Towards Recognition', in Human Rights Law Journal, Vol. 12, 1991, page 11. Recall also chapter III, 
section 2. 
199 Open Society Justice Initiative, Citizenship and Equality in Practice: Guaranteeing Non-
Discriminatory Access to Nationality, Protecting the Right to be Free from Arbitrary Deprivation of 
Nationality and Combating Statelessness, November 2005, page 9. Ruth Donner, "Chapter 4: Human 





explicitly address this question, it will remain unclear in which exact circumstances 
the creation of statelessness in this manner is or is not permissible. For now it 
would seem that the 1961 Statelessness Convention retains its use in this matter, 
even if its approach is flawed. 
The 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness also has a number of 
clear strengths. It unequivocally obliges state parties to confer their nationality upon 
foundlings, whether they adhere to jus sanguinis or jus soli. There is evidence that 
such an obligation has become part of customary international law, but this fact 
could still be debated. The 1961 Convention is a useful tool to consolidate this 
obligation. Furthermore, the 1961 Convention does not allow an individual’s 
renunciation of nationality to take effect unless they already hold or are guaranteed 
of acquiring another nationality. This again, is not generally prescribed under 
international human rights law, although it is reflected in the European Convention 
on Nationality. Finally the 1961 Statelessness Convention prohibits the loss of 
nationality as a consequence of any change in personal status – marriage, 
dissolution of marriage or adoption – unless the individual possesses or is 
guaranteed to acquire another nationality. It also outlaws the withdrawal of 
nationality from the dependents (spouse or minor children) of an individual who has 
lost or been deprived of his own nationality if this were to lead to their 
statelessness. From the point of view of these clear and unambiguous protections 
against statelessness, the Convention is an effective tool in these particular 
circumstances, more so than relying purely on states’ obligations under general 
international human rights law. 
Despite the above-mentioned notes of optimism concerning the 1961 
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, the investigation undertaken in this 
chapter also leads us to conclude that this instrument is behind the times and may 
no longer be an appropriate tool for effectively dealing with the prevention of 
statelessness. In particular we have revealed that under international human rights 
law there is now a patent obligation on states to withdraw any differentiations made 
in their nationality acts with regard to the conferral of nationality on legitimate and 
illegitimate children. Gender-sensitive nationality regulations are also outlawed. 
These are two areas in which general human rights law is now a step ahead of the 
almost 50-year old Statelessness Convention.  
Finally, an interesting lesson learnt in this chapter is the opportunity provided 
by international human rights law to introduce alternative supervisory mechanisms 
to deal with statelessness. The human rights treaty bodies have clearly taken an 
interest in preventing statelessness and are calling upon states to make changes in 
their legislation. We will see this pattern continue in coming chapters. It is also 
noteworthy to see that they are also encouraging states to become a party to the 
1961 Statelessness Convention (as well as the 1954 Statelessness Convention), so 
they obviously see the protection offered by these conventions as an integral part of 
the overall human rights framework.  
                                                                                                                                               
Transnational Publishers, New York: 1994 ; Johannes Chan, 'The Right to a Nationality as a Human 
Right - The Current Trend Towards Recognition', in Human Rights Law Journal, Vol. 12, 1991 ; James 
Goldston, 'Holes in the Rights Framework: Racial Discrimination, Citizenship, and the Rights of 
Noncitizens', in Ethics and International Affairs, Vol. 20, 2006. 
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On the basis of the evaluation of the 1961 Convention’s response to the 
technical causes of statelessness, it seems fair to conclude that this convention is 
worthy of its title: the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. A number of 
its provisions, if properly implemented, should reduce the number of newly 
emerging cases of statelessness. What it does not do, at least not with regard to 
statelessness which results from these technical sources, is to eradicate future 
statelessness. In some areas it seems that its provisions do not go any further than 
what has already been accepted by many states under human rights instruments. 
From this point of view it could be argued that ratification of the 1961 Convention 
should not be objectionable – it would be in line with commitments that states have 
already made. However, if human rights law covers many of the situations for 
which the Convention provides (and it does), as well as moving with the times to 
incorporate newly developed principles and rights, the question remains as to 
whether promoting ratification of this instrument is really worthwhile. In this 
chapter we uncovered only three situations for which increased ratification of the 
Convention may be helpful in that it would clarify the obligations of states in those 
cases.200 In the chapters to come, the assessment of the utility of the 1961 







                                                           
200 These are the cases of prevention of statelessness among foundlings, the definition of state territory 
under jus soli to include births on board a ship or aircraft registered in that country and the prohibition 
of loss, renunciation or deprivation of nationality if the person would be rendered stateless (albeit still 
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The words “arbitrary deprivation of nationality” denote by far the most complex 
and sensitive origin of statelessness. The modern-day caseloads that fall into this 
category are among the most grave and volatile, as well as the most protracted, of 
all stateless situations worldwide. Moreover, the problem of arbitrary deprivation of 
nationality often rears its head in circumstances where nationality policy is already 
under pressure and there is an increased risk of statelessness, such as state 
succession or (forced) migration, making difficult matters worse.1 Meanwhile 
historically, the statelessness cases that first commanded the attention of the 
international community were also those created by what we now call arbitrary 
deprivation of nationality. The mass denationalisation campaigns which surrounded 
the first and second World Wars are forceful examples of the “dangers inherent in 
the power of nation-states to define their own rules of exit”.2 This experience 
contributed to the motivation of states to include the prohibition of arbitrary 
deprivation of nationality in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and to 
gradually introduce limits on state sovereignty in the matter of nationality 
attribution.3 In preceding chapters, the phrase “arbitrary deprivation of nationality” 
already popped up a number of times and we alluded to the fact that – thanks also to 
                                                           
1 These specific issues will be dealt with in detail in chapters VI (on statelessness in cases of state 
succession) and VII (on “new” sources of statelessness). 
2 In the 1920’s, the former Soviet Union issued a series of denationalisation decrees, which retracted the 
Russian nationality of some 2 million people. Rainer Bauböck, Transnational Citizenship. Membership 
and Rights in International Migration, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham: 2002, page 128. A similar policy of 
issuing denationalisation decrees was employed by the Nazi regime in Germany as a tool of 
persecution: “Before the emergence of international human rights law, citizenship or nationality was 
sometimes arbitrarily withdrawn, even on the grounds of race or ethnicity. One of the worst examples is 
Nazi Germany’s ‘German Reich Citizenship Law’ of 1935, one of the so-called Nuremberg Laws, by 
which German citizenship was limited to ‘persons of German or cognate blood’, which was one of the 
first steps in the process leading to the Holocaust affecting Jews, Romanis and others”. Asbjorn Eide, 
“Citizenship and the minority rights of non-citizens”, Working Paper prepared for the UN Sub-
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.5/1999/WP.3, 15 April 1999, paragraph 19. 
3 Ruth Donner, "Chapter 3: The Imposition and Withdrawal of Nationality" in The Regulation of 
Nationality in International Law, Transnational Publishers, New York: 1994, pages 154-156; Open 
Society Justice Intitiative, Citizenship and equality in practice: guaranteeing non-discriminatory access 
to nationality, protecting the right to be free from arbitrary deprivation of nationality and combating 





the Universal Declaration – it is generally considered impermissible under 
international law. However, we have yet to fully reflect on the scope and content of 
this expression or on the related international norms. That is the purpose of this 
chapter. It should thereby be noted from the outset that, until now, we have spoken 
only of deprivation of nationality in the sense of denationalisation at the initiative of 
the state.4 However, in the context of this chapter, the word “deprivation” should be 
interpreted in the broadest possible sense. As we will discover, the prohibition of 
arbitrary deprivation of nationality may impact not only on states’ powers of 
denationalisation but also on their decisions relating to the conferral of nationality 
at birth and even naturalisation.5 
 Arbitrariness is a recurring notion in the context of international law, 
particularly in the field of human rights.6 According to its dictionary definition, 
“arbitrary” can mean: discretionary, dependent upon will or pleasure, derived from 
mere opinion or preference, capricious and even tyrannical. At the very least, for an 
act of state not to be considered arbitrary – or tyrannical – it must be in conformity 
with the relevant law.7 To avoid an allegation of arbitrariness, citizenship may only 
be deprived as prescribed by law. Thus the first situation that the phrase “arbitrary 
deprivation of nationality” describes is the unlawful or illegal deprivation of 
nationality. However, the scope of arbitrariness is clearly broader than illegal, 
suggesting rather an abuse of power that is either outside the law or is indeed 
achieved through the law, where the law itself is arbitrary.8 On this basis, scholars 
                                                           
4 See chapter III, section 1 and chapter IV, section 4. 
5 As an initial example, consider the case of Yean and Bosico v. Dominican Republic, where the Inter-
American Court on Human Rights found that “the State failed to grant nationality to the children, which 
constituted an arbitrary deprivation of their nationality”. Inter-American Court on Human Rights, Case 
of Yean and Bosico v. Dominican Republic, Series C, Case 130, 8 September 2005, para. 174.  
6 Consider the prohibitions of arbitrary arrest or detention (article 9 ICCPR) and of arbitrary 
interference in a person’s private or family life (article 17 ICCPR).  
7 Nehemiah Robinson, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Its Origin, Significance, 
Application and Interpretation, Institute of Jewish Affairs, New York: 1958; Albert Verdoodt, 
Naissance et Signification de la Déclaration Universelle des Droits de l'Homme, E. Warny, Louvain: 
1964; Open Society Justice Initiative, Racial Discrimination and the Rights of Non-Citizens. 
Submission to the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the occasion of its 
64th Session, New York: 2004. 
8 This interpretation follows from the traveaux preparatoires of the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation 
of nationality in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Nehemiah Robinson, The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. Its Origin, Significance, Application and Interpretation, Institute of 
Jewish Affairs, New York: 1958; Albert Verdoodt, Naissance et Signification de la Déclaration 
Universelle des Droits de l'Homme, E. Warny, Louvain: 1964. The Human Rights Committee also 
elaborated on the notion of arbitrariness in the context of the prohibition of arbitrary interference with 
an individual’s private and family life: “The introduction of the concept of arbitrariness is intended to 
guarantee that even interference provided for by the law should be in accordance with the provisions, 
aims and objectives of the covenant and should be, in any event, reasonable in the particular 
circumstances”. Human Rights Committee, General Comment 16: The right to respect of privacy, 
family, home and correspondence, and protection of honour and reputation,Geneva: 8 April 1988, para. 
4. The jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee on the subject arbitrary detention also sheds light 
on the interpretation of arbitrariness: “‘arbitrariness’ is not to be equated with ‘against the law’, but 
must be interpreted more broadly to include elements of inappropriateness, injustice, lack of 
predictability and due process of law”. Human Rights Committee, Case of Van Alphen v. The 
Netherlands, Comm. No. 305/1988, Geneva: 23 July 1990, paragraph 5.8. 
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have therefore identified two further circumstances in which the deprivation of 
nationality shall be considered arbitrary. Thus, the second manifestation of arbitrary 
deprivation of nationality is where such deprivation is discriminatory. As will be 
revealed, this refers to situations that are now commonly described as “denial of 
citizenship”. The third is where the deprivation of nationality is not accompanied by 
“due procedural process, including review or appeal”.9 In the following sections, 
these three variants of arbitrary deprivation of nationality will be dealt with, 
considering the role that they play in rendering individuals stateless and the reaction 
that international law prescribes in each case.10 We will consider the discriminatory 
deprivation of citizenship first (section 1) - and in greatest detail - because this is 
the most severe form and tends to be the core issue in all cases of arbitrary 
deprivation of nationality, whereby unlawfulness of decisions and the lack of due 
process are secondary accompaniments. Thereafter, unlawful deprivation of 
nationality and the absence of due process will be dealt with together (section 2), 
forming, as such, the procedural guarantees encapsulated in the prohibition of 
arbitrary deprivation of nationality.  
  
1 DISCRIMINATORY DEPRIVATION OF NATIONALITY AND “DENIAL OF     
   CITIZENSHIP” 
 
Discriminatory deprivation of nationality fundamentally describes the situation 
where a state withholds or withdraws the nationality of an individual on the basis of 
a distinction that is deemed unreasonable and untenable, such as on the grounds of 
some immutable characteristic like skin colour. Exactly what type of distinction is 
considered to amount to discrimination under international law - in the specific 
context of nationality attribution – will be investigated in the upcoming two 
                                                           
9 Open Society Justice Initiative, Racial Discrimination and the Rights of Non-Citizens. Submission to 
the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the occasion of its 64th Session, 
New York: 2004. 
10 To complete this initial introduction to the concept of arbitrary deprivation of nationality, two further 
remarks should be made. The first relates to the submission made by numerous scholars that any 
deprivation of nationality resulting in statelessness must be considered arbitrary, although deprivation 
appears to be used in this context in its narrower sense as denationalisation: loss or withdrawal of an 
existing nationality. This would add a fourth variant to the list of “arbitrary” measures outlined above. 
As we have already noted in previous chapters, while international law is certainly developing towards 
a stronger condemnation of the creation of statelessness and a firmer obligation on states to prevent 
statelessness, there is insufficient evidence that the deprivation of nationality resulting in statelessness 
per se qualifies as arbitrary deprivation of nationality. However, where this work identifies concrete 
obligations on states to refrain from denationalising a certain person and rendering them stateless, it is 
arguable that to nevertheless do so – in breach of international law – could also amount to arbitrary 
deprivation of nationality. The second comment relates to the issue of collective denationalisation. 
Large-scale withdrawal of citizenship must be considered arbitrary – whether technically prescribed by 
law or not - both because it (usually) involves identifying a particular population group for deprivation 
of citizenship on discriminatory grounds and because the condition of procedural due process cannot be 
met with en masse decision-making. Therefore, it is important to note that the expression arbitrary 
deprivation of nationality automatically covers situations of collective denationalisation, such as the 
historical examples provided above (in note 2), which have proven to be a significant source of 
statelessness. There is no need to discuss this matter separately; the evaluation of applicable 





subsections. However, I would like to first call attention to a closely related issue: 
the development of the newest catchphrase relating to nationality matters to emerge 
into the international arena, namely “denial of citizenship”. It has been taken up by 
– among others – the UNHCR in its Handbook on nationality and statelessness, the 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination in a General 
Recommendation and NGOs in their reports on citizenship issues.11 In spite of the 
increasingly frequent usage of this phrase, no actual definition has been provided to 
date. Nor can the phrase as such be found in international legal instruments. 
Nevertheless, its meaning can be inferred from writings on the subject whereby it 
becomes clear that “denial of citizenship” has become the popular term used in 
describing situations of discriminatory deprivation of nationality (amounting to 
arbitrary deprivation of nationality). The recognition of the equivalence of these 
phrases is of vital importance since it provides content to the otherwise hollow 
expression “denial of citizenship” that has become so commonplace. It also 
establishes the link to international norms that apply to cases of denial of citizenship 
with the result that to label a situation as such is no longer vague and trivial but is in 
fact an appraisal which is loaded with (legal) consequence. 
In view of the significance of equating denial of citizenship to discriminatory 
deprivation of nationality, let us explore how this conclusion was reached. One 
report that came close to ascribing a tangible meaning to the denial of citizenship is 
“Denial of citizenship: A challenge to human security” compiled for the Advisory 
Board on Human Security. In a footnote to the main text it suggests that denial of 
citizenship may stand for: 
 
An individual’s inability to obtain participative membership in a given State 
despite that individual’s meeting the citizenship requirements generally 
identified under international standards.12 
                                                           
11 UNHCR and IPU, Nationality and statelessness. A handbook for parliamentarians, 2005, page 39; 
CERD General Recommendation 30: Discrimination against Non-Citizens 2004, paragraph 15; Open 
Society Justice Initiative, Racial Discrimination and the Rights of Non-Citizens. Submission to the UN 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the occasion of its 64th Session, New York: 
2004; Human Rights Watch report on Malaysia, “The Rohingya’s citizenship: the root of the problem”, 
2000; The term can be found in the working paper prepared by Fernand de Varennes for the UN 
Working Group on Minorities in 1998 entitled “Towards effective political participation and 
representation of minorities”. The phrase has also been employed by former UNHCR Legal Advisor on 
Statelessness, Carol Batchelor in her publications, such as Carol Batchelor, 'Statelessness and the 
Problem of Resolving Nationality Status', in International Journal of Refugee Law, Vol. 10, 1998.  
12 Advisory Board on Human Security (prepared by Constantin Sokoloff), Denial of Citizenship: A 
Challenge to Human Security, February 2005, page 6. It is of interest to note the reference to 
“participatory membership”. In choosing this term instead of simply referring to nationality or legal 
membership, it would appear that consideration should be given not just to the fact of nationality, but 
also to its quality. Where an individual is a de jure national but is prevented from exercising his rights 
of citizenship, for example he is unable to vote or re-enter state territory, this could be qualified as 
denial of citizenship because he lacks participatory membership – an effective nationality. This take on 
the issue may provide the opportunity to tackle the problem of ineffective citizenship under 
international norms relating to the arbitrary deprivation of nationality. Although this does not concern a 
problem of statelessness (see chapter II, section 4) and is therefore beyond the scope of this study, it is 
important to note that the potential existence of means for ensuring that people are able to exercise the 
rights accorded to them through the bond of nationality is an important component of the overall regime 
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Note that denial of citizenship would result in statelessness where the words “a 
given State” can be replaced with “any State” or simply deleted.13 However, this 
prospective definition has one undeniable weakness. This weakness lies in its 
closing words: “despite that individual’s meeting the citizenship requirements 
generally identified under international law”.14 There are two problems with this 
segment of the text. First of all, the conditions that must be met for an individual to 
acquire the nationality of a particular state are set by the municipal law of that state. 
International law does not espouse a clear set of citizenship requirements to be 
enacted by all states, it merely prescribes certain limits on the freedom of states to 
lay down their own conditions for nationality attribution. It is therefore not 
immediately obvious how you would determine whether there has been a denial of 
citizenship under this definition. Secondly, if we were to proceed by assuming that 
the lack of attribution of nationality in violation of any international standard were 
to amount to a denial of citizenship, then the phrase itself would lose all defining 
value. This approach would result in the inclusion of technical causes of 
statelessness and statelessness as a consequence of state succession – in fact any 
case where citizenship is deprived or refused in breach of international law. Not 
only would this render the expression “denial of citizenship” useless in the context 
of this chapter – in identifying a specific, distinct source of statelessness – but this 
does not seem to be the correct use of the phrase as understood from writings on the 
topic.  
The prospective definition introduced above is therefore not entirely 
satisfactory. More precisely, it fails to identify which international standards on the 
attribution of nationality are violated in the context of denial of citizenship. To do 
so, let us consider the caseloads put forward in the Advisory Board’s report as 
examples of the phenomenon. These include – among others – the Rohingyas in 
Myanmar, the Banyarwanda in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the 
Lhotshampas in Bhutan. It is clear that the situations covered by the phrase “denial 
of citizenship” are manifold and diverse. However, you need only briefly scan the 
description of the plight of each of these groups to realise that there are a number of 
recurring buzz-words such as deliberate, marginalisation, exclusion, 
disenfranchisement and ethnicity. There is therefore one uniting element: 
discrimination. Denial of citizenship is about unequal access to nationality and the 
lack of justification for such bias. As the UNHCR Guidelines on statelessness 
suggest: 
 
                                                                                                                                               
for the protection of  individual rights. On the other hand, since the prospective definition goes on to 
discuss the fact of the individual meeting “citizenship requirements”, the phrase “participative 
membership” could equally be construed as synonymous with nationality. 
13 For the sake of clarity, the term nationality should also be substituted for the phrase “participative 
membership” in view of the comments made in the previous footnote. Note that in reality, denial of 
citizenship will more often than not result in statelessness for it is usually the state with which an 
individual is most closely connected that effects the denial of citizenship. Only where another state with 
which the individual has a genuine link intervenes to grant legal membership (or in cases of dual 
nationality), will such denial of citizenship not create a new case of statelessness. 





All nationality laws have distinctions and not all persons will be equally connected 
with all States. Nevertheless, in some cases persons are unable to acquire nationality 
in any State despite very strong ties which are sufficient for the grant of nationality to 
other equally-situated persons. There may be either overt discrimination or 
discrimination created inadvertently in the laws or through their implementation.15 
 
This interpretation of denial of citizenship is backed in another international report 
which explains the idea of “exclusion of minorities from the political process 
through the denial of citizenship” as follows:  
 
Historically, some governments have limited political participation and 
representation to certain categories of individuals by making it more difficult for 
members of certain minority groups to become citizens.16 
 
Thus denial of citizenship distinguishes itself through the element of discrimination 
and the notion that it targets particular population groups. Or put simply: denial of 
citizenship is the discriminatory deprivation of nationality.  
On the basis of the foregoing it is clear that we are not looking at lack of 
access to nationality in contravention of any international standard, but, more 
particularly, in violation of the principle of equal treatment and the complimentary 
prohibition of discrimination. If we translate these findings into a working 
definition of denial of citizenship – and thereby also of discriminatory deprivation 
of nationality – we can present a fully revised version of the problematic description 
presented above: 
 
An individual’s inability to obtain or retain nationality in a given State in 
contravention of international standards on non-discrimination.17 
                                                           
15 UNHCR, Guidelines: Field Office Activities Concerning Statelessness, Field-Office Memorandum 
No.70/98, 28 September 1998, page 6. 
16 Working paper by Fernand de Varennes, “Towards effective participation and representation of 
minorities”, prepared for the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities of the UN Commission on Human Rights, May 1998, E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC5/1998/WP4. See 
also Gay McDougall, Promotion and Protection of all Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development – Report of the Independent Expert on 
Minority Issues, A/HRC/7/23, 28 February 2008, paras. 13-15. 
17 Note that “nationality” was substituted for “participative membership” to avoid ambiguity. 
Furthermore, the words “or retain” were added in order to reflect the understanding that denial of 
citizenship and discriminatory deprivation of nationality may refer equally to situations where a person 
has been unable to acquire the nationality of a state and where a person has been denationalised. This is 
in line with the previous assertion that “deprivation” in the context of arbitrary deprivation of 
nationality should currently be interpreted in the broadest possible sense. In fact cases of denial of 
citizenship often demonstrate both the discriminatory loss or deprivation of citizenship from a 
particular generation in combination with the discriminatory refusal to bestow nationality upon 
successive generations. Consider for example the Lhotshampas (ethnic Nepalese Hindus) of Bhutan, 
many of whom saw their citizenship revoked by the 1985 Citizenship Act when it (retroactively) 
required both parents to be citizens of Bhutan for eligibility to Bhutanese nationality by birth or proof 
of permanent residence on Bhutanese soil since before 31 December 1958 for eligibility to Bhutanese 
nationality by registration. These amendments also made it impossible for successive generations to 
acquire Bhutanese citizenship. Denial of citizenship affected many more after large numbers of 
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This definition covers both the situation where citizenship requirements set by the 
state are of themselves discriminatory and cases of discriminatory (non- or 
incorrect) application of the municipal rules on the attribution of nationality.18  
Again it should be noted that where denial of citizenship results in 
statelessness the words “a given State” must either be replaced with “any State” or 
simply omitted. Thus, since this work focuses on the problem of statelessness, we 
are particularly interested in the denial of citizenship in the following two contexts: 
where a person is denationalised in contravention of international standards on non-
discrimination and where a (potentially) stateless person is denied access to 
nationality in contravention of those same standards. Before investigating the exact 
scope of the relevant international norms, let us take a brief look at two 
statelessness situations that provide a case in point for these variants of denial of 
citizenship as identified by the international community.  The situation of the Kurds 
in the Syrian Arab Republic is an example of the first – withdrawal of citizenship 
resulting in statelessness. In 1962, the government issued Decree No. 93, providing 
for a population census that affected the withdrawal of citizenship from some 
120,000 Syrian Kurds. In the decades that followed, the number of lives that were 
impacted by this decree rose and in January 2006 it was estimated that as many as 
300,000 Kurds had been denied citizenship and rendered stateless.19 Officially, the 
census required people to prove that they had been resident in Syria since before 
1945 in order to retain their citizenship. Yet reportedly, the implementation of this 
policy resulted in the discriminatory denationalisation of Kurds, even those who 
were able to produce proof of residence.20 Whether discriminatory in intent or not, 
the implementation of the government policy was undeniably discriminatory in 
effect, specifically targeting the Kurdish population.21 Their statelessness remains a 
serious concern to the international community.22  
                                                                                                                                               
Lhotshampa fled to neighbouring Nepal and Bhutan contended that they had willingly forfeited their 
citizenship by voluntarily emigrating (a ground for loss of citizenship under the 1977 Citizenship Act). 
Advisory Board on Human Security (prepared by Constantin Sokoloff), Denial of Citizenship: A 
Challenge to Human Security, February 2005, page 10; Hiram Ruiz and Michelle Berg, Unending 
limbo: Warehousing Bhutanese Refugees in Nepal, UNHCR World Refugee Survey 2004, pages 98-
105; Michael Hutt, Unbecoming Citizens. Culture, Nationhood, and the Flight of Refugees from 
Bhutan., Oxford University Press, New Delhi: 2005, pages 147-149 and 221. 
18 It thereby reflects the notion that “arbitrariness” under international law goes beyond mere 
“illegality” to also consider the quality of the law which is being implemented. 
19 Many of these are not only labelled as foreigners (Anjanib) but are entirely undocumented and 
invisible – Maktoumeen.  
20 Human Rights Watch, Syria – The silenced Kurds, Vol. 8, No. 4, October 1996; Maureen Lynch and 
Perveen Ali, Buried Alive. Stateless Kurds in Syria, Report for Refugees International, January 2006. 
21 Such requirements as proof of long-term residence (over several generations) or lineage may be non-
discriminatory or neutral on the face of it but result in indirect discrimination of particular population 
groups because when applied, even without any intent to discriminate, it  has an “exclusive or 
disproportionate adverse effect on a certain category of persons”. See Human Rights Committee, Case 
of Derksen v. the Netherlands, CCPR/C/80/D/976/2001, 15 June 2004, paragraph 9.3. Alternatively, 
discrimination may be direct and explicit in the legislation or policy, such as in the case of the 
Rohingyas in Myanmar whose denial of citizenship resulted from the introduction of the 1982 
Citizenship Act. This law allowed only certain ethnic groups – 135 “national races”- access to full 





 As to statelessness created through the second variant of denial of citizenship – 
discriminatory refusal of access to nationality – the situation of the Dominican-born 
children of (supposed) Haitian descent is a current example. Although the 
Dominican Republic subscribes to the jus soli doctrine of nationality attribution at 
birth, large numbers of children born on Dominican soil are refused birthright 
citizenship. The constitutional exception clause which renders the Dominican-born 
children of parents who are “in transit” ineligible for Dominican citizenship has 
been the subject of a severely controversial, expansive interpretation: all children of 
irregular migrants are excluded from jus soli acquisition of nationality.23 Moreover, 
the implementation of this policy is steeped in racial discrimination as the “irregular 
migrant” is equated with the “Haitian” and this, in turn, is interpreted on the basis of 
(perceived) ethnic traits. In practice, the decision as to which children’s claim to jus 
soli citizenship will be accepted and which rejected, is often based on the parents 
skin colour, language ability and surname.24 This instance of denial of citizenship is 
estimated to have caused anywhere upwards of 200,000 individual cases of 
statelessness.25 In the event of either discriminatory refusal of access to nationality 
and discriminatory denationalisation, the outcome is the same: the creation of a new 
                                                                                                                                               
Constantin Sokoloff), Denial of Citizenship: A Challenge to Human Security, February 2005, page 7; 
Open Society Justice Initiative, Written Comments on the Case of Dilcea Yean and Violeta Bosico v. 
Dominican Republic, New York: April 2005, page 35; Bill Frelick, Statelessness: The Denial of a 
Fundamental Human Right, 19 April 2005, pages 11-12; Doudou Diène, Report by the Special 
Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related 
intolerance, Addendum – Summary of cases transmitted to Governments and replies received, 
A/HRC/4/19/Add.1, 5 June 2007, paragraph 126. 
22 Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations: Syrian Arab Republic, A/53/41, 
Geneva: 1998, para. 624; Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 
Concluding observations: Syrian Arab Republic, A/54/18, New York: 1999, paras. 17-176 and 180; 
Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations: Syrian Arab Republic, CCPR/CO84/SYR, 
Geneva: 2005, para. 19 
23 Article 11 of the Dominican Constitution states “Dominicans are: All persons who were born on the 
territory of the Republic, with the exception of the legitimate children of foreign diplomats resident in 
the country or those who are transiting through it”. The interpretation of “transient” to be synonymous 
with irregular migrant has received much criticism from the international and NGO community. See for 
example Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, “Chapter IX: Situation of Haitian migrant 
workers and their families in the Dominican Republic, in Report on the situation of human rights in the 
Dominican Republic, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.104, 7 October 1999, para. 363; Human Rights Committee, 
Concluding Observations: Dominican Republic, UN Doc. CCPR/CO/71/DOM, Geneva: 26 April 2001, 
para. 18. 
24 With the result that not all those excluded are children of irregular immigrants or even of foreign 
nationals. Movement of Haitian and Dominico-Haitian Women (MUDHA), Solidarity. With the 
struggle of the Dominican minority of Haitian descent for citizenship and justice, Santo Domingo, 
August 2001; Human Rights Watch, “Illegal People”: Haitians and Dominico-Haitians in the 
Dominican Republic, Vol. 14, Number 1, April 2002; Bridget Wooding and Richard Mosely-Williams, 
Needed but unwanted, Catholic Institute for International Relations, London 2004; Inter-American 
Court on Human Rights, Case of Yean and Bosico v. Dominican Republic, Series C, Case 130, 8 
September 2005. 
25 For a full analysis of the situation in the Dominican Republic, see Laura van Waas, Is Permanent 
Illegality Inevitable? The Challenges to Ensuring Birth Registration and the Right to a Nationality for 
the Children of Irregular Migrants - Thailand and the Dominican Republic, Woking: 2006 
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(and often large) stateless population thanks to denial of citizenship.26 These two 
examples will be relied upon where appropriate as we turn to the question as to 
what extent international law stands in the way of such policies. 
 
1.1 The 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness 
 
In the introduction to the 1961 Statelessness Convention, provided in chapter III, 
we noted the unusual absence of any preambles or general principles. This is where 
we might otherwise have expected to find at least a preliminary reference to the 
principle of equality of treatment, a rendition of the prohibition of discrimination or 
indeed a proclamation of the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of nationality.27 
Instead, the important matter of denial of citizenship is first dealt with in the 
Convention’s substantive provisions. Article 9 decrees: 
 
A Contracting State may not deprive any person or group of persons of their 
nationality on racial, ethnic, religious or political grounds.28 
 
Just four prohibited grounds are listed: race, ethnicity, religion and political 
affiliation. The way that the provision is formulated implies that this is a finite list: 
the words “or other status” which are commonly included at the end of such an 
inventory of prohibited grounds of discrimination are absent here. Nor does the 
“Information and Accession package” that accompanies the convention mention the 
possibility of other grounds of discrimination being read into this article. Moreover, 
the position of this provision in the Convention impies that “deprivation” is used 
here in its narrower sense, thus to prohibit only the withdrawal of nationality on the 
enumerated grounds.29 There is no broader reference to non-discrimination in the 
Convention’s text or any proclamation that in the implementation of its provisions 
the principle of equality is to be respected to counter this conclusion.  
With these points in mind, it must be conceded that this provision will not 
cover all conceivable instances of denial of citizenship. Granted, it does prohibit 
denationalisation on racial or ethnic grounds which would have stood in the way of 
                                                           
26 Denial of citizenship need not necessarily occur on such a large scale, it may also be evident in 
strictly individual decisions. Consider the denial of citizenship where parliamentary or presidential 
candidates are the target. One example is the reciprocal campaign by opposing parties in Zambia to 
prove that the other’s leader was not a citizen. In the end, the political opponents of Kenneth Kaunda, 
the country’s former president, were successful in forcing a High Court Ruling that revoked Mr Kaunda 
of his Zambian citizenship, rendering him stateless. Donald McNeil, "Founder of Zambia is declared 
stateless in high court ruling" New York Times, New York: 1999. See also Cécile Pouilly, “Africa’s 
Hidden Problem” and Jack Redden, “Suddenly, you are nobody” in Refugees Magazine, Number 147, 
Issue 3, 2007, pages 28-31. 
27 Nor is there any mention of “denial of citizenship” as an issue. 
28 This is the only substantive article in the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness that is 
not strictly focused on the prevention of statelessness but concerns itself with a broader principle in the 
field of nationality attribution. Under the operation of this instrument, deprivation of nationality on 
these grounds is prohibited whether it leads to statelessness or not.  
29 Article 9 follows an article that clearly deals with deprivation of citizenship in the sense of loss or 
withdrawal of an existing nationality rather than perhaps at the beginning of the convention as a more 






Syria’s treatment of its Kurdish population had it been a state party.30 And the 
deprivation of nationality on political grounds, as has been reported in several 
young multi-party democracies, would also be outlawed. However, even if the four 
prohibited grounds were interpreted expansively,31 they will undoubtedly leave 
some gaps because it is simply not feasible to read entirely new or different grounds 
into this finite list of terms. For example, the failure to prohibit deprivation of 
nationality on the grounds of gender is one obvious concern that cannot simply be 
overcome.32 Moreover, in order to ensure that the four prohibited grounds of 
discrimination that are listed are interpreted in line with developments in 
international law, a competent monitoring body must be in place to lead the way. 
As hinted in chapter III, the supervisory mechanism provided for by the 1961 
Statelessness Convention is unlikely to be able to fulfil this task. Perhaps even more 
severe is the gap that this Convention leaves in preventing discrimination in access 
to nationality. This may equally result in statelessness - as we have seen in the 
Dominican Republic where children of (presumed) irregular Haitian immigrants are 
rendered stateless due to discriminatory denial of access to jus soli Dominican 
citizenship. Let us now consider alternative sources of protection against denial of 
citizenship. 
 
1.2 International human rights law 
 
The prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of nationality is considered to be a 
fundamental norm of international law, the infringement of which amounts to a 
violation of basic human rights and fundamental freedoms.33 It has been 
promulgated in a number of human rights instruments and should be considered as 
the counterpart to the right to a nationality which is included in many more.34 The 
                                                           
30 The Syrian Arab Republic is not a party to either of the Statelessness Conventions. 
31 For example, racial or ethnic grounds also cover discrimination on the basis of colour and descent . 
Plus, where apparently objective distinctions are used (e.g. language) with the effect of discriminating 
on one of these grounds, this can also be interpreted as prohibited discrimination.  
32 Tang Lay Lee, Statelessness, human rights and gender: irregular migrant workers from Burma in 
Thailand, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2005, page 40. In chapter IV we saw the impact that policies 
discriminating on the grounds of gender can have on access to nationality and the risk of statelessness. 
33 UNHCR Executive Committee, Conclusion on the Prevention and Reduction of Statelessness and the 
Protection of Stateless Persons, No. 78, 1995; UN General Assembly, Resolution on the Office of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, A/RES/50/152, 9 February 1996, para. 16; UN 
Human Rights Commission, Resolutions on Human rights and arbitrary deprivation of nationality, 
1997/36, 11 April 1997; 1998/48, 17 April 1998; 1999/28, 26 April 1999 and 2005/45, 19 April 2005; 
Asian-African Legal Consultative Organisation Resolution on Legal Identity and Statelessness 2006. 
See also Paul Weis, Nationality and Statelessness in International Law, Kluwer Academic Publishers 
Group, Dordrecht: 1979, page 248; Johannes Chan, 'The Right to a Nationality as a Human Right - The 
Current Trend Towards Recognition', in Human Rights Law Journal, Vol. 12, 1991; Lisa Stratton, 'The 
Right to Have Rights: Gender Discrimination in Nationality Laws', in Minnesota Law Review, Vol. 77, 
1992; Open Society Justice Initiative, Written Comments on the Case of Dilcea Yean and Violeta 
Bosico v. Dominican Republic, New York: April 2005. 
34 The prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of nationality is explicitly included in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the American Convention on Human Rights. It can also be found in 
article 4 of the European Convention on Nationality; Articles 15 and 16 of the ILC Draft Articles on 
Nationality of Natural Persons in relation to the Succession of States; Paragraph 55 of chapter VI on 
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renditions of this prohibition do not elaborate on the scope of the rule. It is however 
agreed that a major element of the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of nationality 
is the prohibition of discriminatory deprivation of nationality, i.e. the denial of 
citizenship.35 What we need to discover is what kind of differentiation is considered 
legitimate and what is deemed to amount to discrimination in this context. We must 
therefore look to rules on non-discrimination for further guidance on the content of 
this norm. 
The general principle of non-discrimination enjoys such widespread 
recognition that it has become a matter of customary international law.36 Moreover, 
the prohibition of racial discrimination is one of the most fundamental of 
international norms and has joined the ranks of jus cogens.37 The principle can also 
be traced in the UN Charter and in every major human rights instrument adopted to 
date. The term “racial discrimination” covers distinctions based on “race, colour, 
descent, or national or ethnic origin”.38 This general prohibition clearly restricts the 
freedom of states to legislate on nationality matters by demanding that such 
regulations must not differentiate between individuals on the basis of any of these 
qualities, either in purpose or in effect. Neither access to, nor withdrawal of, 
nationality may be ascribed on these prohibited grounds.39  
The jus cogens norm prohibiting racial discrimination therefore goes some 
way to delineating the scope of the denial of citizenship by providing initial content 
to the “international standards on non-discrimination” that were alluded to above.40 
The specific non-discrimination clauses of many human rights instruments prohibit 
discrimination on a number of additional grounds. The UN Charter itself decrees 
                                                                                                                                               
The Human Dimension of the Concluding Document of Helsinki, Conference for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe, 1992; Paragraph 19 of the Charter for European Security of the Organisation 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1999. 
35 Ruth Donner, The Regulation of Nationality in International Law, Transnational Publishers, New 
York: 1994; Johannes Chan, 'The Right to a Nationality as a Human Right - The Current Trend 
Towards Recognition', in Human Rights Law Journal, Vol. 12, 1991. 
36 See the discussion in chapter IV, section 1.2 on the subject of gender-sensitive nationality acts.  
37 Very few rules and principles have acquired the status of jus cogens - peremptory international 
norms. Alongside the prohibition of racial discrimination we find other fundamental matters such as the 
prohibitions of slavery and of genocide. Such rules can “be modified only by a subsequent norm of 
general international law having the same character”. Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties. See also Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford: 2003, pages 488-489; James Crawford, The International Law Commission's Articles on State 
Responsibility, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 2002, pages 245-246. 
38 Article 1 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.  
39 The Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination explicitly reminds us that the 
prohibition of racial discrimination is applicable to the enjoyment of the right to a nationality. Article 5 
of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 1965. The Committee on 
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has also stated that “deprivation of citizenship on the basis of 
race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin is a breach of States parties’ obligations to ensure non-
discriminatory enjoyment of the right to nationality”. UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination, General Recommendation 30: Discrimination against non-citizens, 1 October 2004, 
para. 14.  
40 Put another way, “the realm of State discretion in the field of nationality has an outer limit – the 
prohibition of racial discrimination”. Open Society Justice Initiative, Written Comments on the Case of 
Dilcea Yean and Violeta Bosico v. Dominican Republic, Amicus brief to the Inter-American Court on 





that human rights shall be respected and observed “without distinction as to race, 
sex, language or religion”.41 To this list, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
and the International Covenants add a number of additional qualities, bringing the 
complete list to: 
 
Race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or 
social origin, property, birth or other status.42  
 
The enjoyment of all of the rights that are promulgated in these texts is thereby 
guaranteed to all “on an equal basis and in their totality”.43 Where the document 
includes the right to a nationality, the effect is to prescribe non-discriminatory 
enjoyment of this right.44 On the face of it then, under the operation of these 
agreements the protection against denial of citizenship is broader in scope than 
under the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. At least three 
additional prohibited grounds of discrimination are introduced: sex, language and 
property.45 Moreover, there is the prospect of ruling out further unjust distinctions 
                                                           
41 Article 55 of the Charter of the United Nations. It should be noted that where the discriminatory 
deprivation of nationality on the grounds of gender is concerned, the comments made in the previous 
chapter (IV) on gender imbalance in jus sanguinis citizenship legislation and the discriminatory 
position of women in relation to nationality in the event of marriage are also relevant here. 
42 Article 2, paragraph 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966; Article 2, 
paragraph 2 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966. Such a 
clause can also be found in article 1 of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of 
All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families. The Convention on the Rights of the Child 
maintains a similar list but with the added element that discrimination is prohibited on these grounds 
whether both in respect of the child and his parents. Article 2, paragraph 1 of the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, 1989. It should be noted that some of these terms overlap since “racial 
discrimination” is already considered to include distinctions based on colour or national origin. 
Meanwhile, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women focuses 
on outlawing gender discrimination in a similar context. All of the major regional human rights 
instruments render (their own version of) the same list: Article 14 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights; Article 1 of the American Convention on Human Rights; Article 2 of the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights; Article 3 of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of 
the Child; and Article 5 of the Covenant on the Rights of the Child in Islam. There are subtle variations, 
for example the term “property” is replaced in the African Charters with the word “fortune” and the 
European Convention on Human Rights includes an additional ground, namely “association with a 
national minority”. However these differences are negligible. 
43 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 28: Equality of rights between men and women, 29 
March 2000, para. 2. 
44 As we have seen, the right to a nationality or the right of a child to acquire a nationality is included in 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, the American 
Convention on Human Rights, the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All 
Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, the American Convention on Human Rights, the 
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child and the Covenant on the Rights of the Child in 
Islam. 
45 Colour and national origin are both encapsulated in the term “race”. It could be argued that the 
grounds “social origin” and “birth” are first introduced in these international and regional human rights 
instruments. However, the content of the term “social origin” as distinct from national or ethnic origin 
or from property is ambiguous. Additionally, “birth” may be considered to fall within the broader term 
“racial discrimination” which includes distinctions on the grounds of “descent”, although it also 
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under the category “other status” – an option that is not available under the 1961 
Statelessness Convention. This opportunity has been seized, upon occasion, to 
denounce distinctions on grounds such as migratory status46 or discrimination 
against persons who are affected by HIV/AIDS.47   
It is tempting to conclude that the provisions on the right to a nationality 
and the prohibition of discrimination work in conjunction to forbid distinctions on 
any of the grounds listed in all domestic rules and practice on the attribution of 
nationality. This position is reinforced by provisions such as article 26 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which provides for equality 
(thereby prohibiting discrimination) before the law.48 The impact of this norm was 
outlined in a general comment by the UN Human Rights Committee: “It prohibits 
discrimination in law or in fact in any field regulated and protected by public 
authorities”.49 The attribution of nationality is per definition such a field. 
Nevertheless, the matter is not that straightforward. The “application of the 
non-discrimination principle of equal access to rights does not mean identical 
treatment”50 so we must look more carefully to see how the principle of non-
discrimination is interpreted and applied in the specific context of nationality 
attribution. At present, beyond the absolute prohibition of racial discrimination as a 
jus cogens norm,51 international human rights law is not altogether clear on this 
point. There are two issues that have yet to be fully crystallised. The first is to what 
extent differentiation on each of the grounds enumerated above is considered to 
amount to discrimination in the specific context of nationality attribution. The 
second is the problem of whether such discrimination is prohibited in all questions 
of nationality attribution or only in reference to, for example, denationalisation.  
                                                                                                                                               
prohibits distinctions between legitimate and illegitimate children. See European Court of Human 
Rights, Case of Marckx vs. Belgium, No. 6833/74, 13 June 1979, para. 31.  
46 Inter-American Court on Human Rights, Case of Yean and Bosico v. Dominican Republic, Series C, 
Case 130, 8 September 2005, paras. 155 – 156. 
47 CERD, Concluding Observations: Lithuania, A/57/18, New York: 2002, para. 171. 
48 Similar guarantees can be found in article 24 of the American Convention on Human Rights; Article 
3 of the African Convention on Human and Peoples’ Rights; and Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 to the 
European Convention on Human Rights. 
49 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 18: Non-discrimination, Geneva: 10 November 1989, 
para. 12. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights used similar terms to describe the norm: 
“recognising equality before the law […] prohibits all discriminatory treatment originating in a legal 
prescription”. Inter-American Court on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion on the Proposed Amendments 
to the Naturalisation Provision of the Constitution of Costa Rica, OC-4/84, 19 January 1984, para. 54.  
50 Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment 5: General Measures of Implementation of 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child, Geneva: 27 November 2003. Also with regards to article 26 
on equality before the law in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: “a differentiation 
which is compatible with the provisions of the Covenant and is based on reasonable grounds does not 
amount to prohibited discrimination within the meaning of article 26”. Human Rights Committee, 
Kulomin v. Hungary, case no. 521/1992, A/51/40 vol. II, 22 March 1996, para. 12.4. 
51 The special status of the prohibition of racial discrimination in international law is further evidenced 
by the ruling of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Cyprus v. Turkey. There it was 
determined that “differential treatment on the basis of race might, in certain circumstances, constitute a 
special affront to human dignity” (para. 207). As such, racial discrimination may amount to inhuman 
and degrading punishment as prohibited under article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 





Some initial clues to answering the first question are provided by the 
resolutions on “Human rights and arbitrary deprivation of nationality” that were 
adopted by the UN Commission on Human Rights.52 Four such texts have been 
approved by the Commission in recent years. Each contains an operative paragraph 
on arbitrary deprivation of nationality that includes a list of prohibited grounds of 
discrimination in that particular context. A comparison of these clauses reveals the 
interesting finding that they are not identical. In the first resolution, adopted in 
1997, the list refers to “racial, national, ethnic or religious grounds”.53 By the 
following year, deprivation of nationality on the grounds of gender was also 
included under the term arbitrary deprivation of nationality.54 In the last resolution 
to be passed in the UN Human Rights Commission, in 2005, there was a further 
expansion of the prohibited grounds for discrimination in this context: “political 
grounds” was also included.55 These observations illustrate two things. Firstly they 
are evidence of the shifting nature of the international norm that deals with denial of 
citizenship. What was understood to amount to discrimination 50 years ago under 
the phrase discriminatory deprivation of nationality may be very different to what it 
means today and what it will mean in the future. This type of natural progression is 
common in the field of human rights. The rules certainly appear to be getting 
stricter rather than more lax, with the introduction of additional grounds upon which 
differentiation is forbidden.56 Secondly, the fact that differences were traced over 
such a short period of time also hints at a pervading lack of consistency or 
uniformity in the interpretation of discriminatory (thus arbitrary) deprivation of 
nationality today. This question appears to still be hotly-debated, making it simply 
very difficult to ascertain what type of distinction is generally considered 
reasonable and what kind is essentially unacceptable.  
Turning to another source of information on the scope of arbitrary 
deprivation of nationality, the European Convention on Nationality, we find that the 
picture becomes yet more complicated. This text includes the prohibition of 
arbitrary deprivation of nationality among the basic principles upon which “the 
                                                           
52 The resolutions of bodies such as the UN Commission on Human Rights can be important sources of 
information on the prevailing understanding of international norms at the time. It should be noted that 
the Commission on Human Rights is now obsolete – it was replaced in 2006 by the Human Rights 
Council. Although the Council has retained the question of arbitrary deprivation of nationality on its 
agenda, at the time of writing it has yet to adopt a resolution on the substance of the matter. 
53 UN Human Rights Commission, Resolution on Human rights and arbitrary deprivation of 
nationality, 1997/36, 11 April 1997, operative paragraph. 2. 
54 UN Human Rights Commission, Resolution on Human rights and arbitrary deprivation of 
nationality, 1998/48, 17 April 1998, operative paragraph 2. The year after, the same list (including 
gender) was repeated in Resolution 1999/28, 26 April 1999, operative paragraph 2. 
55 UN Human Rights Commission, Resolution on Human rights and arbitrary deprivation of 
nationality, 2005/45, 19 April 2005, operative paragraph 2.  
56 This is also suggested by the commentary to the Draft Articles on Nationality of Natural Persons in 
relation to the Succession of States of the International Law Commission. Article 15 prohibits 
discrimination on any grounds in access to nationality in the context of state succession. In the 
commentary, the ILC explains that they decided against including an illustrative list of grounds because 
this may not be sufficiently inclusive, there being possible “still other grounds for discrimination in 
relation to a succession of states”. International Law Commission, 'Draft Articles on Nationality of 
Natural Persons in Relation to the Succession of States - With Commentaries', in Yearbook of the 
International Law Commission, Vol. II, 1999. 
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rules on nationality of each State Party shall be based”.57 Thereafter follows a 
separate article entirely devoted to non-discrimination: 
 
The rules of a State Party on nationality shall not contain distinctions or 
include any practice which amount to discrimination on the grounds of sex, 
religion, race, colour or national or ethnic origin.58  
 
Although similar, this list is slightly different again to that espoused in the most 
recent resolution of the UN Commission on Human Rights – political grounds are 
missing here. Moreover, as compared to the European Convention on Human 
Rights, several other elements of discrimination have been left out.59 The 
Explanatory Memorandum to the European Convention on Nationality elucidates 
this choice by noting that the European Convention on Human Rights does not deal 
with matters of citizenship.60 It goes on to explain that the grounds that were not 
transcribed from the human rights convention to the article quoted above were 
“considered as not amounting to discrimination in the field of nationality”.61 This 
may in fact explain the absence of the qualities of “language” and “property” from 
provisions specifically relating to non-discrimination in the attribution of 
nationality, not only in the European Convention on Nationality, but also in the 
aforementioned resolutions of the Human Rights Commission.62  
 What is certain is that different sources currently produce different answers to 
the question of what types of distinction are acceptable in the matter of nationality 
attribution and, conversely, what amounts to discriminatory deprivation of 
nationality.63 There is still one other nuance to the story which may explain (some 
                                                           
57 These are set out in article 4 of the European Convention on Nationality, 1997. 
58 Article 5, paragraph 1 of the European Convention on Nationality, 1997. 
59 The European Convention on Human Rights prohibits discrimination on the grounds of “sex, race, 
colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a 
national minority, property, birth or other status”. Article 14 of the 1950 European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 
60 The right to a nationality is absent from the provisions of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, but the court has considered questions relating to citizenship regulations – in particular the 
alleged arbitrary denial of citizenship - through article 8 on right to respect for private and family life. 
See for instance European Court of Human Rights, Decision as to the admissibility of Karassev v. 
Finland, Application No. 31414/96, 12 January 1999. 
61 This was the reason given for the absence of the various grounds in the non-discrimination clause, 
apart from “social origin” which was simply considered to be too imprecise a term. Council of Europe, 
Explanatory Memorandum of the European Convention on Nationality, Strasbourg: 1997, pages 32 – 
33. 
62 Interestingly, the non-discrimination clause of the European Convention on the Avoidance of 
Statelessness in relation to State Succession does reproduce the full list of prohibited grounds that are 
found in article 14 of the European Convention of Human Rights. This suggests that the approach taken 
in the European Convention on Nationality may not be set in stone. Article 4 of the 2006 European 
Convention on the avoidance of statelessness in relation to State Succession. 
63 The contributions of scholars have in some instances added to the haziness of this matter. For 
example, Weis expresses the view that discrimination on each of the grounds that are promulgated in 
the UN Charter is forbidden. This list includes language, which is not to be found in either the 
European Convention on Nationality or the resolutions of the UN Commission on Human Rights on the 
arbitrary deprivation of nationality. Paul Weis, Nationality and Statelessness in International Law, 





of) the ambiguity. This brings us to the second issue raised above: which elements 
of nationality attribution are influenced by the principle of non-discrimination? As 
we have seen, rules on the attribution of nationality basically deal with three main 
situations. The first is the conferral of nationality at birth, the second is the 
acquisition of nationality later in life and the third is the loss of nationality. It is 
reasonable to expect the principle of non-discrimination to be equally applicable to 
the regulation of all three matters, but this is not the case. Although arbitrary 
deprivation of nationality can be established with respect to either conferral or 
withdrawal of nationality, the demands made by international law are different in 
each case. The rules on acceptance as a national and withdrawal of that status have 
been described as “morally asymmetric”: 
 
Depriving somebody of her citizenship is a grave intrusion into a basic 
human right, whereas not granting naturalisation in a discriminatory 
procedure is in most cases not.64   
 
This citation illustrates the underlying philosophy that explains why international 
law deals differently with the different modes of nationality attribution. States are 
typically granted greater freedom in questions of naturalisation and are faced with 
much more stringent control when it comes to denationalisation. As to the 
attribution of nationality to a child at birth – this falls somewhere between the two. 
Deprivation of nationality in the sense of withdrawal, loss or revocation of 
nationality (i.e. denationalisation) severs the legal bond between a person and his 
state. As we will see in Part 3, this can have grave consequences for his enjoyment 
of rights. It is therefore arguable that the non-discriminatory enjoyment of the right 
to a nationality demands that, once held, this esteemed legal status is not interfered 
with on any of the grounds listed in the non-discrimination clause of human rights 
instruments that also promulgate the right to a nationality. This is the most 
exhaustive list which includes, for example, language and property as prohibited 
distinctions. Thus any denationalisation that is based on one of these qualities - or 
indeed “any other status” that is not reasonable and objective - would be in 
violation of the respective treaty obligations on non-discriminatory enjoyment of 
rights, equality before the law, the right to a nationality and the prohibition of 
arbitrary deprivation of nationality. The example provided above of the 
denationalisation of Syrian Kurds would amount to a violation in this way, which 
explains the reactions by the UN treaty bodies to the plight of the stateless Kurds.65 
So too would denationalisation on political grounds – a concerning phenomenon 
that is becoming increasingly widespread in up-and-coming multiparty 
                                                           
64 Note that deprive is used here in the narrower sense of denationalisation. Rainer Bauböck, 
Transnational Citizenship. Membership and Rights in International Migration, Edward Elgar, 
Cheltenham: 2002, page 135. See also James Goldston, 'Holes in the Rights Framework: Racial 
Discrimination, Citizenship, and the Rights of Noncitizens', in Ethics and International Affairs, Vol. 20, 
2006, page 333. 
65 The UN Human Rights Committee and the Committees on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
and the Rights of the Child have all commented on the denationalisation and continued statelessness of 
the Kurds in Syria. It is a violation of Syria’s treaty obligations in each of the respective instruments. 
See note 22. 
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democracies.66 When withdrawal of nationality in this manner is combined with 
expulsion from state territory, the violation of international law becomes yet more 
severe.67 Not only may this breach further human rights obligations to which the 
state has agreed, such as the duty not to act to destroy an individual’s enjoyment of 
fundamental rights, but it may also amount to a breach of the territorial integrity of 
another state by forcing it to accept these newly-stateless persons.68 
As to the rules on the attribution of nationality at birth, there is an ever-
growing awareness of the importance of obtaining a nationality at birth – an original 
nationality – particularly in the context of the fight against statelessness. Similarly 
to denationalisation, the inability to acquire an original nationality has a dire impact 
on the enjoyment of fundamental rights. This is why the right of every child to 
acquire a nationality at birth was explicitly included in such instruments as the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child. Arguably then, the combined effect of this right of every child 
to acquire a nationality at birth and the corresponding provisions on non-
discrimination is to outlaw discrimination in access to an original nationality with 
equal stringency as the prohibition of discriminatory denationalisation.69 The full 
list of forbidden distinctions that was valid for loss or withdrawal of citizenship 
must also be applicable here: no differentiation may be made on any of those 
grounds, in relation to either the child or his parents, so as to impact on the child’s 
access to citizenship. Unlike the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness 
which did not deal with discriminatory deprivation of access to nationality (at birth 
or otherwise), international human rights law prohibits such distinctions as were put 
into practice in the Dominican Republic in determining eligibility to birthright 
citizenship.  
Indeed, when tasked with ruling on the conformity of the Dominican 
Republic’s citizenship policy with its human rights obligations, the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights confirmed this interpretation. The case in question was 
brought before the court on behalf of two children, Dilcia Yean and Violeta Bosico, 
to whom the Dominican authorities refused to grant jus soli citizenship on the 
                                                           
66 James Goldston, 'Holes in the Rights Framework: Racial Discrimination, Citizenship, and the Rights 
of Noncitizens', in Ethics and International Affairs, Vol. 20, 2006, page 326; Maureen Lynch, Lives on 
hold: The human cost of statelessness, Washington: 2005, page 29 on Swaziland; Open Society Justice 
Initiative, Africa Citizenship and Discrimination Audit, New York: 2004, page 1. Consider also the 
withdrawal of citizenship from former Zambian President, Kenneth Kaunda (note 26 above). 
67 According to the UNHCR, expulsion often follows discriminatory denationalisation of an individual. 
UNHCR and IPU, Nationality and statelessness. A handbook for parliamentarians, 2005, page 39. 
68 Although the European Convention on Human Rights does not contain the right to a nationality, the 
European Commission on Human Rights recognised that to denationalise and expel a citizen may 
amount to a breach of article 17 of the Convention which forbids any act aimed at destroying the rights 
and freedoms contained in the document. Ruth Donner, "Chapter 4: Human Rights Conventions and 
other Instruments" in The Regulation of Nationality in International Law, Transnational Publishers, 
New York: 1994, pages 227-228. 
69 The Committee on the Rights of the Child has expressed concern at cases of discrimination on the 
grounds of race, language (i.e. belonging to a linguistic minority), sex and (parents’) political opinion in 
access to nationality at birth. Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations: 
Cambodia, CRC/C/97, Geneva: 2000, paras. 361 – 362; Democratic Republic of Congo, CRC/C/108, 
Geneva: 2001, paras. 177-178; Estonia, CRC/C/124, Geneva: 2003, paras. 45-46; Cyprus, CRC/C/132, 





grounds that their parents were irregular Haitian immigrants. The court decided in 
favour of the girls and established numerous violations of the American Convention 
on Human Rights by the Dominican state. Two considerations expressed by the 
court are of particular relevance here. Firstly, when the court determined that the 
Dominican Republic had violated the girls’ right to a nationality, it read article 20 
of the American Convention (on the right to a nationality) in conjunction with 
article 24 (on the right to equal protection). Thus the court did not merely establish 
an infringement of the girls’ right to a nationality as such – as contained in article 
20, paragraph 1 – but it further qualified the violation as an “arbitrary deprivation of 
their nationality”.70 This added element was introduced because the two girls had 
been refused access to Dominican citizenship at birth for “discriminatory 
reasons”.71 Discrimination in access to nationality can therefore be qualified as 
arbitrary deprivation of nationality under international human rights law.72 The 
second point of interest in this decision by the Inter-American Court can be found 
in a consideration which precedes the aforementioned conclusion: 
 
The obligation to respect and ensure the principle of the right to equal 
protection and non-discrimination is irrespective of a person’s migratory 
status in a State […] The migratory status of a person cannot be a condition 
for the State to grant nationality, because migratory status can never 
constitute a justification for depriving a person of the right to nationality or 
the enjoyment and exercise of his rights.73  
 
Here the court determines that differentiating between persons on the basis of 
migratory status for the purposes of nationality attribution is an unreasonable 
distinction and amounts to discrimination. It thereby introduces a new prohibited 
ground for discrimination in relation to the right to a nationality. Although it is 
questionable whether this assertion reflects the present state of international law,74 
this finding by the court does illustrate the versatility of human rights law in 
countering any unreasonable distinctions, even if they are not explicitly outlined in 
a treaty text. This increases the scope for protection against discriminatory 
deprivation of nationality and thereby against statelessness. The 1961 Convention 
                                                           
70 Thereby also in contravention of article 20, paragraph 3 of the American Convention on Human 
Rights. Inter-American Court on Human Rights, Case of Yean and Bosico v. Dominican Republic, 
Series C, Case 130, 8 September 2005, para. 174. 
71 Inter-American Court on Human Rights, Case of Yean and Bosico v. Dominican Republic, Series C, 
Case 130, 8 September 2005, para. 174. Of interest is the finding later in this same paragraph that 
rendering the two children stateless in this way also had a detrimental impact on their enjoyment of 
article 1, paragraph 1 and article 19 of the American Convention: the right to enjoy the rights set forth 
in the Convention without discrimination and the right to special measures of protection as a child.  
72 These findings by the court mark a clear progression in its case law on nationality towards a broader 
interpretation of the norms espoused in article 20 of the American Convention on Human Rights. 
Twenty years previously, the same court determined that article 20, paragraph 1 (right to a nationality) 
could not be deemed to be violated if no loss of nationality took place. Inter-American Court on Human 
Rights, Advisory Opinion on the Proposed Amendments to the Naturalisation Provision of the 
Constitution of Costa Rica, OC-4/84, 19 January 1984, para. 42. 
73 Inter-American Court on Human Rights, Case of Yean and Bosico v. Dominican Republic, Series C, 
Case 130, 8 September 2005, paras. 155 - 156. 
74 See chapter VII. 
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on the Reduction of Statelessness lacks this capacity due to the absence of a general 
provision on non-discrimination, a limitative list of prohibited grounds for 
denationalisation and the absence of any mechanism to further develop the norms 
espoused in the text, i.e. through case law. 
 Finally we come to the question of denial of citizenship in the context of 
conferral of nationality later in life through naturalisation. This was undoubtedly the 
furthest concern from the minds of government representatives at the time that the 
text “no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality” was approved for article 
15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.75 However, even the rules on 
voluntary acquisition of nationality are not beyond influence from international law:  
 
As long as such rules do not conflict with superior norms, it is the state 
conferring nationality which is best able to judge what conditions to impose 
to ensure that an effective link exists between the applicant for naturalisation 
and the systems of values and interests of the society with which he seeks to 
associate himself.76  
 
The prohibition of racial discrimination indisputably belongs to the realms of the 
“superior norms” alluded to here, thus the conditions set for naturalisation may not 
differentiate on the grounds of race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin.77 
More generally, a state may not raise “unreasonable impediments” to the 
acquisition of nationality by naturalisation.78 As to the other distinctions that are 
thereby considered impermissible in the context of naturalisation, we see that the 
list necessarily differs from the exhaustive catalogue that applies to 
denationalisation and access to nationality at birth. For example, applicants for 
naturalisation are commonly tested on language ability. Sufficient knowledge of the 
national language is viewed as a legitimate requirement for eligibility for 
naturalisation, whereas we saw that denationalisation on the grounds of “language” 
will be considered unreasonable and discriminatory.79 This observation serves also 
to better explain the choice made in the European Convention on Nationality as to 
                                                           
75 As we have noted, they were confronted with large-scale denationalisation. 
76 Emphasis added. Inter-American Court on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion on the Proposed 
Amendments to the Naturalisation Provision of the Constitution of Costa Rica, OC-4/84, 19 January 
1984, para. 36. 
77 The UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has expressed its concern at 
instances of racial discrimination in laws and regulations on naturalisation and their implementation. 
CERD, Concluding Observations: Croatia, A/50/18, New York: 1995, paras. 173 and 175; Republic of 
Korea, A/51/18, New York: 1996, para. 328; Switzerland, A/57/18, New York: 2002, para. 251. So too 
has the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and 
related intolerance. See for example Doudou Diène, Report by the Special Rapporteur on contemporary 
forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, Addendum – Summary of 
cases transmitted to Governments and replies received, A/HRC/4/19/Add.1, 5 June 2007, paragraphs 
65-67 and Doudou Diène, Report by the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial 
discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, Addendum – Mission to the Russian Federation, 
A/HRC/4/19/Add.3, 30 May 2007. 
78 Human Rights Committee, Individual complaint of Capena v. Canada, case number 558/1993, 
A/52/40, vol. II, Geneva: 3 April 1997, para. 11.3. 
79 See Inter-American Court on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion on the Proposed Amendments to the 





which grounds to include in the provision on non-discrimination. Where elements 
such as language and property were left out with the argument that such 
differentiation does not amount to discrimination in the field of nationality, it is 
important to note that the article in question applies to all domestic rules on 
nationality, including those on naturalisation.80  
We should, therefore, consider the more concise and finite list of grounds 
espoused in the European Convention on Nationality to be a good reflection of the 
present scope of denial of citizenship in the specific context of naturalisation 
procedures.81 Meanwhile it is important to remember that non-prohibited grounds 
such as language requirements and the like “should exclusively be used and 
regarded as an element of integrating non-nationals and should not be used as a 
discriminatory means for a state to select its nationals”.82 Beyond these grounds, it 
is also understood that discrimination against a particular nationality in access to 
naturalisation is an unreasonable distinction.83 In sum, it is possible for a state to 
commit arbitrary deprivation of nationality by enforcing discriminatory conditions 
for naturalisation. Although this may not appear immediately relevant in the context 
of the prevention of statelessness, be reminded that the inability to access 
naturalisation procedures does contribute to the creation and prolongation of 
instances of statelessness. The suggestion that it is possible to “arbitrarily deprive [a 
stateless person]  of the right to acquire the nationality of the country of 
residence”,84 i.e. the ability to gain naturalisation, is a major and important advance 
                                                           
80 As previously cited, article 5 of the European Convention on Nationality reads: “The rules of a State 
Party on nationality shall not contain distinctions or include any practice which amount to 
discrimination on the grounds of sex, religion, colour or national or ethnic origin”. Note again, 
however, that the Council of Europe Convention on the avoidance of statelessness in relation to State 
Succession reproduces the full list of prohibited grounds of discrimination espoused in the European 
Convention on Human Rights. This implies that where access to naturalisation is used as a tool for the 
prevention or reduction of statelessness – at least in the specific context of state succession – there is a 
reduced level of  tolerance for any form of distinction that may impede the avoidance of statelessness. 
81 Alongside references to racial discrimination in the acquisition of nationality by naturalisation, the 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has also expressed concern at religious 
distinctions and the Human Rights Committee has expressed concern at gender discrimination. CERD, 
Concluding Observations: Yemen, A/57/18, New York: 2002, para. 464. Human Rights Committee, 
Concluding Observations: Jordan, A/49/40 vol.1, Geneva: 1994, para. 232; Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 
A/54/40 vol. 1, Geneva: 1999, para. 137. In addition, the Inter-American Court on Human Rights has 
clearly denounced distinctions on the grounds of gender in the context of access to nationality. See 
Inter-American Court on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion on the Proposed Amendments to the 
Naturalisation Provision of the Constitution of Costa Rica, OC-4/84, 19 January 1984, paragraphs 64-
67. 
82 Committee of Experts on Nationality, Report on Conditions for the Acquisition and Loss of 
Nationality, Strasbourg: 14 January 2003, page 12. Similarly, in assessing the compliance with 
international law of the Czech Republic’s rules on naturalisation, Human Rights Watch has 
convincingly argued that other conditions, such as the requirement of a clean criminal record, may also 
amount to indirect discrimination if implemented in such a way as to unreasonably and 
disproportionately target a particular group – in this case the Roma. See Human Rights Watch, Roma in 
the Czech Republic – Foreigners in Their Own Land, 1 June 1996. 
83 Article 1, paragraph 3 of the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination; 
CERD General Recommendation 30: Discrimination against Non-Citizens, New York: 2004, para. 13. 
84 Human Rights Committee, Individual complaint of Stewart v. Canada, case number 538/1993, 
A/52/40, vol. II, Geneva: 1 November 1996, para. 12.4. 
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in the field of international law with consequences reaching far beyond the 
obligations of states under the 1961 Statelessness Convention.  
 
  
2 ILLEGAL DEPRIVATION OF NATIONALITY AND THE LACK OF DUE PROCESS 
 
The lengthy discussion of discriminatory deprivation of nationality has provided an 
insight into the substantive limits set by the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of 
nationality. Existing alongside the question of what a state may and may not 
prescribe in the field of nationality before it is considered to amount to arbitrary 
deprivation of nationality is the more technical question: in what way must the 
attribution of nationality be regulated so as not to be branded as arbitrary? In the 
introduction to this chapter we saw that the most basic formality or procedural 
condition to be met for a decision not to be deemed arbitrary is that it must conform 
to the law in force. This is an important criterion because it helps to ensure that the 
decisions of the authority are foreseeable and not slapdash. Thus the deprivation of 
nationality must be prescribed by law.85 Again, deprivation is to be read here in the 
broadest possible sense, as referring to denationalisation but also denial of access to 
a nationality. If the state authorities go beyond the terms of the law in withdrawing 
or refusing citizenship, this will amount to arbitrary deprivation of nationality. New 
cases of statelessness may thereby be created (or existing plights prolonged) in 
situations where perhaps no fault can be found with the relevant domestic law. This 
contributes to the invisibleness of stateless populations because at first sight, from a 
perusal of the domestic law alone, the problems may not be apparent.   
The second procedural safeguard against arbitrariness is the requirement 
that the deprivation of nationality be accompanied by further guarantees of due 
process. More specifically, there should be opportunity to apply for a review of the 
decision to withdraw or withhold nationality. This has also been described as the 
need to provide a “meaningful opportunity for individuals to go before an 
independent tribunal”.86 This obligation may include aspects such as ensuring that 
the decision to revoke or refuse nationality is provided in writing and that the 
underlying motivation is also disclosed. The necessity of an effective review 
mechanism as a tool for fighting statelessness requires little explanation. It provides 
an opportunity for overturning unlawful, unreasonable or discriminatory decisions, 
but also for reconsidering the position of the individual in view of the threat of 
statelessness.87 Moreover, a review mechanism is an aid in the fight against 
                                                           
85 In relation to nationality attribution, the role of the law is paramount since nationality is the legal 
bond that an individual enjoys with a state. The definition of a stateless person reminds us of this fact 
where it declares that a stateless person is “a person who is not considered as a national by any state 
under operation of its law”.  
86 Emphasis added. Open Society Justice Initiative, Citizenship and Equality in Practice: Guaranteeing 
Non-Discriminatory Access to Nationality, Protecting the Right to be Free from Arbitrary Deprivation 
of Nationality, and Combating Statelessness, New York: November 2005, page 8. 
87 In the Netherlands, for instance, a case arose where a man was rendered stateless through the 
withdrawal of his Dutch nationality, after he had renounced his prior Egyptian citizenship. When the 
case was subjected to review, the domestic court found that the withdrawal of nationality had been 





corruption and where the decision-making authority on nationality attribution has 
been decentralised it furthermore enables such powers to be kept in check - helping 
to secure compliance with standards of domestic and international law. As a 
decision with serious consequences for the rights and duties of an individual, the 
possibility of appeal is a practical and important safeguard. 
 
2.1 The 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness 
 
We have already seen that the 1961 Statelessness Convention lacks any general 
prohibition of the arbitrary deprivation of nationality under which these formal 
protections against arbitrary decision-making would be afforded. However, tucked 
away in article 8, paragraph 4 of the document is a provision that may offer some 
solace: 
 
A Contracting State shall not exercise a power of deprivation permitted by 
paragraphs 2 or 3 of this article except in accordance with law, which shall 
provide for the persons concerned the right to a fair hearing by a court or other 
independent body.88 
 
This paragraph covers the two major procedural elements that must be present in 
the decision-making process to prevent it from being deemed arbitrary: the decision 
must be taken in accordance with the law and there must be an appeals process in 
place. Importantly, the provision requires review by a “court or other independent 
body” and is not content if the decision is only sent back to the same authority for 
renewed consideration. This increases the value of such an appeal – particularly, as 
suggested above, where corruption may be an issue or where competence in 
nationality matters has been decentralised. However, there is a serious drawback to 
this article, namely that it is not applicable to all cases but deals with revocation of 
nationality only. There is no suggestion that these safeguards should equally be in 
place where, for example, the claim to nationality at birth has been refused. Thus on 
the basis of this instrument alone, there is no procedural protection in place against 
arbitrary deprivation of nationality beyond the context of denationalisation.  
 
2.2 International human rights law 
 
As we have already noted, the arbitrary deprivation of nationality is generally 
considered to be forbidden under international law. This overall prohibition covers 
the elements of unlawfulness of decisions on the attribution of nationality and lack 
of a meaningful review mechanism. But international law also offers us the more 
general notions of due process and of an effective remedy, which are prescribed in a 
number of instruments. On the one hand, there is the guarantee of an effective 
remedy in cases where an individual’s fundamental rights have been violated. Thus 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, following suit with the 
Universal Declaration, obliges state parties to “ensure that any person whose rights 
                                                                                                                                               
reinstated. Betty de Hart; Kees Groenendijk, "Multiple Nationality: The Practice of Germany and the 
Netherlands" in R. Cholewinski (ed) International Migration Law, TMC Asser Press, The Hague: 2007. 
88 Emphasis added. Article 8, paragraph 4 of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. 
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or freedoms as herein recognised are violated shall have an effective remedy”.89 A 
person who feels that their right to (acquire a) nationality has been violated must 
therefore be able to lodge a complaint.90  
On the other hand there are the elaborations of the right to a – fair and 
public – hearing, in the context of both criminal and civil suits: “In the 
determination of any criminal charge against him, or of his rights and obligations in 
a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by the 
competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law”.91 However, the 
difficulty here is whether cases involving the determination of nationality could be 
regarded as civil suits for the purposes of such provisions. The Human Rights 
Committee has yet to deal with the question of the applicability of this right to a fair 
hearing to nationality disputes and generally defers interpretation of “rights and 
obligations in a suit at law” to each state party’s domestic law.92 Meanwhile, the 
European Court of Human Rights has been called upon to rule on this matter. In the 
case of X. v. Austria, the Court explained that 
 
the applicant complains that he was deprived of his Austrian citizenship 
without even a fair hearing. He alleges a violation of article 6(1) of the 
Convention […] The provisions or this Article, however, apply exclusively to 
proceedings which deal with “the determination of… civil rights and 
obligations or of any criminal charge”. Accordingly, they do not apply to the 
above proceedings instituted by the applicant since they clearly did not 
determine a criminal charge brought against him and his civil rights and 
obligations were not involved as it is the prerogative of the State to regulate 
citizenship and the relevant rules constitute public law. The proceedings in 
question, therefore, were of a public law nature.93 
                                                           
89 Article 2, paragraph 3 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Article 8 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights states: “Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the 
competent national tribunals for acts violating fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or the 
law”. A similar provision is included in article 25 of the American Convention on Human Rights. 
90 The Human Rights Committee “attaches importance to States Parties' establishing appropriate 
judicial and administrative mechanisms for addressing claims of rights violations under domestic law”. 
See Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31: Nature of the General Legal Obligations 
Imposed on States Parties to the covenant, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, Geneva: 26 May 2004, 
paragraph 15. 
91 Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. A similar guarantee can be 
found in article 8 of the American Convention on Human Rights and article 6 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. See also article 7 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. 
92 The Committee has however found that the protection offered under article 14 of the ICCPR “does 
not apply to extradition, expulsion and deportation procedures” – arguably a similar field to nationality 
decisions being an area of public law involving the determination of legal status. UN Human Rights 
Committee, General Comment 32 on Article 14: Right to equality before courts and tribunals and to a 
fair trial, CCPR/C/GC/32, Geneva: 23 August 2007, para. 17 (Replacing General Comment 13 on 
Article 14: Equality before the courts and the Right to a Fair and Public Hearing by an Independent 
Court Established by Law, A/39/40, 13 April 1984). 
93 European Court of Human Rights, Case of X. v. Austria, Application No. 5212/71, Decision on 
Admissability, 5 October 1972. Moreover, in relation to the applicability of the same provision to 
questions regarding immigration law, this Court also determined that “decisions regarding the entry, 






Within the European regional context then, decisions relating to nationality are not 
subject to the guarantees encapsulated in the right to a fair hearing. When the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights was presented with the same question in 
the context of the case of Yean and Bosico v. Dominican Republic, it sided with the 
claimants by determining that the Dominican state had violated articles 8 and 25 of 
the American Convention – the right to a fair trial and the right to judicial 
protection – by failing to ensure access to an effective appeals procedure in relation 
to the decision on nationality attribution.94 Regrettably, the Inter-American Court 
failed to rule on the substance of this particular allegation due to a procedural 
technicality in the case - not because the charge necessarily lacked merit.95 An 
opportunity was thereby lost to clarify the scope of application of this type of fair 
trial provision. It therefore remains unclear what the value of these particular 
provisions is in relation to nationality matters.  
 It is certainly disappointing that human rights instruments are not any more 
specific in their enunciation of the procedural obligations of states in the particular 
context of nationality attribution. While this may seem like an unnecessary and 
unlikely level of detail to expect of human rights provisions, it is interesting to note 
that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does provide a greatly 
detailed account of the duties of states to offer procedural guarantees in the event of 
the expulsion of a non-national: 
 
An alien lawfully in the territory of a State Party to the present Covenant 
may be expelled therefrom only in pursuance of a decision reached in 
accordance with law and shall, except where compelling reasons of 
national security otherwise require, be allowed to submit the reasons 
against his expulsion and have the case reviewed by, and be represented for 
the purpose before, the competent authority or a person or persons 
especially designated by the competent authority.96 
 
This article is designed to protect aliens against arbitrary expulsion. Not only may 
there be no collective expulsions or discriminatory decisions on expulsion,97 but the 
decision must be in accordance with the law and there must be due process. In this, 
it shows very many parallels with the way in which the prohibition of arbitrary 
deprivation of nationality is commonly understood. What is different about this 
provision is that the content of the duty to provide due process in this context is 
further elaborated: there must be an opportunity to request a review of the decision, 
the complainant must be able to submit reasons against the decision and he may 
organise representation in pleading his case. Although the meaning that is thereby 
                                                                                                                                               
obligations or of a criminal charge against him”. European Court of Human Rights, Case of Maaouia v. 
France, No. 39652/98, 5 October 2000, para. 40. 
94 Inter-American Court on Human Rights, Case of Yean and Bosico v. Dominican Republic, Series C, 
Case 130, 8 September 2005, para. 198. 
95 Inter-American Court on Human Rights, Case of Yean and Bosico v. Dominican Republic, Series C, 
Case 130, 8 September 2005, para. 201. 
96 Article 13 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
97 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 15: The position of aliens under the Covenant, 
A/41/40, Geneva: 1986, para. 10. 
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given to the due process guarantee may provide inspiration for decisions relating to 
nationality attribution, the lack of an equivalent to this provision in relation to the 
denationalisation of citizens or the arbitrary deprivation of nationality in any 
international human rights instrument illustrates a missed opportunity to deal more 
decisively with this important question.  
 Only the European Convention on Nationality is more specific in its demands 
of states in the area of due process in nationality attribution.98 The reference in its 
article on the competence of states in nationality matters, and thereafter throughout 
the text, to the need to regulate the attribution of nationality (in a certain way) in 
domestic law is evidence of the non-acceptance of illegal deprivation of 
nationality.99 This is also an element of the principle prohibiting arbitrary 
deprivation of nationality which is included separately in the Convention.100 Then, 
in chapter IV on “Procedures relating to nationality” a number of additional due 
process conditions are set. Each state party is to ensure that applications or 
decisions relating to the attribution of nationality will: 
 
- be processed within a reasonable time (article 10) 
 
- contain reasons in writing (article 11) 
 
- be subject to reasonable fees (article 13, paragraph 1) 
 
- be open to an administrative or judicial review (article 12), the fee for 
which may not be an obstacle for applicants (article 13, paragraph 2) 
 
As an instrument that concentrates solely on nationality matters, the European 
Convention on Nationality hereby provides strict, concrete guidelines to states in 
guaranteeing due process in relation to nationality attribution. While this treaty 
binds only state parties, the rendition of the content of “due process” does provide a 
valuable insight into what may be understood under the procedural demands of the 
principle on arbitrary deprivation of nationality.101 
 Another matter that comes to light in the perusal of the European Convention 
on Nationality is that international law is not just concerned with preventing 
unlawful denationalisation or ensuring the existence of an effective remedy in cases 
of withdrawal of nationality: the importance of such formalities in the decision-
making process is also recognised in relation to the conferral of nationality, either at 
birth or through naturalisation. The procedural obligations of states under the 
                                                           
98 Article 17 of the International Law Commission Draft Articles on Nationality of Natural Persons in 
relation to the Succession of States includes “procedures relating to nationality issues”, specifying that 
applications are to be processed without due delay and that relevant decisions shall be issued in writing 
and be open to effective review. The European Convention on the avoidance of statelessness in relation 
to State Succession also details procedural guarantees. However, neither of these instruments has 
entered into force. 
99 Article 3, paragraph 1 and thereafter, European Convention on Nationality. 
100 Article 4, paragraph c, European Convention of Nationality. 
101 Note that the same detailed procedural requirements are repeated in article 12 of the Council of 
Europe, Council of Europe Convention on the avoidance of statelessness in relation to State succession 





European Convention on Nationality are valid for decisions relating to the 
“acquisition, retention, loss, recovery or certification” of citizenship.102 Universal 
and regional human rights instruments seemingly take a similar approach. Due 
process is to be ensured in relation to any decisions on nationality attribution, also 
those where attribution of nationality at birth is at stake103 and even in the context of 
naturalisation proceedings: 
 
The Committee is […] concerned that according to legislation still in force 
decisions taken in accordance with [naturalisation] procedures are not 
subject to legal review. The Committee is of the view that the right to 
appeal against decisions, in particular arbitrary or discriminatory ones, in 
matters relating to naturalisation has to be made an integral part of the 
policy on naturalisation.104 
 
In this regard, the procedural protections offered by international (human rights) 
law are superior to those contained within the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of 





“Arbitrary deprivation of nationality” is a phrase that covers a number of distinct 
problems. It deals with situations of denationalisation but also of refusal of access 
to nationality, for example at birth or through naturalisation. It refers to cases where 
the deprivation of nationality is the result of discrimination, so-called “denial of 
citizenship”,105 but also where it is unlawful or unaccompanied by adequate 
procedural safeguards. It is a source of statelessness where an individual is revoked 
of his only existing bond of nationality or where he is refused access to the 
citizenship of any state.106 As such, the arbitrary deprivation of nationality is of 
serious concern to the international community and a legitimate subject for this 
chapter, the second to deal with the origins of statelessness. This time, the 
assessment of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness yielded less 
positive findings.  
In tackling the grave issue of denial of citizenship, the 1961 Statelessness 
Convention demonstrated a number of serious shortcomings. To begin with, it listed 
only four grounds on which deprivation of nationality is considered discriminatory 
and thereby prohibited. The most notable shortfall is the failure to include gender in 
                                                           
102 See articles 10 to 13 of the European Convention on Nationality. 
103 Inter-American Court on Human Rights, Case of Yean and Bosico v. Dominican Republic, Series C, 
Case 130, 8 September 2005. 
104 CERD, Concluding Observations: Switzerland, A/57/18, New York: 2002, para. 251. 
105 The illumination of the equivalence of the phrase “denial of citizenship” with “discriminatory 
deprivation of nationality” was of itself an important conclusion because, in consequence, to label a 
situation as denial of citizenship is to determine that it is in violation of the international norm 
prohibiting arbitrary deprivation of nationality. 
106 This will typically consist of the rejection of a claim to nationality at birth or – where already 
stateless - through the refusal of an application for naturalisation from the only state with which the 
person has a genuine link. 
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this list when this has clearly become a forbidden ground for differentiation in 
relation to nationality attribution under international human rights law.107 Secondly, 
from the formulation and positioning of the article on denial of citizenship in the 
1961 Convention, it is apparent that the provision only addresses discriminatory 
denationalisation. Of the two large stateless caseloads resulting from the denial of 
citizenship that were introduced in this chapter – the Kurds in Syria and the children 
of (presumed) Haitian descent in the Dominican Republic – the 1961 Statelessness 
Convention thereby addresses only the first. In contrast, the human rights field 
admits that denial of citizenship may equally result from discriminatory refusal of 
access to citizenship at birth or later in life, thus allowing situations such as that of 
the Dominican-born children of Haitian descent to also be dealt with.  
A further considerable weakness of the 1961 Statelessness Convention is 
the lack of scope for expanding the protection against discriminatory deprivation of 
nationality, for example by developing the norm over time to reflect any changes in 
the position of states. This problem stems from three main factors. Firstly, there is 
no general prohibition of discrimination in the document nor an overall prohibition 
of arbitrary deprivation of nationality that could be interpreted according to the 
prevailing international law. Secondly, the list of prohibited grounds of 
discrimination in article 9 of the 1961 Convention is limitative, offering no room to 
read additional elements into the text. And finally, the instrument lacks a genuine 
supervisory mechanism with the ability to interpret and further develop the 
convention’s norms. Where the human rights field shows the progressive 
development of the understanding of discriminatory deprivation of nationality over 
time, towards greater protection of the individual, the 1961 Statelessness 
Convention has stood still. Thus overall, international human rights law offers 
broader protection against denial of citizenship: with regard to discriminatory 
denationalisation, many more grounds for differentiation are outlawed and 
discrimination in access to nationality is also prohibited.  
On a more positive note, discriminatory deprivation of nationality on 
“political grounds” is prohibited under the 1961 Statelessness Convention whereas 
this element was overlooked in the European Convention on Nationality and was 
only introduced into the UN Human Rights Commission’s resolution on the 
arbitrary deprivation of nationality in 2005. Seeing as denationalisation on political 
grounds is a genuine issue in young, multiparty democracies, the clear prohibition 
of such action by the 1961 Convention is obviously beneficial in the prevention of 
statelessness. Moreover, the prohibition of discriminatory deprivation of nationality 
as included in the 1961 Statelessness Convention forbids discriminatory deprivation 
of nationality whether provided for by law or not. This allows cases of statelessness 
deriving from abusive law-making to be addressed, such as the situation of the 
Rohingyas of Myanmar.108 It must, however, be admitted that international human 
rights law also covers cases of denial of citizenship where it is effected by 
discriminatory municipal laws, thus the 1961 Convention merely reflects the 
general scope of international law in this respect.  
                                                           
107 In chapter IV we saw how gender discrimination in nationality law may contribute to the creation of 
statelessness. 





Lastly in this chapter we considered the approach of the 1961 Convention on 
the Reduction of Statelessness to the other dimensions of arbitrary deprivation of 
nationality that may play a part in the creation of statelessness: the unlawful 
deprivation of nationality and the absence of effective procedural safeguards such 
as a review mechanism. Here again, it was discovered that the 1961 Convention 
deals only with these matters in the specific context of denationalisation. This 
stands in stark contrast to sources of human rights law which prohibit any unlawful 
decisions on nationality attribution under the overall prohibition of arbitrary 
deprivation of nationality and provide for the right to an effective remedy where a 
violation of fundamental rights – including the right to a nationality – is at stake. 
Moreover, the right to a fair hearing in the context of decisions that effect a persons 
rights and duties under the law may also offer an avenue for ensuring an effective 
remedy in the context of nationality disputes.109 Thus under international human 
rights law, the protections against all elements of arbitrary deprivation of nationality 
are generally strong and well developed while the 1961 Convention on the 
Reduction of Statelessness leaves several serious gaps that will undoubtedly allow 
new cases of statelessness to be created. Yet in spite of this largely positive 
conclusion as to the state of international law, populations around the world 
continue to be rendered stateless through arbitrary deprivation of nationality in one 
manifestation or another. This fact points to a severe problem of enforcement, an 
issue that we will come back to in detail once the evaluation of the content of 






                                                           
109 It should be noted that for the concretisation of these procedural guarantees, much could be learnt 
from the detailed prohibition of arbitrary expulsion of aliens under article 13 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as well as from Chapter IV on “Procedures relating to 
nationality” of the European Convention on Nationality. 
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For an existing state with a fixed territory, regulating the acquisition and loss of 
nationality is relatively straightforward. There is already a body of nationals, so the 
state need only define the criteria for the attribution of nationality to new arrivals 
(both immigrants and newborns) and perhaps provide for the possibility of loss, 
deprivation or renunciation of nationality under certain circumstances. These minor 
additions and subtractions do not have a drastic impact on the overall composition 
of the body of citizens. However, a new state must define itself, mould its own 
identity and delineate its territory and population – deliberate about who belongs 
and who does not.1 When sovereignty over a territory enters new hands, the actual 
population occupying the land need not change,2 raising the question: what happens 
to the inhabitants of the territory which undergoes the change in sovereignty?3 This 
is considered to be among the most difficult issues raised by the succession of 
states.4 It is also one of the most important, particularly when a new state is born, 
because, through the enjoyment and exercise of citizenship, “all persons concerned 
by State succession should be able to participate in the building up of these States 
and in the crucial period of setting up new State structures”.5 However, in 
determining who is and who is not a national in the context of state succession, 
                                                           
1 In the context of state succession, the decision as to who is “us” and who is “them” is particularly 
symbolic and issues an important message as to the identity of the state. Kees Groenendijk, 'Nationality, 
Minorities and Statelessness. The Case of the Baltic States', in Helsinki Monitor, Vol. 4, 1993, page 16.  
2 Ruth Donner, "Chapter 5: Nationality and State Succession" in The Regulation of Nationality in 
International Law, Transnational Publishers, New York: 1994, page 248.  
3 Jeffrey Blackman, 'State Succession and Statelessness: The Emerging Right to an Effective 
Nationality under International Law', in Michigan Journal of International law, Vol. 19, 1998, page 
1145; Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 2003, 
page 908. 
4 There are difficulties in the determination of the “manner in which change of nationality may be 
brought about […] which categories of person are susceptible of having their nationality affected by 
change of sovereignty [and] the question whether or not the inhabitants of absorbed territory may avoid 
a change of nationality”. D.P. O'Connell, State succession in municipal and international law, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 1967, page 497. 
5 Roland Schärer, Statelessness in Relation to State Succession. Feasibility Study: The Necessity of an 
Additional Instrument to the European Convention on Nationality, Council of Europe Committee of 





there is a “particularly high potential”6 that the decision taken will lead to large-
scale statelessness as certain areas of the affected population may be overlooked.  
In fact, the redrawing of international borders has proven to be a 
considerable source of statelessness historically. One of the oldest known groups of 
stateless persons was the “Heimatlosen” – literally homeless or rootless – whose 
statelessness resulted from the dissolution of Austria-Hungary and the settlement of 
the 1919 Peace Treaties.7 Statelessness was produced not only in the reshuffling of 
territories in the aftermath of the First and Second World Wars, but also as a result 
of the decolonisation process in the 1950s and 1960s and more recently in the 
disintegration of a number of federal states. Since the end of World War II, more 
than one hundred new independent states have been formed8 and many of the large 
groups of stateless persons found in the world today can trace the origin of their 
plight to some form of territorial transfer. The Estate Tamils in Sri Lanka, the 
Tatars in the Ukraine, the Bihari in Bangladesh and the ex-Russians in Latvia and 
Estonia are but a few examples. Indeed, the numerous sudden cases of state 
succession in the early 1990s and the ensuing nationality disputes were a major 
factor in the revival of interest in statelessness by the international community.9 
Moreover,  
 
throughout history the death and birth of states has been a bloody process, 
usually fuelled by ethnic hatred and often entailing the commission of mass 
atrocities against vulnerable minority groups.10 
 
This has meant that discrimination, marginalisation and the playing out of old 
vendettas has often accompanied such events, compounding the problem of 
nationality attribution and leading to many instances of denial of citizenship in the 
context of state succession.11 Fortunately, like the current attitude to the creation of 
statelessness generally, there is a “growing awareness among States of the 
compelling need to fight the plight of statelessness […] in relation to the succession 
of states”.12 Thus, after elaborating on the nature of state succession and the impact 
                                                           
6 Roland Schärer, 'The Council of Europe and the Reduction of Statelessness', in Refugee Survey 
Quarterly, Vol. 25, 2006, page 33. 
7 Hannah Arendt, "The Decline of the Nation-State and the End of the Rights of Man" in The origins of 
totalitarianism, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York: 1948; C. Luella Gettys, 'The Effect of Changes 
of Sovereignty on Nationality', in American Journal of International Law, Vol. 21, 1927; Manley 
Hudson, Report on Nationality, including Statelessness, A/CN.4/50, 21 February 1952, pages 18-19. 
8 Malcolm Shaw, International Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 2003, page 861. 
9 Consider the collapse of the USSR and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. UNHCR, 
"Statelessness and Citizenship" in The State of the World's Refugees - A Humanitarian Agenda, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford: 1997, page 227. 
10 Jeffrey Blackman, 'State Succession and Statelessness: The Emerging Right to an Effective 
Nationality under International Law', in Michigan Journal of International law, Vol. 19, 1998, page 
1141. 
11 Numerous recent examples testify to the overlapping issues of state succession and arbitrary 
deprivation of nationality, including the aforementioned Bihari in Bangladesh and former Russians in 
Latvia and Estonia. 
12 Václav Mikulka, Third report on Nationality in relation to the Succession of States, A/CN.4/480, 
Geneva: 27 February 1997, page 42. 
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that it has on matters of nationality, we will turn to the response of international law 
to the problem of statelessness in this context.  
 
1 STATE SUCCESSION AND THE NATIONALITY OF PERSONS AFFECTED 
 
State succession is the official term used to describe the transfer of territory or 
sovereignty and has been defined as: “the replacement of one State by another in 
the responsibility for the international relations of territory”.13 The phrase covers 
four main situations, namely the unification or dissolution of a state, the transfer of 
territory from one state to another and the separation of part of a state.14 
Sovereignty over a particular patch of land is transferred from a “predecessor state” 
to a “successor state”. In principle citizenship matters in the context of state 
succession, as otherwise, must be settled by the nationality laws of the states 
concerned.15 If the issue is not comprehensively addressed or if the policies adopted 
by the respective states are not harmonised (for example by treaty), there is a risk 
that some individuals will be overlooked. In essence, statelessness then arises from 
a negative conflict of laws situation that has been created in the process of the 
transfer of territory or sovereignty and the concurrent adoption of new nationality 
regulations.16 Additionally, as we have already noted, the exclusion of particular 
population groups from citizenship in the context of state succession may be down 
to discriminatory deprivation of nationality.17 Therefore, much that has already 
been said about the technical causes of statelessness as well as statelessness arising 
from arbitrary deprivation of nationality is equally relevant to the problem of 
statelessness in the context of the succession of states. Nevertheless, the 
circumstance of succession is not altogether irrelevant since – as we will discover - 
it generates specific obligations for the states concerned under international law. 
While each case of state succession is unique thanks to the specific 
historical and political circumstances, for the purposes of the nationality question it 
is sufficient to distinguish between two broad categories: universal succession and 
partial succession.18 In the event of universal succession, the predecessor state has 
been entirely deposed and actually ceases to exist. A modern-day example is the 
disintegration of the USSR, a federation that was extinguished to make way for the 
                                                           
13 This is the definition of state succession as found in international instruments on the subject, such as 
in Article 2 of the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, 1978; Article 2 of 
the 1999 Draft Articles on Nationality of Natural Persons in Relation to the Succession of States; and 
Article 1 of the 2006 European Convention on the avoidance of statelessness in relation to State 
Succession. 
14 The distinction between these types of state succession can also be found in the Vienna Convention 
on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, 1978 and the 1999 Draft Articles on Nationality of 
Natural Persons in Relation to the Succession of States. 
15 Malcolm Shaw, International Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 2003, page 908. 
16 Affecting both the persons immediately concerned and successive generations thereafter. Manley 
Hudson, Report on Nationality, including Statelessness, A/CN.4/50, 21 February 1952, page 46. 
17 Note the overlap in cases cited in the context of this chapter with those included in the report on 
denial of citizenship by the Advisory Board on Human Security which was discussed in chapter V. 
18 Paul Weis, Nationality and Statelessness in International Law, Kluwer Academic Publishers Group, 
Dordrecht: 1979, page 136; Ruth Donner, "Chapter 5: Nationality and State Succession" in The 





emergence of 15 independent republics in the early 1990s.19 With the extinction of 
the state, its nationality becomes obsolete. All individuals who were once nationals 
of the predecessor state are dependent on the successor state(s) or third countries 
with which they may have a genuine link to acquire a replacement nationality. After 
December 1991, it was simply no longer possible to hold the nationality of the 
former Soviet Union, leaving 287 million people with a new nationality or with the 
determination of their citizenship pending.20 In such situations the risk of 
statelessness is obviously greatest. 
The other basic class of state succession, partial succession, is precisely 
what its name denotes: part of the territory of a state undergoes a change in 
sovereignty through acquisition by another state or the formation of a new state. In 
this case, the predecessor state continues to exist. The classic example of partial 
succession is the decolonisation process that changed the face of the globe during 
the latter half of the 20th century. The colonising powers withdrew or were forcibly 
ousted, leaving sovereignty over the territory in the hands of a newly independent 
state. For example, while the British Empire crumbled, the state of Great Britain 
subsisted and with it the British nationality. Meanwhile, the newly independent 
states needed a population of their own and compiled nationality acts to determine 
who belonged to their body of citizens. With partial succession, there are therefore 
at least two nationalities involved: those of the predecessor and successor state(s). 
Not only is the question raised as to when an individual is to acquire the nationality 
of the successor state, but also as to when the nationality of the predecessor state is 
to be lost.21 Here, the possibility arises of a negative conflict of laws or an inter-
state dispute over nationality, resulting in statelessness. 
In the past, the general practice traced with regard to the question of the 
nationality of persons affected by state succession reveals that 
 
as a rule, successor States have adopted specific legislation conferring their 
nationality on former nationals of the predecessor State who continued to 
have their habitual residence in the transferred territory.22 
 
Most commonly then, the nationality of the people has followed the change of 
sovereignty over the land.23 A closer look at the treaties settled between states and 
                                                           
19 These are the twelve states that went on to join the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and 
the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. 
20 UNHCR, "Statelessness and Citizenship" in The State of the World's Refugees - A Humanitarian 
Agenda, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 1997, page 233. 
21 Paul Weis, Nationality and Statelessness in International Law, Kluwer Academic Publishers Group, 
Dordrecht: 1979, page 145. 
22 European Commission for Democracy through Law, Consequences of state succession for 
nationality, Strasbourg: 10 February 1997, para. 8. 
23 This assessment of the usual practice of states can be traced in much of the literature on the subject. 
See for example Ian Brownlie, 'The Relations of Nationality in Public International Law', in British 
Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 39, 1963, page 320; D.P. O'Connell, State succession in municipal 
and international law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 1967, page 499; Jeffrey Blackman, 
'State Succession and Statelessness: The Emerging Right to an Effective Nationality under International 
Law', in Michigan Journal of International law, Vol. 19, 1998, pages 1161-1163; and more recently in 
Nida M. Gelazis, 'The European Union and the Statelessness Problem in the Baltic States', in European 
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the laws adopted to regulate the nationality of persons affected by succession 
actually exposes several mechanisms used to identify exactly which people’s 
citizenship will undergo such a change.24 Breaking these down, we see that the 
determination of nationality tends to be based on one or more of the following: 
previous nationality, territorial jurisdiction and ethnicity. This has resulted in three 
basic models for the initial attribution of nationality by the successor state, after 
which time, the regular mix of jus soli, jus sanguinis and jus domicilli principles 
return to further regulate the future conferral of nationality to newborns and 
newcomers.  
 The strategy that involves conferring nationality of the successor state on the 
basis of previous nationality is known as the “restored citizenship model”. This is 
often favoured by states that have regained independence after a period of 
(perceived) occupation or incorporation by another state.25 Simply put, everyone 
who possessed the nationality of the state before it was occupied is entitled to that 
nationality once more, now that the country is once again independent.26 So too are 
the descendents of such persons. This was the model adopted by Latvia and Estonia 
upon partition from the Soviet Union in 1991. All three of the Baltic States – 
Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania – enjoyed a brief period of independence after the 
First World War, before being annexed and incorporated into the Soviet Union in 
1940.27 As noted above, the dissolution of the USSR in 1991 meant that Soviet 
citizenship ceased to exist. The decision by Latvia and Estonia to attribute 
nationality only to those persons who were citizens before the occupation of 1940 
and their descendents meant that many people resident on Latvian or Estonian 
territory in 1991 were excluded from the citizenship of these successor states. 
During the period of Soviet incorporation, many thousands of Russians emigrated 
to these territories and they were the ones who were now overlooked by the new 
nationality laws. Having lost their Soviet citizenship, if they wanted to gain Latvian 
or Estonian nationality they were forced to resort to applying for it under the strict 
and complex naturalisation procedures that were put in place.28 As former USSR-
citizens, they could alternatively apply for nationality of the Russian Federation, 
however, this also involved meeting various conditions and proved to be an 
                                                                                                                                               
Journal of Migration and Law, Vol. 6, 2004, page 236. However, this practice is not considered to 
reflect an international legal norm. Paul Weis, Nationality and Statelessness in International Law, 
Kluwer Academic Publishers Group, Dordrecht: 1979, pages 143-144. 
24 The peace treaties that were settled after the First World War provided the first evidence of additional 
considerations in regulating the nationality of persons affected by state succession. C. Luella Gettys, 
'The Effect of Changes of Sovereignty on Nationality', in American Journal of International Law, Vol. 
21, 1927. 
25 Peter van Krieken, 'Disintegration and statelessness', in Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, Vol. 
12, 1994, page 26; Nida M. Gelazis, 'The European Union and the Statelessness Problem in the Baltic 
States', in European Journal of Migration and Law, Vol. 6, 2004, page 228. 
26 This model may also be used in the dissolution of federal states where prior to state succession 
individuals held both citizenship of the federation and nationality of one of its constituent units or 
republics. The previous nationality that is used as a basis for the bestowal of citizenship after state 
succession is this bond with the constituent unit that is now part of the territory of the successor state. 
27 UNHCR, "Statelessness and Citizenship" in The State of the World's Refugees - A Humanitarian 
Agenda, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 1997, page 238. 
28 UNHCR, "Statelessness and Citizenship" in The State of the World's Refugees - A Humanitarian 





unpopular choice.29 The overall result: large-scale statelessness in both territories.30 
In 2007, UNHCR estimated the residual number of stateless cases in Latvia and 
Estonia to be approximately 420,000 and 136,000 respectively, all tracing the origin 
of their plight to the succession of states that occurred over a decade before.31  
When attributing nationality according to territorial jurisdiction, the basic 
rule that is reflected in the legislation of successor states is as follows: 
 
Everyone who at the time of independence is legally residing in the country 
concerned is entitled to its citizenship.32 
 
This model is called “zero-option” and was adopted by many African states when 
they gained independence as part of the decolonisation process as well as by the 12 
countries to emerge from the former Soviet Union alongside the three Baltic 
States.33 It coincides with the feudal concept of territorial sovereignty where 
“ownership” of population and property follows ownership of the land. Like the 
previous model, this strategy for attribution of nationality to an initial body of 
citizens is not without its problems, particularly in the event of universal succession 
                                                           
29 Russian Federation citizenship could be denied for reasons such as previous criminal convictions or 
party affiliation. In 1993 it was reported that of the 600,000 persons of non-Estonian origin residing in 
Estonia, the number of persons that planned to apply for Russian nationality was only 30,000. 
Moreover, “independent observers have confirmed the impression that the large majority of the 
Russian-speaking population of the Baltic states for various reasons prefer to live in their country of 
residence and to acquire its nationality”. Kees Groenendijk, 'Nationality, Minorities and Statelessness. 
The Case of the Baltic States', in Helsinki Monitor, Vol. 4, 1993, pages 18-19. 
30 Lithuania, the third Baltic State, adopted instead a model that combined aspects of the restored 
citizenship model with a system of attributing nationality based on residence, thereby limiting the 
incidence of statelessness on its own territory. Peter van Krieken, 'Disintegration and statelessness', in 
Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, Vol. 12, 1994, page 26. This difference in approach has been 
explained as reflecting the difference in extent of “russification” of the three territories. Due to in and 
out migration in the Soviet era, the population in Estonia and Latvia changed its face dramatically. For 
example, 75.5% of the population of Latvia was ethnic Latvian in 1935 and by 1995 this had dropped to 
just 55.1%. Meanwhile, in Lithuania, the demographic makeup changed relatively little over the same 
period. Thus, “the fact that Lithuanians felt that they could accommodate a sizeable proportion of non-
Lithuanians (around 20 percent) without sacrificing their democratic ambitions, sovereignty or native 
language and culture, was decisive in their decision to adopt a relatively liberal policy on naturalising 
Soviet-era migrants”. Nida M. Gelazis, 'The European Union and the Statelessness Problem in the 
Baltic States', in European Journal of Migration and Law, Vol. 6, 2004, page 228. 
31 UNHCR, Global Trends 2006, 15 June 2007, table 14. A detailed study of the citizenship issues to 
arise following the independence of the Baltic states can be found in Ineta Ziemele, State Continuity 
and Nationality: The Baltic States and Russia. Past, Present and Future as Defined by International 
Law, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden: 2005; and Nida Gelazis, "An Evaluation of International 
Instruments that Address the Condition of Statelessness: A Case Study of Estonia and Latvia" in R. 
Cholewinski (ed) International Migration Law, T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague: 2007. 
32 Peter van Krieken, 'Disintegration and statelessness', in Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, Vol. 
12, 1994, page 26. Usually, nationality is only extended to persons who were nationals of the 
predecessor state and are resident on the territory of the successor state, leaving the citizenship of 
nationals from third countries unaffected. 
33 UNHCR, "Statelessness and Citizenship" in The State of the World's Refugees - A Humanitarian 
Agenda, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 1997, page 236; Peter van Krieken, 'Disintegration and 
statelessness', in Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, Vol. 12, 1994, page 26. 
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where the predecessor state (and its nationality) ceases to exist. This was evidenced 
in the experience of the Ukraine.  
Upon gaining independence, the Ukraine adopted a “Declaration on State 
Sovereignty” in which it determined that its initial body of citizens shall be 
comprised of former Soviet nationals who had their permanent residence on 
Ukrainian soil on the date of independence (24th of August, 1991).34 This “zero 
option” approach to citizenship does not deal with persons who at the time reside 
outside the territory over which sovereignty is transferred but are, nevertheless, 
affected by the succession of states. It is indeed highly unlikely that all nationals of 
the predecessor state actually live on its soil at the moment of transfer of territory. 
While this issue may only affect small numbers of emigrants, in the example of the 
Ukraine there was a large population group that was thereby exposed to the risk of 
statelessness: the so-called “Formerly Deported Persons” (FDPs). This group, 
composed mainly of Crimean Tatars, consists of those who were deported from the 
Crimea (now a region in the Ukraine) very abruptly in May 1944 upon being 
accused of “siding with the Nazis”.35 Around the time that the Ukraine gained 
independence, these FDPs and their descendents started returning to the Crimea. 
Those who managed to settle and register in the area before the promulgation of the 
Ukrainian citizenship act were automatically entitled to nationality. However, over 
100,000 FDPs returned to the Ukraine after the nationality legislation entered into 
force. Of these, some 25,000 also missed out on the opportunity to acquire 
citizenship of one of the other newly independent states through this move and were 
rendered stateless.36 Thanks to bilateral and multilateral efforts, as well as technical 
support from UNHCR, the statelessness of many of the FDPs who have (re)settled 
in the Ukraine was resolved by the end of the 1990s.37 Yet to this day, many 
Formerly Deported Persons continue to return to the region, testing the aptness of 
the newly amended and simplified Ukrainian naturalisation law in overcoming any 
issues of statelessness to the full. On the one hand, this example therefore shows 
that zero-option citizenship models can also produce statelessness in the context of 
                                                           
34 The citizenship legislation that was consequently adopted put this policy into effect by automatically 
granting such persons citizenship unless they already held another nationality or objected to the 
acquisition of Ukrainian citizenship. UNHCR, Overview of UNHCR's Citizenship Campaign in Crimea, 
Simferopol: December 2000, pages 5-6. 
35 UNHCR, Crimean Tatars Receive Help from UNHCR to Return Home, 9 June 2005,  accessible via 
http://www.unhcr.org. 
36 Many had fallen through the gap between the Ukrainian and Uzbek citizenship acts, both of which 
adopted the zero-option strategy. Uzbek citizenship was granted to residents of the territory on the 28th 
of July 1992. 
37 For a full discussion of the campaign for the resolution of the statelessness of Ukraine’s Formerly 
Deported Persons, see UNHCR, Overview of UNHCR's Citizenship Campaign in Crimea, Simferopol: 
December 2000; and Hans Schodder, “Assisting the integration of formerly deported people in Crimea: 
ten years of UNHCR experiences” in Beyond Borders, Bulletin of UNHCR in Ukraine, 2005. It should, 
however, be noted that the legal status of the Crimean Tatars in the Ukraine remains disputed: the 
discussion has moved from one of citizenship status to one of national minority or indigenous person 
status and related rights. Oxana Shevel, “Crimean Tatars and the Ukrainian state: the challenge of 
politics, the use of law, and the meaning of rhetoric”, paper delivered the Association for the Study of 
the Nationalities (ASN) Fifth Annual World Convention "Identity and the State: Nationalism And 





state succession, but it also illustrates the possibilities for addressing such situations 
by adopting tailor-made solutions to prevent or eliminate statelessness. 
 The third and final factor upon which nationality attribution has been based in 
the context of state succession is ethnicity. In the process of decolonisation, 
according to Weis: 
 
Ethnic considerations normally played a role in the determination of the 
criteria for the conferment of nationality although they are explicitly 
mentioned in the legislation of a few States only.38  
 
He goes on to mention a number of twentieth century examples where this was the 
case, including Burma, Chad, Indonesia and Sierra Leone. Indeed an element of 
discrimination (be it often implicit or indirect) can be traced in the nationality acts 
adopted by many states that have been involved in state succession. The Latvian 
nationality law was criticised because it “seems to single out the ethnic Russian 
population as unsuitable to gain citizenship”.39 The citizenship policy of newly 
independent Sri Lanka (upon partition from India) and Bangladesh (upon separation 
from Pakistan) also indirectly targeted particular population groups. In Sri Lanka, 
the Ceylon Citizenship Act of 1948 required proof of birth in the country going 
back two generations which effectively ensured that the Estate Tamils were 
excluded from acquiring nationality.40 Thereafter, the citizenship of this group 
remained a subject of dispute between India and Sri Lanka, only to be resolved in 
2003 with a new legislative act granting the majority of these persons the 
nationality of Sri Lanka. In Bangladesh, citizenship was attributed at independence 
from West Pakistan according to territorial jurisdiction. However, the resident 
Bihari population, targeted as “Pakistani collaborators”, saw their claim to 
Bangladeshi nationality rejected which rendered them stateless.41 These last two 
examples serve also to illustrate that the risk of statelessness is equally real in the 
context of partial succession - whereby two or more nationalities are theoretically 
on offer – as a consequence of bilateral disputes between the states concerned.  
As we move on to assess the approach of international law to this issue, 
these many different dimensions and variations of the problem of statelessness 
                                                           
38 Paul Weis, Nationality and Statelessness in International Law, Kluwer Academic Publishers Group, 
Dordrecht: 1979, page 155. 
39 Nida M. Gelazis, 'The European Union and the Statelessness Problem in the Baltic States', in 
European Journal of Migration and Law, Vol. 6, 2004, page 233. 
40 The “estate Tamils” are persons of Indian origin who were brought to Sri Lanka by the British 
colonisers as labourers for the tea plantations. They and their descendents (numbering upwards of half a 
million persons in 2004) were rendered stateless in the partition of Sri Lanka from India. The 
requirement to establish birth in Sri Lanka going back two generations “essentially discriminated 
against Hill Tamils, many of whom returned to Tamil Nadu to give birth and most of whom could not 
produce documents to prove two generations of family born in Sri Lanka”. UNHCR, Sri Lanka makes 
citizens out of stateless tea pickers, 2004, accessible via www.unhcr.ch; Katja Kerdel, Stateless persons 
of Indian origin in Sri Lanka - an overview, Colombo: 9 June 2004. 
41 To this day, the citizenship status of upwards of a quarter of a million “stranded Biharis” remains 
unclear with neither Pakistan nor Bangladesh accepting full responsibility for this group. Eric Paulsen, 
'The citizenship status of the Urdu-speakers / Biharis in Bangladesh', in Refugee Survey Quarterly, Vol. 
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resulting from the succession of states must be kept in mind. Before progressing to 
the discussion of international law there are two additional considerations that must 
be noted. The first relates to the question of a right of option for persons whose 
nationality is affected by state succession. This is a much discussed issue in 
literature on the impact of state succession on nationality. In essence it is suggested 
that where the citizenship of two or more states becomes available to an individual 
as a consequence of the succession of states, he should be entitled to opt for the 
nationality that he himself places the most value on or deems most appropriate.42 
While this may seem to be a “rich man’s dilemma”, as it concerns situations where 
multiple nationalities are on offer, it is not irrelevant to the problem of statelessness. 
The granting of the right of option has led to statelessness in the past where 
 
options have […] been held invalid on the grounds of expiration of time limits or 
non-compliance with formalities prescribed for the exercise of the right of option 
or when the right was granted to particular groups only (racial, linguistic or 
religious minorities) because the optant was held not to belong to the eligible 
group.43 
 
In addition, any policy which enables an individual to opt out of the citizenship of a 
country involved in state succession must be exercised diligently so as not to 
introduce the risk of statelessness – for example by allowing a person to repudiate 
the nationality offered by one successor state before ascertaining whether the 
citizenship of the predecessor state or another successor state is truly assured.44 
When we turn to the relevant international legal norms we will therefore also be 
looking at how they deal with the right of option. 
 The second residual issue that should briefly be noted here is the question 
to what extent international law – in particular international treaty law – is actually 
applicable to successor states. It has been suggested that even if there was an 
international convention dealing specifically with the nationality of persons affected 
by state succession, 
 
                                                           
42 The practice of permitting the right of option has a long history. Initially it grew from the notion that 
a person should be able to opt out or refuse the nationality of a state which is being involuntarily 
imposed on them through automatic naturalisation in the context of state succession. Later, however, 
the value of the right of option came to be seen in the opportunity it provides to ensure that an 
individual holds the nationality of the state with which he has the closest genuine link. D.P. O'Connell, 
State succession in municipal and international law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 1967, 
page 529; Paul Weis, Nationality and Statelessness in International Law, Kluwer Academic Publishers 
Group, Dordrecht: 1979, page 156 and further; Jeffrey Blackman, 'State Succession and Statelessness: 
The Emerging Right to an Effective Nationality under International Law', in Michigan Journal of 
International law, Vol. 19, 1998, page 1169; UNHCR and IPU, Nationality and statelessness. A 
handbook for parliamentarians, 2005, page 34. 
43 Manley Hudson, Report on Nationality, including Statelessness, A/CN.4/50, 21 February 1952. 
44 It is also worth noting that the availability of a right of option may be a useful tool in countering the 
problem of an ineffective nationality since it helps to promote the attribution of nationality according to 
a real and genuine link with a state and thereby increases the likelihood that the citizenship acquired 





[it] would not be binding on successor states, which as newly-created 
subjects of international law are not signatories to […] international 
instruments. Rather, new states are bound initially only by those norms that 
form part of customary international law.45 
 
According to this line of reasoning, only international norms on nationality 
attribution in relation to the succession of states that have attained the status of 
customary international law would have any real impact. If this were the case, to 
devise a treaty that lays down obligations on both predecessor and successor states 
would be a futile exercise since successor states are by definition not a party to such 
instruments at the time of state succession. However, the effect of state succession 
on treaty commitments is still a hazy area of international law. The Vienna 
Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties determines that in some 
cases the successor state will be bound by the treaty commitments of the 
predecessor state.46 It depends very much on the kind of state succession as well as 
the type of treaty that is in question. In particular, it has been persuasively argued 
that the succession of states “does not effect obligations arising from human rights 
treaties”.47 Thus, in the context of this chapter, where human rights documents and 
other international instruments that are a clear concretisation of human rights norms 
are under the microscope, there is certainly scope for proposing that these 
commitments will be of real – rather than purely theoretical – relevance to the 
responsibilities of successor states as well as predecessor states in the circumstance 
of state succession. Moreover, the adoption of multiple provisions and even entire 
instruments devoted to tackling problems relating to nationality in the context of 
state succession is evidence of the conviction that successor states can be held to 
such international commitments.  
 
2 THE 1961 CONVENTION ON THE REDUCTION OF STATELESSNESS 
 
The discussion of statelessness arising in the context of state succession brings us to 
the final substantive article in the 1961 Statelessness Convention. Article 10 of the 
1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness reads: 
 
1. Every treaty between Contracting States providing for the transfer of 
territory shall include provisions designed to secure that no person shall 
become stateless as a result of the transfer. A Contracting State shall use its 
best endeavours to secure that any such treaty made by it with a State which 
is not a Party to this Convention includes such provisions. 
                                                           
45 Jeffrey Blackman, 'State Succession and Statelessness: The Emerging Right to an Effective 
Nationality under International Law', in Michigan Journal of International law, Vol. 19, 1998, page 
1142. 
46 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, 1978. Entered into force on the 6th 
of November 1996. As of 1 December 2006, the Convention has attracted just 21 state parties. 
47 This submission is based on an analysis of both recent state practice and the opinions expressed by 
such bodies as the International Labour Organisation, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the 
UN Commission on Human Rights and various United Nations Treaty Bodies. Menno Kamminga, 
'State Succession in Respect of Human Rights Treaties', in European Journal of International Law, 
Vol. 7, 1996, page 484. 
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2. In the absence of such provisions a Contracting State to which territory is 
transferred or which otherwise acquires territory shall confer its nationality 
on such persons as would otherwise become stateless as a result of the 
transfer or acquisition. 
 
Where UNHCR has explained the content of this article – as it has in various 
publications – it has basically summarised the obligation as meaning that “treaties 
shall ensure that statelessness does not occur as a result of a transfer of territory 
[and] where no treaty is signed, the State shall confer its nationality on those who 
would otherwise be stateless”.48 While this is the essence of the article, it is a 
somewhat oversimplified rendition of the rules housed in the text. 
 To begin with, the commitment to ensuring that any treaty in which the 
succession of states is organised will prevent statelessness from arising is actually 
formulated in less resolute terms. Paragraph 1, as cited above, determines merely 
that provisions “designed to secure” the avoidance of statelessness should be 
included in succession treaties. No words are spared on what sort of content could 
or should be given to such provisions, how stringent the implementation and 
monitoring of these arrangements should be or what action should be undertaken 
should the provisions fail to live up to their design. These shortcomings are 
particularly conspicuous in view of the norm elaborated in the second paragraph: 
where no arrangements have been made by treaty, a contracting state is obliged to 
actually grant citizenship to certain persons in order to prevent statelessness. What 
is striking here is that if states fail to ensure that the question of nationality is settled 
by treaty (put forward as the most desirable course of action under this article), the 
protection offered against statelessness may actually be greater.49 Moreover, if the 
treaty provisions which are “designed to secure” that no-one is rendered stateless 
are ineffective, there is no further consequence because the existence of such 
provisions is of itself enough to meet the commitment under the 1961 Statelessness 
Convention.   
 By comparison then, the second paragraph of article 10 is much more 
satisfactory as it contains a concrete norm. It is clear about what action is to be 
taken: to avert statelessness, citizenship must be conferred on persons who would 
otherwise be left without a nationality due to the succession of states. It also 
pinpoints which state is thus obliged: the state “to which territory is transferred or 
which otherwise acquires territory”. It thus falls upon the successor state to bestow 
nationality upon persons who would otherwise be stateless - a reflection of the 
notion that the population follows the territory in the change of sovereignty.  
Moreover, it does not limit the scope of application to only those persons who are, 
                                                           
48 UNHCR, Information and accession package: the 1954 Convention relating to the status of stateless 
persons and the 1961 Convention on the reduction of statelessness, Geneva: January 1999, page 15. See 
also UNHCR and IPU, Nationality and statelessness. A handbook for parliamentarians, 2005, page 34. 
49 The International Law Commission explains the priority given to treaty arrangements as a reflection 
of the understanding that inter-state agreements to ensure the prevention of statelessness are generally 
likely to be more effective than individual domestic measures adopted independently and without 
coordination. International Law Commission, 'Draft Articles on Nationality of Natural Persons in 
Relation to the Succession of States - With Commentaries', in Yearbook of the International Law 





at the time, resident on the territory in question. Since this rule is applicable to all 
“such persons as would otherwise become stateless”, it assures that even those who 
live abroad will be protected against statelessness in the event of loss of nationality 
of the predecessor state. 
 Nevertheless, this second paragraph also produces some difficulties of 
interpretation and implementation. Firstly, in referring to the state “to which 
territory is transferred” rather than using the term “successor state”, there is some 
doubt as to whether this provision deals with all cases of state succession. As it 
reads, it appears to focus on instances in which there is a redefinition of an existing 
border, thus where an area of land is transferred from the sovereignty of one 
country to another - already existing - state. It is unclear whether the norm would 
also apply to the situation in which one or more newly independent states are 
formed – the circumstance of most of the cases of state succession of the latter 20th 
century.50 This brings us to the second problem. If we are to assume that it is the 
intention of this article to cover all situations of state succession, then the question 
arises whether a newly independent state would ever be bound by this norm being 
as it is only applicable through this treaty to state parties. As mentioned in the 
introduction to the problem of statelessness in state succession, the issue of whether 
a successor state is bound to the treaty obligations of the predecessor state is a 
matter of great contention and little consensus. The practice of states that have 
emerged from state succession with regard to the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 
1954 Statelessness Convention has been to succeed to these documents, including – 
where appropriate – reaffirming or redrafting the declarations and reservations that 
were made to these texts by the predecessor state at the time of accession.51 It must 
thereby be assumed that these instruments remained in force in the relevant 
territories throughout. As to the 1961 Statelessness Convention itself, Kiribati is the 
sole state to have succeeded to the instrument,52 but the relevant circumstances have 
only presented themselves in this one instance. Therefore, on the basis of the overall 
treatment of the refugee and statelessness protection regimes and the intent and 
purpose of this article in the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, it 
seems fair to assume that a successor state should be considered bound by these 
norms if the predecessor state has committed itself to the text. Nevertheless, in the 
absence of any real state practice, it remains to be seen whether this point is refuted 
by newly independent states.  
The third setback with this provision is the lack of attention for the role of 
the predecessor state. It falls upon the successor state to attribute nationality to 
those who would otherwise be rendered stateless by the succession of states. 
However, the predecessor state is not required to play any role in the prevention of 
statelessness. There is no duty, for example, to refrain from withdrawing nationality 
until such time as the acquisition by the individual of the citizenship of the 
                                                           
50 The Draft Convention on the Reduction of Future Statelessness, as submitted for consideration by the 
International Law Commission, also referred in paragraph 2 of article 10 to “a new State formed on 
territory previously belonging to another State or States”. This suggests that the text as finally adopted 
deliberately excludes from its scope of application any newly independent states.  
51 Information on state parties, reservations and declarations to the 1951 Convention relating to the 
Status of Refugees and the 1954 Convention relating to the status of Stateless Persons is available via 
http://www.unhcr.org.  
52 Upon independence from the United Kingdom. 
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successor state has been realised. In view of the ambiguity surrounding the 
application of this provision to newly independent states, an opportunity may have 
thereby been missed to further narrow the risk of (even temporary) statelessness. 
Finally, while admirable for the reasons cited above, the broad reference to “such 
persons as would otherwise become stateless” may also lead to problems of 
implementation. Not only may a state be unwilling to accept responsibility for 
certain persons that are rendered stateless by the policy of the predecessor state 
(which is not subject to any restrictions under this article), but what happens if there 
is more than one successor state? Consider the situation in which a federal state has 
dissolved to make way for a number of successor states, as was the case with the 
break up of the Soviet Union. The nationality of the predecessor state is no longer 
available, so all citizens of that state “would otherwise become stateless”, but which 
of the various successor states must confer nationality to which individuals? This 
vagueness may allow states to enter into an unending dispute as to who must grant 
nationality to a particular population group.53 The 1961 Statelessness Convention 
does not offer any guidance as to how such matters should be settled. In particular, 
it does not mention the possibility or obligation of allowing the individual in 
question a right of option for the most appropriate nationality.54  
In interpreting and applying this article of the 1961 Statelessness 
Convention, the aforementioned difficulties may never arise. If the spirit rather than 
the letter of the text is followed, then the result should indeed be as UNHCR 
suggested: that states “either conclude treaties or confer nationality to ensure 
statelessness will not occur as a result of a transfer of territory”.55 However, it 
cannot be denied that the wording of the provision leaves ample room for 
contention and dispute. Once again, an effective supervisory mechanism is an 
important asset to ensuring interpretation and application of the text in accordance 
with its purpose – the avoidance of statelessness.56 Most likely, it simply proved too 
ambitious of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness to attempt to 
deal with the complex issue of statelessness arising from state succession in just one 
provision, featured – almost as an afterthought - at the end of the series of 
substantive provisions and in a much watered down form than originally put 
forward by the International Law Commission for consideration.57 In contrast, as 
                                                           
53 The original Draft Convention on the Reduction of Future Statelessness required states to deal only 
with the potential statelessness of inhabitants of their territory. This had the advantage of forestalling 
nationality disputes to some extent but the disadvantage of negating what has been said above about 
this provision dealing with all persons who would otherwise be stateless. 
54 In fact the instrument does not deal with the right of option at all, nor the risk of statelessness that 
such a mechanism may introduce. Again, the Draft Convention on the Reduction of Future 
Statelessness that was put forward by the International Law Commission did mention the right of 
option, but this wording was lost before the acceptance of the final text by government representatives 
in 1961. 
55 See note 48. 
56 The problem of enforcement of the 1961 Statelessness Convention was broached in chapter III, 
section 3. We will return to this question in chapter VIII. 
57 In comparison to the number and volume of the provisions of the 1961 Statelessness Convention that 
deal with statelessness arising from regular conflict of laws situations, it is unsurprising that the brevity 
with which the problem of statelessness in state succession – an equally complex issue - is dealt with 





we turn to the alternative sources of obligations in this field, we will see how the 
concretisation of the right to a nationality in the context of state succession has lead 
to entire, detailed instruments being elaborated to deal with this matter.   
 
3 INTERNATIONAL (HUMAN RIGHTS) LAW 
 
International human rights instruments do not deal with the specific issue of 
statelessness resulting from the succession of states. Nevertheless, the general 
norms on the right to a nationality and the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of 
nationality are equally applicable in the context of state succession and must 
therefore be taken into account. This has provided treaty bodies with the 
opportunity to comment on policies relating to the attribution of nationality to 
persons affected by state succession. Thus, in a perhaps surprising number of 
concluding observations on state party reports, the various committees have 
commented on the enjoyment of the right to a nationality (explicitly or implicitly) in 
the context of the succession of states. For example, in reference to the Russian 
Federation the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights had this to 
say: 
 
The Committee notes the statement of the State party’s delegation that any 
former citizen of the Soviet Union living in the country can exchange their 
old Soviet passports for new Russian Federation ones without any difficulty. 
However, the Committee is concerned about reports that registration and 
recognition of citizenship have been denied to some groups, particularly the 
Meskhetians living in Krasnador Krai.58 
 
The other treaty bodies have dealt with similar concerns - or expressed praise at 
positive developments – in particular on the situation in Latvia, Estonia, Sri Lanka, 
Slovenia, Croatia and Ukraine.59  
                                                           
58 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations: Russian 
Federation, E/2004/22, New York and Geneva: 2003, para 455. Similar concerns were expressed by the 
UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination in Concluding Observations: Russian 
Federation, A/58/18, New York: 2003, paras 180 and 183. Elsewhere, the statelessness of the 
Meskhetians in the aftermath of the break-up of the Soviet Union has also been reported on. UNHCR, 
"Statelessness and Citizenship" in The State of the World's Refugees - A Humanitarian Agenda, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford: 1997, page 235; Maureen Lynch, Lives on hold: The human cost of 
statelessness, Washington: 2005, page 43. 
59 CERD, Concluding Observations: Croatia, A/50/18, New York: 1995, paras. 173 and 175; Croatia, 
A/553/18, New York: 1998, para 316; Latvia, A/54/18, New York: 1999, para 395; Sri Lanka, A/56/18, 
New York: 2001, para 334; Ukraine, A/56/18, New York: 2001, para 374; Estonia, A/57/18, New 
York: 2002, para 353; Slovenia, A/58/18, New York, 2003, paras 232 and 240. Human Rights 
Committee, Concluding Observations: Ukraine, A/50/40, vol.1, Geneva: 1995, para 322; Latvia, 
A/50/40, vol.1, Geneva: 1995, para. 350; Estonia, A/51/40, vol.1, Geneva: 1996, para 110; Estonia, 
A/58/40, vol.1, Geneva: 2003, para 79(14). Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
Concluding Observations: Sri Lanka, E/1999/22, New York and Geneva: 1998, para 82; Croatia, 
E/2002/22, New York and Geneva: 2001, para 894. Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding 
Observations: Latvia, CRC/C/103, Geneva: 2001, para. 52; Estonia, CRC/C/124, Geneva: 2003, paras 
45-46. Also in reference to the United Kingdom in the context of the transfer of sovereignty over Hong 
Kong to China in CERD, Concluding Observations: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
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The UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has 
clearly been most active in this regard. In response to the country report of 
Lithuania in 2002, the Committee even went so far as to note with satisfaction the 
choice of “zero option” as the mechanism for the attribution of nationality upon 
state succession as this “enabled the majority of the population to obtain Lithuanian 
citizenship [and] has led to the construction of a more stable society”.60 The 
Committee has thereby taken one step beyond expressing concern at discriminatory 
policies of nationality attribution in the context of state succession by appearing to 
voice a preference for a particular mechanism in order to protect the right to a 
nationality. This development is supported by the reference in the General 
Recommendation on Discrimination against non-citizens that was promulgated by 
the Committee in 2004. In paragraph 17 it recommends that states adopt measures 
to: 
 
Regularise the status of former citizens of predecessor States who now 
reside within the jurisdiction of the State Party.61 
 
The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination thus seems to favour 
the attribution of citizenship by territorial jurisdiction to persons affected by state 
succession. Perhaps most interestingly, this recommendation does not refer to 
successor states, only to the state of residence of former nationals of a predecessor 
state, which may, in fact, be a third country that was not directly involved in the 
state succession.62 The important point here is that this is a clear illustration of the 
way in which the right to a nationality is encroaching upon the issue of state 
succession even in the absence of explicit human rights treaty provisions to that 
effect. 
 Meanwhile, inspired by developments in the human rights field and a desire to 
limit the occurrence of statelessness and in the knowledge of the particular 
difficulties raised by state succession for the enjoyment of nationality, the 
international community has been growing increasingly active on this issue.63 In 
fact, thanks to the elaboration of more comprehensive norms to deal with the 
                                                                                                                                               
Ireland, A/51/18, New York: 1996, paras 238 and 254; and in reference to the territory of Macau in 
Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations: Portugal, A/55/40, vol.1, Geneva: 2000, para. 
175. 
60 CERD, Concluding Observations: Lithuania, A/57/18, 2002, para 163. 
61 CERD General Recommendation 30: Discrimination against Non-Citizens, Geneva: 2004, para. 17. 
62 It should also be noted that states are asked to “regularise” the status of former citizens of the 
predecessor state, rather than confer nationality upon such individuals. This may, in fact, be interpreted 
narrowly to mean the legalisation of immigration status only. However, thanks to its placing among the 
paragraphs that house recommendations on the right to a nationality and the avoidance of statelessness 
it can be inferred that the establishment of citizenship is the desired solution.  
63 The numerous cases of sudden state succession towards the end of the 20th Century provided an 
additional impetus to the international community to begin to tackle the issues of state succession and 
nationality jointly, rather than as separate problems which had previously been the approach. Zdzislaw 
Galicki, "State Succession and Nationality" in Council of Europe's First Conference on Nationality, 
Strasbourg: 1999. Not only through the UN human rights system and UNHCR has attention grown for 
this predicament, but even in the work of organisations such as the Organisation for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe. OSCE, Ottawa Declaration of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, Ottawa, July 





attribution of nationality to persons affected by state succession, it is now the area 
in which the right to a nationality has received its most thorough and detailed 
concretisation. There are two instruments that are designed to deal specifically and 
explicitly with the problem of the nationality in the context of state succession.64 
The first is the Draft Articles on Nationality of Natural Persons in relation to the 
Succession of States65 that was prepared by the International Law Commission at 
the request of the UN General Assembly.66 At the time of writing, the General 
Assembly was still considering whether these norms should be adopted in the form 
of a Declaration or perhaps even a Convention.67 Nevertheless, the articles reflect a 
certain consensus on how international law currently stands on the issue. The 
second is the Council of Europe Convention on the avoidance of statelessness in 
relation to State succession,68 opened for signature in May 2006 and yet to enter 
into force.69 This Convention  
 
builds upon Chapter VI of the European Convention on Nationality by 
developing more detailed rules to be applied by States in the context of State 
succession with a view to preventing, or at least as far as possible reducing, 
cases of statelessness arising from such situations.70  
 
By tracing common standards in these two instruments, it is possible to draw some 
conclusions about the direction in which international law has been developing 
since the adoption of the 1961 Statelessness Convention. 
                                                           
64 As instruments specifically designed to deal with the succession of states it is to be assumed that 
where the predecessor state was a party to these texts, the successor state(s) would also be bound to 
implement the rules contained therein, otherwise the instruments would lose all value. 
65 Hereinafter the ILC Draft Articles. 
66 The Draft Articles are annexed to the text of UN General Assembly, Resolution on Nationality of 
natural persons in relation to the succession of States, A/RES/55/153, 30 January 2001. They can also 
be found, with accompanying commentary in ILC Yearbook. International Law Commission, 'Draft 
Articles on Nationality of Natural Persons in Relation to the Succession of States - With 
Commentaries', in Yearbook of the International Law Commission, Vol. II, 1999 
67 UN General Assembly, Resolution on Nationality of natural persons in relation to the succession of 
States, A/RES/59/34, 16 December 2004; see also background documents such as the comments and 
observations received from governments, UN General Assembly, Note by the secretariat on Nationality 
of natural persons in relation to the succession of States, A/59/180, 26 July 2004 and A/59/180/Add.1, 
26 August 2004; UN General Assembly, Report of the Sixth Committee on Nationality of natural 
persons in relation to the succession of States, A/59/504, 19 November 2004. 
68 Hereinafter the Council of Europe Convention. 
69 Since being opened for signature, the Council of Europe Convention has been ratified by 2 states 
(Moldova and Norway) and has been signed – but not ratified – by two further states (Ukraine and 
Montenegro). The ratification of 3 states is needed for the entry into force of the instrument. The 
Convention on Nationality that was also adopted within the framework of the Council of Europe and 
had the same conditions for entry into force attracted the required number of ratifications within three 
years of it being opened for signature. 
70 Council of Europe, Council of Europe Convention on the avoidance of statelessness in relation to 
State succession - Explanatory Report, Strasbourg: 2006. The chapter of the European Convention on 
Nationality referred to will not be considered because it has received further concretisation in the 
Council of Europe Convention on the avoidance of statelessness in relation to State succession that is 
being discussed here. 
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 After an elaborate preamble, both the ILC Draft Articles and the Council of 
Europe Convention open with a restatement of the right to a nationality for the 
specific context of the succession of states.71 While the scope of the two 
instruments is limited to the continuing enjoyment of the right to a nationality for 
persons who held the nationality of the predecessor state prior to state succession, 
precisely because of this very specific focus it becomes possible to identify which 
state is obliged to fulfil this right for the individuals concerned by providing for the 
conferral or retention of citizenship.72 Moreover, although the ILC Draft Articles 
are concerned with all aspects of nationality attribution in relation to state 
succession - not just with the avoidance of statelessness like the Council of Europe 
Convention – the right to a nationality is the “main principle from which other draft 
articles are derived”.73 Both documents therefore have a clear focus on avoiding the 
creation of new cases of statelessness in the process of the transfer of territory. 
Indeed, for good measure, both texts go on to explicitly assert the principle of the 
prevention of statelessness, again in relation to persons who prior to state 
succession possessed the nationality of the predecessor state.74  
The wording of these provisions is of great interest. In spite of the ideal 
that they clearly strive towards, a first reading of the text is disappointing. The 
state(s) concerned are required to “take all appropriate measures” to prevent 
statelessness from arising among the nationals of the predecessor state.75 This 
choice of phrase results in an “obligation of conduct” rather than an “obligation of 
result”.76 Where there are several concerned states, statelessness may nevertheless 
crop up even where appropriate measures have been taken, because these have 
                                                           
71 The ILC Draft Articles assert the right to a nationality in article 1, followed by a provision which 
contains the definition of terms used in the text. The Council of Europe Convention elaborates on the 
definition of terms first, then article 2 proclaims the right to a nationality.  
72 International Law Commission, 'Draft Articles on Nationality of Natural Persons in Relation to the 
Succession of States - With Commentaries', in Yearbook of the International Law Commission, Vol. II, 
1999, page 25. Jeffrey Blackman, 'State Succession and Statelessness: The Emerging Right to an 
Effective Nationality under International Law', in Michigan Journal of International law, Vol. 19, 
1998, page 1173. 
73 International Law Commission, 'Draft Articles on Nationality of Natural Persons in Relation to the 
Succession of States - With Commentaries', in Yearbook of the International Law Commission, Vol. II, 
1999, page 25. Similarly, the Special Rapporteur remarked that “the assumption that States concerned 
should be under the obligation to prevent statelessness was one of the basic premises on which the 
Working Group based its deliberations and received clear support in the Commission”. Václav 
Mikulka, Third report on Nationality in relation to the Succession of States, A/CN.4/480, Geneva: 27 
February 1997, page 43. 
74 Article 4 of the ILC Draft Articles; Article 3 of the Council of Europe Convention. States are free to 
redress the statelessness of residents of their territory who were already stateless prior to the succession 
of states or to extend the protection offered against statelessness to de facto stateless persons, but these 
measures are not required by the instruments. International Law Commission, 'Draft Articles on 
Nationality of Natural Persons in Relation to the Succession of States - With Commentaries', in 
Yearbook of the International Law Commission, Vol. II, 1999, page 28; COE Explanatory Report, para 
16. 
75 The wording of article 4 of the ILC Draft Articles and Article 3 of the Council of Europe Convention 
is virtually identical. 
76 International Law Commission, 'Draft Articles on Nationality of Natural Persons in Relation to the 
Succession of States - With Commentaries', in Yearbook of the International Law Commission, Vol. II, 





proven inadequate. This approach has been sternly criticised as “a tepid affirmation 
of the duty to prevent statelessness, […] an obligation without teeth”.77 A similar 
critique was voiced in the previous section with regard to article 10, paragraph 1 of 
the 1961 Statelessness Convention whereby states commit to settling a treaty which 
includes “provisions designed to secure that no person shall become stateless”. 
However, there is a significant difference between these instruments. While the 
1961 Statelessness Convention does not go on to specify what could be deemed as 
provisions designed to secure the prevention of statelessness, the ILC Draft Articles 
and the Council of Europe Convention both (largely) dedicate the remainder of their 
provisions to delineating what are considered “appropriate measures”: 
 
The principle stated in Article 3 [of the Council of Europe Convention] 
indicates the general framework upon which other, more specific 
obligations are based. The elimination of statelessness is the outcome to be 
achieved by application of the set of principles and rules contained in the 
Convention.78  
 
To evaluate the effectiveness of the ILC Draft Articles and the Council of Europe 
Convention in preventing statelessness in relation to state succession on the basis of 
this statement of principle alone is therefore severely premature. Instead, we must 
consider the concrete, substantive norms contained in these instruments. 
 Where the 1961 Convention on the reduction of statelessness was 
insufficiently clear and unambiguous to guarantee trouble-free implementation, the 
ILC Draft Articles and the Council of Europe Convention are much more detailed. 
These instruments also concentrate mainly on the role of the successor state in 
conferring nationality and preventing statelessness, but they are more specific in 
determining which individuals must be granted citizenship by which successor 
state. Although the ILC Draft Articles prescribe separate measures of nationality 
attribution for each of the four main types of state succession79 and the Council of 
Europe Convention covers all situations in just one article, substantively the norms 
are incredibly similar.80 If an individual would otherwise be rendered stateless by 
                                                           
77 Jeffrey Blackman, 'State Succession and Statelessness: The Emerging Right to an Effective 
Nationality under International Law', in Michigan Journal of International law, Vol. 19, 1998, page 
1181. It should be noted that Blackman was referring to a previous draft by the ILC in which states 
were obliged to take all reasonable measures to prevent statelessness in relation to state succession. 
Nevertheless, his comments are equally relevant to the text of the ILC Draft Articles as approved in 
1999. 
78 Council of Europe, Council of Europe Convention on the avoidance of statelessness in relation to 
State succession - Explanatory Report, Strasbourg: 2006, para 15; Explanation of article 4 of the ILC 
Draft Articles is almost identical, word for word. International Law Commission, 'Draft Articles on 
Nationality of Natural Persons in Relation to the Succession of States - With Commentaries', in 
Yearbook of the International Law Commission, Vol. II, 1999, page 28. 
79 Transfer of territory from one state to another, unification of states, dissolution of states and 
separation of part of a state. 
80 Please be reminded that each of these norms relates only to those persons who prior to the succession 
of states held the nationality of the predecessor state. Once again, note that the ILC Draft Articles 
prescribe general measures for nationality attribution in cases of state succession whereas the Council 
of Europe Convention only obliges states to confer nationality along these lines where the individual 
would otherwise be stateless. Since we are only interested here in what is prescribed where a person 
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the transfer of territory, then, in order to determine which state has a duty to confer 
citizenship, it must first be ascertained in which state the person is habitually 
resident. If the state of habitual residence is (one of) the successor state(s) then, in 
reflection of general state practice by which the change of citizenship follows the 
change of sovereignty, that state must grant nationality.81 As to persons at risk of 
statelessness due to state succession who are not habitually resident on the territory 
of (any of) the successor state(s) at the time of transfer: they will nevertheless be 
entitled to the nationality of such a state if there is an “appropriate connection”.82 
An appropriate connection may consist of a legal bond to a territorial unit of the 
predecessor state that now belongs to the successor states’ territory (for example 
“citizenship” of one of the republics that constituted a federation in the predecessor 
state); birth on the territory that has been transferred; or last habitual residence on 
the territory that has been transferred.83  
By dealing with the risk of statelessness of those who are resident on the 
territory that undergoes a change of sovereignty, as well as those who are living 
abroad at the time of state succession and by clearly delineating simple factors that 
account for an appropriate connection,84 the protection offered against statelessness 
is maximised. In fact, in many cases this approach is likely to lead to eligibility for 
the nationality of more than one successor state. Without taking a stance on the 
appropriateness of dual nationality,85 the two instruments have foreseen the 
difficulties that may arise from this situation and taken measures to forestall 
                                                                                                                                               
would otherwise be stateless, it is not immediately relevant that the rules prescribed by the ILC Draft 
Articles are also applicable to nationality in relation to state succession generally. 
81 Articles 20, 22 (a) and 24 (a) of the ILC Draft Articles; Article 5, paragraph 1(a) of the Council of 
Europe Convention. Only with regard to the unification of states is the basic rule any different – in that 
case, the ILC Draft Articles determine that nationality shall be attributed by the successor state to all 
nationals of the predecessor states, regardless of other factors. 
82 The ILC Draft Articles even allow the attribution of nationality by successor states to non-permanent 
residents with an appropriate connection against their will if they would otherwise be stateless. In 
ordinary circumstances, where there is no risk of statelessness, a successor state may only bestow 
nationality upon non-residents if they agree to the conferral. This exception is therefore another 
admission of the special importance of preventing statelessness. Article 8, paragraph 2 of the ILC Draft 
Articles. 
83 Article 22 (b) and article 24 (b) of the ILC Draft Articles; Article 5, paragraphs 1(b) and 2 of the 
Council of Europe Convention. Both instruments admit that there may be other factors that constitute 
an appropriate connection for the conferral of nationality, but these are the only three upon which the 
states concerned are obliged to attribute nationality. In the commentary to the ILC Draft Articles it is 
suggested that family ties may be another indication of an appropriate connection. International Law 
Commission, 'Draft Articles on Nationality of Natural Persons in Relation to the Succession of States - 
With Commentaries', in Yearbook of the International Law Commission, Vol. II, 1999, page 45. In 
relation to the Council of Europe Convention, “long-term previous residence in their territory or descent 
from a person originating from it” are mentioned as alternative evidence of an appropriate connection 
with the state concerned. Roland Schärer, 'The Council of Europe and the Reduction of Statelessness', 
in Refugee Survey Quarterly, Vol. 25, 2006, page 36. 
84 As well as allowing other factors to be taken into account where necessary by devising a non-
limitative list. 
85 The Council of Europe Convention concerns itself only with the problem of statelessness and the ILC 
Draft Articles are “completely neutral” on the question of dual or multiple nationality. International 
Law Commission, 'Draft Articles on Nationality of Natural Persons in Relation to the Succession of 





disputes that might otherwise lead to a prolonged situation of uncertainty or 
statelessness for the individuals involved. Where the person in question resides on 
the territory of a successor state, it is that state which is responsible for fulfilling his 
right to a nationality. Therefore, as mentioned, only where the individual is not 
habitually resident on the soil of any successor state must another “appropriate 
connection” be sought.86 If the person is found to have an appropriate connection 
with more than one successor state (for example, birth on the soil of one successor 
state but last habitual residence on the territory of another), a dispute is still 
conceivable. This problem has been resolved by leaving the choice to the 
individual: a right of option must be offered where more than one nationality is 
available.87 There must be a real opportunity to exercise such a right of option and 
states may not pre-empt that choice: 
 
A successor state shall not refuse to grant its nationality under Article 5, 
paragraph 1, sub-paragraph b [on the basis of an appropriate connection], 
where such nationality reflects the expressed will of the persons concerned, 
on the grounds that such a person can acquire the nationality of another 
State concerned on the basis of an appropriate connection with that state.88 
 
Any dispute that may arise between states as to which nationality a person should 
acquire is therefore to be resolved by the individual himself and the relevant states 
are required to respect that decision. Only once the individual in question has 
actually acquired the nationality for which he has opted are the other states absolved 
of their duty to offer citizenship or can they give effect to any expressed desire to 
“opt out” of the nationality that they have offered.89 Again this is a useful tool in the 
prevention of statelessness.  
 While the rules discussed so far may be the most progressive and remarkable 
of the provisions included in the ILC Draft Articles and the Council of Europe 
Convention - because they clearly identify which state is obliged to fulfil which 
persons’ right to a nationality - there are other norms that also deal with the problem 
of statelessness in relation to state succession. The first of these addresses the role 
of the predecessor state. Both instruments determine that the predecessor state (if 
still in existence after the succession of states) may not withdraw its citizenship 
until the nationality of a successor state is actually acquired, be it automatically or 
through voluntary act.90 This obligation on the predecessor state does not detract 
from the duty of successor states to offer citizenship to the categories of persons 
                                                           
86 Articles 22 and 24 read together with article 8 of the ILC Draft Articles; Article 5, paragraph 2 of the 
Council of Europe Convention. Moreover, the ILC Draft Articles give second priority, after habitual 
residence, to a legal connection with a constituent unit of the predecessor state that has become part of 
the successor state. Only where this is lacking must the search for an appropriate connection continue to 
consider such aspects as place of birth and place of last habitual residence. 
87 Articles 23 and 26 of the ILC Draft Articles; Article 7 of the Council of Europe Convention. 
88 Article 7 of the Council of Europe Convention. Article 11 of the ILC Draft Articles provides a similar 
safeguard against the shirking of responsibility by any state with which an individual has an appropriate 
connection and against the risk of (temporary) statelessness in the exercise of the right of option. 
89 See also articles 9 and 10 of the ILC Draft Articles. 
90 Articles 20 and 25 of the ILC Draft Articles; Article 6 of the Council of Europe Convention.  
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outlined above.91 It is, however, a key fallback clause to avert temporary 
statelessness92 and even permanent statelessness in exceptional cases. Thus the role 
of the predecessor state is central to the prevention of statelessness wherever it 
subsists after the transfer of territory.93 
Another important norm that has been included in the ILC Draft Articles 
and the Council of Europe Convention is the prohibition of discrimination in the 
enjoyment of the right to a nationality and its application to the context of state 
succession. There may be no discrimination in decisions regarding the retention of 
nationality of the predecessor state, the conferral of nationality by a successor state 
or the grant of the right of option.94 The Council of Europe Convention lists the 
following grounds upon which discrimination is prohibited in relation to the 
attribution of nationality upon transfer of territory: “sex, race, colour, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a 
national minority, property, birth or other status”.95 The same article admits that 
discrimination on other grounds may also be unacceptable. Meanwhile the 
International Law Commission deliberately chose to prohibit discrimination “on 
any ground” and omitted any such illustrative list. The reasoning behind this choice 
was that in the specific context of state succession, there “may still be other grounds 
for discrimination in nationality matters” which it could not necessarily predict 
from the outset but which may be equally intolerable.96 Thus substantial protection 
                                                           
91 The ILC Draft Articles delineate the cases in which the predecessor state incurs the duty to maintain 
the bond of citizenship with its nationals in article 25 (for example nationality will not be withdrawn 
from habitual residents of the territory that remains part of the predecessor state). Where this is the case 
and the nationality of a successor state is also available to such individuals, they must again be granted 
an effective right of option including the additional safeguards against statelessness (article 26 of the 
ILC Draft Articles). 
92 Another tool used to prevent temporary statelessness has been included in the ILC Draft Articles. 
Article 7 determines that the attribution of nationality in the context of state succession (whether 
automatic or by exercise of a right of option) shall “take effect on the date of such succession, if 
persons concerned would otherwise be stateless during the period between the date of the succession of 
States and such attribution or acquisition of nationality”. This exception to the general principle of non-
retroactivity of law in order to counter the effects of (even temporary) statelessness is a further 
illustration of the importance attributed to the prevention of statelessness by the international 
community. See also International Law Commission, 'Draft Articles on Nationality of Natural Persons 
in Relation to the Succession of States - With Commentaries', in Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission, Vol. II, 1999, page 30. 
93 Roland Schärer, 'The Council of Europe and the Reduction of Statelessness', in Refugee Survey 
Quarterly, Vol. 25, 2006, page 36. 
94 Article 15 of the ILC Draft Articles; Article 4 of the Council of Europe Convention. The ILC Draft 
Articles explicitly prohibit discrimination with regards to these three issues while the Council of Europe 
Convention simply decrees that states shall not discriminate in the application of any of the norms in 
the convention. 
95 This list is based on article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights and (as discussed in 
chapter V) is much more extensive than that offered by the European Convention on Nationality. This 
suggests that in the context of the concrete obligations of states that have been formulated for the 
avoidance of statelessness in state succession, a much broader protection against discrimination is 
appropriate. 
96 The example given was the application of the requirement of a clean criminal record for conferral of 





is offered against discrimination in the attribution of nationality in state succession 
with the result that such examples as were given by Weis of the delineation of a 
successor state’s body of citizens on the basis of ethnicity would be decisively 
outlawed,97 as would many other types of distinction. 
 Accompanying the norms which delineate who is to be attributed nationality in 
the context of state succession are rules on how this is to be achieved. In particular, 
there are a number of procedural guarantees that also form an important defence 
against the creation of statelessness. States must:  
 
- provide sufficient information on rules and procedures to persons concerned,98 
 
- process relevant applications without delay,99 
 
- provide decisions, including reasons, in writing,100 
 
- provide an effective administrative or judicial review for decisions,101  
 
- ensure that relevant fees are reasonable and not an obstacle for applicants.102 
 
The aim is to “ensure that the procedure followed with regard to nationality matters 
in cases of succession of states is orderly, given its possible large-scale impact”.103 
This will, in turn, contribute to the proper implementation of the substantive norms 
and help to lower the risk of statelessness.  
This delineation of procedural safeguards constitutes a simple translation of 
existing international norms in the field of nationality to the specific context of state 
succession.104 However, the Council of Europe Convention also introduces an 
important novelty in its article 8 that deals with “rules of proof”. The provision 
acknowledges the turbulence that tends to characterise the period of state succession 
and the difficulties that this may raise for establishing certain facts: 
 
                                                                                                                                               
Persons in Relation to the Succession of States - With Commentaries', in Yearbook of the International 
Law Commission, Vol. II, 1999, page 37. 
97 Note that such distinctions on the basis of ethnicity are also prohibited under the jus cogens norm on 
racial discrimination. See note 38 above. 
98 Article 6 of the ILC Draft Articles; Article 11 of the Council of Europe Convention. 
99 Article 17 of the ILC Draft Articles; Article 12, paragraph a of the Council of Europe Convention. 
100 Article 17 of the ILC Draft Articles; Article 12, paragraph b of the Council of Europe Convention. 
101 Article 17 of the ILC Draft Articles; Article 12, paragraph b of the Council of Europe Convention. 
102 Article 12, paragraph c of the Council of Europe Convention. The International Law Commission 
considers that in principle the attribution of nationality in the context of state succession should not be 
subject to any fee. International Law Commission, 'Draft Articles on Nationality of Natural Persons in 
Relation to the Succession of States - With Commentaries', in Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission, Vol. II, 1999, page 38. 
103 Here, the International Law Commission refers to a warning from the UNHCR of the dire 
consequences of statelessness and the inability to establish one’s nationality. International Law 
Commission, 'Draft Articles on Nationality of Natural Persons in Relation to the Succession of States - 
With Commentaries', in Yearbook of the International Law Commission, Vol. II, 1999, page 38.  
104 See chapter V, section 2.2. 
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It might in some cases be impossible for a person to provide full 
documentary proof of his or her descent if, for instance, the civil registry 
archives have been destroyed, or it may be impossible to provide 
documentary proof of place of residence in cases where this was not 
registered. The provision includes the situation where it might objectively 
be feasible for a person to provide proof but where it would be unreasonable 
to demand for instance an action by a person which might put his or her life 
or health in danger.105 
 
Thus the requirements of proof that must be met in order to establish eligibility for 
citizenship are deliberately lowered by determining that a successor state “shall not 
insist on its standard requirements of proof necessary for the granting of its 
nationality” if the individual would otherwise be stateless or if this amounted to an 
unreasonable burden.106 This is the first time that we have come across any 
provision relating to the question of evidence in relation to nationality matters.107 
Although this article does not delineate what rules are to be followed by state 
parties in establishing eligibility for nationality (or indeed the threat of 
statelessness) – leaving this question to states - the rule should nevertheless go 
some way to ensuring that problems of evidence do not stand in the way of the 
application of the Convention and, in particular, do not form an obstacle to the 
resolution of statelessness.  
Similarly “new” in nationality matters under international law is the 
obligation, within the context of state succession, to cooperate internationally to 
resolve nationality disputes and prevent statelessness. Since state succession is by 
definition an international event, involving more than one country, such a duty is 
more than logical. We already saw that the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of 
Statelessness called upon states to deal with nationality issues by treaty in this 
context. Now the ILC Draft Articles and the Council of Europe Convention add 
another dimension to this duty to cooperate. Not only may the states concerned be 
asked to tackle nationality disputes and statelessness by attempting to settle 
international agreements as appropriate,108 but with the same objective they are also 
required to exchange information and engage in consultations.109 In particular, it 
may be necessary to communicate on the operation of domestic nationality 
regulations in order to investigate the need for coordination of policy. The Council 
of Europe Convention even prescribes cooperation with UNHCR and, “where 
appropriate”, with third states and other international organisations.110 This 
                                                           
105 Council of Europe, Council of Europe Convention on the avoidance of statelessness in relation to 
State succession - Explanatory Report, Strasbourg: 2006, para 33. 
106 Article 8, paragraph 1 of the Council of Europe Convention. Under paragraph 2 of the same article, a 
successor state shall further “not require proof of non-acquisition of another nationality before granting 
its nationality to persons who were habitually resident on its territory at the time of the State succession 
and who have or would become stateless as a result of the State succession”. 
107 Recall the discussion of the problem of identification of (potential) statelessness in chapter II, 
section 2 and chapter III, section 3. 
108 Article 18, paragraph 2 of the ILC Draft Norms; Article 13 of the Council of Europe Convention. 
109 Article 18, paragraph 1 of the ILC Draft Norms; Article 14 of the Council of Europe Convention. 
110 Article 14, paragraph 2 of the Council of Europe Convention. “The question of which international 





provision recognises the intrinsic value of the consultative role that is often already 
played by UNHCR and other actors in devising solutions to the problem of 
statelessness in the context of state succession and aspires to extend the use of such 
important mechanisms.111  
Finally, it must be noted that if all of the above-mentioned safeguards 
against statelessness fail and some persons are nevertheless left without a 
nationality, the ILC Draft Articles and the Council of Europe Convention do not 
rest there. In particular, article 9 of the Council of Europe Convention is 
 
intended to fill any gaps after the application of Articles 5 and 6, either as a 
result of the predecessor State not being a party to the Convention or 
because of its disappearance as a result of which all persons who possessed 
its nationality automatically become stateless. If these persons subsequently 
fail to fulfil the conditions for the acquisition of nationality of a successor 
State they will remain stateless.112 
 
Thus the provision in question obliges whichever of the concerned states 
(predecessor or successor) upon which the person is lawfully and habitually resident 
to facilitate the acquisition of its nationality by persons who have become 
stateless.113 In contrast, the ILC Draft Norms do not prescribe facilitated access to 
nationality by those who were rendered stateless in the succession of states. Instead, 
it determines that where the states concerned fail to live up to their obligations in 
attributing nationality to certain persons in relation to state succession, leaving them 
                                                                                                                                               
this co-operation to non-governmental organisations as well”. Council of Europe, Council of Europe 
Convention on the avoidance of statelessness in relation to State succession - Explanatory Report, 
Strasbourg: 2006, para 55. 
111 For example, UNHCR and the Council of Europe engaged in dialogue with Bosnia and Herzegovina 
in order to avoid statelessness resulting from state succession. In all, UNHCR has consulted with and 
provided advice to over 40 states in relation to nationality laws both in the context of state succession 
and simply in the adoption of new legislation. UNHCR, UNHCR's activities in the field of statelessness: 
Progress Report, EC/55/SC/CRP.13/Rev.1, Geneva: 30 June 2005, page 3. Another example is Ukraine 
where, following state succession, UNHCR, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
and the Council of Europe were all involved in the promotion of solutions for statelessness. See “Good 
Practices: Ukraine” in UNHCR and IPU, Nationality and statelessness. A handbook for 
parliamentarians, 2005, pages 29-31. 
112 Council of Europe, Council of Europe Convention on the avoidance of statelessness in relation to 
State succession - Explanatory Report, Strasbourg: 2006, para 38. It is interesting to note the reference 
to the situation where the predecessor state is not a party to this Convention. Were this the case, then – 
apart from in a simple transfer of territory – the successor state(s) would also not be bound by this 
instrument. Only if the successor state(s) were to become a party to the Council of Europe Convention 
and declare by notification its retroactive application to the state succession would any of the rules 
actually be binding. 
113 Whereas in the allocation of responsibility for conferral of nationality in relation to state succession, 
the rules discussed above required only “habitual residence” as a matter of fact, this provision will 
benefit only persons who are also lawfully present on the state’s territory. In practice this may result in 
the exclusion of many individuals who, upon being rendered stateless, face further difficulties with their 
legal status under (new) immigration laws. It should be noted that the ILC Draft Articles (article 14) 
provide that persons who were habitual residents on the territory prior to state succession shall retain 
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stateless, other states are free to treat such persons as though they nevertheless 
acquired or retained the citizenship in question.114 This approach may only be 
invoked to the benefit of the individuals involved, for example to extend to these 
persons some form of favourable treatment that is also offered to the nationals of 
the state in question..115 The two instruments then concur on the undesirability of 
nationality disputes resulting from state succession impacting upon the second 
generation – children born after the transfer of territory.116 Rationalising the 
inclusion of these provisions on the norm espoused in article 7 of the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, both texts advocate jus soli attribution of 
citizenship to a child who (thanks to the effect of the succession of states on his 
parents nationality) would otherwise be stateless.117 In view of such forward-
thinking provisions and all of the foregoing comments, the ILC Draft Articles and 
the Council of Europe Convention prove to be full and comprehensive instruments 
that are paving the way for a new approach to the attribution of nationality and the 




The succession of states is inevitably a source of great upheaval, both for the states 
concerned and for the wider international community. Through numerous 
international agreements, efforts have been made to regulate various aspects of state 
succession.118 In recent years, there has been particular interest in the position of the 
individuals affected by the transfer of territory. Motivated by human rights norms, 
including the right to nationality, developments in international law reflect the 
understanding that 
   
of paramount importance in the case of the succession of states is the need 
to ensure that everyone who had a nationality prior to the succession has 
                                                           
114 Article 19 of the ILC Draft Articles. 
115 In contrast, “they may not, for example, deport such persons to that State as they could do with its 
actual nationals”. International Law Commission, 'Draft Articles on Nationality of Natural Persons in 
Relation to the Succession of States - With Commentaries', in Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission, Vol. II, 1999, page 40. 
116 Article 13 of the ILC Draft Articles; Article 10 of the Council of Europe Convention.  
117 International Law Commission, 'Draft Articles on Nationality of Natural Persons in Relation to the 
Succession of States - With Commentaries', in Yearbook of the International Law Commission, Vol. II, 
1999, page 36; Council of Europe, Council of Europe Convention on the avoidance of statelessness in 
relation to State succession - Explanatory Report, Strasbourg: 2006, para 42. There is a subtle 
difference between the provisions in the two instruments. The ILC Draft Articles provides the children 
in question with only the “right to the nationality” of the concerned state in which he was born whereas 
the Council of Europe Convention states plainly that such a state “shall grant its nationality at birth”. 
The latter obligation is the more forceful of the two as it obliges attribution of citizenship ex lege to the 
children in question, going further than even the European Convention on Nationality prescribes for 
children who would otherwise be stateless at birth. Roland Schärer, 'The Council of Europe and the 
Reduction of Statelessness', in Refugee Survey Quarterly, Vol. 25, 2006, page 37. 
118 Consider the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, 1978 and the 





one following. Statelessness should not result from this change in 
circumstances well beyond the control of the individuals involved.119 
 
It seems strange to single out the succession of states for special treatment in this 
way because so far virtually all of the causes of statelessness that we have covered 
in this section of the book are arguably “beyond the control of the individuals 
involved”.120 Nevertheless, this idea that the transfer of territory is an exceptional 
case that warrants every effort in protecting the persons concerned from any 
detrimental effects has clearly influenced the thinking of the international 
community on this issue. The rules and standards that have been developed and 
codified to deal with the avoidance of statelessness in relation to state succession 
clearly constitute the most progressive and detailed concretisation to date of the 
right to a nationality and the principle of the avoidance of statelessness. 
 These new standards can be found in the International Law Commission’s 
Draft Articles on Nationality of Natural Persons in relation to the Succession of 
States and the Council of Europe Convention on the avoidance of statelessness in 
relation to State succession.121 The two texts build upon existing norms such as the 
right to a nationality as espoused in numerous instruments and interpreted by 
various human rights bodies, the European Convention on Nationality and, indeed, 
the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness.122 A further elaboration 
was needed because each of these pre-existing instruments 
 
contains […] only general principles and not specific rules with regard to 
statelessness in cases of State succession. Past experience has demonstrated 
that this is not sufficient because an effective prevention of statelessness can 
be achieved only if States concerned by State succession are bound by 
clearly defined obligations to that effect.123 
 
Thus while the 1961 Statelessness Convention makes an admirable attempt to deal 
with statelessness in the context of state succession - even though its main focus is 
the resolution of conflict of laws cases - the provision elaborated simply falls short 
of the required depth and detail to address the problem decisively. The discussion of 
the ILC Draft Articles and the Council of Europe Convention make clear from the 
outset that great progress has been made since the formulation of the 1961 
                                                           
119 Carol Batchelor, 'Transforming International Legal Principles into National Law: The Right to a 
Nationality and the Avoidance of Statelessness', in Refugee Survey Quarterly, Vol. 25, 2006, page 18.  
120 With the exception perhaps of the deprivation of nationality as a punitive measure or in response to 
fraudulent conduct in acquiring citizenship, resulting in statelessness. 
121 As previously noted, the form in which the ILC Draft Articles will be adopted is as yet uncertain and 
the Council of Europe Convention has yet to enter into force. Nevertheless, the value of these 
instruments for tracing the direction in which international law is developing in this field should not be 
underestimated. 
122 See the preambular paragraphs of the ILC Draft Articles and the Council of Europe Convention. 
123 Schärer is referring to the European Convention on Nationality in the context of the elaboration of 
the Council of Europe Convention on the avoidance of statelessness in relation to State succession, 
however the observation is equally valid for the relevant human rights instruments and the 1961 
Statelessness Convention. Roland Schärer, 'The Council of Europe and the Reduction of Statelessness', 
in Refugee Survey Quarterly, Vol. 25, 2006, pages 33-34. 
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Statelessness Convention in delineating precise rules and determining the exact role 
to be played by each of the states concerned in preventing statelessness.  
 Among the innovations and improvements in the protection against 
statelessness in relation to state succession that have been traced in the ILC Draft 
Articles and the Council of Europe Convention is a clear and precise determination 
of which (successor) state is obliged to confer nationality upon the transfer of 
territory to persons who would otherwise be rendered stateless. The instruments 
stick close to state practice by giving the greatest weight to the person’s place of 
habitual residence in identifying the state which must bestow citizenship. The 
enunciation of additional, objective factors that - if present - also compel the 
attribution of nationality to persons who would otherwise be stateless ensures that 
no individual will be overlooked. Moreover, if states’ concern at the risk of multiple 
nationalities for the people thus affected threatens to induce endless uncertainty and 
nationality disputes, the instruments present the solution of the right of option: it is 
for the individual to decide which nationality to accept and for the states concerned 
to respect that decision. This precise delineation of the role of the successor states is 
much less likely to lead to disputes or difficulties in implementation and is, thereby, 
much more readily enforceable than the vague norm espoused in article 10, 
paragraph 2 of the 1961 Statelessness Convention.124 
 Moreover, the ILC Draft Articles and the Council of Europe Convention 
contain a crucial fall-back clause for the absolute prevention of statelessness in 
cases of partial succession of states – where the predecessor state remains in 
existence after the transfer of territory. The very simple, yet effective, rule is that 
the predecessor state may not withdraw its nationality from any person affected by 
the succession of states unless they have already acquired another. The absence of 
such a norm in the 1961 Statelessness Convention leaves a serious gap in the 
protection offered. A similar lapse in protection was unearthed in relation to the 
right of option in the context of state succession: while the ILC Draft Articles and 
the Council of Europe Convention guarantee an effective right of option - the 
exercise of which may not lead to statelessness - as a tool for resolving nationality 
disputes between states, the 1961 Statelessness Convention does not consider this 
matter at all. Nor does the 1961 Statelessness Convention prescribe non-
discrimination in the elaboration and application of rules on nationality attribution 
in the context of the transfer of territory. This principle is central to the ILC Draft 
Articles and the Council of Europe Convention, where in fact the protection offered 
against discrimination in nationality attribution in relation to the succession of 
states is broader than what is offered against discriminatory deprivation of 
nationality generally under international law. These same instruments provide 
numerous procedural guarantees designed to aid in the prevention of statelessness, 
such as the right to an effective review of nationality decisions. In contrast, the due 
process rules that are found in the 1961 Statelessness Convention are not applicable 
                                                           
124 Article 10, paragraph 2 reads “In the absence of [treaty provisions designed to secure that no person 
shall become stateless] a Contracting State to which territory is transferred or which otherwise acquires 
territory shall confer its nationality on such persons as would otherwise become stateless as a result of 





to the situation of state succession.125 A final significant advance made by both the 
ILC Draft Articles and the Council of Europe Convention over the 1961 
Statelessness Convention is the admission that, despite the best of intentions, some 
cases of statelessness arising from the succession of states may slip through the net. 
Where that is the case, the ILC Draft Articles and the Council of Europe 
Convention make an effort to limit the fallout, for example by suggesting facilitated 
access to the nationality of the state of habitual residence and by including 
safeguards against statelessness for the second generation. 
 It became clear early on in this chapter that the 1961 Convention on the 
Reduction of Statelessness has been somewhat left behind by the developments in 
international law in relation to the specific question of the prevention of 
statelessness arising from state succession. Indeed, the very elaboration by the 
International Law Commission of a detailed list of Draft Articles on Nationality of 
Natural Persons in Relation to the Succession of States, with as one of the principle 
objectives the avoidance of statelessness, is evidence of the conviction that the 1961 
Statelessness Convention falls short in this matter.126 In 1961, the time was clearly 
not yet ripe for a resolute text that would deal more decisively with the prevention 
of statelessness in relation to state succession.127 Now though, the necessity of 
dealing with the dire problem of statelessness arising from state succession is 
beginning to outweigh the initial objections to elaborating international agreements 
in this field and the possibility of adopting a new instrument to deal with this matter 
seems very real.128  
It then becomes important to ask what form such an instrument should take. In 
formulating the Draft Articles, the International Law Commission chose to consider 
the full question of (the change of) nationality in relation to state succession, rather 
than limiting the scope of its work to the problem of statelessness. This approach 
has its advantages. For example, the ILC was able to devise rules that will help to 
ensure the attribution of the most appropriate nationality – including the right of 
option – thereby, in fact, helping to protect individuals against the affliction of an 
ineffective nationality.129 However, there is also an obvious disadvantage: by pre-
determining how states should attribute nationality generally in the event of the 
transfer of territory, rather than dealing only with the limited category of “persons 
who would otherwise be stateless”, the Draft Articles may be trying to take on too 
much. States are likely to be less willing to accept the text if it pre-empts all 
decisions relating to the composition of the body of nationals upon state 
                                                           
125 The due process guarantees are found in article 8, paragraph 4 and are expressly applicable only to 
the revocation of nationality on the grounds espoused in that same article. See chapter V, section 2.1. 
126 The 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness was itself prepared by the International Law 
Commission back in the 1950s. 
127 This fact is also evidenced by the substantial differences between the text of the Draft Convention on 
the Reduction of Future Statelessness, as put forward by the International Law Commission, and the 
text that was finally approved as the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness.   
128 As previously noted, this development in the mindset towards the position of individuals in the 
succession of states was particularly spurred on by the experiences with cases of state succession in the 
early 1990s. See note 9. 
129 Sometimes described as “de facto statelessness”.  
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succession.130 As to the form that the Draft Articles may eventually take, the 
International Law Commission has suggested their adoption as a declaration, but 
the possibility of a convention is also on the table.131 Either way, it is clear that the 
new instrument will be established entirely independently from the 1961 
Statelessness Convention.132 This is a logical choice in view of the difference in 
scope as discussed above. By presenting the text in this way, it may also allow the 
instrument to attract broader support, including from among the (many) states that 
have not yet been coaxed into ratifying the 1961 Statelessness Convention. 
However, this approach will undoubtedly do nothing to diminish the obscurity of 
the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness and will, if anything, make 
the status of its provisions all the more ambiguous.   
While the Council of Europe Convention obviously cannot be a substitute 
to the ILC Draft Articles because it is a regional rather than a universal instrument, 
it does offer some idea of what an alternative text might look like. Thanks to its 
narrow focus on the avoidance of statelessness, it is able to offer even greater 
protection against this plight than the ILC Draft Articles provide.133 Such 
thoroughness would better befit a new instrument or optional protocol to the 1961 
Statelessness Convention to deal with the specific problem of statelessness arising 
from state succession. Until such time as the ILC Draft Articles have been formally 
adopted in one form or another and their impact can be assessed, it will fall upon 
such institutions as the human rights treaty bodies to continue to advocate for the 
prevention of statelessness in relation to state succession. The standards elaborated 
in the ILC Draft Articles and the Council of Europe Convention will at least 
provide helpful guidance in advising states on how to deal with this difficult issue 
and states remain free to take the UN General Assembly up on its standing 
invitation to “take into account, as appropriate, the provisions of [the ILC Draft 
Articles] in dealing with issues of nationality of natural persons in relation to the 




                                                           
130 As has been evident throughout this part of the book, the regulation of nationality is a delicate issue 
for states and unless a specific, widely accepted purpose (such as the avoidance of statelessness) is 
served by the dictation of how a state should attribute its citizenship, such rules are likely to meet with 
forceful resistance.  
131 It should be noted that the advantage of a convention over a declaration lies in the enforcement of 
the norms: a convention may provide for a supervisory mechanism, while a declaration cannot. A 
declaration may be favoured where it is felt that a convention would not attract many ratifications, but it 
should not be ignored that a controversial declaration that is adopted with a weak majority may have 
even less value than a convention that is at least binding on its state parties. 
132 Rather than as a protocol. 
133 Consider, for example, the innovation in the area of requirements of proof for the eligibility for 
nationality in its article 8. 
134 UN General Assembly, Resolution on Nationality of natural persons in relation to the succession of 
States, A/RES/55/153, 30 January 2001, para 3; UN General Assembly, Resolution on Nationality of 
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Every international agreement that is settled, every treaty or convention that is 
concluded, is not only contrived for a particular purpose, its details are also 
influenced by the circumstances of its conception and existing notions of the 
problem that it is designed to address. So too was the 1961 Convention on the 
Reduction of Statelessness. Although it was intended as an instrument to prevent 
statelessness, in the foregoing chapters we already uncovered a number of 
circumstances in which the protection offered against this plight is less than 
optimal. This was explained as a consequence of the level of development of 
international law in relation to nationality matters at the time as well as the (lack of) 
preparedness of states to pursue more radical measures. It is arguable that where 
progress in the field of human rights has since overtaken the protection offered by 
the 1961 Statelessness Convention, its provisions could be interpreted in the light of 
and consistent with such developments. The 1961 Convention would then retain its 
use as a tailor-made instrument for addressing the prevention of statelessness and, 
by taking the lessons learned from the study of the broader international legal 
framework, the current viewpoint of the international community to these long-
established problems could simply be added to the equation.1 This, however, would 
not solve a more troubling issue, namely the role of the 1961 Statelessness 
Convention in relation to sources of statelessness that were entirely overlooked in 
this document because they had yet to be identified as such.  
While for years this ultimately remained a hypothetical concern, over the 
course of the past decade or so it has gained immediate, practical importance with 
the acknowledgement of several “new” sources of statelessness. The first of these is 
a deficient civil registration system, in particular with regard to the registration of 
births and marriages. References to birth registration as a cause of statelessness 
started to crop up in the late 1990’s, more than thirty years after the 1961 
Statelessness Convention was opened for signature.2 UNHCR named birth 
registration as a source of statelessness for the first time in the 1997 publication 
                                                           
1 How this approach  might take shape is discussed in chapter VIII. 
2 Weis does not include the issue of registration practices in his 1979 work on statelessness, nor does 
Donner in discussing statelessness in her 1994 work on nationality. Paul Weis, Nationality and 
Statelessness in International Law, Kluwer Academic Publishers Group, Dordrecht: 1979. Ruth 






“The State of the World’s Refugees”.3 From that moment on, faulty birth 
registration practices have been included in every summary of the origins of 
statelessness and the issue is attracting increasing attention from many actors.4 In 
addition, generally deficient civil registration practices, in particular the non-
registration of marriages, have also been identified as a cause of statelessness.  
The other “new” sources of statelessness that have been identified in recent 
years relate to one broad issue: migration. The movement of persons, including 
forced displacement, across international frontiers has given rise to a host of 
problems relating to documentation, legal status and citizenship:5 
 
In a world of nation-states, in which the population of the globe is 
theoretically divided up into mutually exclusive bodies of citizens, 
international migration is an anomaly with which the state system has some 
awkwardness coping.6 
 
The persons involved in three specific migratory phenomena are proving to be 
especially vulnerable to nationality disputes and statelessness. These are irregular 
migrants, the victims of human trafficking and refugees. The link between such 
forms of displacement and statelessness is only just beginning to be discussed and 
further elucidated through studies and reports. However, it is considered a very real 
and likely lasting problem because the number of persons involved is not expected 
to decrease in years to come.7  
Since the 1961 Statelessness Convention did not foresee any of these 
problems and is therefore silent on what I have dubbed the “new” causes of 
statelessness - that being, in essence, what makes them “new” - this chapter takes a 
slightly different shape from its predecessors. The simple comment that relevant 
provisions are absent is enough to lay bare the (lack of) effectiveness of the 1961 
Convention in relation to these matters. The conclusion that in this respect the 1961 
Convention has become outdated is quickly made, so we can immediately proceed 
to consider how the issues are addressed under international human rights law. 
What follows is therefore an assessment of the extent to which the human rights 
field provides a viable alternative in addressing the risk of statelessness arising from 
                                                           
3 UNHCR, "Statelessness and Citizenship" in The State of the World's Refugees - A Humanitarian 
Agenda, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 1997, page 226. 
4 It also reappears in numerous Conclusions of UNHCR’s Executive Committee, including UNHCR 
Executive Committee, General Conclusion on International Protection, No. 90, 52nd Session, Geneva, 
2001, para. (r); UNHCR Executive Committee, General Conclusion on International Protection, No. 
95, 54th Session, Geneva, 2003, para. (x); UNHCR Executive Committee, Conclusion on Identification, 
Prevention and Reduction of Statelessness and Protection of Stateless Persons, No. 106, 57th Session, 
Geneva, 2006, para. (h).  
5 There is a particularly close link between statelessness and forced displacement. Not only can forced 
displacement lead to new cases of statelessness but, vice versa, stateless persons often find that they 
must flee their homes. Additionally, the fact of statelessness can block repatriation efforts. UNHCR, 
"Statelessness and Citizenship" in The State of the World's Refugees - A Humanitarian Agenda, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford: 1997, page 244. 
6 John Torpey, The Invention of the Passport. Surveillance, Citizenship and the State, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge: 2000, page 123. 
7 IOM, World Migration 2003: Managing Migration - Challenges and Responses for People on the 
Move, Geneva: 2003, page 27. 
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poor birth registration, irregular migration, trafficking in human beings and refugee 
situations.8 The question to be born in mind throughout this chapter is whether there 
is the need and indeed the scope to update the protection system offered by the 1961 
Statelessness Convention to include these “new” sources of statelessness.  
 
1 BIRTH AND MARRIAGE REGISTRATION 
 
One of the most tragic and, until recently, most underestimated sources of 
statelessness is a deficient birth registration system. I say most tragic, because a 
child could be born to the “right” parents, on the territory of the “right” state yet 
still be stateless from birth. Why? Because he was not registered or given a birth 
certificate elaborating all the details needed to prove these fortunate circumstances. 
Birth registration is 
 
the process by which a child’s birth is recorded in the civil register by the 
applicable government authority. It provides the first legal recognition and 
is generally required for the child to obtain a birth certificate. […] It is 
important that the registered child receives a birth certificate, since it is this 
that provides permanent, official and visible evidence of a state’s legal 
recognition of his or her existence as a member of society.9 
 
Unless a child is registered at birth, he remains without the all-important official, 
legal proof of existence. The same observation applies to the registration of 
marriages, for this ensures formal recognition by the state of the newly formed 
familial bond – and as we have already seen, contracting marriage can have an 
impact on the nationality of both the spouses and any children subsequently born 
from the union.10 Thus, the non-registration of these important milestones in a 
person’s life has come to be recognised in recent years as a source of statelessness.  
  
1.1 Connecting statelessness to (deficient) birth and marriage registration 
 
Lack of access to birth registration affects some 50 million newborns annually.11 
The level of registration varies from one country and one region to another. The 
poorest registration rates can be found in Sub-Saharan Africa, where on average 
70% of births are not recorded each year. In South Asia, the majority of births also 
go unregistered (63%), while other regions are able to register between 70 and 90% 
of all births. Yet even in industrialised countries, where on average 98% of births 
are registered, there is still room for thousands of births to go unrecorded every year 
                                                           
8 Note that this chapter does not presume – or aspire – to offer an exhaustive discussion of nor provide 
comprehensive solutions for tackling each of these individual issues for this would go beyond the scope 
of this study. Instead, the investigation is guided at all times by the research question that underlies this 
section of the book: how to provide optimal guarantees for the avoidance of statelessness.  
9 Plan International, Universal Birth Registration - A Universal Responsibility, Woking: 2005, page 11.  
10 See chapter IV, including section 1 on the difference in treatment between legitimate and illegitimate 
children and section 3 on the impact of marriage or divorce on nationality. 
11 Or 41% of all births, statistics from the year 2000; UNICEF, Birth Registration: Right from the Start, 





– proof of the worldwide severity of this issue.12 In addition, within a country’s 
borders registration rates can vary enormously. Registration coverage in urban 
centres is generally much better than in rural areas: “rural children are 1.7 times 
more likely to be unregistered than their urban peers”.13 Moreover, certain 
population groups tend to be more vulnerable to non-registration than others. 
Generally speaking, the registration of births of those belonging to a national 
minority or indigenous group, as well as members of a migrant or displaced 
community has proven to be the most troublesome.14 
The underlying reasons for non-registration also vary between countries 
and population groups and may be cumulative, but generally they belong to one of 
two broad categories: “governmental practices or parental inaction”.15 Thus, 
perhaps the most basic hindrance is the failure by the family and the state in 
question to understand or recognise the importance of birth registration with the 
result that it is simply not prioritised as it should be.16 The parents may be put off 
by the costs of registration, the distance that must be travelled to the registry office, 
the complexity and bureaucracy of procedures or an overall distrust of the civil 
authorities.17 The government, on its part, may be failing to allocate enough 
financial resources to ensure a properly functioning civil registration system, 
leading to insufficient registration bureaus and equipment, inadequate storage 
facilities for documents and poorly trained and supervised registry officials. This 
also leaves the door wide open for corruption.18 Moreover, the legal framework and 
administrative set-up of the birth registration procedure may be riddled with 
                                                           
12 All statistics for the year 2000, found in UNICEF, Birth Registration: Right from the Start, Florence: 
March 2002, page 8. Interestingly, of the 74 states to respond to the UNHCR Questionnaire on 
statelessness, four did not reply to the question as to whether the state operated a system for the 
registration of births and two admitted that there was no such system in place (both European states). 
UNHCR, Final report concerning the Questionnaire on statelessness pursuant to the Agenda for 
Protection, Geneva: March 2004, page 23. 
13 For example, in the world’s Least Developed Countries, the percentage of births registered over the 
1999-2004 period was 44% in urban centres but just 28% in rural areas. A similar pattern can be seen in 
statistics across the board. UNICEF, The State of the World's Children. Excluded and Invisible, New 
York: 2006, pages 37-38. 
14 Michael Miller, "Birth Registration: Statelessness and other repercussions for unregistered children", 
3rd European Conference on Nationality - Nationality and the Child, Strasbourg: 2004, page 6. The 
particular link between (irregular) migration and poor birth registration rates will be investigated further 
in the relevant upcoming sections. 
15 Youth Advocate Program International, Stateless Children – Children who are without citizenship, 
Booklet No. 7 in a series on International Youth Issues, 2002, page 8. 
16 UNICEF, Birth Registration: Right from the Start, Florence: March 2002, page 12; UNICEF, The 
State of the World's Children. Excluded and Invisible, New York: 2006, page 37. 
17 As to the question of costs - even in countries where the registration of a birth and issuance of a birth 
certificate is free of charge there are many hidden costs such as those incurred in travelling to the 
registry office as well as in missing work in order to make the journey. It is also possible that 
registration is officially offered free of charge but corruption nevertheless leads to divergent practices. 
In areas with a high infant mortality rate, parents are even less likely to drum up the costs for birth 
registration until the child has reached a surviving age, by which time the registration process has often 
become more complicated, costly or even impossible. Plan International, Universal Birth Registration - 
A Universal Responsibility, Woking: 2005, pages 27 – 30.  
18 UNICEF, Birth Registration: Right from the Start, Florence: March 2002, page 14; Plan 
International, Universal Birth Registration - A Universal Responsibility, Woking: 2005, pages 30-31. 
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obstacles that – perhaps quite unintentionally - hinder the registration of births. 
There may, for example, be unrealistic deadlines or documentary requirements and 
the opportunities for so-called “late registration” (after any initial deadline) tend to 
be subject to additional costs and conditions. It is also possible that barriers are 
deliberately constructed in the law or administrative procedure to block access to 
birth registration for particular groups of children.19  
There are thus a great many aspects to the problem of non-registration 
which collectively account for the aforementioned 50 million newborns every year 
whose arrival into the world is not officially recorded.20 While the number of 
stateless cases produced by this predicament cannot be equated to the number of 
unregistered births, the lack of birth registration significantly increases the risk of 
the child remaining unclaimed by any state. In order to establish the child’s 
nationality, other forms of evidence must be relied upon such as a declaration from 
the medical facility where the child was born (unavailable if the child was born at 
home), the testimony of witnesses or DNA testing. Such methods for proving the 
bond that a child has with a state are often prohibitively expensive and are certainly 
much less reliable than a birth certificate which is already proof that the child’s 
existence, place of birth and parentage are recognised by the state. Furthermore, the 
process of birth registration provides a crucial point of contact between the newborn 
and the state. With appropriate procedures in place, such as for the exchange of 
information from one country to another on domestic citizenship laws or for the 
verification of information such as the nationality or birthplace of the child’s 
parents, the state can take advantage of this moment to ensure that the child will 
acquire a nationality. Using the details provided in the birth registration process, the 
government authorities can identify cases of disputed nationality or statelessness of 
newborns and take the necessary measures to address the situation immediately.21 
Birth registration can thereby be critical to implementing such policies as the 
granting of nationality jus soli to children born on state territory or indeed jus 
sanguinis to a child born abroad who would “otherwise be stateless”.22  
Where government policy is to purposely deny certain persons access to 
birth registration, we see just how much overlap there can be between the issue of 
non-registration and the problem of statelessness. Indeed, in the Dominican 
Republic - where nationality is transmitted jus soli and the process of birth 
registration is the means of establishing a child’s Dominican citizenship – the 
exclusion of particular children from birth registration became the mechanism for 
ensuring that those same children are excluded from Dominican nationality.23 This 
type of careful control of access to birth registration in order to block access to 
                                                           
19 UNICEF, Birth Registration: Right from the Start, Florence: March 2002, pages 12 – 14; Plan 
International, Universal Birth Registration - A Universal Responsibility, Woking: 2005, pages 30 – 31. 
20 See note 11. 
21 UNHCR and IPU, Nationality and statelessness. A handbook for parliamentarians, 2005, page 31. 
22 See chapter IV, sections 1 and 2. 
23 Inter-American Court on Human Rights, Case of Yean and Bosico v. Dominican Republic, Series C, 
Case 130, 8 September 2005, para. 147 of the case. See also Laura van Waas, Is Permanent Illegality 
Inevitable? The Challenges to Ensuring Birth Registration and the Right to a Nationality for the 





citizenship for specific population groups is not an isolated incident.24 The 
deliberate manipulation of birth registration systems in this manner is thus a further 
illustration of the link between registration and access to nationality. Moreover, 
many of the circumstances in which the risk of statelessness is heightened will also 
produce an increased risk of under-registration of births. I have already mentioned 
the particular vulnerability of migrants’ children to non-registration and later in this 
chapter we will see how this and other problems contribute to the exposure of 
particular groups of displaced persons to statelessness. Another example of how 
these issues can merge is the fact that deficiencies with birth registration systems 
are more likely to arise during a period of state succession, since this is often 
characterised by turmoil, mass population displacement and even violent conflict. 
The government authorities of the states involved (predecessor and successor) may 
for a time be unable to perform the duties of birth registration due to the immediate 
situation on the ground. Or the civil registries may be destroyed in armed conflict, 
as was the case in Bosnia and Croatia.25 At a time when nationality policies are 
being redefined and the persons affected will likely need to prove their entitlement 
to acquire or retain the citizenship of one of the states concerned, a deficient birth 
registration system will undoubtedly impede the establishment of such evidence and 
substantially increase the likelihood of statelessness arising.  
The foregoing considerations illustrate why, in the context of the 
prevention of statelessness, it has become so important to consider how 
international law deals with the issue of birth registration.  But before looking at the 
relevant international norms, a final comment is appropriate here. Having seen that 
the registration of births is vital for the protection against statelessness, it should be 
mentioned that the proper registration of marriages may be equally so.26 If a 
marriage goes unrecorded, there is no proof that any child resulting from the union 
is indeed legitimate and problems may arise for the acquisition of nationality by the 
child as outlined in chapter IV.27 Moreover, the non-registration of a marriage may 
contribute to the non-registration of subsequent births as the mother becomes less 
likely to be willing or able to take the necessary steps – for example, because she is 
reluctant to approach the authorities since the child will be considered illegitimate 
or because the evidentiary requirements for unmarried mothers may be harder to 
meet or may require the cooperation of the child’s (illegitimate) father. In this way, 
the improper documentation of events such as births and marriages is seen as 
                                                           
24 UNICEF, Birth Registration: Right from the Start, Florence: March 2002, page 13; Plan 
International, Universal Birth Registration - A Universal Responsibility, Woking: 2005, page 30. 
25 UNHCR, "Statelessness and Citizenship" in The State of the World's Refugees - A Humanitarian 
Agenda, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 1997, page 239. The disruption caused by war to civil 
registration systems may outlast the end of the actual conflict by many years as was shown in the case 
of Cambodia and others. UNICEF, Birth Registration: Right from the Start, Florence: March 2002, 
page 16. 
26 UNHCR Executive Committee, General Conclusion on International Protection, No. 90, 52nd 
session, Geneva, 2001, paragraph (r); UNHCR Executive Committee, General Conclusion on 
International Protection, No. 95, 54th Session, Geneva, 2003, para. (x); Carol Batchelor The 1954 
Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons: Implementation within the European Union 
Member States and Recommendations for Harmonisation 2004, page 10; UNHCR, UNHCR Handbook 
for the Protection of Women and Girls, January 2008, pages 123-124. 
27 See in particular chapter IV, section 1. 
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“interconnected and self-perpetuating”28 as is the increased risk of statelessness that 
results. Moreover, the registration of marriage can be key to the protection of 
stateless persons and the reduction of statelessness since “for stateless persons, a 
marriage certificate […] may be used at a later date to prove residence or for the 
purpose of naturalisation”.29 In response to the UNHCR Questionnaire on 
statelessness, 10.8% of participating states admitted that not all marriages were 
recorded.30 Sadly though, in contrast to the growing availability of statistical 
information concerning birth registration, no information exists on the number of 
marriages that actually go unrecorded every year worldwide. This means that the 
scale of the problem is as yet uncharted. Nevertheless, in the context of the fight 
against under-age marriages, there has been some attention for the problem of non-
registration of marriages31. In the following section we will see whether this has 
been translated into obligations under international human rights law.  
 
1.2 International human rights law 
 
Human rights law recognises the right of every child to be registered at birth. It is 
interesting to note, however, that its promulgation was initially based on an entirely 
different rationale than the prevention of statelessness. The International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights does house the right to birth registration and the right 
to nationality as two consecutive paragraphs of the same article,32 but this should 
not be taken as evidence that the two rights were necessarily linked in that way. 
Instead, it can be explained from the perspective that the entire provision aims to 
ensure special protective measures for a child in view of his vulnerable position as a 
minor.33 The overall role of birth registration has since been elaborated upon by the 
Human Rights Committee in its General Comment 17 on child rights: 
 
The main purpose of the obligation to register children after birth is to 
reduce the danger of abduction, sale of or traffic in children, or of other 
types of treatment that are incompatible with the enjoyment of rights 
provided for in the covenant.34 
 
                                                           
28 Carol Batchelor, "The International Legal Framework Concerning Statelessness and Access for 
Stateless Persons", European Union Seminar on the Content and Scope of International Protection: 
Panel 1 - Legal basis of international protection, Madrid: 2002, page 5. 
29 UNHCR, UNHCR Handbook for the Protection of Women and Girls, January 2008, page 123. 
30 UNHCR, Final report concerning the Questionnaire on statelessness pursuant to the Agenda for 
Protection, Geneva: March 2004, page 21. 
31 Consider, for example, the country report on Bangladesh prepared by the UN Development 
Programme (UNDP) in 2000, where a section is devoted to the registration of marriages with particular 
focus on the problem of underage marriage. UNDP Regional Bureau for Asia and the Pacific, Common 
Country Assessment on Bangladesh, 2000, section 6.4.2. 
32 Article 24 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
33 As suggested by the first paragraph of the same article: “Every child shall have […] the right to such 
measures of protection as are required by his status as a minor, on the part of his family, society and the 
State”. 
34 Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment No. 17: Rights of the Child (Art. 24), Geneva: 7 





While the right to acquire a nationality would certainly fall under “the enjoyment of 
rights provided for in the covenant” since it is the very next right to be included, it 
is clear that this is not the main inspiration behind the imposition of the duty of 
registration upon states. Nevertheless, in recent years, the Committee has illustrated 
its awareness of the importance of birth registration in the context of the prevention 
of statelessness in the Concluding Observations to several of the periodic reports of 
state parties to the ICCPR.35 The Committee has even suggested that the moment of 
registration should be utilised to ensure that the child acquires a nationality.36  
 The Convention on the Rights of the Child adopts a virtually identical 
approach to the ICCPR, including a child’s right to be registered at birth in the same 
article as the right to acquire a nationality. Almost in one breath in fact, it states: 
“the child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have […] the right to 
acquire a nationality”.37 The duty of state parties to register all births within their 
jurisdiction – children born on state territory as well as children born abroad to 
nationals of the state38 - is a subject to which the Committee on the Rights of the 
Child has devoted substantial attention in the consideration of dozens of reports by 
state parties over the years. In most of these, birth registration has been addressed as 
an independent issue.39 However, in a number of concluding observations, the link 
with the right to acquire a nationality has also been made apparent by the 
Committee. In some cases, the Committee has even explicitly identified the role 
that non-registration has played in the creation of statelessness in the state party. 
For example, in 2004 the Committee expressed its concern that in Japan  
 
                                                           
35 For example with regards to in Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations: Ecuador, 
A/53/40 vol. I, Geneva: 1998, paragraph 291; Thailand, A/60/40 vol. I, Geneva: 2005, paragraph 95 
(22).  
36 In the Concluding Observation on Slovenia, the Committee states that “while recognising that 
registration is distinct from conferral of nationality, [it] is also concerned that some children are 
registered at birth without a nationality”; in Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations: 
Slovenia, A/60/40 vol. I, Geneva: 2005, paragraph 93 (15). Regrettably, the Committee has not 
delineated the precise action that it envisages states to take in these circumstances. 
37 Article 7, Convention on the Rights of the Child.  
38 See Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations: Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
CRC/C/15/Add.259, Geneva: 2005, paragraph 33. 
39 A small selection of such reports through the years is: Committee on the Rights of the Child, 
Concluding Observations: Ethiopia, CRC/C/15/Add.67, Geneva: 1997, paragraph 29; Fiji, 
CRC/C/15/Add.89, Geneva: 1998, paragraphs 15 and 35; Belize, CRC/C/15/Add.99, Geneva: 1999, 
paragraph 18; Honduras, CRC/C/15/Add.105, Geneva: 1999, paragraph 21; Sierra Leone, 
CRC/C/15/Add.116, Geneva: 2000, paragraphs 42-43; Kyrgyzstan, CRC/C/15/Add.127, Geneva: 2000, 
paragraphs 29-30; Dominican Republic, CRC/C/15/Add.150, Geneva: 2001, paragraphs 26-27; Turkey, 
CRC/C/15/Add.152, Geneva: 2001, paragraphs 35-36; Bhutan, CRC/C/15/Add.157, Geneva: 2001, 
paragraphs 34-35; Sudan, CRC/C/15/Add.190, Geneva: 2002, paragraphs 33-34; Jamaica, 
CRC/C15/Add.120, Geneva: 2003, paragraphs 30-31; Pakistan, CRC/C/15/Add.217, Geneva: 2003, 
paragraphs 38-39; Brazil, CRC/C/15/Add.241, Geneva: 2004, paragraphs 38-39; Botswana, 
CRC/C/15/Add.242, Geneva: 2004, paragraphs 34-35; Togo, CRC/C/15/Add.255, Geneva: 2005, 
paragraph 37; Yemen, CRC/C/15/Add.266, Geneva: 2005, paragraphs 39-40. 
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undocumented migrants are unable to register the birth of their children, and 
that this has also resulted in cases of statelessness.40  
 
In another report the Committee recalled that  
 
official birth registration is a fundamental first step towards securing the rights 
of a child to a name and nationality.41  
 
In yet others, the Committee has chosen to encourage ratification of the 1954 and 
1961 Statelessness Conventions in the same paragraphs in which the issue of birth 
registration is dealt with – implicitly reaffirming the close connection between these 
matters.42 
 The Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child on 
the subject of birth registration confirm that lack of access to birth registration tends 
to disproportionately affect particular vulnerable groups. Most commonly identified 
in this context are children born to indigenous persons, refugees or asylum seekers, 
(undocumented or illegal) migrant workers and – in Europe – Roma. The 
Committee has made clear that the right to be registered immediately after birth is a 
right that all children enjoy, “including asylum-seeking, refugee or migrant children 
– irrespective of their nationality, immigration status or statelessness”.43 
Furthermore, while the child will not necessarily have a claim to the nationality of 
the country that is obliged to provide them with birth certification, coupled to the 
birth registration process there must be a system in place that is designed to “fulfil 
his or her right to acquire […] a nationality”.44  Within the UN human rights system 
then, there is full recognition of the right of every child to be registered at birth and 
the importance of this right in the prevention of statelessness.  
Moving to regional instruments, we see that both the African Charter on the 
Rights and Welfare of the Child and the Covenant on the Rights of the Child in 
Islam expound a right to birth registration, where it is housed alongside the right of 
a child to a name and a nationality.45 In contrast, the European and American 
human rights conventions remain silent on this issue. This has not, however, 
stopped both the European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of 
                                                           
40 Committe on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations: Japan, CRC/C/15/Add.231, Geneva: 
2004, paragraph 31. Other examples of this phenomenon are the reports on the Islamic Republic of 
Iran, CRC/C/15/Add.254, Geneva: 2005, paragraphs 35-36 and Philippines, CRC/C/15/Add.258, 
Geneva: 2005, paragraph 36. 
41 Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations: The Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia RC CRC/C/15/Add.118, Geneva: 2000, paragraph 21. 
42 For example in Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations: Djibouti, 
CRC/C/15Add.131, Geneva: 2000, paragraph 32; Niger, CRC/C/15/Add.179, Geneva: 2002, paragraph 
61; Canada, CRC/C/15/Add.215, Geneva: 2003, paragraph 27; Kazakhstan, CRC/C/15/Add.213, 
Geneva: 2003, paragraphs 32-33. 
43 Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 6: Treatment of unaccompanied and 
separated children outside their country of origin, 2005, at paragraph 12. 
44 UN General Assembly Resolution, “A world fit for children”, Twenty-Seventh Special Session of the 
GA, 11 October 2002, at paragraph 44 (1). 
45 Article 6, paragraph 2 of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child; Article 7, 





Human Rights from dealing with the question of access to birth registration under 
the auspices of related provisions from the respective conventions. The European 
Court has read the right to birth registration into article 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights which deals with the right to respect for family life.46 
Meanwhile, the Inter-American Court addressed the matter of birth registration in 
depth in the case of Yean and Bosico v. Dominican Republic that was discussed in 
chapter V. The court interpreted article 18 of the American Convention on Human 
Rights concerning the right to a name as follows:  
 
Under article 18 of the Convention, States are obliged not only to protect 
the right to a name, but also to provide the necessary measures to facilitate 
the registration of an individual, immediately after birth.47  
 
Indeed, both the European and Inter-American human rights courts clearly concur 
with the Committee on the Rights of the Child that the right to birth registration is 
unconditional and no (groups of) children should be excluded.48  
In sum then, the universal and regional human rights systems together 
provide abundant evidence of a global consensus on the fundamental right of every 
child to be registered at birth. In the concluding observations to country reports of 
such bodies as the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child it is even possible to 
trace a series of suggestions as to how universal birth registration coverage is to be 
achieved.49 State parties have, for example, been reminded that registration should 
be made compulsory for all births on state territory.50 Where states have introduced 
                                                           
46 European Court of Human Rights, Case of Marckx vs. Belgium, No. 6833/74, 13 June 1979; See also 
the case before the European Commission on Human Rights, Case of Kalderas Gipsies v. the Federal 
Republic of Germany and the Netherlands, No. 7823/77-7824/77, 6 July 1977; As cited in Geraldine 
van Bueren, The International Law on the Rights of the Child, Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht: 1995, page 
118..  
47 Inter-American Court on Human Rights, Case of Yean and Bosico v. Dominican Republic, Series C, 
Case 130, 8 September 2005, para. 183. 
48 In particular, the European Court of Human Rights found that conditions impeding the registration of 
illegitimate children were intolerable. European Court of Human Rights, Case of Marckx vs. Belgium, 
No. 6833/74, 13 June 1979 as cited in Geraldine van Bueren, The International Law on the Rights of 
the Child, Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht: 1995, page 118. The Inter-American Court determined that the 
parents migratory status is irrelevant for access to birth registration. Inter-American Court on Human 
Rights, Case of Yean and Bosico v. Dominican Republic, Series C, Case 130, 8 September 2005. 
49 Similar references can be found in some instances in the concluding observations of other UN treaty 
bodies such as the Committee on the Elimination or Discrimination Against Women. However, the 
main body of work on this issue can be found in the reports of the Committee on the Rights of the 
Child. This Committee indeed requests that certain information relating to birth registration practices be 
included in country reports in order to facilitate the monitoring of this treaty obligation. Information 
should be provided on: “Steps taken to prevent the non-registration of children immediately after birth, 
including in view of possible social or cultural obstacles […] measures taken to sensitize and mobilize 
public opinion on the need for birth registration of children, and to provide adequate training to registry 
personnel [and] information on the elements of the child’s identity included in the birth registration and 
the measures adopted to prevent any kind of stigmatization or discrimination of the child”. Committee 
on the Rights of the Child, General guidelines for periodic reports, CRC/C/58, Geneva: 20 November 
1996, paras. 49-51. 
50 See for example Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding observations: Malawi, 
CRC/C/114, Geneva: 2002, paras. 410-411. 
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deadlines for registration as an incentive to ensure that the birth is recorded 
“immediately”51, the Committee has nevertheless called for leniency – more 
particularly for the extending of initial time periods for registration, for every effort 
to be made to ensure late birth registration and for the abolition of sanctions such as 
fines for late registration as these have a severely deterrent effect.52 Concerning the 
more general question of imposing a fee for birth registration, the concluding 
observations provide a somewhat mixed message: calling for free issuance of a 
birth certificate as part of the registration process,53 asking that costs for birth 
registration be kept low54 or determining that birth registration should, in fact, 
simply be free of charge.55 The Committee has also called for improved access to 
registration procedures through the decentralisation of birth registration and where 
necessary the deployment of mobile registration units to the most isolated areas of 
the country.56 Meanwhile, to promote the use of procedures that have been put in 
place, the Committee has recommended awareness raising activities on the 
importance of birth registration, aimed not only at parents, but also at “government 
officers, midwives, community and religious leaders”.57 Thus the Committee on the 
Rights of the Child has taken the lead in delineating the form that birth registration 
procedures should take in order to address many of the practical obstacles 
mentioned in the introduction above and to ensure that the right to birth registration 
is enjoyed by all children, everywhere. 
Finally in this section, we must consider the registration of marriages. It 
can be established from the outset that international human rights instruments and 
bodies are less forthcoming about this issue than on the matter of birth registration. 
However, the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women 
                                                           
51 As prescribed by, among others, article 7 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
52 On the extension of time limits and the overall promotion of late registration, see Committee on the 
Rights of the Child, Concluding observations: Mozambique, CRC/C/114, Geneva: 2002, para. 284; 
Jamaica, CRC/C/132 Geneva: 2003, para. 425. On the abolition of fines or fees for late birth 
registration see Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding observations: Guinea-Bissau, 
CRC/C/118, Geneva: 2002, paras. 58-59; Zambia, CRC/C/132, Geneva: 2003, para. 180.  
53 Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding observations: Gambia, CRC/C/111, Geneva: 
2001, para. 429. 
54 “The Committee […] recommends that the State party makes the birth registration procedure less 
costly and more accessible”. Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding observations: Kenya, 
CRC/C/111, Geneva: 2001, para. 113; “The Committee recommends that the State party […] make the 
birth registration procedure accessible free or at a low cost”. Committee on the Rights of the Child, 
Concluding observations: Malawi, CRC/C/114, Geneva: 2002, para. 411.  
55 Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding observations: Central African Republic, 
CRC/C/100, Geneva: 2000, para. 434; Kyrgyzstan, CRC/C/97, Geneva: 2000, paras. 296-297; Haiti, 
CRC/C/124, Geneva: 2003, para. 425; Georgia, CRC/C/133, Geneva: 2003, para. 541. 
56 On the decentralisation of birth registration, see for example, Committee on the Rights of the Child, 
Concluding observations: Greece, CRC/C/114, Geneva: 2002, para. 132; Haiti, CRC/C/124, Geneva: 
2003, para. 425; Zambia, CRC/C/132, Geneva: 2003, para. 180. On the use of mobile registration units, 
see for example Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding observations: Cameroon, 
CRC/C/111, Geneva: 2001, para. 358; Guinea-Bissau, CRC/C/118, Geneva: 2002, para. 59; Eritrea, 
CRC/C/132, Geneva: 2003, para. 52; Jamaica, CRC/C/132, Geneva: 2003, para. 424. 
57 Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding observations: Kenya, CRC/C/111, Geneva: 2001, 






does address the question of registration in its article 16, which deals mainly with 
discrimination against women in the context of marriage. The second paragraph of 
this provision prescribes the taking of “all necessary action, including legislation 
[…] to make the registration of marriages in an official registry compulsory”.58 In 
1994, the UN treaty body mandated to monitor the implementation of this 
convention issued a General Recommendation on “Equality in marriage and family 
relations”. This included the following statement: 
 
States parties should also require the registration of all marriages whether 
contracted civilly or according to custom or religious law. The State can 
thereby ensure compliance with the Convention and establish equality 
between partners, a minimum age for marriage, prohibition of bigamy and 
polygamy and the protection of the rights of children.59 
 
The registration of marriages is thereby deemed to serve a number of purposes, 
including the protection of the rights of children – this being a broad reference that 
may arguably include protection against statelessness. Regrettably, the Committee 
on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women has not been very active in 
pursuing the question of the registration of marriages in its consideration of state 
party reports.60 Meanwhile, the only other documents to explicitly prescribe the 
registration of all marriages by a competent authority are the Convention on consent 
to marriage, minimum age for marriage and registration of marriages61 and the 
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of 
Women in Africa.62 The former is a little-known instrument dating from 1962 
which has attracted just 49 state parties to date, while the latter is a very young 
document that has so far been ratified by less than half of the African states.63 The 
impact of these two instruments is therefore limited. So although there is some 
understanding of the importance of the registration of marriages, the issue has yet to 
attract a substantial response from the international community comparable with the 
way in which birth registration is being addressed.  
 
 
                                                           
58 The rest of the paragraph addresses the problem of under-age marriage. Article 16, paragraph 2 of the 
1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. 
59 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General Recommendation 21: 
Equality in marriage and family relations, A/49/38, New York: 1994, para. 39. 
60 Just two references to the registration of marriages can be found. Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women, Concluding Observations: Namibia, A/52/38/Rev.1 Part II, New 
York: 1997, paras. 110 and 125; India, A/55/38 part I, New York: 2000, para. 62. While this may also 
be construed as a sign that the failure to register marriages is not a widespread problem, there is no 
evidence to support such a conclusion. It is equally likely that the problem has not yet been thoroughly 
mapped. 
61 The duty to register all marriages is included in its article 3. 
62 The registration of marriages is prescribed in article 6, section d), Protocol to the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, 2003. 
63 The Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in 
Africa has attracted 20 state parties, while the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights itself has 
been ratified by all 53 African states. 
 
 







The second “new” cause of statelessness that has come to the fore is migration. 
Throughout history, migration has been a natural human impulse.64 Homes are 
uprooted as people move on in search of land, food or hope - or to escape war, 
poverty or despair. The world today paints no different picture. In fact, international 
migrants now make up roughly 3% of the global population - 191 million people 
reside outside the country in which they were born.65 Moreover, “migration has 
never been as pervasive, or as socio-economically and politically significant, as it is 
today”.66 No region has been left untouched.67 These simple facts have heralded the 
emergence of new questions about the attribution of nationality and the 
coordination of citizenship policies:68   
 
The growing international mobility of people questions the basis for 
belonging to the nation-state. […] The idea of the citizen who spent most 
of his or her life in one country and shared a common national identity is 
losing ground.69  
 
The result is that many of the concerns raised in previous chapters are growing ever 
more prevalent. To begin with, there will be an increasing incidence of conflict of 
laws situations – of marriages between nationals of different states; of children born 
in a state that their parents do not hold citizenship of; and of an incongruity between 
the laws of the country of origin on loss of nationality and the naturalisation law of 
the host country. All of these situations were identified as potential “technical” 
sources of statelessness in chapter IV. Furthermore, where migration has preceded 
or accompanied the transfer of territory, we saw that the displaced population was 
at significantly greater risk of exposure to statelessness.70 With present-day 
migration also traversing ever wider divides, not just in a geographical sense, but 
                                                           
64 Note that throughout this section the terms “migration” and “migrant” are used in a general sense to 
refer to any form of displacement – or person displaced – across international borders. 
65 The number of migrants is also growing, and it is growing at a more rapid pace: the growth rate was 
1.4% from 1990-1995 but was up to 1.9% from 2000-2004. UN, International migration and 
development, Report of the Secretary General, UN Doc. A/60/971, 18 May 2006, pages 12 and 28. See 
also the section Facts and Figures: Global estimates and trends on the website of the International 
Organisation for Migration, accessible via http://www.iom.int.  
66 Stephen Castles; Mark Miller, The Age of Migration, The Guildford Press, London: 2003, page 278. 
67 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, International Migration 2006 Wall 
Chart, Population Division, New York, March 2006; See also Stephen Castles; Alastair Davidson, 
Citizenship and Migration. Globalisation and the Politics of Belonging, Macmillan Press, London: 
2000, page 9. 
68 It has also encouraged renewed thinking on the content of nationality as a legal status upon which 
certain rights and duties rest – evidenced, for example, by the emergence of various forms of “quasi-
citizenship” and “denizen” status, as we well see in Part 3. 
69 Stephen Castles; Alastair Davidson, Citizenship and Migration. Globalisation and the Politics of 
Belonging, Macmillan Press, London: 2000, pages vii - viii (preface). 





also religiously, linguistically, culturally and economically,71 it brings new concerns 
to the citizenship debate with policy makers forced to consider the effect that the 
newcomers have in altering the social fabric of their host country and challenging 
the (perceived) national identity.72 “Racism towards certain groups is to be found in 
virtually all immigration countries”73 and with it come new opportunities for 
discrimination and denial of citizenship which may translate into statelessness.74 In 
addition, cultural or linguistic barriers may prevent migrants from accessing and 
utilising mechanisms that can play a vital role in preventing statelessness, such as 
birth registration procedures or appeals procedures in the event of a nationality 
dispute.75  
Fundamentally then, simply by causing a greater intermingling of people 
across the boundaries that formally separate nation-states, modern migration 
patterns precipitate and exacerbate many of the causes of statelessness that have 
already been identified and dealt with in preceding pages and chapters. To avoid 
repetition, the following paragraphs will focus rather on specific problems and 
corresponding international norms relating to three – variously overlapping76 – 
categories of migrant or displaced person who are acutely vulnerable to 
statelessness: irregular migrants, victims of trafficking persons and refugees. What 
these groups have in common is that they defy regulation and thereby confront 
states with newcomers whose presence is unpredicted, uninvited and – more often 
than not – unwanted. In the current age of “migration management” this type of 
displacement raises serious policy questions in dealing with (access to) legal status 
                                                           
71 Stephen Castles; Alastair Davidson, Citizenship and Migration. Globalisation and the Politics of 
Belonging, Macmillan Press, London: 2000, page 9; Stephen Castles; Mark Miller, The Age of 
Migration, The Guildford Press, London: 2003, pages 278 and 281. For example, according to UN 
statistics, one third of all migrants have moved from a developing country to a developed country – 
implying at least that a large economic and cultural divide has been crossed. UN Report, International 
migration and development, Report of the Secretary General, UN Doc. A/60/971, 18 May 2006, page 
12. 
72 Douglas Klusmeyer; Alexander Aleinikoff, From Migrants to Citizens: Membership in a Changing 
World, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC: 2000, page 1; Aristide Zolberg, 
"Modes of Incorporation: Toward a Comparative Framework" in Bader (ed) Citizenship and Exclusion, 
Macmillan Press, London: 1997, page 141. 
73 Stephen Castles; Mark Miller, The Age of Migration, The Guildford Press, London: 2003, page 35. 
74 The UN warns of “rising cultural and religious tensions” in its report, International migration and 
development, Report of the Secretary General, UN Doc. A/60/971, 18 May 2006, page 7. This may 
significantly impact citizenship policy. See chapter V for the discussion of denial of citizenship and 
arbitrary deprivation of nationality. If denial of citizenship subsists and the newly formed immigrant 
minority remains marginalised, then there is a danger that the rising tensions will eventually be 
manifested in violence, destabilisation, conflict and even (a call for) the break-up of the state. In this 
extreme example, migration will have contributed to state succession that, in turn, introduces new risks 
of statelessness (see chapter VI). For a discussion of the potential of (states’ reactions to) migration 
leading to conflict, see Stephen Castles; Alastair Davidson, Citizenship and Migration. Globalisation 
and the Politics of Belonging, Macmillan Press, London: 2000, chapter 3; Stephen Castles; Mark 
Miller, The Age of Migration, The Guildford Press, London: 2003, pages 287-288. 
75 See section 1 above and chapter V, section 2. 
76 Note that because the determination of a person’s status as an irregular migrant, a victim of 
trafficking or a refugee is based on different criteria, these categories may overlap. An individual may 
be a victim of trafficking, hold an irregular immigration status and qualify under the definition of a 
refugee – all at once. The categories are therefore not mutually exclusive.  
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and nationality. In the following sections we will consider how each of these groups 
can become susceptible to statelessness and to what extent international law has 
intervened to stave off such a troublesome result. Before doing so, it is helpful to 
note that what distinguishes the groups from one another is their treatment under 
international law: the fact of being a victim of trafficking or a refugee has 
consequences for the international protection offered. In fact, the position of 
irregular migrants forms the baseline or minimum standard of treatment to be 
guaranteed to all persons, in an irregular status or otherwise, so this will be looked 
at first. Thereafter, we will also consider the additional rights ascribed to victims of 
trafficking and refugees to the extent that these are relevant in the fight against 
statelessness.  
 
2.1 Irregular migration 
 
Ever since the emergence of nation-states, and most notably over the course of the 
last hundred years or so, the question of how to regulate the movement of people 
across borders has been a constant preoccupation for the powers that be. States 
gradually assumed the authority to control migration - a process that was facilitated 
by institutionalising the use of identity papers and passports.77 Today, every effort 
is made to regulate or manage migration through detailed immigration policies and 
border control. States can now hold what is, in effect, a selection process for 
prospective immigrants by pre-determining the conditions that must be met for 
eligibility to enter the country. This can be seen as a sort of initial qualifying round 
for access to citizenship: those who are approved and admitted are granted the 
opportunity to build up a bond with the host state that may, one day, lead to a jus 
domicilli claim to nationality (for instance through naturalisation) or indeed a jus 
soli entitlement to citizenship for future offspring.78 It is not unsurprising then that, 
over the last half-century at least, efforts to carefully manage migration have been 
joined by measures that focus on the newcomer as a potential citizen and are 
devised to “integrate immigrants [and] regulate community relations”79 in order to 
smoothen the transition from outsider to member of the polity.80 It is certainly true 
that recent amendments to nationality acts in many countries admit that 
international migration must now be carefully factored into citizenship policy.81 For 
example, “most jus sanguinis countries have realised that the exclusion [of 
                                                           
77 John Torpey, The Invention of the Passport. Surveillance, Citizenship and the State, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge: 2000, page 9. 
78 It has been argued that “the acquisition of nationality by immigrants is […] increasingly understood 
as a point on a continuum of legal status ranging from “aliens” to “denizens” and then to “full citizens”. 
Douglas Klusmeyer; Alexander Aleinikoff, From Migrants to Citizens: Membership in a Changing 
World, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC: 2000, page 436. 
79 Stephen Castles; Alastair Davidson, Citizenship and Migration. Globalisation and the Politics of 
Belonging, Macmillan Press, London: 2000, page 60.  
80 Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer have persuasively argued that the basic premise behind nationality policy 
in the age of migration should be that “it is desirable that immigrants and their descendents become 
citizens and have the right to become citizens”. Alexander Aleinikoff; Douglas Klusmeyer, Citizenship 
Policies for an Age of Migration, Carnegie Empowerment for International Peace, Washington D.C.: 
2002. 





immigrants and their children] from citizenship is problematic, leading to social 
marginalisation, political exclusion, conflict and racism” and have adapted their 
policy accordingly.82 However, any relaxation of citizenship policy tends to benefit 
only those immigrants (and their children) who have correctly and successfully 
navigated the systems of migration management.  
Meanwhile the notion that migration can be meticulously managed has proven 
to be flawed, as evidenced by the enduring process of irregular migration. Every 
year, thousands upon thousands of people defy existing systems of migration 
management and move to or settle in a country without authorisation under its 
immigration laws. This includes 
 
immigrants who entered the host country clandestinely, asylum-seekers 
who have been denied refugee status, immigrants who find themselves in a 
situation of de facto illegality, and those whose residence permits have 
expired.83 
 
Whatever the circumstances, such persons have become irregular migrants: 
“person[s] whose presence in the territory of a state violates the domestic 
immigration laws”.84 They are also known as undocumented migrants or “illegal 
immigrants”85 and they form a new, extremely vulnerable group in international 
relations. The International Organisation for Migration estimates there to be 30-40 
million irregular migrants worldwide (or 15-20% of the globe’s total migrant 
stock)86 and numbers are on the rise.87 
                                                           
82 Stephen Castles; Alastair Davidson, Citizenship and Migration. Globalisation and the Politics of 
Belonging, Macmillan Press, London: 2000, page 94. The prevalence of the “double jus soli” rule is 
increasing, whereby the third generation immigrant is automatically awarded citizenship at birth: 
double jus soli confers nationality at birth on the basis of birth on state soil to a child, (one of) whose 
parent(s) was also born on state territory. There is also “a clear trend towards increasing naturalisation 
of foreign residents”. Stephen Castles; Mark Miller, The Age of Migration, The Guildford Press, 
London: 2003, page 243. 
83 Jorge Bustamante, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants, 
E/CN.4/2006/73, 30 December 2005, page 11. It is, for instance, reported that “up to 90% of asylum 
applications are rejected – yet many asylum seekers cannot be deported”, so they remain, indefinitely 
and irregularly, in the receiving state. Stephen Castles; Mark Miller, The Age of Migration, The 
Guildford Press, London: 2003, page 104.  
84 Adapted from Beth Lyon, New International Human Rights Standards on Unauthorised Immigrant 
Workers Rights: Seizing an Opportunity to Pull Governments Out of the Shadows, in A. Bayefsky 
(Ed.), “Human Rights and Refugees, Internally Displaced Persons and Migrant Workers”, Koninklijke 
Brill, Leiden 2006, page 553. 
85 The latter term is often that favoured by the media and by politicians at national level while the more 
neutrally toned expressions irregular migrant and undocumented migrant are the approved terms of 
international law. See for example the International Convention on the Rights of All Migrant Workers 
and Members of Their Families, 18 December 1990.  
86 Facts and Figures: Global estimates and trends on the website of the International Organisation for 
Migration, www.iom.int. The United States alone is considered to host somewhere in the region of 11 
million irregular immigrants and there are also an estimated 3 million US-born children whose parents 
are irregular immigrants in the country. Stephen Camarota, Immigrants at mid-decade. A snapshot of 
America’s foreign-born population in 2005, Centre for Immigration Studies, December 2005. It should 
be noted, however, that irregular migration by nature “eludes registration and statistical coverage” thus 
such estimates are an imprecise result of a combination of empirical evidence, assumptions and guess-
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The composition and characteristics of the irregular migrant population vary 
from one host country to the next, influenced by the content of domestic 
immigration laws. This means that it is impossible to generalise about the profile of 
irregular migrants: the underlying motives for migration, the method of entry into 
the receiving state, the deportability, living conditions and other details differ from 
one person to another and between states.88 Nevertheless, irregular migrants share 
two further characteristics, besides their unlawful status, that are relevant here. 
Firstly, many have become a (semi-)permanent feature of their receiving state 
because host states are reluctant or unable to enforce their immigration laws too 
strictly: there may be humanitarian objections to sending irregular migrants home 
(the prohibition of non-refoulement)89 or the state may be conceding to the national 
economy’s demand for 3I labour (inexpensive, imported and irregular).90 And 
secondly, despite their factual, long-term presence on the territory of the host state, 
a great many of these migrants will never have their status regularised.91 These 
basic observations are key to understanding the link between irregular migration 
and statelessness. 
  
2.1.1 Connecting statelessness to irregular migration 
 
Holding an irregular immigration status can have a detrimental impact on an 
individual’s enjoyment of many rights, including their right to a nationality. We 
have already seen how migrants may lose their citizenship, for example through 
                                                                                                                                               
work. Citation from a report comparing approaches to compiling statistics on irregular migration in 
various states across Europe and beyond; Charles Pinkerton, Gail McLaughlan and John Salt, Sizing the 
illegally resident population in the UK, United Kingdom Home Office Online Report 58/04, Migration 
Research Unit, University College London, page 1. Elsewhere described as irregular migration’s 
“opaqueness to measurement and scrutiny”. Stephen Castles; Mark Miller, The Age of Migration, The 
Guildford Press, London: 2003, page 95. 
87 Stephen Castles; Mark Miller, The Age of Migration, The Guildford Press, London: 2003, pages 94 
and 283 
88 Thailand makes an interesting case in point as it is home to at least 17 different categories of persons 
whose presence in the state is officially illegal. This includes “persons fleeing fighting” (refugees from 
neighbouring Myanmar who are currently warehoused in border camps), irregular migrant workers 
from Lao DPR, Cambodia and Myanmar, as well as numerous ethnic minority groups whose long-term 
presence in the country means that the term irregular migrant no longer really suffices. International 
Rescue Committee, Basic Information on Rights of Migrant Workers in Thailand, ICR Bangkok, 2006, 
p. 3. 
89 Consider situations of so-called “warehousing” of refugee populations, where the situation becomes 
protracted as their continuing presence is tolerated but their situation is not regularised, preventing them 
from accessing a range of rights. At the end of 2003, UNHCR put the number of protracted refugee 
situations worldwide at 38 and concluded that “the average duration of refugee situations, protracted or 
not, has increased: from 9 years in 1993 to 17 years in 2003”. UNHCR, Protracted refugee situations, 
EC/54/SC/CRP.14, Geneva: 10 June 2004. 
90 Stephen Castles; Alastair Davidson, Citizenship and migration. Globalisation and the politics of 
belonging, Macmillan Press, London: 2000, p. 73. 
91 Amnesty programmes are still exceptional and selective, regularising the stay of certain categories of 
irregular migrants and often providing only short-term residence permits, whereby the individual 
returns to irregularity again after the permit expires. Charles Pinkerton, Gail McLaughlan and John 
Salt, Sizing the illegally resident population in the UK, United Kingdom Home Office Online Report 





revocation of nationality due to long-term residence abroad or as a result of state 
succession which took place in their absence. The crucial difference in the position 
of the irregular migrant lies in the lack of opportunity to access an alternative 
nationality. Whatever the additional criteria for naturalisation in the host country, an 
absolute requirement in all countries is a minimum period of lawful residence, 
thereby excluding irregular migrants from the outset.92 If an irregular migrant loses 
his only nationality, or is already stateless prior to displacement,93 he is very likely 
to remain stateless indefinitely – particularly since the status of irregularity so often 
proves to be a protracted, even indefinite one.  
To illustrate this scenario, let us take as an example the irregular migrants from 
Myanmar (Burma)94 who have settled in Thailand. Up to 2 million persons from 
Myanmar are now irregularly on Thai soil – a consequence of the enduring situation 
in Myanmar, characterised by human rights abuses, economic collapse and 
persecution of minority groups.95 Some 140,000 of those who have come to 
Thailand have been allowed to settle in refugee camps with the status of “persons 
fleeing fighting” while others (many similarly situated) are cast as “illegal migrant 
workers” or “unregistered illegal immigrants”.96 All are in an irregular situation 
under Thai immigration law. Meanwhile, it has been reported that in leaving 
Myanmar without permission from the government authorities, these migrants are 
deemed to have left the country permanently and thereby forfeited their Burmese 
citizenship.97 Burmese citizenship may be withdrawn “if there is evidence of 
complete uprooting even if one were forced to leave and has been absent from 
Burma for less than a year”.98 Moreover, once Burmese nationality is lost in this 
                                                           
92 Stephen Castles; Alastair Davidson, Citizenship and migration. Globalisation and the politics of 
belonging, Macmillan Press, London: 2000, p. 86. 
93 A common problem where forced displacement and refugees are concerned. See UNHCR, 
"Statelessness and Citizenship" in The State of the World's Refugees - A Humanitarian Agenda, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford: 1997, page 244 
94 There is some contention surrounding the official name of Myanmar/Burma. The UN has recognised 
the name change from Burma to Myanmar but some governments continue to dispute the legitimacy of 
this change. 
95 See the successive reports of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, 
Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro, including most recently E/CN.4/2006/34, 7 February 2006; A/HRC/4/14, 12 
February 2007 and A/HRC/7/24, 7 March 2008. 
96 The dire human rights situation and ongoing civil conflict in Myanmar since the 1980s has caused a 
mass exodus of persons seeking safety and protection. Thailand is not a party to the 1951 Refugee 
Convention and does not have an asylum policy so all unauthorised immigrants from neighbouring 
Myanmar are treated as irregular migrants, whatever other label they are given. Veronika Martin, 
Myanmarese Refugees in Thailand: No Freedom, No Choices, US Committee for Refugees, World 
Refugee Survey 2004, page 82. 
97 Article 16 of the Burma Citizenship Law of 1982 declares that “a citizen who leaves the state 
permanently […] ceases to be a citizen”. See further Nyo Nyo, “Burmese Children in Thailand: Legal 
Aspects”, in Legal Issues on Burma Journal, Burma Lawyers Council, No. 10, December 2001; Human 
Rights Yearbook Burma 2003-2004, Chapter 15. The Situation of Migrant Workers, Human Rights 
Documentation Unit, National Coalition Government of Burma, 2002; Refugees International, Stolen 
Futures: The Stateless Children of Burmese Asylum Seekers, 25 June 2004. 
98 Tang Lay Lee, “Statelessness, Human Rights and Gender. Irregular migrant workers from Burma in 
Thailand”, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden 2005, page 158. 
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manner, it cannot be recovered.99 At the same time, the irregular status of these 
migrants in Thailand is an absolute bar to applying for naturalisation there. The 
combined effect is the enduring statelessness of many members of this group.100 
 Children born to irregular migrants on the territory of the receiving state also 
run a substantially increased risk of statelessness. To begin with, if their parents 
have been rendered stateless and they are born on the territory of a state that grants 
nationality jus sanguinis, without a back-up clause offering jus soli citizenship to 
prevent statelessness, then the plight of the parent becomes the plight of the child. It 
is true that this problem may affect children of all stateless migrants alike. Again, 
what really brings the vulnerability of the situation of the irregular migrant to light 
is the fact that the irregularity of the parents’ migratory status often forms an 
additional and quite unassailable obstacle to the acquisition of a nationality by the 
child. Just as irregular migrants are ineligible to apply for naturalisation, the 
children of irregular migrants may be ineligible for jus soli citizenship even where it 
is generally on offer. Numerous countries that employ (or have partially introduced) 
the jus soli doctrine for nationality attribution have set additional conditions that 
must be met in order for birthright nationality to be assured. The principle group 
excluded in this manner is the children of irregular migrants because a particular 
(immigration) status is required of the parents if their children are to be granted 
nationality jus soli.101 Instead of gaining citizenship, these children may inherit their 
parents’ immigration status with the somewhat bizarre result of them being labelled 
“irregular immigrants” themselves, despite being born on the territory.102 Excluded 
from nationality jus soli, the children of irregular migrants become definitively 
                                                           
99 Article 22 of the Burma Citizenship Law of 1982 states that “a person whose citizenship has ceased 
or has been revoked shall have no right to apply again for citizenship”. 
100 See for an in depth discussion of the situation of irregular migrants in Thailand, Laura van Waas, Is 
Permanent Illegality Inevitable? The Challenges to Ensuring Birth Registration and the Right to a 
Nationality for the Children of Irregular Migrants - Thailand and the Dominican Republic, Woking: 
2006. 
101 For example, under the Australian Citizenship Act, 1948, a child will acquire nationality jus soli 
only where one of his parents is an Australian citizen or a permanent resident. Children born to 
irregular migrants are therefore excluded from birthright citizenship. They may, however, apply for 
nationality on their tenth birthday if they have been resident on Australian soil since their birth. David 
Martin, Citizenship in countries of immigration – Introduction, in Alexander Aleinikoff; Douglas 
Klusmeyer (Eds.), “From Migrants to Citizens. Membership in a changing world”, Brookings 
Institution Press, Washington D.C. 2000, p. 43. Such policies are intended to avoid a situation in which, 
thanks to the child’s acquisition of citizenship of the country of birth, not only the child but also the 
parents become undeportable (protection of family life), thus creating a back-door for irregular 
migrants to settle in the state. This problem is sometimes referred to as the phenomenon of “anchor 
babies”. 
102 The United States is a major exception here as it continues to uphold birthright citizenship as a 
blanket policy: “although customary exceptions to the jus soli rule exist (e.g. children born on foreign 
vessels, children of diplomatic personnel), birthright citizenship has been understood to extend to the 
native-born children of aliens who are in the country illegally or on a non-immigrant visa”. Peter 
Schuck, Immigration, refugee and citizenship law in the United States, in Donald Horowitz and Gerard 
Noiriel (Eds.), “Immigrants in two democracies. French and American Experience”, New York 
University Press, New York 1992, p. 348. See also Alexander Aleinikoff, Between Principles and 
Politics: U.S. Citizenship Policy, in Alexander Aleinikoff and Douglas Klusmeyer (Eds.), “From 
Migrants to Citizens. Membership in a changing world”, Brookings Institution Press, Washington D.C. 





reliant on the country of nationality of their parents to grant citizenship jus 
sanguinis. This is a problem where the parents are themselves stateless or where 
there are other limitations on the transmission of nationality through the bloodline 
such as a gender imbalance in the law or restrictions in the passing on of citizenship 
to successive generations born abroad.103 
In practice, what proves to be a greater obstacle than this heightened risk of 
a conflict of nationality laws is the inability of irregular migrants to register the 
birth of their child in the host state. Taking Thailand as an example once more, we 
see that although Thai law provides for the registration of every birth on state 
territory, an official instruction to the competent registrars in fact interprets the law 
in such a way as to prevent the registration of children born to anyone with an 
irregular status.104 Considering the aforementioned population of irregular migrants 
in the country (up to 2 million), this instruction means that a substantial proportion 
of births on Thai soil are going unrecorded. Even in the absence of direct legal or 
policy constraints on access to birth registration, irregular migrants across the globe 
are prevented from recording the birth of their child for a whole host of reasons. As 
mentioned above,105 they may face a cultural or language barrier and where 
irregular migrants are concerned, the likelihood of the authorities investing time and 
resources in assisting these migrants to navigate the procedures or promoting the 
importance of birth registration within the immigrant community is greatly 
diminished.106 Then there is the simple fact that irregular migrants are less likely to 
(be in a position to) give birth at a medical facility, often missing out on crucial 
information or evidence that can significantly facilitate the birth registration 
process.107 Another enormous challenge that migrants face is discrimination. 
Exposure of foreigners to discrimination is nothing new and attitudes towards 
“illegal immigrants” tend to be particularly severe. In some states, deep-rooted 
discrimination towards a specific immigrant group may be the most influential 
factor in the non-registration of births. This is for example the major stumbling 
block in the Dominican Republic for anyone construed by the relevant official – in 
                                                           
103 These issues were introduced and discussed in chapter IV, section 1. 
104 Letter (MorTor 0310.1/Wor 8) of the 26th of March 2002 issued by the Bureau of Registration 
Administration, Ministry of Interior regarding the Act for Registration of Inhabitants for Aliens, 
addressed to all Provincial and Bangkok Registrars. 
105 At note 75. 
106 Moreover, there is no incentive for the government to do so since the irregular migrant population is 
not part of the voting constituency and cannot hold the authorities in any way politically accountable 
for their action or inaction. 
107 For example, in the Netherlands, attitudes and perceptions in relation to the “Linkage Law” - 
introduced in 1998 to couple an individual’s right to various welfare services with his immigration 
status – have prevented many irregular migrants from seeking medical assistance with childbirth and 
have also reportedly led to the refusal by hospital staff to provide such a service. Petra Snelders, Sabine 
Kraus and Marjan Wijers, Commentaar inzake de specifieke effecten van de Koppelingswet op de 
situatie van vrouwen t.b.v. de Tussentijdse Evaluatie Koppelingswet [A commentary on the specific 
effects of the Linkage Law on the situation of women in aid of the mid-term evaluation of the Linkage 
Law] Komitee Zelfstandig Verblijfsrecht Migrantenvrouwen, E-Quality and Clara Wichmann Instituut, 
Amsterdam, 7 February 2000.  
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some cases arbitrarily on the basis of skin colour or surname - to be an irregular 
migrant.108  
Finally, the greatest practical and conceptual obstacle to birth registration 
for children of irregular migrants relates to the fact that it is by definition an act of a 
government authority. The importance of birth registration hinges on the very fact 
that it is the official recognition of the circumstances surrounding the child’s birth 
and thereby existence. At the same time, one of the other tasks of the state 
authorities is to monitor and enforce immigration laws. Are these two jobs 
compatible or will the birth registration process necessarily uncover the parents 
immigration status and lead to their arrest and deportation? This is certainly the fear 
that prevents many irregular migrants from approaching the authorities to register 
the birth of their child. For example,  
 
the births of children born in Ecuador to undocumented refugees are 
frequently not registered due to the parents’ fear of deportation. This 
situation prevents the children from claiming Ecuadorian nationality, to 
which any child born in Ecuador is entitled under Ecuadorian Law.109 
 
Time now to turn to the question of what international law has to say about these 
issues that are affecting the enjoyment of the right to a nationality by irregular 
migrants and their children the world over.110 Recall that this investigation will 
uncover the baseline standard set for all (irregular migrants) and later we will look 
at the specific issues facing – and protection offered to - victims of trafficking and 
refugees.  
  
2.1.2 International (human rights) law 
 
In discussing the situation of irregular migrants and their children we came across 
three main problems that may contribute to (protracted) statelessness among this 
particular group: absolute lack of access to naturalisation for all persons in an 
irregular situation and lack of access to jus soli citizenship as well as problems 
accessing birth registration for children born to irregular migrants. In principle, the 
mere fact that a person or his parent(s) holds an irregular immigration status does 
not excuse the host state from providing a basic level of protection - “basic human 
rights are not conditional upon the circumstances of residence”.111 Thus, where the 
                                                           
108 Laura van Waas, Is Permanent Illegality Inevitable? The Challenges to Ensuring Birth Registration 
and the Right to a Nationality for the Children of Irregular Migrants - Thailand and the Dominican 
Republic, Woking: 2006. 
109 Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations: Ecuador, A/53/40 Vol. 1, Geneva: 1998, para. 
291. 
110 For a further elaboration on the connection between irregular migration, birth registration and 
statelessness, see Laura van Waas, 'The Children of Irregular Migrants: A Stateless Generation?' in 
Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, Vol. 25, 2007. 
111 Guy Goodwin-Gill, 'International Law and Human Rights: Trends Concerning International 
Migrants and Refugees', in International Migration Review, Vol. 23, 1989, page 535. See also the 
preliminary articles of many major international human rights instruments where it is clearly enunciated 
that a state is to extend protection to “all individuals within its territory”. For instance, article 2, 





aforementioned policies threaten an individual’s enjoyment of his right to a 
nationality or right to birth registration, they may be found to violate human rights 
norms.  
However, the right to a nationality does not include a right to naturalisation. 
We have already seen that naturalisation is a discretionary procedure and that states 
are generally free to set the conditions for it, so long as they do not discriminate on 
the basis of race, gender, religion or against any particular nationality.112 
International law does not oppose the precondition of a minimum period of lawful 
residence for an application for naturalisation - distinguishing between persons on 
the grounds of immigration status is not considered inappropriate. In fact, the 
European Convention on Nationality – the only instrument to set out concrete 
demands for naturalisation policy – admits that “lawful and habitual residence” is a 
key and legitimate requirement.113 According to the same instrument, lawful and 
habitual residence also appears to be a justifiable condition for (facilitated) access 
to nationality for a number of different groups, including stateless persons, and for 
the recovery of nationality by persons who have lost it.114 Until their status is 
regularised, irregular migrants are thus unable to benefit from such international 
protection and host states are free to maintain that the factual presence of the 
irregular migrant on state territory is irrelevant and inadequate for the accumulation 
of an jus domicilli connection that may provide access to citizenship.115 The 
circumstance of an augmented risk of (prolonged) statelessness does not affect this 
conclusion.  
International law offers a somewhat more complex picture in relation to the 
problems associated with the children of irregular migrants. To begin with, human 
rights instruments clearly prescribe the universal enjoyment of both the right to 
acquire a nationality and the right to be registered at birth. As we saw earlier in this 
chapter, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child has confirmed that birth 
registration must be “available to all children – including asylum-seeking, refugee 
and migrant children – irrespective of their nationality, immigration status or 
statelessness”.116 The International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of 
All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families also helps to remove any 
doubt that children of irregular migrants are entitled to both birth registration and 
                                                           
112 See chapter V, section 1.2. 
113 “Each State Party shall provide in its internal law for the possibility of naturalisation of persons 
lawfully and habitually resident on its territory”. Article 6, paragraph 3 of the European Convention on 
Nationality, 1997. 
114 Article 6, paragraphs 4 (e), (f), and (g) as well as Article 9 of the European Convention on 
Nationality, 1997. The Council of Europe Convention on the avoidance of statelessness in relation to 
State succession similarly prescribes facilitated naturalisation for persons who are rendered stateless in 
the context of the succession of states only if they are lawfully and habitually residing on state territory. 
115 For the purposes of naturalisation, in accordance with the European Convention on Nationality, the 
irregular migrant only begins to accrue a relevant period of residence after the regularisation of his 
status.  
116 Emphasis added. Committee on the Rights of the Child, Committee on the Rights of the Child, 
General Comment No. 6: Treatment of unaccompanied and separated children outside their country of 
origin, 2005, at para 12; It has also made this position clear through its jurisprudence in reaction to 
country reports as cited in note 40. 
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the acquisition of a nationality.117 Its article 29 states that “Each child of a migrant 
worker shall have the right to a name, to registration of birth and to a nationality”. 
This provision is located in the general section where the rights of all – regular and 
irregular – migrant workers are espoused and is therefore applicable to all children 
of migrant workers, regardless of the immigration status of their parents.118 
Similarly, a report issued under the auspices of the Council of Europe on the human 
rights of irregular migrants includes the rights to a nationality and to birth 
registration among the minimum rights to which irregular migrants’ children are 
entitled.119 And the Inter-American Court on Human Rights has also ruled that the 
children of irregular migrants enjoy the right to a nationality, just the same as any 
other children: 
 
The migratory status of a person cannot be a condition for the State to grant 
nationality, because migratory status can never constitute a justification for 
depriving a person of his right to nationality or the enjoyment and exercise 
of his rights.120 
                                                           
117 The rights ascribed to irregular migrants are not new, but the Convention does help to remove any 
ambiguity on their application. Doug Cassel, "Equal Labor Rights for Undocumented Migrant 
Workers" in Bayefsky (ed) Human Rights and Refugees, Internally Displaced Persons and Migrant 
Workers, Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden: 2006, page 495. The Convention thereby represents “the United 
Nations’ first effort to ascribe binding rights specifically to the unauthorised”. Beth Lyon, "New 
International Human Rights Standards on Unauthorized Immigrant Worker Rights: Seizing an 
Opportunity to Pull Governments Out of the Shadows" in Bayefsky (ed) Human Rights and Refugees, 
Internally Displaced Persons and Migrant Workers, Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden: 2006, page 558.  
118 The Convention also includes a series of rights which only regular migrant workers can claim. These 
are promulgated in articles 36-56. It should be noted that the International Convention on the Rights of 
All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families has been ratified by just 34 states to date and that 
the majority of these are major sending rather than receiving countries of (irregular) migrants. 
Moreover, the Convention excludes stateless persons (and refugees) from its personal scope of 
application with the result that the children of stateless irregular migrants cannot benefit from its 
provisions – even if the stateless migrant in question meets the definition of a migrant worker that is set 
out in the convention. Article 3, paragraph (d) of the International Convention on the Protection of the 
Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, 1990. Nevertheless, the deliberate 
separation of the rights of migrant workers into two categories – those applicable to all and those 
applicable only to regular migrant workers - and the position of the right to birth registration and a 
nationality in the first group, is illustrative of the international consensus already laid down in the 
ICCPR and CRC. 
119 Ed van Thijn, Human rights of irregular migrants, Committee on Migration, Refugees and 
Population of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Document 10924, 4 May 2006, 
paragraphs 26 and 107. It should be noted that these rights were not included in the Resolution that was 
subsequently adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Resolution 1509 on 
Human Rights of Irregular Migrants, Strasbourg, 27 June 2006. This issue is currently under revue by 
various bodies of the Council of Europe and further developments can be expected in the near future. 
120 Inter-American Court on Human Rights, Case of Yean and Bosico v. Dominican Republic, Series C, 
Case 130, 8 September 2005, para. 156. The Court refers back to its own Advisory Opinion on the 
Juridical Condition and Rights of Undocumented Migrants, where it ruled that "the migratory status of 
a person can never be a justification for depriving him of the enjoyment and exercise of his human 
rights”. In the Advisory Opinion, this statement was made in the context of employment-related rights. 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion on Juridical Condition and Rights of 







So, it would certainly appear that international law calls for the enjoyment of the 
right to acquire a nationality and the right to be registered at birth, by all children, 
including those born to irregular migrants.121 
On the other hand, f we look again to the European Convention on Nationality, 
we see that the developing international norm prescribing jus soli attribution where 
a child would otherwise be stateless may actually be qualified by the immigration 
status of the parents. As remarked in chapter IV, in its elaboration of this norm, the 
European Convention on Nationality allows states to choose between automatic 
attribution of citizenship at birth and subsequent conferral of nationality upon 
application. Thereafter, it declares that “such application may be made subject to 
the lawful and habitual residence on its territory for a period not exceeding five 
years immediately preceding the lodging of the application”.122 The commentary to 
the text explains that the residence of the child must therefore be “effective and in 
compliance with the provisions concerning the stay of foreigners in the State”.123 
Where the child in question has inherited the irregular status of his parents in 
accordance with domestic law,124 he will be unable to meet this condition even if he 
does manage to stay on the territory of the host state for the prescribed period. It is 
also quite conceivable that the child will be expelled from the territory due to his 
irregular status - or that of his parents - before he can meet the minimum term for 
application. So the protection offered to children of irregular migrants in respect of 
their right to acquire a nationality at birth is not as straightforward as it first appears 
and, within the European context at least, it would seem that there may be some 
gaps in protection offered against statelessness at birth. In this respect, the 1961 
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness could, in fact, have opened an avenue 
for more comprehensive protection: where it offers states the opportunity to set 
additional requirements for the attribution of nationality jus soli upon application 
later in life, one of the conditions that may be set is a certain period of “habitual 
residence”, without the specification that such residence must also be lawful.125 This 
does not remove the concern that the child of an irregular migrant may not, in 
                                                           
121 See also the recommendation by the UN Independent Expert on Minority Issues in her 2008 report, 
where she calls on states to “grant nationality to children born on their territory if the child would 
otherwise be stateless [and] in this case, the immigration status of the parents should be irrelevant”. Gay 
McDougall, Promotion and Protection of all Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development – Report of the Independent Expert on Minority 
Issues, A/HRC/7/23, 28 February 2008, para. 85. 
122 Emphasis added. Article 6, paragraph 2 (b) of the European Convention on Nationality, 1997. 
123 Council of Europe, European Convention on Nationality: Explanatory report, Strasbourg: 1997, 
page 34. 
124 This is, for example, the case in Thailand, under article 7 bis, paragraph 3 of the Nationality Act 
B.E. 2508 (1965). 
125 Tang Lay Lee, “Statelessness, Human Rights and Gender. Irregular migrant workers from Burma in 
Thailand”, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden 2005, page 47. The traveaux preparatoires of the 
Convention are ambiguous on the matter of the scope of “habitual residence”. By reference to other 
international provisions it can, arguably, be inferred that the term “habitual residence” does not, of 
itself, imply lawful residence: other documents, including the European Convention on Nationality and 
the Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection prepared by the International Law Commission. Moreover, 
in the Council of Europe Convention on the avoidance of statelessness in relation to State Succession 
(article 1), “habitual residence” is defined as “a stable factual residence”. 
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practice, have the chance to remain habitually resident in the host state for the 
required period due to his own or his parents’ migratory status – a concern that is 
very real considering the absence from the Convention of any provision for 
regularisation of the child’s status in the intervening years. Nevertheless, the 
somewhat contradicting messages issuing from different sources of international 
law, and the comments that  have just been made on the 1961 Statelessness 
Convention, show that the statelessness instrument may yet have an important role 
to play in respect of this “new” source of statelessness.  
 The same ambiguity does not exist with regard to the right to birth registration 
– this is a clearly enunciated right of all children, regardless of the status of their 
parents. But how far does international law go in providing special measures or 
guidance to ensure that the children of irregular immigrants are able to enjoy this 
right? In the introduction to this issue we found that the migratory status of the 
parents seriously jeopardises the chances of the child’s birth being registered - one 
of the most serious obstacles being the (fear of) repercussions in approaching the 
authorities to ask for the birth of the child to be recorded. So far, this is not an issue 
that international instruments have dealt with, nor has it been the subject of any 
international jurisprudence to date. However, in its consideration of the human 
rights of irregular migrants, the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly did 
pause to give this substantial practical problem some thought. In its resolution of 27 
of June 2006, the Assembly invited governments 
 
to assure that irregular migrants are able to enjoy their minimum rights in 
practice, including by […] dispensing with the duty of certain authorities 
(for example school authorities, doctors and medical authorities) to inform 
on the illegal status of migrants so as to avoid the situation where irregular 
migrants do not claim their rights through fear of identification as irregular 
migrants and fear of expulsion.126 
 
There are examples of cases where authorities have been able to separate their tasks 
of provider of rights and services and of enforcer of immigration laws.127 
Alternatively, such issues could be circumvented by exploring and expanding the 
role of the sending state. It has already been mentioned in passing that the UN 
Committee on the Rights of the Child has suggested that the duty to ensure a child’s 
right to birth registration falls equally on the state of nationality of the parents as on 
the host state. In reference to the worrisome non-registration of children born to 
overseas Filipino workers, the Committee recommended that the Philippines 
                                                           
126 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Resolution 1509 on Human Rights of Irregular 
Migrants, Strasbourg, 27 June 2006, para. 16. 
127 An initiative in the south-eastern USA state of Tenessee at the beginning of the 21st century is a 
prime example. There a campaign “fought successfully for access to a state-issued driver’s licence for 
people who could not produce proof of lawful residence in the USA [and] within days, throngs of 
Latinas and Latinos descended on licensing stations”. Lessons can be learned from this type of initiative 
about the opportunities and methods for circumventing the supposed clash between a state authority’s 
immigration duties and the provision of vital services – among which birth registration. Fran Ansley, 
"Constructing Citizenship Without a Licence: The Struggle of Undocumented Immigrants in the USA 
for Livelihoods and Recognition" in Kabeer (ed) Inclusive Citizenship Meanings and Expressions, Zed 





“encourage and facilitate parents, irrespective of their residence status, to register 
their children born abroad”.128 With this recommendation, the Committee has hit 
upon one feasible solution to the problem of under-registration of children born to 
irregular migrants due to the fear of repercussions in approaching the authorities of 
the host state for registration and documentation. However, where the sheer 
distance to the diplomatic representation of their country of nationality in the host 
state is an unsurpassable obstacle129 or where the irregular migrants concerned are 
in fact refugees or stateless themselves, this option of reverting to the authorities of 
the country of nationality for the registration of births ceases to be an appropriate or 
workable alternative. Consider, in this respect, the example raised above of 
irregular migrants and refugees from Myanmar that live in many of the remote, 
border areas of Thailand.130  
What has become clear from the foregoing observations is that not only the 
content, but also the means to successfully implement the rights of irregular 
migrants (and their children) requires further crystallisation. Where this has already 
begun in relation to, for instance, the employment-related rights of irregular 
migrants,131 other areas of human rights law including the right to a nationality and 
the right to birth registration are currently lagging behind in the discussion. 
However, organisations such as the Council of Europe and mechanisms like the UN 
Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants and the UN Committee on 
Migrant Workers charged with monitoring the implementation of the Migrant 
Workers Convention remain seized by this “priority issue”.132 There are therefore 
numerous opportunities for the – much needed - further elaboration and 
development of norms relating to the rights of irregular migrants and their children, 
                                                           
128 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding observations: Philippines, 
CRC/C/15/Add.258, Geneva: 2005, paras 36 and 37. See also note 38 above. 
129 The diplomatic presence of a foreign state is likely to be far less decentralised – and thereby less 
easily accessible – than a state’s own civil registration system. There may be just one embassy or 
consulate in the state capital and it may be necessary for the parents to register the child there in person. 
130 See section 2.1.1 of the present chapter. 
131 Consider, for example, the work of the International Labour Organisation in elaborating standards in 
this regard; Beth Lyon, "New International Human Rights Standards on Unauthorized Immigrant 
Worker Rights: Seizing an Opportunity to Pull Governments Out of the Shadows" in Bayefsky (ed) 
Human Rights and Refugees, Internally Displaced Persons and Migrant Workers, Martinus Nijhoff, 
Leiden: 2006, pages 554-558. See also more generally Doug Cassel, "Equal Labor Rights for 
Undocumented Migrant Workers" in Bayefsky (ed) Human Rights and Refugees, Internally Displaced 
Persons and Migrant Workers, Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden: 2006, pages 478-516. See also chapter XI, 
section 2.2. 
132 Jorge Bustamante, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants, 
E/CN.6/2006/73, 30 December 2005, page 16.  The mandate of the UN Special Rapporteur was first 
created in 1999 and was extended for a further three years in 2005. Part of this mandate is “to examine 
ways and means to overcome the obstacles existing to the full and effective protection of the human 
rights of [migrants], including obstacles and difficulties for the return of migrants who are non-
documented or in an irregular situation”. The UN Committee on Migrant Workers held its first session 
in March 2004 and although it has considered some number of country reports it has yet to build up any 
substantial jurisprudence or formulate any General Comments on the content of the Convention. See 
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whereby the prevention of statelessness and non-registration of births should be 
placed high on the agenda. 
 
2.2 Human trafficking and refugee situations 
 
Now we come to two very particular manifestations of (irregular) migration that 
warrant a closer look because the situation of the migrants involved calls for special 
treatment and international law has elaborated norms to that effect that may be 
relevant to the task of preventing statelessness. Thus, one specific way in which the 
“paper walls” that have been erected between countries by way of immigration 
policies and border control are circumvented is through human trafficking.133 
Trafficking is defined as: 
 
The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of 
persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of 
coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or 
of a position of vulnerability or of the giving and receiving of payments 
or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another 
person, for the purpose of exploitation.134 
 
It has many different manifestations and can affect men, women and children, but 
“most notoriously […] it entails the sale of women and children to work in the sex 
trade without their consent”.135 As a migratory phenomenon, trafficking is on the 
rise and has boomed into an incredibly lucrative business.136 It has been estimated 
that as many as 600,000 to 800,000 people are trafficked across international 
borders every year – generating an estimated US$ 9.5 billion.137 In response, the 
international community has unanimously espoused the opinion that trafficking is a 
crime that must be suppressed and punished.138 Thus, numerous instruments have 
been put in place to criminalize and prevent trafficking.139 In addition, in 
                                                           
133 References to “paper walls” found in John Torpey, The Invention of the Passport. Surveillance, 
Citizenship and the State, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 2000, page 139. 
134 Article 3, section a of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, 
especially women and children, supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational 
Organised Crime (“Palermo Protocol”), UN, 2000. 
135 Ryszard Piotrowicz, 'Victims of trafficking and de facto statelessness', in Refugee Survey Quarterly, 
Vol. 21, 2002, page 50. 
136 Trafficking is just one branch of a vast and expanding “migration industry” of which people 
smuggling is another major sector and within which people from travel agents to interpreters are 
making a living. Stephen Castles; Mark Miller, The Age of Migration, The Guildford Press, London: 
2003, page 114. 
137 Millions more fall victim to trafficking within their own state borders. IOM, World Migration 2003: 
Managing Migration - Challenges and Responses for People on the Move, Geneva: 2003, page 27. As 
cited in US Department of State, Trafficking in persons report 2006, Washington: 2006, pages 7 and 
13. 
138 Trafficking in human beings is often even described as one of the contemporary forms of slavery 
and the prohibition of slavery is one of the oldest jus cogens norms. Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public 
International Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 2003, pages 489 and 537. 
139 The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women is one example: 





recognition of their position as the victims of a grievous human rights violation, 
persons who have been trafficked are offered certain protection and rights under 
international law. It is among these standards that we will attempt to trace any 
relevant norms for the prevention of statelessness. 
 Meanwhile, another substantial group of migrants whose (forced) 
displacement across international borders challenges systems of migration 
management is comprised of refugees. At the end of 2006, there were an estimated 
9.9 million refugees globally.140 There were also an estimated 744,000 asylum 
seekers or “aspirant refugees”.141A refugee is a person who has been displaced 
across an international border and whose situation meets the definition espoused in 
article 1 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. The decisive 
element is that the individual holds a “well-founded fear of being persecuted for 
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion”.142 And it is this vulnerability and extreme dearth of protection 
that inspired the establishment of a special international status and the elaboration 
of a catalogue of accompanying rights, the most central of which is the right not to 
be expelled or returned to the country in which persecution threatens.143 Once more, 
the question to be considered here is in what way do refugees become exposed to 
statelessness and whether the applicable international standards have anticipated 
and addressed this problem.   
 
2.2.1 Connecting statelessness to human trafficking and refugee situations 
 
In many cases, the victims of trafficking and even recognised refugees share the 
same fate as irregular migrants. This is because although some states will officially 
pardon the unlawful entry of victims of trafficking and/or recognised refugees, thus 
(temporarily or permanently) extracting them from the irregular migrant group, in 
other states no such provision has been made. For instance, in countries without an 
asylum law, all persons who seek protection as refugees will be treated in the eyes 
of the law as irregular immigrants, although their continuing unlawful presence on 
                                                                                                                                               
suppress all forms of traffic in women”. The Convention on the Rights of the Child (article 35) 
similarly induces contracting states to “take all appropriate national, bilateral and multilateral measures 
to prevent the abduction of, the sale of or traffic in children”. Following on from this, an Optional 
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child was opened for signature in 2000 on “The sale of 
children, child prostitution and child pornography”, elaborating on how states should implement – 
among others – the aforementioned article of the CRC. Several regional human rights documents also 
house a prohibition of trafficking in persons, including in article 6 of the American Convention on 
Human Rights; article 29 of the African Convention on the Rights and Welfare of the Child; and article 
4, section g of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of 
Women in Africa. 
140 UNHCR, Statistical Yearbook 2006 – Trends in Displacement, Protection and Solutions, Geneva, 
December 2007, page 23. An asylum seeker is a person who has crossed an international border to seek 
protection but whose claim to refugee status has yet to be decided. 
141 UNHCR, Statistical Yearbook 2006 – Trends in Displacement, Protection and Solutions, Geneva, 
December 2007, page 23. 
142 See also chapter II, section 4 on the development of the definition of a refugee. 
143 The prohibition of non-refoulement, housed in article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the 
Status of Refugees as well as being implicit in numerous human rights instruments. 
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state territory may be tolerated on humanitarian grounds.144 For the victims of 
trafficking there is even less certainty of regularisation of stay. As a result, when 
treated simply as irregular migrants, refugees and victims of trafficking are exposed 
to statelessness in the same way as has already been described above. Concurrently, 
their children also run the same risks.145  
Moreover, even if the individual’s stay is regularised on account of being a 
trafficking victim or refugee, the status acquired may not be commensurate to 
accruing eligibility for acquisition of nationality in the host state. Whereas once, 
“permanent asylum and local integration were widely practiced in asylum countries 
in the West”, today there is a clear worldwide preference for temporary 
protection.146 A variety of temporary statuses has emerged - for asylum seekers 
awaiting a decision on their application for refugee status but also for victims of 
trafficking while they cooperate with procedures to prosecute the perpetrators, for 
recognised refugees and in response to mass influxes of persons displaced by 
conflict.147 Thus, although technically lawfully resident, these persons may hold an 
immigration status that is “inadequate or incompatible with the residency 
requirements for naturalisation”.148 It may be similarly inadequate or incompatible 
with the conditions for access to jus soli citizenship for their children. In the case of 
refugees in particular, it may also be impossible to comply with other requirements 
for the acquisition of a nationality such as obtaining proof of loss of prior 
nationality, if required, because “for obvious reasons many refugees hesitate to 
                                                           
144 This is the situation in a number of Asian and Middle Eastern countries that are not party to the 1951 
Refugee Convention, such as India, Pakistan, Thailand, Indonesia, Syrian Arab Republic, Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait and Bahrain. These countries tolerate the presence of refugees so long as the international 
community provides the necessary humanitarian assistance and only until such time as repatriation or 
resettlement can be realised. Nor is asylum law uniformly implemented in the event of mass influxes of 
refugees, their status remaining irregular. See for the latest information on these – and other – states’ 
treatment of refugees the relevant UNHCR Country Operations Plans, accessible through 
http://www.unhcr.org. Moreover, “Many of Africa’s protracted refugee situations do not have a clearly 
defined legal status, do not have residence rights, and have no prospect of seeking naturalisation in their 
country of asylum”. Jeff Crisp, No solutions in sight: the problem of protracted refugee situations in 
Africa, UNHCR Working Paper No. 75, January 2003, pages 11-12. See also Yante Ismail, “Is 
Toleration Enough?” in Refugees Magazine, Number 148, Issue 4, 2007, page 31. 
145 Refugees often have particular difficulty securing birth registration for their children: the problems 
described above may be compounded by a specific state policy of not registering refugee births, often 
common to those countries where the child may stake a claim to citizenship jus soli. Youth Advocate 
Program International, Stateless Children – Children who are without citizenship, Booklet No. 7 in a 
series on International Youth Issues, 2002, pages 10-16. An example given was the refusal by the 
Honduran authorities during the 1970s and 1980s to register children born to Salvadoran refugees living 
in camps in the state: “Although these authorities were legally obliged to register all children born on 
Honduran territory, in practice, the refugee camps were treated as if they had extraterritorial status. In 
other instances, the problem is not one of status, but of access to procedures, especially where refugees 
are confined to camps. 
146 Karen Jacobsen, The forgotten solution: local integration for refugees in developing countries, 
UNHCR Working Paper No. 45, July 2001, page 2. 
147 Alex Schmid, “Whither Refugee? The Refugee Crisis: Problems and Solutions”, PIOOM, Leiden: 
1996, pages 158-159 and 167. 
148 Rosa da Costa, Rights of Refugees in the Context of Integration: Legal Standards and 
Recommendations, Geneva: June 2006, page 187. See also Karen Jacobsen, The forgotten solution: 





approach their embassy to start procedures to give up citizenship, and for equally 
obvious reasons some states make problems for political opponents who apply to be 
released from citizenship”.149 
In addition, the risk of statelessness for both the displaced persons themselves 
and any children they subsequently bear can be exacerbated by problems relating to 
documentation.150 Victims of trafficking and refugees suffer from an acute threat of 
loss of personal documentation.151 Trafficked persons “may have their documents 
stolen or destroyed either on arrival in a third country or prior to transfer, often 
making it impossible to prove their status”.152 And refugees may similarly lose or 
leave behind their identity or travel documents – if they ever held any.153 Moreover, 
in the event of massive refugee flows,  
 
the general state of upheaval, paperwork disorder, and mass confusion 
typical of refugee situations often overwhelm authorities in both the 
refugees’ original country as well as the host country. Adults and children 
become officially lost – not accounted for by any government system.154 
 
As explained in the context of discussing birth registration above, being 
undocumented cannot be directly equated with being stateless.155 However, the lack 
of official papers to prove nationality, identity or even any other basic personal 
facts does heighten the risk of statelessness. It may still be difficult for the 
individual to firmly establish that he is not considered a national by any state and 
therefore stateless, but the absence of documents may equally prevent any country 
with which he enjoys a link from tracing or acknowledging that connection.156 It 
may also become impossible for the individual to successfully claim nationality jus 
                                                           
149 Alex Schmid, “Whither Refugee? The Refugee Crisis: Problems and Solutions”, PIOOM, Leiden: 
1996, page 177. 
150 UNHCR, The World's Stateless - Questions and Answers, Geneva: 2004, page 13; David 
Weissbrodt; Clay Collins, 'The Human Rights of Stateless Persons', in Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 
28, 2006, page 263. 
151 Other migrants, including irregular migrants and especially persons who have been smuggled may 
face similar difficulties but the problem has particularly been reported in the context of trafficking and 
refugee situations. 
152 Carol Batchelor, "The International Legal Framework Concerning Statelessness and Access for 
Stateless Persons", European Union Seminar on the Content and Scope of International Protection: 
Panel 1 - Legal basis of international protection, Madrid: 2002, page 4; see also UNHCR, UNHCR 
Handbook for the Protection of Women and Girls, January 2008, page 220. 
153 “Due to the circumstances in which they are sometimes forced to leave their home country, refugees 
are perhaps more likely than other aliens to find themselves without identity documents. Moreover, 
while other aliens can turn to the authorities of their country of origin for help in obtaining documents, 
refugees do not have this option”. UNHCR, Identity documents for refugees, Note on International 
Protection, Geneva: 20 July 1984. 
154 Youth Advocate Program International, Stateless Children – Children who are without citizenship, 
Booklet No. 7 in a series on International Youth Issues, 2002, page 13.  
155 See section 1.1. 
156 Note that the inability to establish nationality is often referred to as a problem of “de facto 
statelessness”. However, recall the discussion in chapter II, section 2 of the difficulty of the 
identification versus definition of statelessness. This is exemplified by both this situation of 
undocumentation and the issue of the lack of birth registration as discussed above.  
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sanguinis for their offspring – or, vice versa, to establish entitlement to nationality 
jus soli for a child who would otherwise be stateless because this fact also becomes 
harder to establish.157 What is more, the fact of international displacement puts the 
individual in a state other than his state of origin or nationality and commonly a 
long way from home where it may otherwise have been a relatively straight-forward 
matter to secure secondary proof of citizenship such as witness testimony or 
indirect supporting documentation. This difficulty becomes more acute as time 
lapses and any evidence of a connection has faded still further. These problems 
have, for example, been reported in a number of cases of trafficking, such as among 
Polish women trafficked to Western Europe and among Thai women victims of 
trafficking.158 Yet, when surveyed by UNHCR in 2003, only half of the 
participating states responded positively to having a mechanism in place to assist 
trafficking victims in establishing their identity and nationality.159 In the sections to 
come we will see whether international law offers trafficked persons or refugees a 
suitable avenue for relieving this problem and what commitments states have taken 
on in this context. 
 
2.2.2 International (human rights) law 
 
We have already seen that international law offers little recourse to irregular 
migrants who are (threatened with) stateless(ness) and seek to acquire the 
nationality of their host state. Lawful residence is generally deemed to be an 
appropriate condition for naturalisation and possibly also for the acquisition of a 
nationality in other circumstances, even where the failure to do so leads to 
statelessness. The question is whether the international legal framework that deals 
specifically with victims of trafficking and refugees offers recourse from the same 
plight. Disappointingly, we find that the mere fact of being a victim of trafficking or 
a refugee does not affect the aforementioned conclusion with regard to the freedom 
of states to impose the condition of lawful residence for access to nationality.  
However, where victims of trafficking are concerned, the international legal 
regime may offer indirect assistance by encouraging states to regularise their status. 
The Palermo Protocol on trafficking asks states to consider  
 
adopting legislative or other appropriate measures that permit victims of 
trafficking in persons to remain in its territory, temporarily or permanently, in 
                                                           
157 Recall the “baby Andrew” case that was fought all the way to the Supreme Court in Japan where the 
enjoyment by baby Andrew of special provisions offering Japanese nationality to a child who would 
otherwise be stateless hinged on the determination of the nationality of his undocumented mother. See 
chapter III, section 3 at note 78. 
158 The related problem of establishing the nationality of any children born to trafficking victims has 
also been reported. International Law Association, Final Report on Women’s Equality and Nationality 
in International Law, Committee on Feminism and International Law, London Conference, 2000, page 
5. Some research projects are now underway to investigate more closely the link between nationality 
disputes and trafficking, for example in the Asia-Pacific region under the auspices of the Office of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. 
159 52.7% of states answered this question in the affirmative. UNHCR, Final report concerning the 





appropriate cases [giving] appropriate consideration to humanitarian and 
compassionate factors.160  
 
Even so, the state concerned is under no concrete obligation to implement such 
measures. Moreover, a temporary status – which would also satisfy this plea for 
compassion with victims of trafficking -  may not actually be adequate to comply 
with the residence requirements set under a particular state’s naturalisation law. On 
the European continent, the Council of Europe Convention on Action Against 
Trafficking in Human Beings does at least oblige states to issue residence permits to 
victims of trafficking if “the competent authority considers that their stay is 
necessary owing to their personal situation” and/or “the competent authority 
considers that their stay is necessary for the purpose of their co-operation with the 
competent authorities in investigation or criminal proceedings”.161 Nevertheless, the 
article describes simply a “renewable residence permit” and there is no suggestion 
that the status provided must be either permanent or such that it allows for the 
eventual possibility of naturalisation. 
The position of refugees is similarly ambiguous. While international standards 
remain weak and indirect on this point, there is some evidence that both the country 
of origin of the refugee and the receiving state – or even a third country - would be 
compelled to address any problems of statelessness in the context of attaining a 
durable solution, be it voluntary repatriation, local integration or resettlement.162 
Indeed, a number of the clauses for cessation of refugee status under the 1951 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees hinge on the (re)acquisition of a 
nationality where this has been lost.163 Thus, according to (non-binding) 
international guidelines, in the context of voluntary repatriation,  
 
                                                           
160 Article 7 of  the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially women 
and children. Note that no such recommendation can be found in the equivalent instrument dealing with 
the problem of smuggling - the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air. 
Together. This difference in treatment of persons who have been smuggled and victims of human 
trafficking reflects the differences between these two phenomena. In particular, it takes into account the 
notion that “In trafficking, there is a clear human victim – it is a crime against the person […] In 
smuggling there is only a State victim – it is a crime against public order”. Brian Iselin and Melanie 
Adams, Distinguishing between Human Trafficking and People Smuggling, UN Office on Drugs and 
Crime, 2003, page 3. Thus states must “clearly distinguish between trafficking in persons and other 
forms of irregular migration” for the victims of trafficking enjoy special protection and assistance that 
accompany that fact. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Trafficking in Persons: 
Global Patterns, Vienna: April 2006, pages 12-13. 
161 Article 14, paragraph 1 of the Council of Europe Convention on Action Against Trafficking in 
Human Beings. This instrument entered into force on the 1st of February 2008. It has been ratified by 17 
states and a further 22 countries have signed the convention. 
162 These are the three main durable solutions recognised by the international community, as reflected in 
– among others – successive conclusions of UNHCR’s Executive Committee. Voluntary repatriation is 
clearly put forward as the preferred durable solution. See, among others, UNHCR Executive Committee 
Conclusions No. 29 (1983); No. 50 (1988); No. 79 (1996); No. 85 (1998); and No. 95 (2003). 
163 See article 1, paragraph C of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. 
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where refugees have lost their nationality, the country of origin should arrange 
for its restoration as well as for its granting to children born outside the 
territory and, as appropriate, to non-national spouses.164 
 
Meanwhile, although there is no clear obligation upon the receiving state to offer 
recognised refugees a particular immigration status,165 where local integration is 
pursued, the opportunity to eventually acquire nationality must be present.166 It 
would seem incompatible with the overall purpose of the protection regime to never 
offer refugees a status that is conducive with naturalisation and thereby obstruct 
opportunities for local integration.167 Additionally, by asking state parties to 
                                                           
164 UNHCR, Handbook on Voluntary Repatriation: International Protection, Geneva: 1996, section 
2.6. In addition, the Handbook determines that “assurances of […] access to official documentation and 
citizenship including for children born abroad” are “core protection elements” to be included in any 
repatriation agreement with a  state. See section 3.6 of the Handbook. The idea that citizenship must be 
available upon repatriation to children born to refugees while in exile suggests that jus sanguinis 
attribution of nationality is being prescribed even if the state usually adheres to the jus soli doctrine. 
However, this would be an over-simplification. Instead, this policy derives from the notion that, where 
refugee situations are concerned, the fact that the child was not born on state territory is not a matter of 
individual choice. Had the parents not been threatened with persecution and forced to flee, the child 
would have been born within the state and it is therefore appropriate to take this as the point of 
departure for the attribution of nationality. So where children are threatened with statelessness in the 
receiving state due to restrictions on the attribution of nationality to refugee children or those whose 
parents have an irregular or temporary status, it would seem that the onus is on the state of origin of the 
parents to confer citizenship. However, for the residual caseload – those who remain behind after large-
scale repatriation – other avenues will have to be sought to avoid the (enduring) statelessness of these 
children. See also the conclusions of UNHCR’s Executive Committee, in particular No. 18 on 
Voluntary Repatriation, 1980. Numerous examples of repatriation agreements providing for 
reacquisition of nationality for refugees who had lost their citizenship, as well as for conferral of 
nationality on refugee children born in exile, can be found in Amnesty International, Bhutan: 
Nationality, expulsion, statelessness and the right to return, September 2000, section 4.  
165 The 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees does provide for the non-penalisation of 
refugees in the event of unlawful entry (article 31) – as well as, of course, the principle of non-
refoulement prohibiting expulsion or return (article 33) - but it does not clearly delineate what 
immigration status is to be offered to refugees.  
166 The 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees encourages states to facilitate naturalisation 
of refugees in its article 34. Local integration involves “a process of legal, economic, social and cultural 
incorporation of refugees, culminating in the offer of citizenship”. Karen Jacobsen, The forgotten 
solution: local integration for refugees in developing countries, UNHCR Working Paper No. 45, July 
2001, page 1. In its 2005 Conclusion on local integration, UNHCR’s Executive Committee “welcomes 
the practice in States with developed asylum systems of allowing refugees to integrate locally; and calls 
on these States to continue supporting refugees’ ability to attain this durable solution through the timely 
grant of a secure legal status and residency rights; and/or to facilitate naturalisation”. UNHCR 
Executive Committee, Conclusion on Local Integration, No. 104, Geneva: 2005. 
167 “Best practice standards grant refugees permanent residence or an equivalent durable residence 
status which is compatible with naturalisation requirements and is granted automatically upon 
recognition, thereby permitting them to naturalise at the earliest possible opportunity”. Rosa da Costa, 
Rights of Refugees in the Context of Integration: Legal Standards and Recommendations, Geneva: June 
2006, page 187. Nevertheless, this is no firm international legal basis for obliging states to adopt such 
practices or indeed to pursue local integration as a solution. Moreover, in the current climate of 
temporary protection measures and warehousing of refugee populations, prospects for local integration 





facilitate the naturalisation of refugees, the 1951 Convention relating to the Status 
of Refugees provides a possible legal basis for challenging further naturalisation 
requirements that refugees find difficult or impossible to meet, such as delivering 
proof of loss or renunciation of former nationality.168 Lastly, in the context of 
resettlement, the status provided by the receiving state should “carry with it the 
opportunity to eventually become a naturalised citizen of the resettlement 
country”.169 So the principle of the avoidance of statelessness has clearly permeated 
international policy on the response to refugees as developed under the auspices of 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, even if this is not laid down 
in binding standards specifically applicable to refugees. 
Overall, it is fair to say that access to a new or replacement nationality for 
victims of trafficking and refugees therefore remains a somewhat ambiguous area of 
international law. Does the international legal framework perhaps provide more 
concrete obligations where the verification of nationality and (re)issuance of 
personal documents is concerned? In the context of trafficking, this would appear to 
be the case. One aspect of the protection that may be offered under the Palermo 
Protocol on trafficking is the clarification and verification of the victim’s identity 
and nationality as well as the provision of travel documents or authorisation for the 
victim’s return to his or her country of nationality or of previous lawful permanent 
residence.170 These measures should go some way to ensuring that the victim is not 
left in a situation of limbo or indeed statelessness. However, the Protocol has been 
criticised in respect of the latter provisions for being “as much about the 
convenience of states as the protection of the trafficked”.171 This critique refers to 
the problem that the duty to verify the nationality of a trafficking victim and assist 
in his or her repatriation is only prescribed where the receiving state has made a 
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request to that effect. Such protection is not a right attributed to the trafficking 
victim directly so he or she is unable to demand the cooperation of the states 
involved but is reliant instead on their initiative. Moreover, the Palermo Protocol is 
silent on the procedure to be followed to verify nationality as well as on the 
question of what to do should the nationality or state of origin of the trafficked 
person remain undetermined or appear to be absent. For example, nowhere does the 
text prescribe or advise facilitated access to nationality for victims whose 
citizenship could not be verified or provide the opportunity for the victim to appeal 
the refusal by his or her presumed state of nationality to recognise and verify this 
bond. Thus statelessness is by no means precluded entirely. Meanwhile, the content 
of the Council of Europe Convention on Action Against Trafficking in Human 
Beings on this point is very comparable to the Palermo Protocol in that it has 
adopted the same style of provision to guarantee cooperation in the verification of 
the victim’s nationality and the facilitation of repatriation “at the request of the 
receiving state”.172 Only in cases where the victim is an unaccompanied child is the 
state party directly obliged to “take the necessary steps to establish his/her identity 
and nationality”.173 Moreover, similarly to the Palermo Protocol, this Council of 
Europe Convention does not offer any further instruction with a view to the 
identification or avoidance of statelessness. 
 One additional international norm that may prove valuable in this context is 
that espoused in article 8 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. This 
provision deals with the right of every child to preserve his identity, of which 
nationality is one aspect. Its second paragraph determines that  
 
where a child is illegally deprived of some or all of the elements of his or her 
identity, State Parties shall provide appropriate assistance and protection, with 
a view to re-establishing speedily his or her identity.174 
 
Although this article was drafted with the particular situation of the enforced 
disappearance of children in mind - as experienced in Argentina between 1975 and 
1983 – it is conceivable that it could, by extension, be invoked in the context of 
trafficking in children.175 In fact, the Committee on the Rights of the Child has 
elaborated its views on the importance of the right to preservation of identity for all 
separated or unaccompanied children – be they a victim of trafficking or otherwise 
– who find themselves displaced across an international border.176 Moreover, with 
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regards to any action concerning such children, the state is required to take into 
account the best interests of the child and, for those purposes, must conduct “a clear 
and comprehensive assessment of the child’s identity, including his or her 
nationality”.177 This provides another avenue for ensuring that the nationality or 
(risk of) statelessness of the child is established and that the child is supplied with 
documentation enabling the preservation of its identity.178  
 The scenario for refugees is necessarily more complicated because it may not 
be possible or advisable to immediately invoke the cooperation of the state of origin 
of the refugee in verifying or documenting his nationality. Instead, the regime for 
refugee protection concentrates on the establishment and documentation of refugee 
status by the receiving state.179 Nevertheless, the process of refugee status 
determination necessitates an appraisal of nationality status since “an applicant’s 
well-founded fear of persecution must be in relation to the country of his 
nationality”.180 It may be that the applicant is found to be stateless (in which case 
the assessment of his refugee claim will be based on his relationship with his 
country of former habitual residence).181 This means that situations of statelessness 
may be uncovered within the context of procedures for Refugee Status 
Determination.182 The nationality status of the person should subsequently be 
included in the personal documentation issued to the refugee. For instance, 
UNHCR’s own Refugee Certificates include “the name by which the refugee is 
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registered with UNHCR and other core bio-data including the date and place of 
birth, and nationality”.183  
Yet, having identified cases of statelessness – and perhaps situations where a 
person’s nationality is not clear or documented – in this manner, the international 
refugee framework does not provide for any immediate further action on this point. 
The individual simply enjoys various rights on the basis of his refugee status, 
leaving the issue of nationality to resurface when the possibility of a durable 
solution is tabled. In those circumstances, states are clearly urged – if not compelled 
– to address problems of statelessness as part of whichever durable solution is 
envisaged, as described above. At that stage, the documentation issued to the 
refugee can play a crucial role. For example, in the context of the repatriation of 
Guatemalan refugees in the early 1990s – most of whom were undocumented at the 
time they fled – the Guatemalan government  
 
never contested that those who were registered as refugees in Mexico had 
indeed come from Guatemala and accepted the registration undertaken by the 
Mexican Government or by UNHCR as sufficient evidence of their identity 
and right to return.184  
 
In a roundabout way then, the question of statelessness is being addressed in the 
international community’s response to refugee situations. Nevertheless, explicit and 
binding standards on the avoidance of statelessness in this particular context have 




This chapter covered a diverse yet interrelated selection of topics that are 
increasingly perceived to be contributing to the creation of statelessness. These 
were collectively described as “new” causes of statelessness to reflect their absence 
from discussions at the time that the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of 
Statelessness was drafted (and from the text of this instrument as adopted). The 
consideration of these issues went some way to uncovering the complexity of 
relationships between questions of statelessness and of lack of documentation 
generally as well as between immigration status and access to nationality. In this 
context, the acute difficulties involved in the identification of statelessness truly 
come to the fore. For instance, while there is growing recognition that the difficulty 
in establishing a nationality - due to the non-registration of births or loss of 
documents by migrants – may lead to statelessness, this acknowledgement has so 
far failed to result in the development of any further guidelines on how states or 
institutions are to determine where a person is simply undocumented and where an 
individual is (at risk of becoming) stateless for the purposes of applying the relevant 
international regime. This general concern was raised earlier, but it is particularly 
delicate in the context of these “new” causes of statelessness. In the following 
                                                           
183 UNHCR, Procedural Standards for Refugee Status Determination under UNHCR’s Mandate, 
Geneva: 2005, section 8.2.1. 
184 Amnesty International, Bhutan: Nationality, expulsion, statelessness and the right to return, 





chapter we will give some consideration to how to move forward and address this 
issue. The task that remains here is to draw some conclusions as to the effectiveness 
with which international human rights law addresses the “new” causes of 
statelessness and to what extent additional instruments or measures are required to 
fill any potential gaps – including the question as to the role of the 1961 
Statelessness Convention in this respect.  
With regard to birth registration we discovered that despite a clear and 
unambiguous enunciation of the right of every child to be registered at birth, in 
practice vast numbers of children do not have their birth officially recorded. This 
suggests that there is room for improvement in the international community’s 
response to the issue to date. Indeed, although some efforts have been made to 
address several of the practical obstacles that contribute to the under-registration of 
births, it would certainly be beneficial to elaborate further guidelines on appropriate 
procedures, including suitable measures with a view to tackling statelessness within 
this context. Such guidelines should bring together, clarify and build upon the 
suggestions made by – amongst others – the UN Committee on the Rights of the 
Child in its response to individual state party reports, but also take into account the 
recommendations of organisations such as UNICEF and Plan International that 
have been undertaking numerous activities to promote universal birth registration. 
Thus, the guidelines should provide for: the compulsory registration of all births; 
improvement of the reach of registration systems through decentralisation and the 
use of mobile registration units to reach isolated populations; awareness raising on 
the importance of birth registration among all relevant actors and the facilitation of 
late birth registration. It should also clarify that birth registration must be free of 
charge, thus ending any ambiguity on this question resulting from the statements of 
the Committee on the Rights of the Child. In addition, the formulation of such 
guidelines would provide an opportunity to set standards on the transparency and 
simplification of all registration procedures; the opportunity to appeal against a 
decision whereby birth registration is refused; and the proper storage of records so 
as to avoid loss or damage (for example due to conflict). Where two countries may 
have jurisdiction over the persons in question, the role of the state of nationality of 
the parents as a compliment to or an alternative for the registration procedures of 
the host state should also be clarified – a matter that is of particular value in the 
circumstance of irregular migration. With the added complexity of the situation of 
such groups as irregular migrants and refugees – where contact with one or other of 
the states involved is particularly difficult – every effort should be made to 
elucidate feasible responsibilities and procedures for these particular circumstances, 
based on a careful study of best practices in this regard. Moreover, norms should be 
set concerning the information that should be recorded, taking into account the 
inappropriateness and deterrent effect of requiring information about race or 
religion and, in contrast, the absolute necessity of establishing and recording certain 
information in order to facilitate the prevention and reduction of statelessness. The 
latter may include details such as the nationality, birthplace and country of habitual 
residence of the parents (and possibly also the grandparents). Finally, such a 
guiding document should also elaborate on the link between birth registration and 
the right to acquire a nationality. In particular, it must establish the need for – and 
details of - procedures to be put in place for identifying and remedying cases of 
statelessness as an integral part of the birth registration process. A similar project of 
 
 
Addressing the “New” Causes of Statelessness 
 189 
developing detailed guidelines could also be envisioned in relation to the full and 
proper registration of marriages - a matter that has so far attracted less attention.  
At this stage, with the head-start that the Committee on the Rights of the 
Child has in detailing the measures to be adopted to promote birth registration, the 
most effective route may be for any guidelines on the correct registration of births 
to be drafted as a General Comment to article 7 of the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child by this treaty body. Alternatively, the task could be taken on by the 
Human Rights Committee as a General Comment to article 24 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Similarly, the elaboration of standards on 
the registration of marriages could be dealt with under the auspices of a General 
Recommendation by the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against 
Women. As opposed to the creation of a specialised convention, these options have 
the advantage of both speed and simplicity. It would also be a way of avoiding any 
critique surrounding the over-proliferation and fragmentation of human rights 
documents.185 After all, the right of a child to be registered at birth is already clearly 
delineated in binding instruments, all that remains is to clarify how this right should 
be effectuated - arguably a job for the supervisory apparatus attached to these 
instruments. Yet the weakness of such an approach is evidenced in the title of the 
document produced: it would be a “General Comment” or a “General 
Recommendation” and lack full binding authority. Alternatively, all of the above 
issues could be dealt with jointly in a new UN convention on civil registration 
procedures or indeed a protocol to the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of 
Statelessness that addresses nationality issues in the context of civil registration. 
Although the process of hammering out a binding international instrument is a 
lengthy and complicated one, the contribution of such an exercise towards reaching 
some kind of consensus on the organisation of civil registration is a valuable 
reward. It would also provide states with the opportunity to fully debate such 
crucial matters as the exchange of information within the context of maintaining a 
civil register with a view to avoiding (prolonged) non-documentation and 
statelessness.  
The question of statelessness arising from various forms of international 
migration was found to be a more complex one with less clear direction being 
provided by international law. It is certainly true that “large-scale settlement 
inevitably leads to debate on citizenship”186 and with regards to immigrants 
generally, nationality policies have largely been influenced by a growing 
acknowledgement of the fact that 
 
if political participation is denied through refusal of citizenship and failure 
to provide channels of representation, immigrant politics is likely to take on 
militant forms. This applies particularly to the children of immigrants born 
in the countries of immigration. If they are excluded from political life 
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through non-citizenship, social marginalisation or racism, they are likely to 
present a major challenge to existing political structures in the future.187 
 
Nevertheless, in spite of the reality that irregular migrants remain increasingly 
indefinitely in their host state and may eventually grow dissatisfied with their 
vulnerable position,188 in the debate on citizenship it appears that the position of 
these migrants is suffering from neglect and that they are commonly excluded from 
the benefits of any relaxation of nationality policy. Their unlawful immigration 
status influences not only their own (indefinite lack of) access to citizenship in the 
host state, but also renders their children especially vulnerable to lack of birth 
registration and statelessness.189 As the irregular migrant’s overall enjoyment of 
rights presents itself as an ever more pressing agenda item for the international 
community, questions relating to their right to a nationality must be addressed to 
prevent a degeneration of a situation of dissatisfaction into one of instability. The 
UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Migrants and the UN Committee on 
Migrant Workers should take the lead in cultivating and directing this debate. These 
efforts should focus on minimising any risk of statelessness, for example by 
promoting cooperation between states, wherever feasible, to resolve problems of 
documentation. By reaffirming and working to ensure the avoidance of 
statelessness, the need to reconsider the question of access to nationality for 
irregular migrants in the host state can be allayed without compelling states to 
necessarily adapt their immigration or naturalisation policy. Nevertheless, where 
states are faced with stateless, irregular migrants, the possibility of regularisation or 
of waiving some of the conditions for naturalisation may have to be considered. 
This question, however, goes beyond the issue of prevention of statelessness and 
will naturally come up in Part 3 as we look more closely at the rights of stateless 
persons, including the right of solution, i.e. acquisition of nationality. 
The situation of the children of irregular migrants is particularly troubling, 
for although international law clearly promulgates the right of every child to acquire 
a nationality at birth, there are certain details in instruments such as the European 
Convention on Nationality that call this right into question. This has led to the 
conclusion that “illegal immigration status has emerged as a bar to acquisition of 
nationality even though it would render children de jure stateless”. 190 In view of the 
                                                           
187 Stephen Castles; Mark Miller, The Age of Migration, The Guildford Press, London: 2003 page 277 
(see also pages 253 and 287-288).  
188 In May 2006, the United States’ irregular immigrant population turned out in their masses on the 
streets of cities across the country to protest against their protracted powerless situation. “Today we 
protest and tomorrow we vote” was their non-violent plea for recognition of the inevitable – that they 
are there to stay and want to participate. It is possible that one day such non-violent form of protest will 
be dropped in favour of more militant action. BBC News, LA feels migrant day of action, 2 May 2006,  
accessible via http://news.bbc.co.uk. 
189 Any argument that irregular immigrants have brought such problems on themselves and have by 
way of their disregard for immigration law essentially committed a kind of fraud for which international 
law accepts statelessness as a penalty is untenable considering the diverse make-up of the irregular 
migrant population. This includes persons who are the victims of the heinous international crime of 
trafficking and forced migrants such refugees. 
190 Tang Lay Lee, “Statelessness, Human Rights and Gender. Irregular migrant workers from Burma in 
Thailand”, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden 2005, page 47. 
 
 
Addressing the “New” Causes of Statelessness 
 191 
otherwise unambiguous statements of the child’s right to acquire a nationality, this 
would seem to be a regressive and unacceptable development. This led to the rather 
surprising discovery that the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness 
actually appears to offer broader protection to children of irregular migrants by 
allowing only the condition of a period of “habitual” - rather than “lawful and 
habitual” - residence to be set. However, the traveaux preparatoires are ambiguous 
on this point and the Convention does not offer any suggestions as to how habitual 
residence is to be established – particularly where it is unlawful and therefore proof 
of the fact of residence may be less readily available.191 In order to settle this point 
of contention, it would be advisable for the Council of Europe to clarify its position, 
ensuring that it is guided by the principle of the avoidance of statelessness and 
indeed falling in step at least with the protection offered in the 1961 Statelessness 
Convention. Moreover, it would be helpful if one or more of the human rights treaty 
bodies were to offer their guidance on the implementation of a child’s right to a 
nationality where the child is indeed threatened with statelessness and, in doing so, 
address the question whether particular residence requirements can be set and how 
to establish when these conditions are satisfied. Ideally, the most fail-safe policy for 
the prevention of statelessness at birth would be prescribed: automatic and 
unconditional attribution of nationality at birth where the child would otherwise be 
stateless. With the right guidance as to how to establish the threat of statelessness, 
such a policy could be implemented as part of the birth registration procedure to 
great effect.  
Lastly we saw that the especially vulnerable position of victims of 
trafficking and refugees has been acknowledged and that the international 
community has taken numerous measures to afford protection to such individuals. 
As far as protection against statelessness in the context of trafficking is concerned, 
the measures prescribed by international instruments were found to be conditional 
upon the stance and initiative of the receiving state rather than securing an 
unequivocal right of the victim to the clarification and verification of his or her 
nationality status. Furthermore, the same instruments do not prescribe any 
additional steps that should be taken should the victim’s citizenship remain 
undetermined. The scope for preserving or re-establishing the nationality of child 
victims of trafficking is greater thanks to the guarantees offered by the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child. Moreover, the instruments that have been tailored to 
tackle trafficking and offer protection to its victims are very young and there are a 
number of institutions that are currently involved in the promotion of such 
standards. One of the tasks to be tackled is the elaboration of guidelines for the 
prevention of statelessness and recovery of nationality and documentation in the 
context of trafficking. For refugees, there was a similarly mixed picture. The 
avoidance of statelessness is a core value that is reflected in a number of ways 
throughout the overall refugee protection regime. However, the prevention or 
resolution of statelessness is likely to be tackled only once a solution is in sight for 
the refugee situation as such – i.e. in the context of voluntary repatriation, local 
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integration or resettlement. And even then, the obligatory nature of efforts to tackle 
statelessness is doubtful and there is no assurance that everyone will benefit from 
the measures envisaged. 
The overall impression is that the international community has already 
begun to take up the fight against the newly-identified sources of statelessness, be it 
in a conscious effort to resolve nationality issues or as a bi-product of measures to 
tackle underlying issues such as human trafficking and the under-registration of 
births. Yes, the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness is substantially 
outdated where these particular sources of statelessness are concerned - although 
with respect to the risk of statelessness among the children of irregular migrants it 
appears to retain some value as a standard-setting instrument.192 Nevertheless, it 
seems feasible that each of the “new” sources of statelessness can, in fact, be 
addressed through an elaboration on existing mechanisms, expanded involvement 
of such institutions as the UN treaty bodies and a more resolute focus on the 
specific problem of the prevention of statelessness. To attempt to combine the 
diverse and complicated issues into one instrument or supplement the 1961 
Statelessness Convention with a protocol addressing all of these “new” sources of 
statelessness would, I feel, be both unattainable and counter-productive. The 
international community’s energy is better spent in tracing, developing and better 
utilising existing remedies while the broader concern of identifying statelessness is 
perhaps tabled as an issue to be (newly) investigated by an appropriate body, such 
as the International Law Commission. This issue of the identification of cases 
where statelessness threatens, and the related problem of enforcement of existing 
remedies, will be looked at again as we move into the next chapter where overall 
conclusions must be drawn about the current state of international law in the fight 







                                                           
192 We saw that the 1961 Statelessness Convention allows states to require a certain period of “habitual 
residence” in providing access to nationality for children who would otherwise be stateless, whereas the 




INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE PREVENTION OF 
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For the best part of a century, states have sought ways to tackle the undesirable 
anomaly that is statelessness by way of international agreements that delineate basic 
rules on how nationality should be attributed so as to ensure that no-one is left 
unclaimed. First the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions relating to the 
Conflict of Nationality Laws, then the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of 
Statelessness and now a plethora of human rights instruments. The developments 
are such that basic conceptions on nationality matters have changed dramatically: 
 
Although nationality is essentially governed by national legislation, the 
competence of states in this field may be exercised only within the limits 
set by international law […] As a result of this evolution in the field of 
human rights, the traditional approach based on the predominance of the 
interests of States over the interests of individuals has subsided.1 
 
So, today international law sets out a host of measures and obligations aimed to 
protect “the interests of individuals” –  to protect people against statelessness.  
Yet statelessness still rears its head in substantial measure across the globe. 
UNHCR explains that people are rendered stateless “through a bewildering series of 
sovereign, political, legal, technical or administrative directives or oversights”.2 
This is no exaggeration: even after dividing the origins of statelessness into four 
main categories in order to deal with them more systematically, there proved to be 
many sub-categories, nuances and further intricacies that had to be taken into 
account. The foregoing chapters therefore sought to expose the ways in which 
statelessness is being created in order to assess whether the international 
community’s response corresponds to this reality. In particular, we asked how 
effective the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness is in thwarting 
statelessness (or would be if it were universally ratified and implemented) and to 
what extent human rights law now compliments or even negates the protection 
offered by this tailor-made instrument. This investigation was guided by the 
following specific research question: 
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How can the way in which international law deals with the prevention 
of statelessness be improved so as to ensure optimal protection against 
statelessness for the individual (i.e. the realisation of the right to a 
nationality)? 
 
This chapter will draw together the findings of the preceding chapters and provide 
an overall assessment of the value of the 1961 Statelessness Convention, the role of 
human rights law in preventing statelessness, discuss the gaps must still be attended 
to and consider the potential for the implementation and enforcement of all of the 
relevant norms. 
 
1 THE VALUE OF THE 1961 CONVENTION ON THE REDUCTION OF 
STATELESSNESS IN THE PREVENTION OF STATELESSNESS 
 
Designed primarily with conflict of laws situations in mind, the 1961 Convention 
on the Reduction of Statelessness is most at home dealing with the “technical 
causes” of statelessness that were uncovered in chapter IV. Eight out of the ten 
substantive provisions in the Convention address statelessness arising from a legal 
or administrative technicality. This is pursued through clear yet cautious direction. 
Clear, because the Convention explicitly details certain policies that states either 
must or must not follow in their nationality law and because, where statelessness 
threatens, it identifies which state is responsible for attributing nationality. In this 
lies the instrument’s strength: determining not only what must be done – avoid 
statelessness – but also how this is to be achieved. For example, in respect of 
foundlings, the Convention determines that the state upon which the child is found 
must grant nationality, be it a jus soli or jus sanguinis regime. Other decisive 
provisions can be found in relation to the definition of territory for the purpose of 
jus soli conferral of nationality; the prohibition of automatic loss of nationality 
resulting in statelessness as a consequence of any change in personal status 
(marriage, adoption, divorce, etc); the prohibition of automatic withdrawal of 
nationality from the dependents of a person whose citizenship is lost or deprived; 
and the non-acceptance of an act of renunciation of nationality where it would lead 
to statelessness. In fact the Convention carefully instructs states upon how to deal 
with every situation where statelessness threatens from a conflict of laws or similar 
technicality, both at birth and later in life. The Convention offers a level of detail 
and clarity that is often lacking under international (human rights) law generally, 
thereby providing helpful guidance on how to resolve these situations. 
Nevertheless, the 1961 Statelessness Convention errs on the side of caution 
by failing to provide unequivocally for the bestowal or retention of nationality 
wherever statelessness threatens. In this sense, the text reflects the sticking points of 
the debate that preceded it. Thus the Convention provides for the attribution of 
nationality either jus soli or jus sanguinis at birth to a child who would otherwise be 
stateless, but allows states to choose to delay the conferral of citizenship until late 
childhood or even early adulthood and set a number of additional conditions to be 
met.3 Similarly, the Convention prohibits the loss or deprivation of nationality 
                                                           
3 Article 1 and Article 4 of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. These conditions 
include, among others, certain residence requirements. See chapter IV, section 1.1. 
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where an individual does not hold an alternative citizenship, but goes on to 
delineate a number of exceptional circumstances in which statelessness is 
nevertheless an approved consequence.4 Thanks to such clauses, the Convention 
will only ever achieve a reduction in the instance of statelessness arising from these 
technical causes in future. However, the Convention does not promise to do any 
more than that and does therefore live up to its name.5 Moreover, by seeking careful 
compromises and finding a balance between the interests of jus soli and jus 
sanguinis states, the Convention was thought more likely to achieve widespread 
support than if it had ignored the qualms of many governments and adopted a rigid 
and uncompromising approach that encroached much further upon the freedom of 
states in nationality matters. From this point of view, the enduring low number of 
state parties to the instrument remains something of a mystery. 
A more troublesome finding in respect of its treatment of the technical 
causes of statelessness is that the Convention fails to denounce certain distinctions 
that are now considered inappropriate and untenable under international law. In the 
first place, the Convention actually employs the distinction between legitimate and 
illegitimate children in one of its articles6 – a ground that is prohibited under the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
and the American Convention on Human Rights. Secondly, although not explicitly 
approving of a gender-imbalance in nationality regulations, the Convention does not 
include an outright prohibition of gender-sensitive nationality acts. Gender is even 
left out of the list of grounds enunciated in article 9 where the discriminatory 
deprivation of nationality is outlawed. The Convention has thereby neglected a 
most fundamental international norm: gender discrimination is expressly forbidden 
in every major human rights instrument adopted to date.7 In practice these 
shortcomings may be written off as simply untidy, since state parties will 
nevertheless be held to respect such standards of non-discrimination under their 
overall human rights commitments. However, in urging states to ratify and 
implement the Convention in its present form, these shortcomings send an 
unfortunate - if not dangerous - and regressive message. 
 As we turned our attention to other sources of statelessness in chapters IV, V 
and VI, the weaknesses of the Convention began to outweigh its strengths. Thus, in 
dealing with the question of arbitrary deprivation of nationality: yes, the 
Convention outlaws discriminatory deprivation whether this is realised outside of 
the law or through discriminatory lawmaking, certain procedural safeguards are 
introduced and discrimination on “political grounds” is also outlawed (where this is 
a less clear prohibition under international human rights law). But, the article leaves 
out other grounds, such as gender, and provides no opportunity to expand the list so 
as to take into account the developments in the perspective of states on this matter. 
More problematic still is the discovery that the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation 
                                                           
4 For example, citizenship may be withdrawn due to long-term residence abroad, even if it results in 
statelessness, where the individual acquired nationality by naturalisation, has resided abroad for at least 
7 years and has neglected to register his intent to retain his nationality. Article 7, paragraph 4. Similar 
exception clauses can be found in article 8 of 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. 
5 States elected for a convention on the reduction rather than the elimination of future statelessness 
early on in the drafting process. 
6 Article 1, paragraph 3 of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. 





of nationality, as elaborated in the Convention, only appears to be applicable to 
situations of discriminatory denationalisation. While this is a major issue and 
historical examples of the mass denationalisation of population groups on ethnic or 
racial grounds undoubtedly shaped the approach taken, it has become apparent that 
the denial of citizenship can also occur in the context of the conferral of nationality. 
Consider the situation of the children of (suspected) Haitian descent who are 
refused access to birthright citizenship in the Dominican Republic. This is an 
example of arbitrary deprivation of nationality that would not be covered by the 
1961 Statelessness Convention but is nonetheless a very real, present-day source of 
statelessness. 
 The Convention then makes an admirable attempt to address statelessness 
arising from state succession, but this issue seems to have been taken up as an 
afterthought and the assessment of the sole provision that is devoted to it led to a 
perhaps inevitable conclusion: it lacks the depth and the detail to effectively prevent 
statelessness in the context of state succession. For example, while the article 
proposes to avoid statelessness by specific international agreement between the 
states concerned,8 there is no fall-back clause in case such an agreement fails to 
meet its aim. Meanwhile, if the question of nationality is not settled by treaty, the 
Convention calls upon the state to which territory is transferred to grant citizenship 
to anyone who would otherwise be rendered stateless due to the succession of 
states.9 On the face of it, this approach is straightforward and incontrovertible, but 
its application may nevertheless present some difficulties. Newly independent states 
may not be bound by this provision and where there is more than one successor 
state a dispute may arise as to which state is obliged to grant nationality to which 
persons who are at risk of statelessness. There is no mention of a right of option for 
the individual involved – a method that has been adopted elsewhere to stave off 
such nationality disputes and promote the conferral of the most appropriate 
nationality. Moreover, there is no effort to limit the freedom of the predecessor state 
(if still in existence) to withdraw its nationality and render the individuals stateless 
to begin with. Thus unless the states concerned do agree and implement an effective 
bilateral solution to nationality questions - for the modalities of which the 
Convention provides no suggestions – the solution offered by the Convention to 
statelessness in the context of state succession is unlikely to be adequate.  
 Finally, we found that since the adoption of the 1961 Statelessness 
Convention, much more has been learnt about the statelessness phenomenon and its 
underlying causes. In particular, a number of “new” sources of statelessness have 
been identified which the Convention had not foreseen: deficiencies in birth 
registration systems (and the registration of marriages) and problems connected to 
the status of irregular migrants and the position of victims of human trafficking and 
refugees. The Convention has little to offer in answer to these newfound issues, 
further diminishing its overall effectiveness as the instrument for the prevention of 
statelessness. Part of the difficulty here is that some of these “new” issues present 
an even greater challenge for the identification of concrete cases of – the threat of – 
statelessness. One critical point is where to draw the line between the simple lack of 
documentation and a case of statelessness. And since the 1961 Statelessness 
                                                           
8 Article 10, paragraph 1 of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness.  
9 Article 10, paragraph 2 of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. 
 
 
International Law and the Prevention of Statelessness 
 197 
Convention does not offer any guidance as to how a person’s nationality or lack of 
nationality is to be established, dealing with these “new” problems will require a 
substantial rethink of this difficult question.  
 So what is the value of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness 
today? It is not easy to offer one, all-encompassing answer to this question. It 
simply cannot be denied that in many ways the Convention is proving to be 
seriously inadequate to address the “bewildering” diversity of ways in which an 
individual may be rendered stateless. It is particularly difficult to ignore the fact that 
the newly emerging sources of statelessness are not touched upon at all by this text. 
As to the problem of nationality and statelessness in the context of state succession, 
since this has pushed itself to the fore and is now being taken up in a separate, 
universal instrument – the ILC Draft Articles on Nationality of Natural Persons in 
relation to the Succession of States – the 1961 Statelessness Convention can be 
excused for its flaws there. In effect, if and once the ILC Draft Articles are formally 
adopted as a declaration or convention, article 10 of the 1961 Statelessness 
Convention will become more or less obsolete. With respect to the question of 
arbitrary deprivation of nationality however, the Convention’s approach is not only 
inadequate to deal with situations on the ground, it is also severely outdated now 
that international human rights law has developed a much broader norm. Arguably, 
this article has, therefore, already become obsolete and state parties should simply 
consider themselves bound by the more expansive standard to which they are 
committed through their accession to human rights instruments.10 This leaves the 
eight detailed provisions that address the technical causes of statelessness to rescue 
the fate of the Convention. And in this, in my opinion, they succeed. There is 
certainly room for improvement in the details of the measures prescribed – a matter 
that will be considered more closely when we come to address the gaps that remain 
in international law’s approach to the prevention of statelessness. Nevertheless, the 
1961 Statelessness Convention is the only universal instrument on offer that 
provides clear and detailed obligations with a view to reducing the incidence of 
statelessness in the future.11 By consolidating numerous questions into one text it 
focuses states’ attention on the goal of the prevention of statelessness and if the 
instrument were widely ratified and implemented it would certainly go some way to 
achieving that aim. And by doing so in such deliberate detail, the text sets out 
unambiguous measures that can be readily implemented and enforced.12 Herein lies 
the enduring value of the 1961 Statelessness Convention. It should not be viewed as 
the solution to the perpetuation of statelessness, but seen rather as one valid and 
                                                           
10 See also article 13 of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness which determines that 
the instrument’s terms will be “shall not be construed as affecting any provisions more conducive to the 
reduction of statelessness” in either a states domestic or international legal commitments. 
11 The European Convention on Nationality has developed some of the norms of the 1961 Statelessness 
Convention much further, but it is important to recall that this is a regional instrument and therefore of 
limited geographical application. Meanwhile, under human rights law there is evidence of the 
development of universal norms such as the bestowal of nationality jus soli to a child who would 
otherwise be stateless, but these remain somewhat vague – for example, should this be granted ex lege 
at birth or later in life and what additional conditions may be set - and may be disputed.  
12 Leaving aside for a moment the fact that the actual prospects for implementation and enforcement are 





important contribution to the reduction and eventual eradication of this terrible 
plight.  
 
2 THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL (HUMAN RIGHTS) LAW IN THE PREVENTION OF 
STATELESSNESS 
 
Although ending on a more positive note, the above assessment of the 1961 
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness raised serious concerns about the 
protection offered against statelessness under international law. But the Convention 
is not the only source of norms on the prevention of statelessness. There are many 
other instruments, particularly in the human rights field, that have an impact on - 
the freedom of states to establish - nationality policy and play a role in the 
prevention of statelessness today. Just as “human rights standards can be used to 
help refugees by reinforcing and supplementing refugee law”,13 so too can human 
rights standards assist in tackling statelessness. Indeed we have seen that in relation 
to all four categories of causes of statelessness, international (human rights) law has 
something to say. In many areas, these alternative sources of international legal 
obligations actually compliment the 1961 Statelessness Convention, reinforcing or 
even raising the overall level of protection against statelessness on offer. 
 The most fundamental contribution of human rights law to the prevention of 
statelessness is the enunciation of an individual’s right to a nationality. From this 
basic norm, two important standards have been distilled. The first is the avoidance 
of statelessness at birth, to which end there is a growing consensus - evidenced also 
by the recent reiterations of this norm at the regional level14 and in instruments that 
deal with nationality in relation to state succession15 – that states should attribute 
nationality jus soli to a child born on their territory who would otherwise be 
stateless. Where foundlings are concerned, this same norm is further substantiated 
by a widespread state practice. The second standard that is taken from the overall 
right to a nationality is the mounting intolerance for any loss of nationality that 
would result in statelessness – whereby retraction of citizenship gained under false 
pretences remains an agreed exception.16 Yet a shadow of uncertainty still hangs 
over these two important norms as they have yet to be consolidated in a binding, 
universal text. Indeed the only instrument to translate these standards into such 
concrete legal obligations remains the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of 
Statelessness. At this stage, developments in human rights law simply reaffirm the 
approach taken in this Convention. 
 Where human rights norms first take a step beyond the terms of the 1961 
Convention is in relation to the principle of equality of treatment and non-
                                                           
13 Leonardo Franco, "Protection of Refugees and Solutions to the Refugee Problem: A Human Rights 
Perspective" in Schmid (ed) Whither Refugee? The Refugee Crisis: Problems and Solutions, PIOOM, 
Leiden: 1996, page 203. 
14 Article 6 of the European Convention on Nationality and article 6 of the African Charter on the 
Rights and Welfare of the Child – both following suit with the American Convention on Human Rights. 
See further chapter IV, section 1.2. 
15 Article 13 of the ILC Draft Articles on Nationality of Natural Persons in relation to the Succession or 
States and article 10 of the Council of Europe Convention on the avoidance of statelessness in relation 
to State succession. See further chapter VI, section 3. 
16 See in particular article 7 of the 1997 European Convention on Nationality. 
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discrimination. According to these standards, there should be no distinction 
between legitimate and illegitimate children in access to nationality at birth.17 Also 
relevant in relation to the technical causes of statelessness, is that gender 
discrimination in nationality acts is outlawed – important for both jus sanguinis 
laws and policy relating to citizenship in the event of marriage.18 In addition, human 
rights law proscribes the arbitrary deprivation of nationality which includes policies 
of denationalisation and refusal of access to nationality on a considerable range of 
prohibited grounds.19 Such policy is outlawed whether it is achieved through or 
outside of the law. This norm provides vital protection against denial of citizenship, 
although there is some need for clarification of the scope of the standard of non-
discrimination in relation to the different aspects of nationality attribution. 
Similarly, human rights law introduces a crucial defence against improper or 
arbitrary decision-making in the form of various guarantees relating to an effective 
remedy and due process20 - although, except in the European Convention on 
Nationality,21 no special provision has been made for the specific context of 
nationality disputes. 
 Recently, international law has been pulling out all the stops and developing 
detailed, progressive, innovative and thorough agreements on the proper attribution 
of nationality and the prevention of statelessness in the context of the succession of 
states. At the time of writing, these agreements had yet to enter into force, housed 
as they are in a brand-new Council of Europe Convention that must first achieve the 
ratification of 3 states and a series of Draft Articles devised by the International 
Law Commission whose future status is still uncertain. Nevertheless, the potential 
that these instruments hold is enormous and they reflect a huge achievement in the 
negotiation of practical, rights-oriented solutions to difficult nationality questions in 
relation to state succession. Where the 1961 Statelessness Convention dealt only 
with the role of the “state to which territory is transferred” and concentrates on 
international cooperation as the primary remedy, these texts diligently set out 
detailed obligations for the successor state(s) and the predecessor state. A solution 
is also offered to any emerging dispute over which state is responsible for 
conferring nationality when more than one genuine link is identified - the individual 
must be given an effective opportunity to opt for one of the available citizenships. 
Furthermore, the instruments offer:  
 
- elaborate procedural guarantees;  
 
- an expansive non-discrimination clause; 
 
- an avenue for preventing statelessness for affected persons habitually 
resident in the states concerned and abroad; 
                                                           
17 See chapter IV, section 1.2. 
18 See chapter IV, sections 1.2 and 3.2. 
19 See the detailed discussion of the scope of the phrase “arbitrary deprivation of nationality” in chapter 
V. 
20 See in particular chapter V, section 2.2. 







- a more elaborate obligation to engage in international cooperation with a 
view to resolving nationality questions; and 
 
- a fall-back provision limiting the long-term damage for those persons who 
nevertheless are rendered stateless and their offspring.22  
 
In addition, the Council of Europe Convention includes the absolute innovation of 
lowering the standard of proof for the attribution of nationality to persons who are 
at risk to statelessness due to the succession of states.23 Once these agreements have 
attained a definite legal status, they will provide an impressive tool in the 
prevention of statelessness arising from future state successions. Already they serve 
as an excellent reference point for best practices in this field that can be referred to 
by states and international (human rights) bodies alike when seeking an appropriate 
response to nationality concerns in the event of state succession. 
 In respect of the “new” causes of statelessness, human rights law goes some 
way to offering the answers that the 1961 Statelessness Convention could not. The 
right of every child to be registered at birth is recognised at both universal and 
regional levels.24 The UN treaty bodies, in particular the Committee on the Rights 
of the Child, have even begun to advise states in some detail on how to improve 
birth registration coverage and use the procedure to ensure that each child enjoys 
his right to acquire a nationality. There is also an understanding of the importance 
of – and right to – the registration of marriage, although this has yet to attract the 
same level of attention as birth registration matters. It is possible to conceive of 
measures to further consolidate these developments, with a greater focus on the 
many practical and conceptual obstacles to be overcome and on the link between 
civil registration and nationality questions, but the basic tools are undoubtedly in 
place. International (human rights) law has, so far, provided less direction in dealing 
with the exposure of irregular migrants, the victims of human trafficking and 
refugees to statelessness. For the former, the protection against statelessness is just 
one of the many questions that the international community faces in respect of this 
increasingly prevalent and extremely vulnerable group – general affirmations of the 
right to birth registration and to a nationality will not suffice. For the latter two 
categories, a start has been made in delineating various steps that could be taken in 
order to stave off problems of statelessness. These include the verification and 
documentation of nationality for victims of trafficking (with a view to repatriation) 
and establishing a commitment to resolving residual nationality questions in the 
context of securing durable solutions for refugees. However, these standards are in 
their infancy and in many instances, the success of prevention is still conditional 
upon the goodwill or initiative of the state(s) involved.  
                                                           
22 See chapter VI, section 3. 
23 Article 8 of the European Convention on the avoidance of statelessness in relation to State 
succession. 
24 For example in article 7 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, article 6 of the African 
Convention on the Rights and Welfare of the Child and in the jurisprudence of both the European and 
Inter-American human rights courts.  
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International human rights law – in the broadest sense of the term – 
therefore closes several of the gaps that are left open by the 1961 Statelessness 
Convention in responding to the many and varied sources of statelessness. An 
added benefit of the growing attention to nationality matters under human rights 
law is that it allows the UN treaty bodies and courts such as the European Court on 
Human Rights and the Inter-American Court on Human Rights to play a part in the 
development and enforcement of these norms – albeit in some instances as a knock-
on effect of the attention paid to other human rights concerns, such as birth 
registration. Nevertheless, there are some areas in which additional standard-setting 
is advisable and in the following section I will bring together and elaborate on a 
number of suggestions for ways to improve the protection offered against 
statelessness by building upon the foundations of existing legal norms. Thereafter 
we will also give closer consideration to questions relating to the actual 
implementation and the enforcement of international standards relating to the 
avoidance of statelessness. 
 
3 NORMATIVE GAPS IN THE PREVENTION OF STATELESSNESS UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SUGGESTED REMEDIES 
 
Even operating in conjunction, the 1961 Statelessness Convention and international 
human rights law are inadequate to stave off the creation of statelessness from all of 
its sources. With this in mind, over the course of preceding chapters, some ideas 
have already been tabled as to how to improve upon existing standards for the 
prevention of statelessness. Time now to review these suggestions and add some 
overall thoughts on the course to be taken by the international community in order 
to more effectively address the problem of statelessness. I submit that there are four 
main avenues that could (should) be pursued:  
 
- consolidation and clarification of certain existing international human 
rights norms and their application in the context of the prevention of 
statelessness;  
 
- further substantive standard-setting measures in those fields where 
international (human rights) norms are un(der)developed;  
 
- revisiting the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness with a 
view to updating and improving the text and promoting increased 
ratification; and 
 
- elaborating additional norms with a specific focus on the prevention (and 
eradication) of statelessness, whereby lessons are taken from the standard-
setting already accomplished in relation to nationality in the succession of 
states.  
 
These options are not mutually exclusive, but rather a set of tools that should be 
explored and carefully coordinated so that, together, they may address all of the 





 The need to consolidate and clarify existing international human rights norms 
that impact upon the prevention of statelessness can – at this stage – best be 
answered by the human rights institutions charged with advising on and monitoring 
the implementation of those norms. In particular, the UN treaty bodies are well-
placed to take on this task. The most appropriate route would then be the adoption 
of a General Comment by either the Human Rights Committee, based on article 24 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, or the Committee on the 
Rights of the Child based on article 7 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
Or, better still, the Committees could work together to create a joint general 
comment on the issue since it is one that clearly straddles the two conventions.25 
Whichever the preferred option, the document should address both birth registration 
and the right to a nationality, with an underlying focus on the avoidance of 
statelessness. It should clarify whether nationality should indeed be prescribed jus 
soli to a child who would otherwise be stateless – with particular attention to the 
position of foundlings – and delineate the method to be employed and the 
conditions that may be set in implementing this policy. As submitted in chapter VII, 
the General Comment should consolidate the work of the Committee on the Rights 
of the Child in promoting universal birth registration by elaborating clear guidelines 
on how this can be achieved. The text should also incorporate some comment on the 
prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of nationality: the scope of the non-
discrimination norm, the applicability of procedural remedies to nationality disputes 
and to what extent the withdrawal or refusal of nationality is permitted under this 
norm where it leads to statelessness. Although this route would not result in a 
binding legal instrument, it is a goal that should be relatively readily attainable in 
the short-term and it would help to remove the current ambiguities surrounding the 
interpretation of the relevant international norms. Alternatively, an independent 
General Comment focusing solely on the right to a nationality could be envisaged 
while the creation of a separate instrument devising comprehensive guidelines for 
civil registration is put on the agenda of an institution such as the International Law 
Commission. 
 In relation to those areas where international law is currently less expressive 
on the measures to be taken in order to prevent statelessness – such as in the context 
of irregular migration, trafficking in persons and refugee situations – there is a need 
for more substantive standard setting. The fundamental first step is to ensure that 
                                                           
25 This may be a good opportunity for the treaty bodies to seek to collaborate in issuing an 
interpretation of the content of international norms that can be found in more than one universal human 
rights convention. In the context of investigations into the reform of the UN human rights monitoring 
system, such substantive cooperation is increasingly considered to be a desirable direction for the treaty 
bodies to go in. If there were to be a joint general comment on the right to birth registration and to a 
nationality – or at least some form of inter-committee cooperation in the drafting process – this could 
involve not only the Human Rights Committee and the Committee on the Rights of the Child, but also 
profit from the input of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (added perspective 
on the scope of the non-discrimination norm in relation to nationality matters), the Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (input on gender issues in relation to nationality policy) 
and the Committee on Migrant Workers (consideration for the particular position of migrants, 
particularly irregular migrants, and their families). See on the question of reform of the treaty bodies the 
Report of the working group on harmonisation of the working methods of treaty bodies, 
HRI/MC/2007/2, 9 January 2007. 
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the relevant bodies and organisations begin to consider the dimension of 
statelessness in their work on these issues. Thus the UN Committee on Migrant 
Workers and the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Migrants should instigate an 
investigation into and a discussion on the access of irregular migrants – and their 
children – to birth registration and a nationality. Similarly, the UN Special 
Rapporteur on trafficking in persons could draw greater attention to the problem of 
avoiding statelessness among trafficking victims in order to cultivate further debate 
on this issue and promote a more rights-oriented rather than state-oriented solution. 
Where statelessness rears its head in the context of refugee situations, UNHCR has 
already taken the lead in reminding states of the need to address this concern at the 
moment that a durable solution to the case at hand is in sight. Nevertheless, a 
further investigation into the nexus between statelessness and refugee situations 
would help to ensure that the right action is being prescribed at the right moment in 
order to have maximum effect for the prevention of statelessness. Guidelines could 
then be developed on how to deal with this specific issue on the basis of the 
outcome of the study. Although these tasks are inevitably complex and time-
consuming, in view of its growing interest in migration-related issues generally, this 
is an opportune moment for raising the international community’s consciousness of 
this important problem and starting to debate what should be done. 
 While the human rights norms that can play a part in the prevention of 
statelessness are undergoing further elaboration and concretisation, it is important 
not to forget the tailor-made instrument devised specifically with the aim of 
reducing future instances of statelessness. In view of what we have learned about 
the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness over the course of the past 
few chapters, it may be worthwhile revisiting this text to consider how it could be 
updated or improved so as to not only boost its effectiveness, but also promote 
further accession to and implementation of the instrument. It was interesting to 
discover that despite developments in the field of human rights to a large extent 
reinforcing the norms of the 1961 Statelessness Convention, the number of state 
parties remains disappointingly low. This may be explained by the overall low-
profile that the Convention enjoyed until the mid 1990s when UNHCR began to 
actively promote accession to the instrument26 or the enduring reluctance of states 
to forfeit any of their (remaining) freedom in delineating nationality policy. Yet 
there may be another reason for its poor acceptance. If we look to the refugee 
regime, 
 
the refrain among states not party to the international refugee instruments 
[is] that the Refugee Convention and its Protocol is outdated, 
Eurocentric, and of limited relevance in dealing with refugee problems in 
less-developed countries […] there is little value in becoming party to 
the international refugee instruments.27 
 
                                                           
26 There has been a relative spate of accessions since then, with 17 states acceding to the convention 
since 1995, doubling the total number of state parties. 
27 Brian Gorlick, "(Mis)perception of Refugees, State Sovereignty, and the Continuing Challenge of 
International Protection" in Bayefsky (ed) Human Rights and Refugees, Internally Displaced Persons 





Perhaps states sustain similar objections to acceding to the 1961 Statelessness 
Convention. Thus by devising ways in which to make the instrument more attuned 
to the reality on the ground and more relevant in the fight against statelessness it 
may be possible to raise the profile of the Convention and make it more attractive to 
non-state parties to sign up. One way to achieve this would be to draft a protocol to 
the Convention that – taking into account developments in the human rights field – 
moderates the scope and application of a number of the Convention’s existing 
provisions.28 For example, it could extend the application of the procedural 
guarantees elaborated in the context of the withdrawal of nationality to all decisions 
on nationality attribution.29 It could also introduce an overall prohibition of 
arbitrary deprivation of nationality or expand the scope of the current article 9 of 
the Convention on discriminatory deprivation of nationality. Furthermore, it could 
offer states the opportunity to move beyond the commitment to reduce future 
statelessness to a commitment to eliminate future statelessness (a step that was 
premature at the time that the Convention was drafted).30 While a noble goal, it is 
however doubtful that this last measure would lead to a more widespread 
acceptance of the Convention.  
 Finally, and to make full use of the detailed discussion of each of the causes of 
– and techniques to prevent – statelessness that has been undertaken in this work, 
we must consider the possibility of elaborating a number of new norms that are 
specifically focussed on more effectively preventing statelessness. These could be 
taken up in the process of revisiting the 1961 Statelessness Convention and 
included in the suggested protocol, thereby contributing significantly to its currency 
and relevance. The most important source of inspiration for such standards is the 
progress that has been achieved in relation to the avoidance of statelessness in the 
context of state succession: 
 
If the Commission [ILC] has been able to develop techniques for 
identifying which of several states in a succession has the obligation to give 
effect to an individual’s right to a nationality, then no logical reason exists 
as to why the same techniques cannot be extended to states generally […] 
Nationality in relation to state succession is becoming legally 
indistinguishable from nationality issues generally […] This distinction is 
becoming increasingly difficult to maintain as nationality issues come to be 
regulated by international human rights norms, which do not easily admit 
                                                           
28 The International Law Commission could prepare the draft protocol using the understanding of the 
statelessness phenomenon gained from work on the Draft Articles on Nationality of Natural Persons in 
relation to the Succession of States and indeed the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness 
itself. 
29 Article 8, paragraph 4 of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. 
30 This can be accomplished by retracting the possibility to set conditions and exclusion clauses that 
allow some instances of statelessness at birth and from withdrawal of nationality later in life to slip 
through the net. These changes could either be introduced as binding or as facultative for those state 
parties that wish to move closer to the ideal of the eradication of statelessness and are seeking guidance 
in how best to do so. 
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distinction: stateless people are stateless regardless of the fact of a state 
succession.31  
 
We must therefore ask: what exactly can we learn from the measures envisaged to 
prevent statelessness in relation to state succession? In short, an awful lot.  
There are two particular innovations that could be adapted to tackle 
statelessness beyond the context of the succession of states.32 Firstly, there is a 
greatly elaborated set of procedural guarantees that could easily be transposed to 
decisions on nationality attribution generally. These include the following 
considerations: the provision of sufficient information on nationality regulations, 
the timely processing of nationality applications, the detailing (in writing) of the 
decision on nationality attribution including its motivation, the insurance of an 
effective opportunity for review and the reasonableness of fees for nationality 
procedures. The second is the introduction of the right of option as a tool to prevent 
(ongoing) nationality disputes from leaving an individual in a protracted situation of 
statelessness or uncertainty. Where a person has a genuine link with more than one 
state and any one of them could feasibly be called upon to protect him from 
statelessness, he should be allowed (an effective opportunity) to opt for one or other 
of the nationalities “on offer”. This way states cannot (continue to) defer the 
responsibility of allowing a person to obtain or retain citizenship where he would 
otherwise be stateless by pointing to another state with which the individual also 
has some connection.  
 
4 PROSPECTS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF NORMS FOR 
THE PREVENTION OF STATELESSNESS 
 
Whatever the strengths or weaknesses inherent in the current approach to the 
prevention of statelessness under international law, the success of the regime in 
actually securing the avoidance of statelessness will still be heavily dependent on 
the implementation and enforcement of those standards. This is a question that has 
largely been bypassed in the foregoing chapters, where the aim was to establish the 
potential of the existing substantive framework. Nevertheless, here and there 
problems were flagged in relation to the (lack of) clarity about how the various 
guarantees against statelessness should be implemented and the (in)adequacy of 
supervisory apparatus. Such concerns must be factored into the overall assessment 
of the effectiveness of the legal regime in preventing statelessness and will 
therefore be considered in more detail in the following paragraphs. 
 There are two main worries. The first relates to the problem of establishing 
when the relevant norms can be invoked. In order to determine whether the loss, 
deprivation or renunciation of nationality would result in statelessness – and should 
therefore be avoided in many cases – the authorities concerned need to ascertain 
whether the individual already possesses or is assured of acquiring an alternative 
nationality. Similarly, before a child can benefit from special measures to ensure 
                                                           
31 Jeffrey Blackman, 'State Succession and Statelessness: The Emerging Right to an Effective 
Nationality under International Law', in Michigan Journal of International law, Vol. 19, 1998, pages 
1175 and 1193.  





that he acquires a nationality at birth, the state must be satisfied that the child would 
“otherwise be stateless”. These circumstances can only be established through the 
determination of such facts as the nationality (or statelessness) of the parents and 
the content, interpretation and application of all relevant citizenship regulations in 
the case at hand. And the list of examples goes on. In every case, the identification 
of the threat of statelessness is critical to the satisfactory implementation of fall-
back clauses to avoid this plight.33 Thus, in pursuit of the full and correct 
implementation of the various substantive standards, some agreement must be 
reached on the procedure and evidentiary requirements for the identification of 
instances where these special guarantees against statelessness should be applied. 
The difficulty is that, as we have seen, very little guidance has been issued on this 
question of identification for the purposes of the avoidance of statelessness, let 
alone any agreed, concrete procedures or principles for states to follow.  
The 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness does not elaborate on 
how states are to establish whether its substantive provisions are applicable. Nor has 
any human rights instrument or body tackled the general question of how to actually 
implement the right to a nationality in practice - how to weigh the threat of 
statelessness. However, there is a growing awareness of the need to address this 
aspect of the problem. In the context of the developing international framework for 
the prevention of statelessness in relation to state succession we traced a few basic 
standards that may be relevant. There we saw international cooperation prescribed, 
including through exchanging information and conducting consultations, to 
establish the content, interpretation and effects of domestic nationality laws.34 In 
fact, the European Convention on Nationality provides for similar measures in a 
pair of articles that we have yet to look at: article 23 on “Co-operation between the 
States Parties” and article 24 on “Exchange of information”. State parties to the 
Convention are thereby required to share information on the parameters of their 
domestic citizenship laws, both through the apparatus of the Council of Europe and 
directly with one another upon request.35 This cooperation should be geared 
towards dealing with “all relevant problems”,36 a broad reference which would 
certainly cover the aspiration of preventing statelessness.37 The Council of Europe 
system for addressing nationality questions, does therefore provide at least one 
basic example of how the difficulty of identifying situations which call for the 
application of special measures for the prevention of statelessness could be 
appeased. Nevertheless, there is still no clear indication of how or when a state that 
is confronted with this question is to consider the presence or absence of an 
alternative nationality to be conclusively established. And although the newer 
                                                           
33 Recall the “Baby Andrew” case, discussed in chapter III, section 3. 
34 See chapter VI, section 3. 
35 The Council of Europe has compiled a central record of information on municipal nationality acts at 
its European Documentation Centre on Nationality (EURODOC), and has published summaries of such  
laws through its European Bulletin on Nationality (last updated in 2004). Note that the Organisation for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe also collects domestic citizenship – and other – legislation, as does 
the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. These can be accessed at 
www.legislationonline.org and www.refworld.org respectively. 
36 See article 23, paragraph 2 of the European Convention on Nationality. 
37 Recall that the avoidance of statelessness is also included as a general principle in the European 
Convention on Nationality, in its article 4.  
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Council of Europe Convention on the avoidance of statelessness in relation to State 
succession calls for the standard of proof to be lowered in order to facilitate the 
granting of citizenship with a view to preventing statelessness,38 it does not explain 
what is generally considered to be an appropriate standard of proof or in what way 
this burden should be reduced.39 Meanwhile, a call has gone out from civil society 
for the development of standards specifically relating to the right to a nationality on 
the African continent – perhaps in the form of a Protocol to the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights on Citizenship. Among other things, this Protocol 
should “place the burden of proof on the state in situations of disputed citizenship 
and establish the standard of proof”.40 But that is currently the full extent of the 
proposal and it has yet to be taken up by the African Union. 
So identification remains a challenge for which, it seems, domestic authorities 
and courts must find their own approach in their attempts to ensure compliance with 
international standards for the avoidance of statelessness. The danger in this lack of 
universal agreement on questions relating to the burden of proof and procedures to 
be followed is that states may, more easily, allow themselves to be swayed by other 
considerations and not just the aspiration of preventing statelessness. On the other 
hand, the dilemma of identification goes beyond the circumstances of the 
prevention of statelessness in that it is also extremely relevant to the protection of 
stateless persons. The application of a special protection regime for stateless 
persons necessarily begins with the determination of whether a person is indeed 
stateless. Thus perhaps in that context there has been a greater effort to agree 
international rules on procedures and proof of statelessness.41 Since the protection 
of stateless persons is the topic of part 3 of this book, we will soon discover 
whether this is indeed the case. If so, these standards could arguably be applied, by 
extension, to situations involving the prevention of statelessness. And if not, we 
will be forced to reconsider this point and undertake a renewed and broader search 
for plausible answers to this identification dilemma.  
The second major concern to arise with respect to the effective implementation 
of norms for the prevention of statelessness, which in fact reinforces the first, is 
this: where the applicability or interpretation of the various guarantees against 
statelessness is indeed disputed, the types of enforcement procedures and 
mechanisms that would help to settle the matter and protect the interests of the 
individual may be lacking. It is true that international law demands some form of 
review to be made available at the domestic level to allow individuals to assert their 
rights.42 However, when it comes to a subsequent international review – of 
particular utility in the context of preventing statelessness where more than one 
                                                           
38 Article 8 of the Council of Europe Convention on the avoidance of statelessness in relation to State 
succession.  
39 See further chapter VI, section 3. 
40 Open Society Justice Initiative, The Face of Statelessness: A Call for African Norms on the Right to 
Citizenship, February 2007, page 10. See also www.citizenshiprightsinafrica.org.  
41 In chapter III, section 3 we saw how the 1961 Statelessness Convention is generally considered to 
have deferred the question of the definition of statelessness to the 1954 Statelessness Convention. It is 
feasible that this issue of identification of problems of statelessness has been similarly deferred. 
42 Obviously though, it is equally unclear on what basis the court or review board charged with re-
examining the case is to decide on questions relating to the burden of proof and how the evidence 





state may be, directly or indirectly, involved in the dispute – the opportunities are 
less evident. That little international case law was presented or discussed over the 
course of the preceding chapters is a reflection of the simple fact that there is a 
distinct shortage of such case law to draw from.   
 As mentioned in the introduction to the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of 
Statelessness, no dispute has ever been brought before the International Court of 
Justice on the interpretation or application of the instrument’s provisions.43 In 
addition, we saw that the idea of establishing a tribunal to decide upon individual 
claims brought on the basis of the document was thrown out during the document’s 
drafting process.44 So it falls to UNHCR, mandated with the task of helping 
individuals to claim their rights under the 1961 Statelessness Convention, to attempt 
to promote the – correct and full – implementation of its provisions45. But the 
                                                           
43 A possibility provided for in article 14 of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. 
44 Recall from chapter III, section 3, that the initial draft of the 1961 Convention by the ILC provided 
for “the establishment within the framework of the United Nations of an agency to act on behalf of 
stateless persons before governments and the establishment also within this framework of a tribunal 
competent to decide upon claims presented by the agency on behalf of individuals claiming to have 
been denied nationality in violation of the provisions of the Convention”. Paul Weis, Nationality and 
Statelessness in International Law, Kluwer Academic Publishers Group, Dordrecht: 1979, page 255; 
Carol Batchelor, 'Stateless Persons: Some Gaps in International Protection', in International Journal of 
Refugee Law, Vol. 7, 1995, page 253; UNHCR and IPU, Nationality and statelessness. A handbook for 
parliamentarians, 2005, page 13. Again, the Council of Europe came perhaps closer to establishing a 
specialised, international body to settle nationality questions, this time on the basis of the European 
Convention on Nationality. The Committee of Experts on Nationality had a mandate to, among others, 
“encourage States, where necessary by providing them with appropriate assistance, to implement the 
principles and rules of the European Convention on Nationality in their internal legislation and 
practices and to implement other relevant international instruments in this field [and] follow up the 
steps taken by States to implement the European Convention on Nationality”. See the Specific Terms of 
Reference of the Committee of Experts on Nationality, 2001, paragraph 4 (c). However, this group has 
not met since 2005. The last plenary meeting of the Committee of Experts on Nationality took place in 
October 2004. Since then, the European Committee on Legal Co-operation (CDCJ) approved an Action 
Plan making nationality one of its main priorities. See the Action Plan of the CDCJ, 17 October 2007. 
Thereafter, the Bureau of the CDCJ approved new draft terms of reference for a Group of Specialists on 
Nationality which were adopted by the Committee of Ministers. The Group of Specialists held its first 
meeting in April 2008, concentrating in particular on the further analysis of issues affecting the 
nationality of children – including the problem of stateless children. Despite these initiatives, it is 
certainly regrettable that the European Court of Human Rights, or a special chamber thereof, has not 
been tasked with the supervision of the already existing European Convention on Nationality. The 
availability of such an advanced international remedy to promote compliance with the instrument would 
have been highly beneficial. The Council of Europe Convention on the avoidance of statelessness in 
relation to State Succession has similarly separated itself from the supervisory machinery of the 
European Court of Human Rights and instead determines that “any dispute concerning the 
interpretation or application of this Convention shall primarily be settled through negotiation” (article 
17). 
45 Recall that when the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness entered into force in 1975, 
the UN General Assembly requested UNHCR to fulfil this task (UN Docs. A/Res/3274 (XXIX) 1974; 
A/Res/31/36 1976; A/Res/49/169 1995; A/Res/50/152 1996; and A/Res/61/137 2007). See also chapter 
III, section 3. 
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agency has no power to preside over cases regarding the application of the 
Convention in the sense of a judicial organ.46 Moreover, it has been suggested that 
 
while UNHCR does have the responsibility of assisting States and individuals 
and has been requested by the General Assembly to assist States in avoiding 
statelessness, neither UNHCR, other international or regional organisations, 
nor third States can pronounce authoritatively on nationality in one or other 
State. The State concerned must indicate whether the individuals in question do 
or do not have its nationality, for it is that State which has both the privilege 
and the obligation to determine who are its citizens, according to international 
law. While organisations and other States may promote the recognition of a 
genuine and effective link and encourage recognition of these links wherever 
they exist, only the State concerned can indicate whether it acknowledges these 
links.47 
 
This perspective on the matter of nationality attribution questions the very 
suitability of the issue for international adjudication. However, while there is a core 
truth to this statement in the sense that only a state can formally acknowledge the 
bond of nationality with an individual, there is nothing to suggest that the state 
cannot be found in violation of its international commitments with regard to the 
prevention of statelessness in the same way as it can be found to violate other 
international (human rights) norms which it has a responsibility to uphold. 
 Indeed there are some examples from the overall human rights field in which 
courts and various quasi-judicial institutions, such as the UN treaty bodies, have 
been able to provide an authoritative opinion on the interpretation and application 
of the international legal standards relating to the avoidance of statelessness. The 
Inter-American Court on Human Rights is an excellent case in point and two of its 
decisions have been discussed in the preceding chapters.48 In 1984, the Inter-
American Court issued an Advisory Opinion on “the proposed amendments to the 
naturalisation provisions of the Constitution of Costa Rica”, where it had the 
opportunity to consider the issue of the prevention of statelessness. In the end, the 
decision of the Court was disappointing for it found that although 
 
one consequence of the amendment as drafted is that foreigners who lose their 
nationality upon marriage to a Costa Rican would have to remain stateless for 
at least two years because they cannot comply with one of the obligatory 
                                                           
46 Instead, what UNHCR can do is work with governments, through advocacy efforts and the offering 
of technical and advisory services, to try to ensure that the various guarantees are reflected in the 
relevant domestic legislation and that these protections are implemented properly. And in fact the 
agency has a growing track record of successes based on exactly this approach For instance, “between 
2003 and 2005, UNHCR worked with more than 40 States to help enact new nationality laws and to 
revise older legislation”. UNHCR and IPU, Nationality and statelessness. A handbook for 
parliamentarians, 2005, page 44. Examples of these and other activities can also be found in UNHCR, 
UNHCR’s activities in the field of statelessness: Progress report, EC/55/SC/CRP.13/Rev.1, 30 June 
2005. 
47 Carol Batchelor, 'Statelessness and the Problem of Resolving Nationality Status', in International 
Journal of Refugee Law, Vol. 10, 1998, 1998. 





requirements for naturalisation unless they have been married for that period of 
time [and] it should also be noted that it is by no means certain that 
statelessness would be limited to a period of two years only […the 
amendment] would not as such create statelessness. This status would in fact 
be brought about by the laws of the country whose nationals, upon marrying a 
Costa Rican, lose their nationality. It follows that this amendment cannot 
therefore be deemed to be directly violative of Article 20 of the Convention.49 
 
Nevertheless, this case illustrated that the Court was competent to consider and 
pronounce upon the legitimacy of a law that may inadvertently heighten the risk of 
statelessness. In the later, contentious case of Yean and Bosico v. Dominican 
Republic the same court did find fault with a state’s interpretation and application of 
its citizenship laws where statelessness was the result.50 The Court then ordered the 
authorities, among other things, to  
 
adopt within its domestic law […] the legislative, administrative and any other 
measures needed to regulate the procedure and requirements for acquiring 
Dominican nationality based on late declaration of birth. This procedure should 
be simple, accessible and reasonable since, to the contrary, applicants could 
remain stateless. Also, an effective remedy should exist for cases in which the 
request is rejected.51 
 
Moreover, under the rules regarding the compliance with decisions of the Inter-
American Court in such contentious cases, the Dominican Republic is actually 
required to “guarantee implementation of the Court’s ruling at the domestic 
level”.52 It is therefore far from inconceivable that international courts could have a 
very real impact on the prevention of statelessness in both general terms, through 
the consideration of domestic laws, and in individual cases by prescribing concrete 
remedies.53  
                                                           
49 Inter-American Court on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion on the Proposed Amendments to the 
Naturalisation Provision of the Constitution of Costa Rica, OC-4/84, 19 January 1984, paragraphs 46-
48. 
50 Recall that the court found “that for discriminatory reasons, and contrary to the pertinent domestic 
norms, the State failed to grant nationality to the children, which constituted an arbitrary deprivation of 
their nationality, and left them stateless for more than four years and four months, in violation of 
Articles 20 and 24 of the American Convention”. Inter-American Court on Human Rights, Case of 
Yean and Bosico v. Dominican Republic, Series C, Case 130, 8 September 2005, paragraph 174. 
51 Inter-American Court on Human Rights, Case of Yean and Bosico v. Dominican Republic, Series C, 
Case 130, 8 September 2005, operative paragraph 7. 
52 Article 68, paragraph 1 of the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights. The court will continue 
to monitor whether the ruling it has given has been fully and correctly implemented. And in the case of 
this decision, the Dominican Republic has yet to satisfy the court that all of the prescribed measures 
have been carried out. See Inter-American Court on Human Rights, Case of the Girls Yean and Bosico 
v. Dominican Republic – Monitoring Compliance with the Judgement, Order of 28 November 2007. 
53 Human rights bodies on the African and European continents have also considered questions related 
to the prevention of statelessness. Recall, for instance, the Decision as to the admissibility of Karassev 
v. Finland before the European Court of Human Rights, cited in chapter V at note 60. Another case of 
interest is now pending before the European Court of Human Rights: the Makuc and others v. Slovenia, 
Application No. 26808/06. The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights ruled on a case in 
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So the human rights framework currently provides the best opportunity for 
supervising the implementation of relevant standards for the prevention of 
statelessness. The success or failure of such enforcement methods for actually 
shaping state’s behaviour in this regard is then largely a factor of the strengths and 
weaknesses of these mechanisms generally.54 However, there is also evidence that 
the various human rights bodies are rather cautious in finding against the state 
where domestic nationality policy is the subject of the dispute – perhaps exactly 
because human rights standards do not always offer unequivocal or precisely 
detailed norms for the allocation of responsibility in individual disputes relating to 
the realisation of the right to a nationality. This prudence is unmistakable in the 
Advisory Opinion of the Inter-American Court cited above on the naturalisation 
policy of Costa Rica where the court did not, or could not, find fault with a 
proposed amendment even after it conceded that it would contribute to the creation 
of (enduring) statelessness.55 Various other cases have shown a similarly wide 
margin of appreciation being granted to states as far as nationality policy is 
concerned, even where statelessness threatens. For example in the Case of Borzov v. 
Estonia, the Human Rights Committee readily accepted that the refusal to grant the 
stateless applicant naturalisation for reasons of national security did not violate the 
terms of the ICCPR, largely on the basis of the finding that the applicant was at 
least offered a “genuine substantive review” of his case by the Estonian courts.56  
 There is one case in which the dilemma of enforcement and the 
aforementioned difficulties inherent in the lack of clear guidelines for establishing 
nationality or identifying the risk of statelessness come together: the noteworthy 
decision on admissibility in Karassev v. Finland before the European Court on 
Human Rights.57 The dispute surrounded the applicability of Finland’s domestic 
legal guarantees against statelessness at birth and therefore hinged on the finding 
that the child concerned “would otherwise be stateless”, qualifying for citizenship 
jus soli. The Finnish authorities refused to apply this provision to the case at hand 
because they deemed the applicant to have received the nationality of the Russian 
Federation at birth. The European Court weighed the evidence before it on the 
plausibility of this assertion that the applicant had gained Russian citizenship - not 
with a view to determining whether the applicant had indeed obtained Russian 
nationality, but simply in order to ascertain whether the Finnish authorities’ 
interpretation of the situation had been arbitrary. So, despite a declaration “signed 
by an attaché of the Embassy [stating] the applicant had never been a citizen of the 
Russian Federation” and only “ambiguous” evidence to the contrary, the Court 
                                                                                                                                               
1997 that concerned access to citizenship, (Case of John K. Modise v. Botswana, Comm. No. 97/93) 
and there are currently two other relevant cases pending: People v. Côte d’Ivoire and Yusuf Ali and 
others v. Kenya. In addition, consider the plethora of comments and concluding observations of the UN 
treaty bodies relevant to the prevention of statelessness discussed throughout chapters IV to VII, as well 
as a number of individual decisions, including Capena v. Canada and Stewart v. Canada, decided by 
the Human Rights Committee.  
54 A question that falls beyond the scope of this study. 
55 See above at note 34. 
56 Human Rights Committee, Case of Borzov v. Estonia, CCPR/C/81/D/1136/2002, Geneva: 25 August 
2004, paragraphs 7.1 - 7.4. 
57 European Court of Human Rights, Decision as to the admissibility of Karassev v. Finland, 





found “that the decision of the Finnish authorities not to recognise the applicant as a 
citizen of Finland was not arbitrary in a way which could raise issues under Article 
8 of the Convention”.58 The nationality status of the applicant thus remained 
unresolved. This case clearly demonstrates both the dangers of the wide margin of 
appreciation that is still often granted to states in nationality matters by international 
bodies and the ramifications of the absence of agreed procedures or rules of proof 
for the determination of nationality and identification of the risk of statelessness. 
With this in mind, the absence of a supervisory mechanism for the 1961 Convention 
on the Reduction of Statelessness is unquestionably regrettable, since this 
instrument does at least establish clear lines of responsibility where statelessness 
threatens and its provisions thereby lend themselves well for close supervision, 
leaving less discretion to states. Therefore if the international community takes up 
the challenge of improving and extending the normative framework for the 
prevention of statelessness, the issue of enforcement should be revisited and the 
idea of the establishment of a tribunal reconsidered. In the meantime, the relevant 
human rights bodies should continue to advise and adjudicate in matters relating the 
attribution of nationality and should be guided at all times by the ideal of the 




In bringing the discussion of the prevention of statelessness to a close, it is 
important to pause briefly to consider the following warning: 
 
Nationality issues are intimately bound up with the very notion of identity 
and the nation. This century has taught us only too well that we should not 
treat such matters lightly. In every war and conflict that comes to mind, 
issues relating to nationality have played a critical role.59 
 
The fight against statelessness is no trifling matter and there is no quick-fix 
solution. Yet there is an ever-growing realisation of the need tackle this challenge. 
And the international community is arguably better placed than ever before to do so 
because states have unmistakably allowed the interests of the individual to 
encroach, little by little, upon their freedom to attribute nationality however they 
deem fit.  
In fact, the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness is now just 
one of the many tools at the international community’s disposal in its goal of 
preventing statelessness. In many respects, the arduous drafting process and the age 
of this instrument are reflected in its effectiveness with the result that, in some 
cases, the Convention fails to offer unconditional protection against statelessness 
and, in others, it prescribes no remedy whatsoever. Even where the Convention 
does offer solutions, we have seen that international human rights law has 
progressed to such an extent that in some areas it supersedes the Convention’s 
                                                           
58 European Court of Human Rights, Decision as to the admissibility of Karassev v. Finland, 
Application No. 31414/96, 12 January 1999. 
59 Guy de Vel, Closing speech to the 1st European Conference on Nationality, Director General for 
Legal Affairs of the Council of Europe, Strasbourg: 1999. 
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norms. Should institutions such as UNHCR and international non-governmental 
organisations be investing their energy in advocating for accession to this 
instrument and would this energy not be better spent elsewhere? It is certainly true 
that there are perhaps more pressing or more effective routes to pursue in an effort 
to stave off statelessness today – such as promoting universal birth registration and 
further developing the substantive and procedural protection offered by the 
prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of nationality. Yet despite it not being the 
ultimate solution to statelessness in all of its manifestations, the 1961 Statelessness 
Convention remains a useful tool in dealing with the – still widespread – problem of 
statelessness arising from technical causes and, as a specialised instrument dealing 
only with the prevention of statelessness, it focuses the attention of states on this 
(too often neglected) issue. Perhaps by revisiting the Convention and considering 
the options for the elaboration of a protocol to update and improve upon the text, a 
remedy will be found to the enduring low profile of this instrument.  
Meanwhile, the sheer scale of the statelessness phenomenon and the severity 
of the situation of the stateless must spur the international community in utilising 
and developing alternative sources of standards for prevention. As the development 
of norms in relation to statelessness in the context of state succession has illustrated 
“the question is one of political will, not of undue legal or factual complexity”.60 
Arguably even more critical than addressing the gaps in the substantive legal 
protection offered against statelessness, a major and urgent task is to tackle the 
concerns raised in the context of ensuring the full and effective implementation and 
enforcement of existing norms. Now, however, we must deal with the pressing 
conundrum that follows from the observation that cases of statelessness look set to 
continue to arise in years to come: the protection of the rights of the stateless. The 
following chapters will consider this question as we look more closely at the 
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The time has come to consider the question of how much nationality matters. So 
far, we have discovered the many ways in which a person can end up without a 
nationality and we have developed a general notion that this is an undesirable state. 
But what exactly is the substance of nationality and what role does it play in an 
individual’s enjoyment of fundamental rights? In other words: are stateless persons 
missing out because of their lack of a nationality and if so, to what degree? The 
answers to these questions reveal the extent to which additional measures are 
required to remedy the vulnerable situation of the stateless. This is the focus of the 
following chapters, where the international community’s response to the enduring 
existence of statelessness is placed under the microscope and assessed as to its 
effectiveness. Mirroring the approach taken in Part II, the content of the tailor-made 
statelessness instruments is set off against the content of international human rights 
norms. Here however, attention is turned away from the 1961 Convention on the 
Reduction of Statelessness to look more closely at the 1954 Convention relating to 
the Status of Stateless Persons.1 This introductory chapter begins by considering the 
meaning of citizenship, including that generally ascribed to it under contemporary 
international law, before introducing the 1954 Statelessness Convention – the 
instrument that has been specifically designed to protect the rights of those who 
have no nationality. 
 
1 THE SUBSTANCE OF NATIONALITY: RIGHTS AND DUTIES 
 
We have already seen that nationality is a legal bond that marks the membership of 
a state and is attributed to those who, for one reason or another, are considered to 
‘belong’. But what does the possession of a nationality actually mean for the 
individual? This is a question that we have not yet covered and it is appropriate to 
do so now. An oft-repeated portrayal of the substance of nationality is that which is 
attributed to US Supreme Court Chief Justice Earl Warren in the decision on the 
1958 case of Trop v. Dulles: nationality is “the right to have rights”.2 Nationality 
                                                           
1 The full text of the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons can be found in Annex 
2. 





therefore provides not only a sense of membership - of belonging and of identity3 - 
but it also paves the way for the enjoyment of various rights.4 In the course of ruling 
on the case in question, the US Supreme Court went on to describe the impact of the 
revocation of citizenship and the condition of statelessness as: 
 
The total destruction of an individual’s status in organised society [that] strips the 
citizen of his status in the national and international political community. His very 
existence is at the sufferance of the country in which he happens to find himself.5  
 
While this is a very dramatic account of the importance of nationality, its sentiment 
has rung true and been echoed on many other occasions.6 Historically, states have 
bestowed certain rights upon their people – often indeed limiting this protection to 
members only, excluding outsiders.7 As far back as ancient Greece, communities 
reserved certain privileges for their citizens.8 Thus, “to be deprived of citizenship of 
a state, when the state is the key distributor of social resources, is to be deprived of 
the basis of other rights”.9 
  The question then arises: what rights accompany nationality? The answer is in 
principle to be found in the laws of each state. Just as we discovered that it has 
traditionally been domestic law that determines what constitutes a genuine link for 
the attribution of nationality, it is also domestic law that gives content to that status. 
It is the state, as a political community, that decides on the substance of 
nationality.10 A citizen thus holds “all the rights […] agreed upon in that particular 
state”.11 The basic contours are frequently outlined in a state’s constitution and tend 
to include both civil freedoms and positive entitlements. For example, over a dozen 
                                                           
3 UNHCR, "Statelessness and Citizenship" in The State of the World's Refugees - A Humanitarian 
Agenda, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 1997, page 225. 
4 For the full picture, nationality is in fact better described as resulting in “reciprocal rights and duties” 
on the part of the individual and the state concerned. International Court of Justice, "Nottebohm Case" 
(Liechtenstein v. Guatamala), 1953; see also Donald Galloway, "Citizenship: A Jurisprudential 
Paradox" in Torre (ed) European Citizenship - An Institutional Challenge, Kluwer Law International, 
The Hague: 1998, page 80; Ruth Donner, "Chapter 1: Nationality Law in the Context of Public 
International Law" in The Regulation of Nationality in International Law, Transnational Publishers, 
New York: 1994, page 27; Yaffa Zilberschats, "Chapter 2 - Citizenship and International Law" in The 
Human Right to Citizenship, Transnational Publishers, Ardsley, NY: 2002, pages 34-36. This work is 
only concerned with the rights accorded or accessed on the basis of nationality and the corresponding 
duties of the state in that respect.  
5 US Supreme Court, Trop v. Dulles, Secretary of State et. al., 356 US 86, 1958. 
6 Nationality is commonly described as a “necessary precursor to the exercise of other rights”. See, for 
example, Carol Batchelor, 'Statelessness and the Problem of Resolving Nationality Status', in 
International Journal of Refugee Law, Vol. 10, 1998, page 159. 
7 Haro van Panhuys, "Section X.II: The Waning Significance of Nationality in Rules Concerning the 
Protection of Human Rights" in The Role of Nationality in International Law, A.W. Sijthoff's 
Uitgeversmaatschappij, Leiden: 1959, page 220. 
8 Mija Zagar, "Citizenship - Nationality: A Proper Balance Between the Interests of States and those of 
Individuals" in Council of Europe's First European Conference on Nationality, Strasbourg: 1999, page 
94. 
9 Keith Faulks, Citizenship, Routledge, London: 2003, chapter 1, page 8. 
10 Keith Faulks, Citizenship, Routledge, London: 2003, chapter 3, page 81. 
11 Peter van Krieken, 'Disintegration and statelessness', in Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, Vol. 
12, 1994, page 25. 
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provisions of the constitution of the People’s Republic of China are devoted to the 
elaboration of the rights of its citizens including the right to freedom of religious 
belief and the right to “material assistance from the state and society when they are 
old, ill or disabled”.12 Further details as to the exact entitlements of nationals will 
subsequently be delineated in other municipal laws and policies. As a result, the 
content of nationality varies from one state to another and it also evolves over 
time.13 
 Nevertheless, there are two fundamental rights that ordinarily belong to the 
core substance of nationality. The first is the right to reside on the territory of the 
state. As a legally-affirmed member of the community, a national must be able to 
live within its borders. A citizen therefore has the automatic and absolute right to 
(re-)enter the state and to remain on its soil, offering the individual both stability 
and certainty.14 The second is a right that accompanied the introduction of 
democracy. It is the right to join in with decision-making, to participate in the 
affairs of the state: “citizenship became the legal title for exercising political 
rights”.15 The opportunity to participate is provided through the right to vote, to be 
elected and to work in public service. Nationality thus came to mean 
empowerment.16 As mentioned, beyond these two rights that are intrinsic to the 
function of nationality in this world of nation-states, many further rights and 
entitlements of citizens are laid out in states’ municipal laws.  
 An additional, important component of the substance of nationality is 
diplomatic protection. Based on the notion that “whoever ill-treats a citizen 
indirectly injures the state”,17 states have the right to protect their citizens in the 
                                                           
12 Articles 36 and 45 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, China Law no. 141, 1993. It 
should be noted that in response to developments in international human rights law – as will be 
discussed later - constitutional provisions are increasingly attributing fundamental rights to “everyone” 
and reserving just a select few to “citizens”. China is one state that is lagging behind somewhat in these 
developments. See also David Weissbrodt, Final Report on Prevention of Discrimination - The Rights 
of Non-Citizens, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/23, 26 May 2003, paragraph 24. 
13 Haro van Panhuys, "Chapter VIII: The Traditional Function of Nationality in International Law (A 
Digest)" in The Role of Nationality in International Law, A.W. Sijthoff's Uitgeversmaatschappij, 
Leiden: 1959, page 181. 
14 This right of the national corresponds to a duty on the part of the state to (re-)admit its citizens. If a 
state fails or refuses to readmit its own citizens, this may result in the breach of another state’s 
sovereignty as it is forced to continue to host foreign nationals. Paul Weis, Nationality and 
Statelessness in International Law, Kluwer Academic Publishers Group, Dordrecht: 1979, page 45. 
15 Mija Zagar, "Citizenship - Nationality: A Proper Balance Between the Interests of States and those of 
Individuals" in Council of Europe's First European Conference on Nationality, Strasbourg: 1999, page 
98. The extent to which political rights could actually be exercised by the nationals of a state is 
something that has also varied over time and from country to country – consider the initial exclusion of 
women from suffrage. Nevertheless, the legal bond of nationality has been considered a necessary 
prerequisite for political participation. 
16 Advisory Board on Human Security (prepared by Constantin Sokoloff), Denial of Citizenship: A 
Challenge to Human Security, February 2005, page 6. 
17 Statement by Vattel, considered the father of the doctrine of state responsibility that is the foundation 
for the exercise of diplomatic protection. As cited in Carmen Tiburcio, "Chapter III. Development of 
the Treatment of Aliens from Diplomatic Protection to Human Rights" in The human rights of aliens 





face of injuries committed by another state.18 The state whose national has been 
wronged can exact some form of redress. Although the individual cannot demand 
such diplomatic protection, which is a right of the state and can thus be exercised at 
its discretion,19 nationality thereby provides the gateway to another important 
measure for the protection of the individual.    
 
2 INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, THE SUBSTANCE OF NATIONALITY AND  
THE POSITION OF NON-NATIONALS 
 
Whereas the extent to which a national enjoys any rights or entitlements was once 
purely a matter of municipal law, it has now also become the subject of 
international law. The major issue to surface in the wake of the devastation of 
World War II was one of protection - protection of individuals against the arbitrary 
whims of their own government. The protection afforded by national legislation and 
constitutions had proven to be inadequate since this law was susceptible to abuse by 
totalitarian regimes and could be employed as a weapon of persecution just as easily 
as being an instrument of protection. A new approach was deemed necessary, not 
only in the interest of the individuals involved, but also with the broader ideal of 
maintaining international peace and stability in mind. It was generally agreed that 
states which did not respect the fundamental rights of their own nationals would be 
much less likely to respect the rights of other peoples and territories, thus posing a 
greater threat to international security. 20 The international community put its faith 
in multilateral legal instruments and so the human rights regime was born: 
endowing individuals with certain basic rights directly on the basis of international 
law. Every state was obliged to recognise these rights with regards to their own 
nationals.21 International law thereby began to replace (or at least set the broad 
parameters for) municipal law in delineating the substance of citizenship. 
The rights in question were termed “human rights” – a label conveying the 
sentiment that they are owed to all people, everywhere, on the basis of their 
“humanity” rather than being conditional upon the possession of a particular legal 
status such as citizenship.22 This was evident in the drafting of the Universal 
                                                           
18 “The state exercises sovereignty over its territory and over its citizens wherever they are located. 
Thus if, State A harms the citizens of State B, State A infringes the sovereignty of State B and is 
consequently responsible to State B”. Emphasis added, Yaffa Zilberschats, "Chapter 2 - Citizenship and 
International Law" in The Human Right to Citizenship, Transnational Publishers, Ardsley, NY: 2002, 
page 36; See also Guy Goodwin Gill, "The rights of refugees and stateless persons" in Saksena (ed) 
Human rights perspectives & challenges (in 1900's and beyond), Lancers Books, New Delhi: 1994, 
page 392. Ruth Donner, "Chapter 1: Nationality Law in the Context of Public International Law" in The 
Regulation of Nationality in International Law, Transnational Publishers, New York: 1994, page 19. 
19 Paul Weis, Nationality and Statelessness in International Law, Kluwer Academic Publishers Group, 
Dordrecht: 1979, page 33. 
20 Ruth Donner, "Chapter 4: Human Rights Conventions and other Instruments" in The Regulation of 
Nationality in International Law, Transnational Publishers, New York: 1994 page 186 
21 Whereas previously, a minimum standard of treatment had existed only in relation to the treatment of 
foreign nationals by the host state, protected through the doctrines of state responsibility and diplomatic 
protection; Diana Elles, International Provisions Protecting the Human Rights of Non-Citizens: Study, 
New York: 1980. 
22 This is the basis of the claim that has been repeated time and time again, that human rights are 
universal. See for instance the 2005 World Summit Outcome document, where in paragraph 13 the 
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Declaration of Human Rights, the inspiration behind all other human rights 
instruments to date: 
 
When the subject first came up for discussion in the United Nations, the 
representative from Panama remarked that ‘the rights of the individual do 
not spring from the fact that he is a citizen of a given state, but from the fact 
that he is a member of the human family’. That idea became the starting 
point for any consideration of Human Rights.23 
 
So at a time when international law was beginning to delineate what rights citizens 
should enjoy, there was a simultaneous “denationalisation” of protection which 
deeply affected the very significance of nationality.24 Rather than citizenship being 
the right to have rights, “the principles of human rights would maintain that being 
human is the right to have human rights”.25 A great illustration of this development 
is provided by the UN Human Rights Committee’s General Comment on the 
position of non-nationals under the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights. The Committee held that “the rights set forth in the Covenant apply to 
everyone, irrespective of reciprocity, and irrespective of his or her nationality or 
statelessness”.26 Indeed such observations have led many to point out that modern 
human rights norms now call into question the very relevance of nationality for the 
enjoyment of rights as citizens rights made way for human rights.27 This vision is a 
utopia for the stateless who have no nationality to rely on. 
                                                                                                                                               
world’s states declared: “We reaffirm the universality, indivisibility, interdependence and 
interrelatedness of all human rights”; 2005 World Summit Outcome, United Nations document, 
A/60/L.1, 20th September 2005. 
23 UN, Our rights as human beings: A discussion guide on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
New York: 1949, page 13. The preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights reminds us that 
it deals with the “recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all 
members of the human family”.  
24 Separate Opinion of Judge A.A. Cancado Trindade, Inter-American Court on Human Rights, Case of 
Yean and Bosico v. Dominican Republic, Series C, Case 130, 8 September 2005, paras. 7 and 11. 
25 David Weissbrodt; Clay Collins, 'The Human Rights of Stateless Persons', in Human Rights 
Quarterly, Vol. 28, 2006, page 248. See the example in Donner, The regulation of nationality in 
international law, on the right to petition: “it is granted to physical persons qua human beings, no bond 
of nationality or other form of allegiance is taken into account”; Ruth Donner, "Chapter 1: Nationality 
Law in the Context of Public International Law" in The Regulation of Nationality in International Law, 
Transnational Publishers, New York: 1994, page 14; see further David Weissbrodt, Final Report on 
Prevention of Discrimination - The Rights of Non-Citizens, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/23, 26 May 2003, page 
5. 
26 Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment No. 15: The Position of Aliens under the 
Covenant, Geneva: 11 April 1986. See also Human Rights Committee, General Comment 31: Nature of 
the General Legal Obligation imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, 
Geneva: 26 May 2004, para. 10. 
27 See among others David Weissbrodt; Clay Collins, 'The Human Rights of Stateless Persons', in 
Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 28, 2006; Keith Faulks, Citizenship, Routledge, London: 2003; 
Vincenzo Ferrari, "Citizenship: Problems, Concepts and Policies" in Torre (ed) European Citizenship - 
An Institutional Challenge, Kluwer Law International, The Hague: 1998; Richard Lillich, The human 
rights of aliens in contemporary international law, Manchester University Press, Manchester: 1984; 
Bard-Anders Andreassen, "Human Rights for Non-Citizens. Migrant Workers and the Trespassing of 





If this were the case across the board – if human rights law did indeed 
guarantee and ensure the enjoyment of the full spectrum of rights for all people – 
the protection of the rights of the stateless would need no special provision. There 
would be no such thing as a gap in international protection in this regard, since each 
denial of rights would amount to an infringement of human rights obligations, 
whether committed against a national or a non-national. However, this conclusion is 
premature. Although the aim of the human rights regime was to circumvent the 
question of nationality to the extent that basic rights were granted to all individuals 
via international law, it did not intend to eliminate the need for a nationality 
entirely.28 In particular, considerations of sovereignty and the need to respect the 
integrity of states ensured that nationality retained its place and importance. After 
all, it cannot be ignored that the world is organised into individual, sovereign states 
which each comprise a territory and a body of nationals for whom they are 
responsible.29 So, while the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the human 
rights instruments adopted in its wake grant each and every right that they contain 
to all persons everywhere, certain rights can only be exercised in relation to the 
country of citizenship.30 For example, human rights law includes political rights 
such as the right to vote but these rights are guaranteed only with respect to the state 
of nationality.31  
Therefore, while human rights instruments have at least “confined the 
rights afforded solely to citizens within a very short list”,32 in reality there are 
numerous ways in which the enjoyment of human rights by non-nationals may 
                                                                                                                                               
Salzburg: 1984; Guy Goodwin-Gill, "The Rights of Refugees and Stateless Persons" in Saksena (ed) 
Human Rights Perspectives & Challenges (in 1900's and beyond), Lancers Books, New Delhi: 1994.  
28 Ruth Donner, "Chapter 4: Human Rights Conventions and other Instruments" in The Regulation of 
Nationality in International Law, Transnational Publishers, New York: 1994, page 183-186. 
29 While the “draft [Universal] Declaration considers man as an isolated individual […] this Declaration 
does not meet reality because man cannot be considered as an isolated entity. He is a member of certain 
communities and the concept of the individual man is contrary to social reality”. Statement made by 
Yugoslavia at the plenary session of the General Assembly during the final debate on the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. In UN, Our rights as human beings: A discussion guide on the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, New York: 1949, page 28. For further treatment of the “struggle between 
the universal and the particular, between the principles of human rights and the sovereignty of a 
concrete people”, see Seyla Benhabib, Transformations of Citizenship - Dilemmas of the Nation State in 
the Era of Globalisation, Koniklijke van Gorcum, Assen: 2001; See also Keith Faulks, Citizenship, 
Routledge, London: 2003. 
30 Indeed we also see a number of provisions and instruments geared especially to the rights of (certain 
groups of) non-nationals, including the UN Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals Who are 
not Nationals of the Country in which They Live and the Convention on the Protection of the Rights of 
all Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families. These norms exemplify the notion that human 
rights are not just rights between states and their own nationals. 
31 See article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and article 25 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. There are other examples of human rights norms that explicitly 
permit distinctions between nationals and non-nationals, such where the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights allows developing countries to “determine to what extent they 
would guarantee the economic rights recognised in the present Covenant to non-nationals” taking into 
account the country’s economic situation. This provision is found in Article 2, paragraph 3 of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
32 Yaffa Zilberschats, "Chapter 2 - Citizenship and International Law" in The Human Right to 
Citizenship, Transnational Publishers, Ardsley, NY: 2002, page 34. 
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differ from that of nationals, both through divergence in the applicability of legal 
norms and through state practice. As long as every individual holds a nationality, 
the universality of these documents remains intact: everyone can enjoy these rights 
in relation to at least one country, so no one is excluded. This was a strong 
argument for including a right to a nationality among the human rights norms 
espoused in the Universal Declaration and other instruments.33 Indeed human rights 
bodies still admit that: 
 
[Nationality] is one of the most important rights of man, after the right to 
life itself, because all other prerogative guarantees and benefits man 
derives from his membership in a political and social community – the 
states – stem from or are supported by this right.34 
 
If the right to a nationality were fully realised, then no one would be without this 
legal bond and denied the enjoyment of the related rights. However, as we have 
seen, the full realisation of the right to a nationality for all is still a long way off. In 
practice then, the existence of statelessness interferes with the universal ambition of 
the human rights regime. In the absence of any special provision for their situation, 
such persons who lack the formal bond of nationality with any state are excluded 
outright from the enjoyment of certain human rights.35  
Moreover, the equal enjoyment of rights by nationals and non-nationals is 
not an absolute norm as David Weissbrodt, UN Special Rapporteur on the rights of 
non-citizens, explains: 
 
The architecture of international human rights law is built on the premise 
that all persons, by virtue of their essential humanity, should enjoy all 
human rights unless exceptional distinctions, for example, between citizens 
and non-citizens, serve a legitimate State objective and are proportional to 
the achievement of that objective.36 
 
Thus, although the general principles of “non-discrimination, together with equality 
before the law and equal protection of the law without any discrimination” are 
absolutely central to the human rights system as a whole,37 distinctions between 
                                                           
33 Paragraph 1 of Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights reads: “Everyone has the 
right to a nationality”. 
34 Inter-American Commission for Human Rights, Third report on the situation of human rights in 
Chile, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.40, doc. 10, 1977, as cited in Open Society Justice Initiative, Written Comments 
on the Case of Dilcea Yean and Violeta Bosico v. Dominican Republic, New York: April 2005, page 
20. 
35 It should be noted that the position of migrants may also cause some concern from the point of view 
of human rights protection as they may not practicably be in a position to exercise all of their rights. 
However, their position can be resolved by their return to their state of nationality - admittedly an 
unfeasible option in the case of forced migrants and refugees - whereas that of the stateless requires the 
(re)instatement of citizenship. 
36 Emphasis added. David Weissbrodt, Final Report on Prevention of Discrimination - The Rights of 
Non-Citizens, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/23, 26 May 2003, para. 6. 
37 UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment 18: Non-discrimination, Geneva: 10 November 





nationals and non-nationals are not necessarily outlawed under these standards. 
Indeed, it has been said that one of “today’s issues [is] the validity of the concept of 
alienage as a basis for discrimination in the protection of human rights”.38 And it is 
a pondering that cannot be immediately satisfied. On the one hand, for instance, the 
Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination does not cover 
“distinctions, exclusions, restrictions or preferences made by a State Party to this 
Convention between citizens and non-citizens”.39 On the other hand, the Committee 
charged with overseeing the Convention declared that “human rights are, in 
principle, to be enjoyed by all persons [and] States parties are under an obligation to 
guarantee equality between citizens and non-citizens in the enjoyment of these 
rights to the extent recognised under international law”.40 The same Committee 
subsequently added that 
 
under the Convention, differential treatment based on citizenship or 
immigration status will constitute discrimination if the criteria for such 
differentiation, judged in the light of the objectives and purposes of the 
Convention, are not applied pursuant to a legitimate aim, and are not 
proportional to the achievement of this aim.41  
 
Whether a distinction based on citizenship would pass muster or not therefore 
depends on the specific circumstances at hand – which instrument, which right, 
which facts - and is not by definition prohibited. As such, the position of the 
stateless may still be precarious. As we look more closely at different (categories 
of) rights over the course of the upcoming chapters, the extent to which the 
principles of equality and non-discrimination accept distinctions between citizens 
and non-citizens is a factor that must be taken into account.  
In view of all of the foregoing it seems that in spite of the development of a 
comprehensive set of international human rights standards, nationality may not have 
lost its relevance in today’s world. This means that – barring special remedies - the 
stateless may in fact find themselves in a protection gap as far as the enjoyment of 
rights is concerned. The challenge in the chapters to come is to find out exactly 
which rights are reliant on the bond of nationality for their (full) enjoyment 
                                                           
38 Guy Goodwin-Gill, 'International Law and Human Rights: Trends Concerning International Migrants 
and Refugees', in International Migration Review, Vol. 23, 1989, page 546. A main reason for the 
current pertinence of this question is the fact that, according the International Organisations for 
Migration, “more people are on the move today than at any other point in human history”. It is 
estimated that three percent of the world’s population, or 192 million people are migrants. See for more 
information and up to date statistics on modern migration http://www.iom.int. 
39 Article 1, paragraph 2 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. 
40 UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General Recommendation 30: 
Discrimination against Non-citizens, CERD/C/64/Misc.11/Rev.3, 2004, paragraph 3. Note that this 
recommendation has been described as building upon “all the previous protections for non-citizens and 
their interpretations not only by the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, but also by 
the Human Rights Committee and other human rights institutions” and providing “a comprehensive 
elaboration of the human rights of non-citizens as a guide to all countries and particularly those that 
have ratified the Convention”. Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, “The Rights of 
Non-citizens”, prepared by David Weissbrodt, Geneva 2006. 
41 UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General Recommendation 30: 
Discrimination against Non-citizens, CERD/C/64/Misc.11/Rev.3, 2004, paragraph 4. 
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according to current human rights law. In contrast, we must identify which rights 
are or may (to some extent) be restricted to citizens only. The work that has been 
done to date to document the difference in treatment between nationals and non-
nationals under human rights law - by scholars such as Lillich, Tiburcio and 
Weissbrodt42 - provides an invaluable source of information in this respect. The 
situation of the non-national is by and large representative of the stateless since, to 
put it plainly, stateless persons are non-nationals everywhere.  
Nevertheless, the fact that the stateless are non-nationals everywhere adds a 
particular dimension to their plight that should not be overlooked. This makes them 
an “extremely vulnerable group of non-citizens”.43 It has been said of the refugee 
that he is 
 
an alien in any and every country to which he may go. He does not have 
the last resort which is always open to the ‘normal alien’ – return to his 
own country. The man who is everywhere an alien has to live in unusually 
difficult material and psychological conditions […] Moreover, the refugee 
is not only an alien wherever he goes, he is also an ‘unprotected alien’ in 
the sense that he does not enjoy the protection of his country of origin.44  
 
This dire predicament indeed befalls the refugee since the factual situation in the 
country of origin prevents him from returning home to exercise his rights as a 
national or calling in the assistance of his home country. However, where the 
stateless are concerned this fate is sealed in legal terms – only to be resolved 
through the attribution or restoration of the bond of nationality. Thus we must go 
further than scouring human rights law for any difference in treatment between 
nationals and non-nationals, we must also consider whether special provision is 
made for the situation of the stateless as non-nationals everywhere. In other words, 
we must reflect on whether the differentiation in treatment is indeed applicable to 
the particular situation of the stateless and whether this is in fact justifiable.45  
 
3 THE 1954 CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF STATELESS PERSONS 
 
Out on the periphery of the human rights field as we know it, is a little-regarded 
instrument that was specially devised to protect the rights of the stateless: the 1954 
Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons. Even as work was being 
completed on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the path was being 
laid for the future protection of all persons under international human rights law, the 
international community was second-guessing the effectiveness of this approach in 
                                                           
42 Richard Lillich, The human rights of aliens in contemporary international law, Manchester 
University Press, Manchester: 1984 ; Carmen Tiburcio, The human rights of aliens under international 
and comparative law, Kluwer Law International, The Hague: 2001 ; David Weissbrodt, Final Report 
on Prevention of Discrimination - The Rights of Non-Citizens, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/23, 26 May 2003.  
43 David Weissbrodt, Final Report on Prevention of Discrimination - The Rights of Non-Citizens, 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/23, 26 May 2003, Add.3, para. 7. 
44 Communication from the International Refugee Organisation to the Economic and Social Council, 
UN Doc. E/1392, 11 July 1949, App. I, as cited in James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under 
International Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 2005, page 84. 





dealing with the massive humanitarian tragedy that had already unfolded. The 
implementation of international obligations and realisation of these international 
rights would still be reliant on the system of nation-states. As Hannah Arendt has 
vividly described: 
 
The rights of man had been defined as ‘inalienable’ because they were 
supposed to be independent of all governments, but it turned out that the 
moment human beings lacked their own government and had to fall back 
upon their minimum rights, no authority was left to protect them and no 
institution was willing to guarantee them.46 
 
At that time there were vast numbers who were not in a position to rely on national 
protection47 - millions of people who had become displaced by the Second World 
War or spontaneously found themselves residing in the territory of a different state 
because borders had been redrawn. Among these people, and others, some even 
found themselves stripped of the legal bond with their state thanks to 
denationalisation decrees or the legal consequences of state succession. Collectively 
known simply as the “unprotected”, this destitute group presented the international 
community and the host countries with a serious challenge: who was to be 
responsible for their well-being, which rights could they rely on and to whom could 
they turn for protection? Such questions prompted the Economic and Social Council 
of the newly founded United Nations to commission a comprehensive study of the 
situation of the “stateless” on the grounds of which action could then be taken.48  
As we briefly touched upon in chapter II, the Study of Statelessness marked 
the beginning of the process of according the stateless person - and the refugee - an 
independent definition and legal status. It was completed by the Secretary General 
in 1949 and, following its recommendation, an Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness 
and Related Problems was established with the mandate of determining whether a 
new international instrument was needed to ensure the protection of both stateless 
persons and refugees.49 This Committee decided that a convention was indeed 
desirable and set about the job of compiling a Draft Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees and a Protocol thereto Relating to the Status of Stateless 
Persons.50 In 1951, a conference of plenipotentiaries unanimously adopted the 
                                                           
46 Hannah Arendt, "The Decline of the Nation-State and the End of the Rights of Man" in The origins of 
totalitarianism, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York: 1948, pages 291-292.  
47 Carol Batchelor, 'Stateless Persons: Some Gaps in International Protection', in International Journal 
of Refugee Law, Vol. 7, 1995 page 239 
48 UN, A Study of Statelessness, E/1112, New York: August 1949 
49 The Study of Statelessness was not in fact limited to considering statelessness as it is defined today. It 
included an assessment of the situation of other “unprotected persons”, in particular refugees. Until 
then, the terms “stateless” and “refugee” were employed relatively indiscriminately to describe a person 
who could not rely on the protection of a state – both concepts had yet to be cordoned off. Nehemiah 
Robinson, Convention relating to the status of stateless persons - Its history and interpretation, 
UNHCR, Geneva: 1955 Page 1 
50 The preamble to the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons would later explain 
that while reaffirming “the principle that human beings shall enjoy fundamental rights and freedoms 
without discrimination”, further international agreement is needed “to assure stateless persons the 
widest possible exercise of these fundamental rights and freedoms”. 
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Convention relating to the Status of Refugees.51 The accompanying Draft Protocol 
on the Status of Stateless Persons was referred back to the General Assembly.52 The 
refugee and the stateless person, who until then had “walked hand in hand”53, thus 
embarked on diverging paths when the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of 
Stateless Persons was adopted by a second conference of plenipotentiaries some 
three years after the 1951 Refugee Convention.54 However, the content of the 
Refugee Convention remained the point of departure in deciding which rights were 
to be granted to stateless persons. Consequently, the text of the 1954 Statelessness 
Convention closely resembles that of the 1951 Refugee Convention, with a number 
of exceptions where articles were either omitted, added or slightly modified. 
Indeed, in drafting the Statelessness Convention, “the prevailing view of the 
conference was that for a practical consideration (time) they should not engage in 
rewording the text of the Refugee Convention, except when this was justified by the 
difference between the two groups (refugees vs. stateless persons)”.55 In technique 
as well as in substance then, the two Conventions are highly similar and their 
parallel development has definitely left its mark. One helpful significance of this 
finding is that it allows us to also turn to reports and commentaries on the Refugee 
Convention to better understand the content of this 1954 Statelessness 
Convention.56  
According to the “Information and Accession Package” which is used to 
promote ratification of the convention, the 1954 Convention is 
 
                                                           
51 Hereafter referred to as the 1951 Refugee Convention. 
52 The decision to delay consideration of the Protocol – motivated by the time pressure to adopt an 
instrument to deal with refugees before the International Refugee Organisation was definitively 
dissolved - has had far-reaching consequences for the legal protection offered. The International 
Refugee Organisation (IRO) was established in 1947 and carried out the role of offering assistance to 
refugees until it was replaced by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in 
1951 alongside the adoption of the 1951 Refugee Convention; Carol Batchelor, 'Stateless Persons: 
Some Gaps in International Protection', in International Journal of Refugee Law, Vol. 7, 1995 page 243 
53 Guy Goodwin Gill, "The rights of refugees and stateless persons" in Saksena (ed) Human rights 
perspectives & challenges (in 1900's and beyond), Lancers Books, New Delhi: 1994 page 389 
54 In the intervening period it became increasingly clear that the provisions relating to statelessness 
could no longer feasibly form a protocol to the Refugee Convention and so the document under 
consideration became a draft convention in its own right. It became obvious for example, that the rights 
which were to be bestowed on stateless persons were not entirely identical to the rights which were 
granted to refugees on the basis of the 1951 Refugee Convention and a protocol could not easily reflect 
the desired deviations. See further Nehemiah Robinson, Convention relating to the status of stateless 
persons - Its history and interpretation, UNHCR, Geneva: 1955 Page 4-5 
55 Nehemiah Robinson, Convention relating to the status of stateless persons - Its history and 
interpretation, UNHCR, Geneva: 1955, page 25. 
56 In particular, the 2005 work by James Hathaway offers an in depth analysis of the content and scope 
of the substantive rights of the 1951 Refugee Convention – as well as any counterpart guarantees under 






the primary international instrument adopted to date to regulate and 
improve the legal status of stateless persons and to ensure to stateless 
persons fundamental rights and freedoms without discrimination.57 
 
To achieve this aim, the convention employs the same technique as the Refugee 
Convention: the individuals deserving of this protection are adorned the legal status 
of “stateless person”. This status qualifies them for the guarantees that are laid out 
in the convention. The 1954 Statelessness Convention therefore opens with the 
official, internationally endorsed definition of statelessness:58 
 
The term “stateless person” means a person who is not considered as a 
national by any state under the operation of its law.59  
 
After defining statelessness the 1954 Statelessness Convention goes straight on to 
delineate the rights - and duties - that accompany this newly created legal status.60 
The instrument does not spare any words on indicating how states are to undertake 
the process of identifying stateless persons for the purposes of applying the 
Convention’s guarantees. No guidance is given as to the procedures by which the 
definition should be applied or where proof is to be sought of the satisfaction of the 
criteria outlined.61 Just as we found for the 1961 Statelessness Convention, it is left 
entirely to states to organise the identification of cases which call for the 
implementation of these special protections. The prospects for a harmonised 
approach are therefore poor. And indeed, when surveyed, half of the respondent 
states reported having neither a specialised procedure for identifying cases of 
statelessness nor a mechanism for identifying stateless persons within the context of 
                                                           
57 UNHCR, Information and accession package: the 1954 Convention relating to the status of stateless 
persons and the 1961 Convention on the reduction of statelessness, Geneva: January 1999, page 10. 
58 It is interesting to note that the original Draft Protocol to the Refugee Convention on the Status of 
Stateless Persons neglected to include a definition of statelessness which would have made the uniform 
application of its provisions impossible. Without a definition of a “stateless person” it would have been 
entirely for each state to decide whether an individual qualified for the protection offered under the 
Convention and what criteria would be used to make this determination. Nehemiah Robinson, 
Convention relating to the status of stateless persons - Its history and interpretation, UNHCR, Geneva: 
1955, page 11. 
59 Article 1, 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons. For a full discussion of this 
definition of statelessness, see chapter II, section 4. Note further that the convention imitates the 1951 
Refugee Convention again here by going on to exclude certain (groups of) persons from its scope of 
application including persons who are already receiving assistance from a United Nations agency other 
than the UNHCR, persons who are effectively treated as nationals by the country in which they reside 
and persons who have committed one of a variety of serious crimes. See on these grounds for exclusion 
Carol Batchelor The 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons: Implementation 
within the European Union Member States and Recommendations for Harmonisation 2004, pages 15-
17. 
60 Indeed it starts by determining that “every stateless person has duties to the country in which he finds 
himself”. Article 2 of the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons. Rather than 
requiring a far-reaching allegiance to that state, the duties of the stateless person are restricted to 
conforming to its laws and refraining from disturbing public order. 
61 UNHCR and IPU, Nationality and statelessness. A handbook for parliamentarians, 2005, page 19. 
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asylum procedures.62 This is likely to seriously impede the actual recognition as a 
stateless person and subsequently the enjoyment of any other rights emanating from 
the 1954 Statelessness Convention.  
Some 30 provisions of the 1954 Statelessness Convention are then devoted to 
the improvement of the status of stateless persons by setting out a minimum 
standard of treatment for the stateless to enjoy, without discrimination.63 There are 
two central observations to be made on how these substantive rights have been 
elaborated. The first is that not all of the rights are actually granted to all stateless 
persons. Eligibility for a particular entitlement is rendered further dependent on the 
relationship between the stateless person and the state in which he wishes to 
exercise that right. The Convention delineates five “levels of attachment” that the 
stateless person may enjoy in relation to the state.64 The weakest level of attachment 
is simply being subject to the state’s jurisdiction. From this position, a stateless 
person is guaranteed such rights as access to courts and education – assuming, of 
course, that his status as a stateless person has been established.65 Thereafter, in 
order of strengthening attachment, the four other levels are: physical presence, 
lawful presence, lawful stay and durable residence. Thus a stateless person is, for 
example, entitled to identity papers and the freedom of religion in the state in which 
he is physically present, but only when such presence is also lawful is the freedom 
of movement within the state guaranteed.66 Finally, as the connection between the 
individual and the state develops further and there is lawful stay or even durable 
                                                           
62 UNHCR, Final report concerning the Questionnaire on statelessness pursuant to the Agenda for 
Protection, Geneva: March 2004, pages 26-27. 
63 Article 3 of the 1954 Statelessness Convention provides for the application of the non-discrimination 
principle to the guarantees offered under this instrument. For a discussion of this provision see 
Nehemiah Robinson, Convention relating to the status of stateless persons - Its history and 
interpretation, UNHCR, Geneva: 1955, pages 24-28. Meanwhile, article 5 determines that “nothing in 
this Convention shall be deemed to impair any rights and benefits granted by a Contracting State to 
stateless persons apart from this Convention” confirming that it sets out minimum standards beyond 
which states are free to extend additional protection and rights to (groups of) stateless persons. Brian 
Gorlick, Human Rights and Refugees: Enhancing Protection through International Human Rights Law, 
Geneva: October 2000, page 7; See also Nehemiah Robinson, Convention relating to the status of 
stateless persons - Its history and interpretation, UNHCR, Geneva: 1955, page 27. 
64 The system whereby rights are granted in accordance with the level of attachment to the state is 
identical to that adopted in the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. This is outlined in 
detail in James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge: 2005, pages 156-192. This “level of attachment” technique has also been referred to 
as the “criteria for entitlement”. Guy Goodwin-Gill; Jane McAdam, The refugee in international law, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford: 2007, pages 524-528. 
65 Access to courts is guaranteed in article 16, paragraph 1 and the right to education in article 22 of the 
1954 Statelessness Convention. Other rights that are granted to all stateless persons within a state’s 
jurisdiction are: “non-discrimination” (article 3), “moveable and immoveable property” (article 13), 
“rationing” (article 20), “fiscal charges” (article 29) and “naturalisation” (article 32). 
66 The right to identity papers is found in article 27 and the freedom of religion in article 3 of the 1954 
Statelessness Convention. Both articles delineate that contracting states must accord those rights to 
“stateless persons within their territories”. The right to freedom of movement and choice of place of 
residence need only be guaranteed by a contracting state to “stateless persons lawfully in its territory”. 





residence, the stateless person will gain access to additional rights.67 The 
entitlement of a stateless person to the rights offered by the 1954 Statelessness 
Convention is therefore largely dependent on his status and the connection that he 
enjoys with the state in question. The possession, for example, of an irregular 
immigration status severely curtails the enjoyment of rights under this instrument. 
This aspect of the regime must be taken into account later as we discuss the 
effectiveness of the Convention in protecting the various rights of the stateless. 
The second essential observation with regard to the scope of the substantive 
rights in the 1954 Statelessness Convention is that the level of protection offered 
differs from one right to another. Under the Convention there are basically three 
levels of protection or “standards of treatment”: treatment at least as favourable as 
that accorded to aliens generally, treatment on a par with nationals and absolute 
rights.68 Thus stateless persons are entitled to the same level of enjoyment of such 
rights as self-employment and the right to housing as is attributed to aliens 
generally, although more favourable treatment is encouraged.69 This is, in fact, the 
minimum standard of treatment ascribed to stateless persons under the 1954 
Statelessness Convention: its article 7, paragraph 1 determines that  
 
except where this Convention contains more favourable provisions, a 
Contracting State shall accord to stateless persons the same treatment as is 
accorded to aliens generally.70  
                                                           
67 These include, among others “wage-earning employment” (article 17) and “travel documents” (article 
28) to which “stateless persons lawfully staying” in a state’s territory are entitled and “artistic rights and 
industrial property” (article 14) which must be guaranteed to the stateless person “in the country in 
which he has his habitual residence”. So-called “durable residence” refers to the additional criterion – 
alongside lawful stay – of a certain period of residence in a state. Thus article 7, paragraph 2 accords 
stateless persons exemption from legislative reciprocity after three years residence in the territory of a 
contracting state. Note that article 10 of the 1954 Statelessness Convention, on “continuity of 
residence” provides a special guarantee for the establishment of residence status or duration for those 
stateless persons who were forcibly displaced during World War II – sixty years on, this provision has 
become obsolete. See Nehemiah Robinson, Convention relating to the status of stateless persons - Its 
history and interpretation, UNHCR, Geneva: 1955, pages 46-47. 
68 This is the language used by Hathaway to describe the same system in the 1951 Refugee Convention. 
It should be noted that the Refugee Convention in fact has four standards of treatment – the fourth 
being the standard extended by the state to most-favoured nationals. This does not however feature in 
the 1954 Statelessness Convention where the two rights in question (association and wage-earning 
employment) demand treatment at least as favourable as non-nationals generally. For standards of 
treatment in the Refugee Convention, see James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International 
Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 2005, pages 228-238; Guy Goodwin-Gill; Jane 
McAdam, The refugee in international law, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 2007, pages 509-510.  
69 The right to property (article 13), the right to self-employment (article 18) and the right to housing 
(article 21) feature among the provisions that demand “treatment as favourable as possible and, in any 
event, not less favourable than that accorded to aliens generally in the same circumstances”. Note that 
the encouragement to accord treatment as favourable as possible “imposes a duty on states to consider 
in good faith the exemption of [stateless persons] from even rules applied generally to non-citizens”. 
James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge: 2005, page 526. 
70 Note that under article 6 of the 1954 Statelessness Convention, where stateless persons are provided 
treatment on a par with non-nationals generally, “in the same circumstances”, they are exempted from 
meeting requirements “which by their nature a stateless person is incapable of fulfilling”. See 
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But with regard to other rights, such as rationing, education and freedom of 
religion, the Convention sets a higher standard by demanding that stateless persons 
be afforded “the same treatment as is accorded to nationals”.71 Among the absolute 
rights - those which are not contingent upon the treatment of any other group within 
the state but are guaranteed directly to stateless persons whether available to anyone 
else in the state or not72 – are non-discrimination, access to courts, naturalisation 
and travel documents.73 Similarly to the observation that not all rights in the 1954 
Statelessness Convention are available to all stateless persons, this finding that the 
level of protection also varies from one right to another uncovers the complexity of 
the protection offered by this instrument and must be weighed into its evaluation in 
the chapters to come.  
It is interesting to note that there is no discernable correlation between the 
level of attachment required for entitlement to one of the rights in the 1954 
Statelessness Convention and the standard of treatment offered. This is clearly 
illustrated in the schematic overview provided in Annex 3 of the rights in the 
Convention by level of attachment needed and level of protection guaranteed.74 
Absolute rights are ascribed to stateless persons at each level of attachment, from 
merely being under a state’s jurisdiction through to durable residence. Meanwhile, 
although lawful presence or lawful stay in a state does lead to the entitlement to 
more rights, it is not per definition the key to treatment on a par with nationals. 
Evidently both the level of attachment required and the level of protection offered 
have been independently deliberated, debated and determined in relation to each 
and every right that is included in the Convention and there is no all-explanatory 
logic to the system. 
Beyond the impact of the level of attachment and the level of protection on 
the scope and content of the rights bestowed upon stateless persons, there are 
several additional comments to be made in this introduction to the protection 
offered by the 1954 Statelessness Convention. Firstly, it should be mentioned that 
                                                                                                                                               
Nehemiah Robinson, Convention relating to the status of stateless persons - Its history and 
interpretation, UNHCR, Geneva: 1955, pages 31-32; James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under 
International Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 2005, pages 205-208. Moreover, under 
article 7, paragraphs 2 to 5, stateless persons are also exempted from the condition of reciprocity under 
certain circumstances, ensuring that their particular situation as non-nationals everywhere does not 
impede their enjoyment of the benefits of bi- and multilateral agreements between states. See Nehemiah 
Robinson, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Its Origin, Significance, Application and 
Interpretation, Institute of Jewish Affairs, New York: 1958, pages 32-39; James Hathaway, The Rights 
of Refugees Under International Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 2005, pages 200-205. 
71 In fact, article 4 on the freedom of religion goes further still by demanding that stateless persons be 
granted treatment “at least as favourable as that accorded to nationals”. 
72 The rights which are made contingent on the entitlements available to other groups have also been 
referred to as “equated rights”. Richard Lillich, The human rights of aliens in contemporary 
international law, Manchester University Press, Manchester: 1984, page 66. 
73 The formulation of many of these rights as absolute rights can be explained by the lack of an 
available counterpart or standard in the treatment of aliens or nationals since many of these are 
measures that are specifically geared to deal with the situation of the stateless. See James Hathaway, 
The Rights of Refugees Under International Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 2005, page 
237. 





the 1954 Statelessness Convention has succeeded in attracting more accessions than 
its 1961 counterpart. To date, there are 62 state parties.75 Nevertheless, this figure is 
far below the level of acceptance of the 1951 Refugee Convention – a striking fact 
given the shared history of these instruments.76 Moreover, half of the state parties to 
the 1954 Statelessness Convention have exercised their right to submit either a 
declaration or reservations to its text upon ratification.77 Even where reservations 
have not been lodged, the instrument itself allows for some restrictions to be placed 
on the enjoyment of certain Convention rights where this is necessitated by 
“national security or public order”.78 The limited acceptance of the 1954 
Statelessness Convention and these further restrictions that may be placed on the 
rights that it houses should be kept in mind as we move on to consider how 
effective the 1954 Statelessness Convention is in protecting the fundamental rights 
of stateless persons.  
Finally, we find that with regard to any dispute to arise on the interpretation or 
application of the 1954 Statelessness Convention, the question can be referred to the 
International Court of Justice for settlement.79 However, as was discovered to be the 
case for the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, this option has 
never been utilised. The 1954 Statelessness Convention does include a general 
provision obliging state parties to  
 
communicate to the Secretary General of the United Nations the laws and 
regulations which they may adopt to ensure the application of this 
Convention.80 
 
This article “stems from the right of every state party to a convention to be 
informed about its application by other parties” and was not necessarily conceived 
with a supervisory apparatus in mind.81 Disappointingly then, this is the other only 
reference, albeit indirect, to the issue of enforcement.82 There is no further mention 
of an enforcement or supervisory mechanism - a provision included in the 1951 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees on the duty of state parties to 
                                                           
75 The most recent spate of accessions was in 2006 when Belize, Montenegro, Romania and Rwanda 
became parties to the Convention. 
76 The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (and its 1967 Protocol) has attained 144 
state parties, more than double the number of ratifications of the 1954 Statelessness Convention. 
77 Reservations are permitted to any of the articles of the 1954 Statelessness Convention with the 
exception of article 1 (definition), article 3 (non-discrimination), article 4 (religion), article 16,1 (access 
to courts) and articles 33-42 (final clauses). 
78 This is provided for in article 28 in relation to the provision of travel documents and in article 31 on 
expulsion. 
79 Article 34 of the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons. 
80 Article 33 of the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons (mimicking article 26 of 
the 1951 Refugee Convention). 
81 Nehemiah Robinson, Convention relating to the status of stateless persons - Its history and 
interpretation, UNHCR, Geneva: 1955 
82 According to Batchelor, “for procedural reasons, namely time, lack of authority, creation of an 
independent instrument and failure to raise the issue with governments or through reference back to the 
Refugee Convention, the matter of a supervisory body was never discussed”. Carol Batchelor, 'Stateless 
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cooperate with the UN agency charged with overseeing the implementation of the 
Convention was not transposed to the 1954 Statelessness Convention’s text and 
there is no equivalent either to the provision in the 1961 Statelessness Convention 
that called for an agency to assist individuals with the task of claiming their rights.83 
Although UNHCR’s mandate in relation to statelessness has now expanded to 
include the promotion of the rights of stateless persons,84 enforcement remains an 
area of concern for the 1954 Statelessness Convention. 
 
4 PURPOSE AND METHOD OF PART III 
 
The following three chapters will build upon what has been said here as the 
international community’s response to the protection needs of the stateless is 
discussed in detail. As a reminder, this quest is guided by the second of the research 
questions introduced in chapter 1: 
 
How can the way in which international law deals with the legal status 
and entitlements of stateless persons be improved so as to ensure 
optimal protection of the individual’s rights in the absence of 
nationality? 
 
To this end I will be assessing the value of the 1954 Convention relating to the 
status of stateless persons as well as general norms of international human rights 
law. While this is an ambitious aim, much work has inadvertently already been 
done by others in the detailed consideration of the rights of non-nationals under 
international human rights law and the in-depth analysis of the rights of refugees 
under both human rights norms and the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees. On these foundations it becomes possible to build a picture of the 
specific position of the stateless person as opposed to the non-national generally or 
the refugee. Moreover, it is prudent to be bear in mind that this investigation centres 
around the position of the stateless person and does not pretend to provide an 
exhaustive overall discussion of any of the individual topics covered. 
 In view of the elaborate and diverse catalogue of rights guaranteed under the 
1954 Statelessness Convention it is absolutely vital to find a structured approach to 
dealing with its content.85 One possibility would be to follow Hathaway and deal 
with the rights in categories according to the level of attachment required for their 
                                                           
83 The refugee instrument determines that “the Contracting States undertake to cooperate with the 
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, or any other agency of the United 
Nations that may succeed it, in the exercise of its functions, and shall in particular facilitate its duty of 
supervising the application of the provisions of this Convention”. Article 35, paragraph 1 of the 1951 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. The second paragraph of this provision goes on to 
specify that the state parties must provide information and statistical data concerning “the condition of 
refugees; the implementation of this convention; and laws, regulations and decrees which are, or may 
hereafter be, in force relating to refugees”. For a discussion of article 11 on the establishment of an 
agency to assist in the implementation of the 1961 Statelessness Convention, see chapter III, section 3. 
84 See for instance, UNHCR Executive Committee, Conclusion on Identification, Prevention and 
Reduction of Statelessness and Protection of Stateless Persons, No. 106, 57th Session, Geneva, 2006. 
85 As annex 3 shows, there is no discernible logic to the structure of the 1954 Statelessness Convention 





enjoyment.86 Another would be to group the rights according to the level of 
protection offered and deal with them that way.87 However, I feel that neither will 
adequately facilitate the investigation into the overall protection offered to stateless 
persons and, in particular, the identification of gaps in that protection. I have 
therefore chosen a third route whereby the structure is inspired not by system of the 
1954 Statelessness Convention itself, but by the system of international human 
rights law. So, while fully aware that the distinction between civil and political 
rights on the one hand and economic, social and cultural rights on the other is now 
considered largely artificial,88 I feel that this traditional division does provide an 
appropriate framework for discussing the rights espoused in the 1954 Statelessness 
Convention. The rights contained in the Convention are therefore split according to 
the content of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights versus that of 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: civil and 
political rights are dealt with in chapter X while economic, social and cultural rights 
are addressed in chapter XI. This approach makes it easier to identify the gaps in 
the protection offered by the 1954 Statelessness Convention – if any – and to 
assessing the overall enjoyment of each category of rights by stateless persons 
under contemporary international law. Once these rights have been separated and 
dealt with, there remains a residual category of provisions in the Convention that 
are dealt with in chapter XII under the heading “protecting the special needs of the 
stateless”.89 The findings from these three chapters are drawn together in chapter 
XIII where the strengths and weaknesses of the international community’s approach 
to the protection of the stateless are laid out, the problems relating to 
implementation and enforcement of these norms reconsidered and suggestions made 





                                                           
86 James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge: 2005. 
87 This is the approach adopted in Richard Lillich, The human rights of aliens in contemporary 
international law, Manchester University Press, Manchester: 1984, pages 66-69. 
88 It is explained that: “These are not airtight categories. Many treaties declare rights that straddle the 
two basic covenants in these fields, or that fall clearly within the domains of both of them. Many rights 
are hard to categorise. Nonetheless, at their core, the conventional distinctions are clear, whatever the 
relationships and interdependency between the two categories”. Henry Steiner; Philip Alston, 
International Human Rights in Context. Law, Politics and Morals, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 
2000, page 136. 
89 Although this language is slightly ambiguous, since the entire convention is supposedly geared 
towards the special needs of the stateless, this expression was chosen for want of better language to 
indicate those additional measures that are prescribed alongside the attribution of ‘traditional’ rights to 
stateless persons. In the context of the refugee convention such matters have been described as 
“refugee-specific concerns” or “standards applicable to refugees as refugees”. See James Hathaway, 
The Rights of Refugees Under International Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 2005, page 
121; Guy Goodwin-Gill; Jane McAdam, The refugee in international law, Oxford University Press, 




PROTECTING THE CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 
OF THE STATELESS 
235 
This chapter deals with the international legal protection of the civil and political 
rights of stateless persons. Using the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) as a model, it was possible to identify which of the rights espoused 
in the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons would generally 
be considered to fall within this category.1 In the order in which they will shortly be 
discussed, these rights are: freedom of movement (articles 26 and 31), the right to 
legal personhood (article 12), access to courts (article 16), freedom of religion 
(article 4) and the right to property (article 13).2 When contrasted with the 
provisions of the ICCPR – 27 substantive articles in all - this list is concise to say 
the least. In the process of this simple exercise we are thus immediately cautioned 
about the possible limitations of the 1954 Statelessness Convention in guaranteeing 
the civil and political rights of stateless persons. However, the protection of 
stateless persons’ rights is not based on the 1954 Convention alone, it is the 
cumulative effect of this instrument and general human rights norms, to the extent 
that they are applicable to the situation of statelessness. Therefore, to uncover the 
full spectrum of stateless persons’ civil and political rights, we must not only 
analyse the content of the 1954 Convention, but we must also compare and contrast 
these provisions with human rights law and consider the way in which the human 
rights field deals with those civil and political rights that the 1954 Statelessness 
Convention has overlooked. This will allow us to assess both the overall enjoyment 
of civil and political rights that is offered to stateless persons under international 
law and the role of the 1954 Statelessness Convention in guaranteeing these rights. 
In order to keep this investigation orderly and manageable, greatest attention will be 
                                                           
1 The full text of the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons is included as Annex 2. 
2 Article 29 that addresses fiscal charges and article 30 that deals with the transfer of assets are relevant 
for the scope of the right to property as guaranteed under the 1954 Statelessness Convention. This right 
is dealt with here, although it should be noted that the right to property also forms an important 
backbone to the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights. Note that the freedom of association 
could also be included among the civil and political rights attributed to stateless persons under the 1954 
Statelessness Convention, however, this is a right that is very much situated on the boundary between 
the rights traditionally classed as civil and political and those classed as economic, social and cultural 
and can be found in both of the international covenants. In view of the formulation of this right in the 
1954 Statelessness Convention– with its clear focus on the social aspect of membership of non-political 
associations such as trade unions– it will be dealt with in chapter XI when we turn to economic, social 





paid to those civil and political rights that are identified as particularly important in 
the specific context of statelessness. 
 
1 NON-NATIONALS, NON-DISCRIMINATION AND THE ENJOYMENT OF CIVIL AND 
POLITICAL RIGHTS 
 
As we commence consideration of the civil and political rights guaranteed to the 
stateless under international law it is helpful to make some general observations 
about the relevance of nationality for the enjoyment of this set of rights and the role 
of the principle of non-discrimination in this context. Firstly, recall that the 
enjoyment of the rights enumerated in the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights  
 
is not limited to citizens of States Parties but must also be available to all 
individuals, regardless of nationality or statelessness [...] who may find 
themselves in the territory or subject to the jurisdiction of the State Party.3  
 
Moreover, the Human Rights Committee has declared that  
 
the general rule is that each one of the rights of the Covenant must be 
guaranteed without discrimination between citizens and aliens.4  
 
Read together these two statements imply that as far as civil and political rights go, 
non-citizens, including the stateless, not only benefit from the full catalogue of 
guarantees, but they are to enjoy the same level of protection as citizens. However, 
this conclusion is inaccurate – or at least incomplete – on both counts.  
To begin with, a number of the rights contained in the ICCPR make their 
own distinctions, being explicitly concerned with only certain limited categories of 
person.5 One such specialised or qualified provision addresses the right to 
participate in government found in article 25. As we have already noted, this right is 
offered to citizens rather than to everyone and thereby operates to the apparent 
exclusion of the stateless.6 So within the realm of civil and political rights there is at 
least one area, if not more, in which (the possession of a) nationality continues to 
play a part.7 This means that the personal scope of each right will have to be 
                                                           
3 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 31: Nature of the General Legal Obligation imposed on 
States Parties to the Covenant, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, Geneva: 26 May 2004, paragraph 10; 
Human Rights Committee, General Comment 15: The position of aliens under the covenant, Geneva: 
Geneva: 11 April 1986, paragraph 1. See chapter IX, section.2.  
4 Emphasis added. Human Rights Committee, General Comment 15: The position of aliens under the 
covenant, Geneva: 11 April 1986, paragraph 2.  
5 See, for instance, article 6, paragraph 5 on the prohibition of the death penalty for juvenile offenders as 
well as for pregnant women. 
6 See chapter IX, section 2. 
7 The enumeration of the civil and political rights that are to be enjoyed by all non-nationals, including 
the stateless, has therefore been presented by the Human Rights Committee as follows: “Aliens thus 
have an inherent right to life, protected by law, and may not be arbitrarily deprived of life. They must 
not be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; nor may they be 
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investigated. The extent to which the explicit qualification of the right to participate 
in government - and perhaps others - places a restraint on its enjoyment by stateless 
persons, as a particular sub-group of non-citizens with its own specific traits, is 
something that will be studied closely as we move through the civil and political 
rights one by one over the course of this chapter. Meanwhile, since those rights that 
are elaborated to the enjoyment of everyone, regardless of nationality, may be 
qualified “by such limitations as may lawfully be imposed under the Covenant”,8 
the extent to which restrictions are allowable will also need to be looked into.   
A second issue is the precise impact of the principle of non-discrimination 
on the enjoyment of civil and political rights by non-nationals. The Human Rights 
Committee explains that 
 
the term ‘discrimination’ as used in the Covenant should be understood to 
imply any distinction, inclusion, restriction or preference which is based on 
any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status, and which 
has the purpose of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or 
exercise by all persons, on an equal footing, of all rights and freedoms.9 
 
Article 2, paragraph 1 of the Covenant prohibits discrimination, as described above, 
in the protection of the civil and political rights set out in the instrument and the 
broad notion of “any other status” forms a potential basis for the prohibition of 
discrimination between citizens and non-citizens.10 Thus in the case of Gueye et al. 
v. France where the Human Rights Committee was called upon to judge the 
                                                                                                                                               
held in slavery or servitude. Aliens have the right to liberty and security of the person. If lawfully 
deprived of liberty, they shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of their 
person. Aliens may not be imprisoned for failure to fulfil a contractual obligation. They have the right 
to liberty of movement and free choice of residence; they shall be free to leave the country. Aliens shall 
be equal before the courts and tribunals, and shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a 
competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law in the determination of any criminal 
charge or of rights and obligations in a suit at law. Aliens shall not be subjected to retrospective penal 
legislation, and are entitled to recognition before the law. They may not be subjected to arbitrary or 
unlawful interference with their privacy, family, home or correspondence. They have the right to 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion, and the right to hold opinions and to express them. Aliens 
receive the benefit of the right of peaceful assembly and of freedom of association. They may marry 
when at marriageable age. Their children are entitled to those measures of protection required by their 
status as minors. In those cases where aliens constitute a minority within the meaning of article 27, they 
shall not be denied the right, in community with other members of their group, to enjoy their own 
culture, to profess and practice their own religion and to use their own language.” Human Rights 
Committee, General Comment 15: The position of aliens under the covenant, Geneva: 11 April 1986, 
paragraph 7. 
8 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 15: The position of aliens under the covenant, Geneva: 
11 April 1986, paragraph 7. 
9 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 18: Non-discrimination, Geneva: Geneva: 10 
November 1989, paragraph 7. 
10 Meanwhile article 26 provides a similar, stand-alone guarantee for any field regulated and protected 
by public authorities. See also article 2 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child; article 14 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights and article 1 of Protocol No. 12 to the European Convention; 
Articles 1 and 24 of the American Convention on Human Rights; and Articles 2 and 19 of the African 





compliance with the Covenant of a law that differentiated on the basis of 
nationality, 
 
it notes that nationality as such does not figure among the prohibited 
grounds for discrimination [but] in the Committee’s opinion, this falls 
within the reference to “other status”.11 
 
The upshot of this finding is not that states may not differentiate between nationals 
and non-nationals in the protection of civil and political rights, but that such 
distinctions may be subject to scrutiny.12  
Indeed, “the enjoyment of rights and freedoms on an equal footing […] 
does not mean identical treatment in every instance”.13 Instead,  
 
the Committee observes that not every differentiation of treatment will 
constitute discrimination, if the criteria for such differentiation are 
reasonable and objective and if the aim is to achieve a purpose which is 
legitimate under the Covenant.14 
 
                                                           
11 Human Rights Committee, Case of Gueye et al. v. France, Comm. No. 196/1985, Geneva: 1989, 
paragraph 9.4. See for instance also Human Rights Committee, Case of Adam v. The Czech Republic, 
Comm. No. 586/1994, Geneva: 1996; Case of Blazek v. Czech Republic, Comm. No. 857/1999, 
Geneva: 2001; Case of Gratzinger v. Czech Republic, Comm. No. 1463/2006, Geneva: 2007; and Case 
of Zdenek v. Czech Republic, Comm. No. 1533/2006, Geneva: 2007. Note that in these cases, the state 
was found to have violated article 26 of the ICCPR, the stand-alone guarantee of equal treatment before 
the law, because the differentiation on the grounds of citizenship was considered unreasonable in the 
specific context of the case at hand. 
12 The fact that article 25 of the ICCPR, by its own admission “guarantees certain political rights, 
differentiating on grounds of citizenship” is evidence that distinctions between nationals and non-
nationals will not always be inappropriate or forbidden. Human Rights Committee, General Comment 
18: Non-discrimination, Geneva: 10 November 1989, paragraph 8. See also Richard Lillich, The human 
rights of aliens in contemporary international law, Manchester University Press, Manchester: 1984, 
pages 45-46; Sarah Joseph; Jenny Schultz; Melissa Castan, The International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights. Cases, Materials and Commentary, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 2000, pages 
529-530; James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge: 2005, pages 123-147.  
13 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 18: Non-discrimination, Geneva: 10 November 1989, 
paragraph 8. Not all distinctions amount to discrimination. Recall also the discussion on the principle of 
non-discrimination in the context of the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of nationality in chapter V. 
14 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 18: Non-discrimination, Geneva: 10 November 1989, 
paragraph 13. In other words, “the principle of non-discrimination […] places upon those who would 
make distinctions in the recognition or protection of rights the burden of showing that non-national 
status is a relevant basis for differentiation, that the distinction is implemented in pursuit of a 
reasonable aim or objective; that it is necessary, no alternative action being available; and that the 
discriminatory measures taken or contemplated are proportional to the end to be achieved”. Guy 
Goodwin-Gill, 'International Law and Human Rights: Trends Concerning International Migrants and 
Refugees', in International Migration Review, Vol. 23, 1989, page 532. Recall also the statement made 
by the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination in General Recommendation 30: 
Discrimination against Non-citizens, CERD/C/64/Misc.11/Rev.3, 2004, paragraph 4, as cited in chapter 
IX at note 40. 
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It is therefore difficult to make a general statement about how tolerant international 
law is of differentiation between nationals and non-nationals in the enjoyment of 
civil and political rights. The Human Rights Committee deals with the question on 
a right by right and case by case basis by putting the distinction employed by the 
state to the test as described above. Thus, in one of a series of cases brought against 
the Czech Republic involving differentiation between citizens and non-citizens in 
the recovery of confiscated property, the Committee first explained that “the 
criterion of citizenship is objective”.15 Thereafter, the Committee considered the 
question of whether “in the circumstances of these cases the application of the 
criterion to the authors would be reasonable”.16 Although here, the Committee 
found the differentiation on the grounds of citizenship to be unreasonable,17 other 
cases, with other facts may present a different outcome. Indeed, according to 
Hathaway, the reasonable and objective test generally tends to be applied with 
regrettable lenience, to the detriment of the protection of non-citizens.18  
Nevertheless, a case-specific application of the reasonable and objective 
test should allow consideration to be given to the particular circumstance of 
statelessness (as opposed to ‘simple’ non-citizenship) in determining the 
appropriateness of the distinction between nationals and non-nationals in the 
enjoyment of civil and political rights. In fact, consideration for the specific 
condition of statelessness in applying the principle of non-discrimination may call 
for positive measures in favour of stateless persons. The right not to be 
discriminated against in the enjoyment of the rights guaranteed under human rights 
treaties is also violated when states, without an objective and reasonable 
justification, fail to treat differently persons whose situations are significantly 
different: 
  
The Committee also wishes to point out that the principle of equality 
sometimes requires States parties to take affirmative action in order to 
diminish or eliminate conditions which cause or help to perpetuate 
discrimination prohibited by the Covenant. For example, in a State where 
the general conditions of a certain part of the population prevent or impair 
their enjoyment of human rights, the State should take specific action to 
correct those conditions. Such action may involve granting for a time to the 
part of the population concerned certain preferential treatment in specific 
matters as compared with the rest of the population.19 
 
                                                           
15 Human Rights Committee, Case of Blazek v. Czech Republic, Comm. No. 857/1999 (2001), 
paragraph 5.7. 
16 Human Rights Committee, Case of Blazek v. Czech Republic, Comm. No. 857/1999 (2001), 
paragraph 5.7. 
17 The Committee found that, taking into account the role of the state in creating the situation whereby 
the claimants lacked Czech citizenship as required for restitution or compensation following the 
confiscation of property, the differentiation between citizens and non-citizens was unreasonable. 
18 For a full discussion of this question see James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under 
International Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 2005, pages 129 –147. 






The often vulnerable and deprived position of stateless persons may call for 
affirmative action to redress this disadvantage. This fact may influence not only the 
application of the norm of non-discrimination in cases involving stateless persons, 
but may even have an impact upon the very content or application of certain civil 
and political rights in the circumstances of statelessness. 
 The bottom line that can be distilled from this discussion is that to determine 
the enduring relevance of nationality for the enjoyment of civil and political rights 
and discover what treatment stateless persons can anticipate in this regard, a right-
by-right exposition is unavoidable. Which rights are themselves prescribed to the 
exclusion of non-nationals? Which rights permit limitations that could be invoked 
to the exclusion of non-nationals? How has the principle of non-discrimination 
influenced the equal enjoyment of particular civil and political rights by non-
nationals? And, most importantly, when presented with the concrete scenario of 
statelessness, how do or may the answers to each of these questions change? This 
final consideration (re)establishes the link to the issue of the role and value of the 
1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, that is geared 
specifically to the protection of the stateless, within the broader human rights 
framework. Together, the questions presented will help to guide the discussion in 
the following sections.20 
 
2 FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT 
 
The first fundamental right to be addressed is the freedom of movement. When a 
person utilises his right to move freely from one place to another the freedom that 
he is exercising goes far beyond any simple change of address. It means the 
opportunity to leave a place where your political opinions are not accepted or to 
move to a place where you are able to enjoy an education. This is why the freedom 
of movement has also been described as the “right to ‘vote with one’s feet’ [which] 
may be the ultimate means through which the individual may express his or her 
personal liberty”.21 Moreover, the freedom of movement is considered to “interact 
with several rights”22 because it deals with the aspect of physical access – to a 
state’s territory and thus jurisdiction or to particular opportunities, facilities and 
                                                           
20 Note that in order to present a clear overview of the main points of relevance, the question of the 
relationship between nationality, the principle of non-discrimination and the enjoyment of civil and 
political rights was discussed in this section with reference to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights. However, other instruments and documents will also influence the answer to these 
questions, including the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Migrant Workers Convention, the UN Declaration on the 
Rights of Individuals Who are not Nationals of the Country in which They Live and regional human 
rights texts. These will be included, wherever relevant, in the right-by-right treatise in the rest of this 
chapter. 
21 Hurst Hannum, The Right to Leave and Return in International Law and Practice, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, Dordrecht: 1987, page 4. See also General Comment 27 of the Human Rights Committee 
where freedom of movement is described as “an indispensable condition for the free development of a 
person”. Human Rights Committee, General Comment 27: Freedom of Movement, A/55/40 vol.1, 
Geneva: 2000 128, para. 1. 
22 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 27: Freedom of Movement, A/55/40 vol.1, Geneva: 
2000 128, para. 1. 
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services. Curtailing a person’s freedom of movement may subsequently hinder their 
access to other entitlements and, as we will see, part of the difficulty that stateless 
persons experience in accessing their rights indeed stems from problems related to 
the liberty of movement.  
The freedom of movement actually encompasses two distinct elements: an 
internal and an international dimension. The first deals with the right to move freely 
within the territorial boundaries of a state while the second is concerned with the 
right to move across the international frontiers that separate one state from another. 
These two aspects of the freedom of movement are governed by different 
considerations and are regulated separately under international law. For this reason, 
they will now be dealt with in turn. Particular attention will be paid to the 
international dimension of the right to free movement, for the consideration of this 
issue plays a crucial role in shedding light on the overall protection system of the 
1954 Statelessness Convention and uncovering a substantial underlying weakness. 
The upcoming paragraphs will thereby reveal just why the freedom of movement 
deserves this prominent position at the head of the discussion of the rights of the 
stateless. 
 
2.1 Internal freedom of movement 
 
As alluded to above, the freedom to move around within the borders of a state and 
to choose one’s place of residence is of utmost importance as it will help to ensure 
access to all sorts of rights, facilities and services. For example, “impediments to 
freedom of movement [may] prevent persons entitled to vote from exercising their 
rights effectively”.23 And there are many other, comparable scenarios: the right of 
access to court, the right to work, to an education, to healthcare, to birth registration 
and many others may all be similarly affected. Yet it is not uncommon for 
restrictions to be placed on an individual’s internal freedom of movement. One of 
the most straight-forward examples is the curtailment of the freedom of movement 
of prisoners – bound to remain within the confines of a detention facility for the 
duration of their sentence. Another is the employment of quarantine measures to 
contain the outbreak of an infectious disease. But states can also be found to limit 
the freedom of other (categories of) persons to choose their place of residence and 
move at liberty around the country for a wide variety of reasons. 
Stateless persons are reportedly a common object of such restrictions and 
this has a severely negative impact on their enjoyment of other rights. In Thailand, 
restrictions placed on the freedom of movement of stateless and undocumented 
persons are impairing access to birth registration procedures as well as facilities 
such as healthcare and schooling.24 In Bhutan, the stateless ethnic Nepalese are 
curtailed in their freedom of movement within the country and “adding insult to 
                                                           
23 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 25: The Right to Participate in Public Affairs, Voting 
Rights and the Right of Equal Access to Public Service, A/51/40 vol.1, Geneva: 1996, para. 12. 
24 W. Courtland Robinson, Thailand: Background paper on human rights, refugees and asylum seekers, 
A Writenet Report commissioned by UNHCR, July 2004, pages 16-17. See also Laura van Waas, Is 
Permanent Illegality Inevitable? The Challenges to Ensuring Birth Registration and the Right to a 
Nationality for the Children of Irregular Migrants - Thailand and the Dominican Republic, Woking: 





injury, people’s inability to cross checkpoints makes it difficult for them to appeal 
their census status or otherwise claim their citizenship in Bhutan’s capital”.25 While, 
in Myanmar 
 
the freedom of movement of the Rohingyas is severely restricted. They are 
virtually confined to their respective villages, unable to access medical and 
educational services, due, inter alia, to the fact that, should they wish to 
travel outside their respective villages, they would require official 
authorisation and must pay a fee which in many cases they cannot afford. 
This restriction, which is not applied to the Rakhine population in Rakhine 
State, seriously affects their standard of living, particularly with regard to 
food security. When Rohingyas nevertheless do attempt to travel without 
authorisation, if apprehended, they are reportedly arrested and 
imprisoned.26  
 
Indeed, more broadly, the “treatment of the stateless has included internal 
relocation, often to harsh and inhospitable areas”27 and similarly to refugees, 
stateless persons are also commonly subject to (immigration) detention or 
confinement to camps.28 With some notion of the problems experienced by the 
stateless in practice, the following paragraphs will uncover what international law 
has to say about the internal freedom of movement of these persons. 
 
2.1.1 The 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons 
 
Stateless persons are guaranteed “freedom of movement” in article 26 of the 1954 
Statelessness Convention. This provision in fact concentrates in its entirety on the 
internal aspect of freedom of movement and determines that 
 
each Contracting State shall accord to stateless persons lawfully in its 
territory the right to choose their place of residence and to move freely 
within its territory, subject to any regulations applicable to aliens generally 
in the same circumstances.29 
                                                           
25 Human Rights Watch, We don’t want to be refugees again, HRW Briefing Paper for the 14th 
Ministerial Joint Committee of Bhutan and Nepal, 19 May 2003, page 18. 
26 Recall that the Rohingyas are a stateless population group in Myanmar. Doudou Diène, Report by the 
Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related 
intolerance, Addendum – Summary of cases transmitted to Governments and replies received, 
A/HRC/4/19/Add.1, 5 June 2007, paragraph 126. 
27 UNHCR, Stateless persons: a discussion note, EC/1992/SCP/CRP.4, Geneva: 1 April 1992, para. 9. 
28 Consider, among others, the stateless Bihari living dispersed over 66 camps in Bangladesh and the 
stateless ethnic Nepalese from Bhutan living as refugees in camps in Nepal. See Refugees International, 
Stateless Biharis in Bangladesh: A humanitarian nightmare, RI Bulletin, 13 December 2004; UNHCR, 
Unending Limbo: Warehousing Bhutanese Refugees in Nepal, World Refugee Survey 2004, page 102. 
See also James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge: 2005, pages 695 – 704; David Weissbrodt; Clay Collins, 'The Human Rights of 
Stateless Persons', in Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 28, 2006, pages 267-268. 
29 Note that two states lodged reservations to this article upon ratification of the 1954 Statelessness 
Convention – both reserving the right to designate a place of residence for stateless persons. Zambia 
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The wording of this article betrays several weaknesses. Only stateless persons 
whose presence on the territory of the state in question is authorised are entitled to 
invoke this right. Stateless persons with an irregular immigration status are thus 
entirely excluded from the protection of the provision.30 This may prove to be a 
serious limitation in practice since many of the world’s stateless populations have 
an irregular or uncertain status in their host country – a problem that will be 
elucidated in section 2.2. 
Meanwhile, even having met the precondition of lawful presence, stateless 
persons are not guaranteed an absolute right of free movement or choice of 
residence but are instead assimilated with other non-nationals. The Convention does 
not set any substantive limits to the measures that may be imposed. Wherever 
restrictions are placed on foreigners’ freedom of internal movement, these may also 
apply to stateless persons, so long as the constraints do not deliberately target 
stateless persons.31 This approach “was considered sufficient because free residence 
and movement are ordinarily granted all aliens”.32 Yet even then it was admitted 
that some states do enforce restrictions, a fact evidenced by the examples above.33 
As we now turn to look at the right to internal free movement under international 
human rights law we see that attention is also paid to the substance and purpose of 
restrictive measures, thereby potentially affording stateless persons broader 
protection. 
 
2.1.2 International human rights law 
 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights includes a concise expression of the 
right to internal freedom of movement in article 13, paragraph 1: “Everyone has the 
right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state”. 
According to this formulation, nationality is irrelevant for the enjoyment of this 
right since it addresses the entitlement to “everyone” in respect of “each state”. 
Neither, it would appear, is immigration status relevant.34 As we turn to other 
sources of human rights norms, the terms narrow. The Civil and Political Rights 
Covenant determines that 
                                                                                                                                               
reserved this right unconditionally while the Netherlands would only invoke this possibility where 
public interest is at stake. 
30 Basic guarantees against detention and certain restrictions on the freedom of movement for refugees 
who entered the state unlawfully were included in the 1951 Refugee Convention (article 31) where they 
form a compliment to its own article 26 that provides for internal freedom of movement and residence 
for lawfully present refugees in the same terms as adopted in the 1954 Statelessness Convention. 
However, article 31 was dropped from the 1954 Statelessness Convention, leaving the contracting 
parties to restrict the freedom of movement of unlawfully present stateless persons as they see fit. 
31 James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge: 2005, page 712. 
32 Nehemiah Robinson, Convention relating to the status of stateless persons - Its history and 
interpretation, UNHCR, Geneva: 1955, page 78. 
33 Nehemiah Robinson, Convention relating to the status of stateless persons - Its history and 
interpretation, UNHCR, Geneva: 1955, page 78. 
34 Although since the provision only addresses movement within the borders or a state it is equally 







everybody lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that 
territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his 
residence. 35 
 
This article explicitly embraces the precondition that a person must be lawfully 
within the territory of a state before he is entitled to liberty of movement and choice 
of residence within its borders. Eligibility to invoke this right is therefore dependent 
on immigration status rather than nationality. Nationals of the state in question will 
always meet this requirement since by virtue of their nationality their presence on 
state soil is automatically lawful.36 Stateless persons (and all other non-nationals) 
must be lawfully present under domestic immigration regulations before they can 
rely on this provision. The ICCPR thus sets the same prerequisite for the enjoyment 
of the right to internal freedom of movement as the 1954 Statelessness Convention. 
However, once this precondition has been met, the level of protection offered by the 
International Covenant is higher than that provided for by the 1954 Statelessness 
Convention. The statelessness instrument prescribes treatment on a par with non-
nationals generally while the ICCPR in principle entitles lawfully present non-
nationals equal protection to nationals.37 
 The human rights norm does allow certain exceptions to the general rule of 
free movement within the borders of a state. The right housed in article 12 of the 
ICCPR is, in fact, qualified by a clause that closely succeeds it which allows for 
restrictions to free movement if they “are provided by law, are necessary to protect 
national security, public order (ordre public), public health or morals or the rights 
and freedoms of others, and are consistent with the other rights recognised in the 
present covenant”.38 Thus while the 1954 Statelessness Convention permits states to 
curtail the freedom of movement of non-nationals as they see fit, so long as they do 
not specifically target stateless persons, the human rights standard shows greater 
concern for the substance of any restrictions that encroach upon this basic liberty. 
                                                           
35 Article 12 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. A comparable approach 
can be found in other human rights instruments and documents such as the Declaration on the Human 
Rights of Individuals Who are not Nationals of the Country in which They Live (article 5, paragraph 3); 
the Migrant Workers Convention (article 39); the American Convention on Human Rights (article 22); 
Protocol No. 4 to the European Convention on Human Rights (article 2); and the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights (article 12). 
36 This is inherent in the right of nationals to (re)enter and remain in the territory of the state of 
nationality that will be dealt with in greater detail in section 2.2. See also Human Rights Committee, 
CCPR General Comment No. 27: Freedom of movement, Geneva: 2 November 1999, para. 4. 
37 Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment No. 15: The Position of Aliens under the 
Covenant, Geneva: Geneva: 11 April 1986, para. 8. See also the case of Tatishvili v. Russia brought 
before the European Court of Human Rights. There, a stateless applicant successfully invoked article 2 
of Protocol No. 4 to the European Convention on Human Rights to claim free movement and residence 
rights. The court determined the applicant to be lawfully resident – a fact that the Russian government 
strongly contested – and the fact of statelessness was then irrelevant to the enjoyment of free internal 
movement. European Court of Human Rights, Case of Tatishvili v. Russia, Application No. 1509/02, 22 
February 2007. 
38 Article 12, paragraph 3 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Similar 
clauses can also be found in the other human rights instruments referred in note 35. 
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So-called “permissible limitations”39 must have the objective of protecting one of 
the values or interests set out - such as public order - and must also be necessary to 
achieve that goal and be provided by law and be in line with other fundamental 
rights.40 Restrictions are therefore to be limited to “exceptional circumstances”.41 
Although such broad notions as national security or public order can be invoked to 
cover a wide range of situations,42 the requirement that the measures taken are also 
necessary serves to limit the possibilities of invoking this clause. This 
proportionality test necessitates that the measures be “appropriate to achieve their 
protective function […] the least intrusive instrument amongst those which might 
achieve the desired result and […] proportionate to the interest to be protected”.43 
Any difference in treatment between nationals and lawfully present non-nationals - 
any measure that is specifically addressed to non-nationals or a particular group 
such as the stateless – is to be treated as a restriction to the general norm of liberty 
of movement and must satisfy all the aforementioned “demanding legal provisos”.44 
This does not altogether rule out the possibility of imposing such restrictions but it 
does compel states to justify any relevant measures as specified. In this respect, 
human rights norms offer stateless persons stronger guarantees than the 1954 
Statelessness Convention that the essence of the right to free movement and choice 
of residence within the territory of a state remain in tact.  
 
2.2 International freedom of movement 
 
Questions relating to the right of individuals to travel between territories and to 
settle on the soil of a foreign state - as well as the right of states to refuse or expel 
foreigners - have long been a favoured subject of debate by jurists and philosophers 
alike.45 These matters are now dealt with under norms concerning the international 
dimension of the freedom of movement which has been further deconstructed into 
                                                           
39 Sarah Joseph; Jenny Schultz; Melissa Castan, The International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights. Cases, Materials and Commentary, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 2000, page 256. 
40 In particular the principle of non-discrimination. Hurst Hannum, The Right to Leave and Return in 
International Law and Practice, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht: 1987, page 44. 
41 Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment No. 27: Freedom of movement, Geneva: 2 
November 1999, para. 11. 
42 See the examples in Sarah Joseph; Jenny Schultz; Melissa Castan, The International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights. Cases, Materials and Commentary, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 2000, 
pages 258-259. 
43 Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment No. 27: Freedom of movement, Geneva: 2 
November 1999, para. 14. See also Hurst Hannum, The Right to Leave and Return in International Law 
and Practice, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht: 1987, pages 26-27. 
44 James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge: 2005, page 716. See further Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment No. 15: 
The Position of Aliens under the Covenant, Geneva: Geneva: 11 April 1986, para. 8; Human Rights 
Committee, CCPR General Comment No. 27: Freedom of movement, Geneva: 2 November 1999, para. 
4; David Weissbrodt, Final Report on Prevention of Discrimination - The Rights of Non-Citizens, 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/23, 26 May 2003, para. 39. 
45 See Hurst Hannum, The Right to Leave and Return in International Law and Practice, Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht: 1987, page 3; Carmen Tiburcio, "Chapter IX. Public Rights" in The 
human rights of aliens under international and comparative law, Kluwer Law International, The 





three specific individual entitlements: the right to enter (or return), the right to 
remain and the right to leave. For the stateless, these rights can be critical. We have 
already noted that many of the rights espoused in the 1954 Statelessness 
Convention are granted to a stateless person only once they have attained physical, 
lawful or even durable access to the territory of the contracting state.46 Human 
rights norms also commonly require the individual to be within the territory of the 
state (or otherwise subject to its jurisdiction) to be invoked.47 If a stateless person 
enjoys the right to enter or remain on the soil of a particular state, this can play a 
pivotal role in providing (continued) access to other rights.  
However, as commented in chapter IX, the right to (re)enter and reside in a 
state has traditionally belonged to the substance and indeed the very function of 
nationality. This fact signals a grave potential difficulty for the stateless: no 
nationality so no automatic right to (re)enter or reside anywhere. With this 
observation in mind, the right to international free movement for the stateless is not 
only relevant to the ability to “vote with one’s feet”, as described in the introduction 
to this section, but indeed reveals a more basic dilemma: where do they have the 
right to live? As such, a review of the international legal framework relating to 
stateless persons’ right to international free movement could not be more pertinent. 
It seeks to discover whether the international community has put in place the 
guarantees needed to protect the stateless from becoming the object of a game of 
human ping-pong – from facing life in physical as well as legal limbo, being passed 
from one state to another, with no officially acknowledged homeland to settle in.48 
Meanwhile, when a national travels abroad it is his citizenship that guarantees to the 
host state that, in whatever eventuality, there is always a state to which he can be 
returned and which is bound to accept him. In the absence of such an “escape 
clause” for the host state, the stateless may find themselves unwelcome and 
consequently their travel prospects limited. Moreover, in order to actually exercise 
free movement across an international frontier, “a passport has become a legal as 
well as a practical necessity”49 and this all-important travel document is typically 
issued by the country of nationality.50 
                                                           
46 See in particular the discussion of the different “levels of attachment” required for access to the 1954 
Statelessness Convention rights in chapter IX, section 3. 
47 See for example article 2 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. A person 
may also be subject to the jurisdiction of a state through the bond of nationality, but the stateless do not 
enjoy this position with any state. 
48 See on the problems of detention and the ping-pong effect David Weissbrodt; Clay Collins, 'The 
Human Rights of Stateless Persons', in Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 28, 2006, page 268; Stefanie 
Grant, “The Legal Protection of Stranded Migrants” in International Migration Law, R. Cholewinski, 
R. Perruchoud and E. MacDonald [Eds.], TMS Asser Press, The Hague 2007, pages 29-47. 
49 Hurst Hannum, The Right to Leave and Return in International Law and Practice, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, Dordrecht: 1987, page 21. A passport provides the “prima facie guarantee that another state 
is prepared to accept an alien that the destination state may choose not to admit or to expel”, thereby 
facilitating (temporary) entry into the state of destination. John Torpey, The Invention of the Passport. 
Surveillance, Citizenship and the State, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 2000, page 163. 
50 Carmen Tiburcio, "Chapter IX. Public Rights" in The human rights of aliens under international and 
comparative law, Kluwer Law International, The Hague: 2001, page 217. Note that the specific 
problem of access to (travel) documentation is dealt with in detail in return in greater detail in chapter 
XII where we consider the “special needs” of the stateless. 
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It is a painful irony then that statelessness and displacement often go hand-
in-hand. For a start, migration has proven to be an instigating factor in the loss of 
nationality and the creation of statelessness.51 Consider the situation of the 
Lhotsampas (ethnic Nepalese Hindus) of Bhutan whose statelessness was 
consolidated when they were forced to flee to neighbouring Nepal and were 
deemed, through this act, to have voluntarily forfeited their Bhutanese citizenship. 
They have subsequently been stuck in exile for over a decade, their stay tolerated 
but not officially recognised in Nepal and all calls for repatriation refused by the 
Bhutanese authorities.52 How are such situations addressed in international 
standards on the right to enter, remain or leave a state? In other instances 
displacement has followed statelessness and is a consequence of the newly 
vulnerable status of the individuals concerned - the lack of a nationality may be just 
one manifestation of the severe treatment to which the population is exposed.53 
Here again, the fact of statelessness commonly presents an irreconcilable obstacle 
to eventual repatriation of refugees and other such displaced persons.54 Yet neither 
does the circumstance of statelessness appear to provide any particular 
opportunities with respect to entry or residence in a host state.  
Finally then, it is not uncommon for stateless groups or individuals to find 
themselves cast into an irregular situation or even expelled as a result of their loss 
of nationality. Consider the case of a man who was rendered stateless in the 
Netherlands through the withdrawal of his Dutch citizenship on the premise that he 
had failed to fulfil his commitment to renounce his Egyptian nationality, even 
though he had in fact managed to lose this other citizenship. The loss of his Dutch 
nationality brought with it the loss of an automatic right of residence and “in order 
to be readmitted as a foreign national, he had to return to Egypt to apply for a long-
term visa, which was not possible because the applicant no longer had an Egyptian 
passport”.55 Meanwhile,  
 
incidents arousing international concern have included expulsion of large 
groups of stateless people from their countries of habitual residence [and] 
non-readmission by the countries of habitual residence of such groups.56 
 
                                                           
51 Be reminded of the discussion of the link between migration and statelessness in chapter VII. 
52 Advisory Board on Human Security (prepared by Constantin Sokoloff), Denial of Citizenship: A 
Challenge to Human Security, February 2005, page 10; Hiram Ruiz and Michelle Berg, Unending 
limbo: Warehousing Bhutanese Refugees in Nepal, UNHCR World Refugee Survey 2004, pages 98-
105; Michael Hutt, Unbecoming Citizens. Culture, Nationhood, and the Flight of Refugees from 
Bhutan., Oxford University Press, New Delhi: 2005, pages 147-149 and 221. At the time of writing, 
efforts were underway to resolve this protracted situation through resettlement to various third countrys. 
See UNHCR, Nepal: large-scale resettlement of refugees from Bhutan, Briefing Notes, 25 March 2008. 
53 Frequently, “stateless and denaturalised populations are obliged to flee from their usual place of 
residence”. UNHCR, "Statelessness and Citizenship" in The State of the World's Refugees - A 
Humanitarian Agenda, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 1997, page 244. 
54 UNHCR, "Statelessness and Citizenship" in The State of the World's Refugees - A Humanitarian 
Agenda, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 1997, page 246.  
55 Betty de Hart; Kees Groenendijk, "Multiple Nationality: The Practice of Germany and the 
Netherlands" in R. Cholewinski (ed) International Migration Law, TMC Asser Press, The Hague: 2007, 
page 99. 





For example, the mass expulsion of Bidoons from Kuwait contributed to the overall 
exodus of some 100,000 stateless persons from the country in the early 1990’s 
while at around the same time Mauritania expelled some 60,000 black Africans, 
claiming that they were not Mauritanian nationals.57 This begs the question whether 
the stateless are not protected from expulsion by international standards in the 
sphere of the right to international free movement, such as the right to (re)enter and 
to remain. Or in other words, in view of the foregoing, has the 1954 Statelessness 
Convention addressed the right to (re)enter a state for those who lack any 
citizenship and/or has this function of nationality in some way been superseded by 
developments in international human rights law – at least in relation to the stateless?  
  
2.2.1 The 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons 
 
While the 1954 Statelessness Convention requires physical, lawful or even durable 
presence on state territory for the enjoyment of many of the rights espoused, the 
instrument does not provide stateless persons with the right to enter a contracting 
party in order to claim the protection offered. Indeed, arguably the most noteworthy 
change made to the text of the 1951 Refugee Convention when it was transformed 
into the 1954 Statelessness Convention was the omission of an equivalent to article 
33 on non-refoulement.58 Central to the refugee protection regime, this article forms 
the basis for the entitlement of refugees to gain, or at least retain,59 access to the 
territory of a state party. When read in conjunction with article 31 of the 1951 
Refugee Convention on non-penalisation of unlawful entry – another provision 
omitted from the 1954 Statelessness Convention – the prohibition of refoulement 
provides “a limited right of (at least) temporary admission for asylum seekers to 
access fair and effective refugee status procedures”.60 Once refugee status has been 
recognised on the basis of the definition in article 1 of the Refugee Convention, the 
prohibition of refoulement ensures that the refugee has the right to remain in the 
                                                           
57 UNHCR, "Statelessness and Citizenship" in The State of the World's Refugees - A Humanitarian 
Agenda, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 1997, pages 244-245. See also Human Rights Committee, 
Concluding Observations: Kuwait, A/55/40 vol.I, Geneva: 2000, paras. 477-479. 
58 A resolution was elaborated in the Final Act of the Conference which adopted the 1954 Convention 
relating to the Status of Stateless Persons recalling that the prohibition of refoulement (as housed in 
article 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention) was considered to be a generally accepted principle and that 
to include an equivalent in the 1954 Statelessness Convention was unnecessary.  
59 Evident already in the debate surrounding the formulation of the 1951 Refugee Convention, there 
remains some contention to this day as to whether the principle of non-refoulement encompasses a duty 
for states to admit refugees to their territory rather than strictly a duty not to return refugees. 
Nevertheless, Goodwin-Gill concludes that: “By and large, States in their practice and in their recorded 
views, have recognised that non-refoulement applies to the moment at which asylum seekers present 
themselves for entry, either within a state or at its border. Certain factual elements may be necessary 
before the principle is triggered, but the concept now encompasses both non-return and non-rejection”. 
Guy Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee in International Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 2007, page 
208. 
60 Guy Guy Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee in International Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 2007, 
page 384. It is important to note that such admission for the purposes of determining refugee status 
must be considered to amount to lawful presence for the purposes of the application of the convention 
rights. See also James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge: 2005, pages 177-179 and page 301. 
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host state so long as the risk of persecution endures.61 In contrast, the 1954 
Statelessness Convention “doesn’t oblige States to grant a legal stay to an 
individual while his/her request for recognition as a stateless person is being 
assessed”,62 nor once this status has been determined. Obviously, if a stateless 
person is also a refugee, his right to enter or remain in the host state will be 
determined on the basis of the 1951 Refugee Convention.63 But without provision 
for lawful entry or regularisation of a stateless person’s immigration status under 
the 1954 Statelessness Convention, state parties are free to treat the non-refugee 
stateless as any other non-national and subject them to the regular provisions of 
domestic immigration law. There is nothing in the convention to prevent a state 
from refusing entry to a stateless person.64 And if he nevertheless enters the state – 
unauthorised – he may be deported or subjected to whatever penalties domestic 
immigration law imposes.65 In order for a stateless person to become eligible for the 
rights proclaimed in the 1954 Statelessness Convention on the condition of (lawful) 
presence or a closer level of attachment, he must satisfy the conditions set in 
municipal immigration law.  
These facts uncover what is arguably the core weakness of the 1954 
Statelessness Convention: that with no state compelled to allow a stateless person to 
enter or settle on its territory, these individuals are stuck in a true legal limbo. They 
may be passed from one state to another, kept in indefinite detention pending the 
possibility of deportation or be forever informally “tolerated” without achieving a 
lawful status (the essential precondition for access to many of the rights housed in 
the Convention itself). In a Handbook for dealing with statelessness, UNHCR has 
determined that  
 
once an individual is on a State’s territory, a determination of his/her 
nationality status may be the only way to identify a solution to his/her 
plight. If the individual is determined to be stateless, and if there is no 
possibility of return to the country of former habitual residence or if there 
                                                           
61 James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge: 2005, page 302. 
62 UNHCR and IPU, Nationality and statelessness. A handbook for parliamentarians, 2005, pages 20–
21. 
63 If a person qualifies both as a refugee under the definition in the 1951 Refugee Convention and as a 
stateless person under the definition in the 1954 Statelessness Convention, the Refugee Convention is 
applicable: “this follows from the purpose of the Stateless Persons Convention to cover such person to 
whom the Refugee Convention is not applicable”. Nehemiah Robinson, Convention relating to the 
status of stateless persons - Its history and interpretation, UNHCR, Geneva: 1955, page 8. 
64 The only persons that may be able to claim some right of (re)entry into a state on the basis of the 
1954 Statelessness Convention are “stateless persons regularly serving as crew members on board a 
ship flying the flag of a Contracting State”. But even in these very limited cases, the state is only 
required to “give sympathetic consideration” to admitting the stateless individual – obliging the state to 
consider such requests but by no means providing an absolute or secure guarantee. See article 11 of the 
1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons. 
65 As previously noted, the 1954 Statelessness Convention does not include an equivalent to article 31 
of the 1951 Refugee Convention which elaborates a norm on the non-imposition of penalties on 





is no such country, then admittance to the State and some type of legal stay 
may be the only solution.66 
 
While this may indeed be the only conceivable solution for the individual, the 1954 
Statelessness Convention fails to set out any such guarantee.67  
Once a state has recognised the lawful presence of a stateless person, however, 
the right to remain becomes relatively secure. Article 31 of the Convention devotes 
its first paragraph to the general rule that “Contracting States shall not expel a 
stateless person lawfully in their territory save on grounds of national security or 
public order”.68 States retain full discretion to expel stateless persons who have no 
authorisation to be on their territory,69 but  
 
once a stateless person has been admitted or legalised, he is entitled to stay 
in the country indefinitely and can forfeit this right only by becoming a 
national security risk or by disturbing public order.70  
 
There must be “exceptional circumstances” for the exceptions to non-expulsion to 
be invoked.71 Where expulsion is envisaged on national security grounds, such 
exceptional circumstances may be at stake when the presence or actions of the 
individual in question “give rise to an objectively reasonable, real possibility of 
directly or indirectly inflicted substantial harm to the host state’s most basic 
interests, including the risk of an armed attack on its territory or its citizens or the 
destruction of its democratic institutions”.72 For public order to be a ground for 
                                                           
66 UNHCR and IPU, Nationality and statelessness. A handbook for parliamentarians, 2005, page 21. 
67 UNHCR therefore calls upon states to at least ensure that detention with a view to expulsion is not 
unduly prolonged and that where expulsion is found to be impracticable, “states should consider giving 
[stateless] delinquents the same treatment as national delinquents” rather than concentrating on giving 
effect to the order. UNHCR Executive Committee, Conclusion No. 7: Expulsion, 28th session, Geneva 
1977, paras. (d)-(e). 
68 Since the entire article was adopted – eventually and after much debate – in the same wording as it is 
included in the 1951 Refugee Convention, we can once again turn to the discussions of this instrument 
for further explanation of the content of this provision. Nehemiah Robinson, Convention relating to the 
status of stateless persons - Its history and interpretation, UNHCR, Geneva: 1955, pages 95 and 98. 
Note that objections by many states to the format of this article were not entirely dispelled by the 
decision to stick to the text as adopted in the 1951 Refugee Convention. This article of the 1954 
Statelessness Convention on expulsion went on to attract a substantial number of reservations as states 
ratified the instrument. See the overview of Declarations and Reservations to the 1954 Convention 
relating to the Status of Stateless Persons provided by the UNHCR. 
69 Nevertheless, thanks also to the resolution included in the Final Act to the Convention, the principle 
of non-refoulement may have some bearing on the freedom of states to expel stateless persons even 
when unlawfully present. See note 58. 
70 Nehemiah Robinson, Convention relating to the status of stateless persons - Its history and 
interpretation, UNHCR, Geneva: 1955, pages 96-97.  
71 UNHCR Executive Committee, Conclusion No. 7: Expulsion, 28th session, Geneva: 1977, para. (a). 
72 James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge: 2005, page 679. 
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expulsion, a stateless person would have to have committed a serious crime or 
caused severe offence to the social norms of the host state.73 
 Alongside this substantive aspect of article 31 of the 1954 Statelessness 
Convention is a procedural dimension that further strengthens the protection against 
expulsion of lawfully present stateless persons. Not only are states compelled to 
enact an expulsion order only “in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance 
with due process of law”, but they must also provide the opportunity to seek a 
review of this decision.74 The final paragraph of article 31 deals with the position of 
the stateless person once the state has made the final decision to expel. The 
individual must be given some opportunity to seek legal admission to another 
country. This is to prevent the situation where the stateless person is forced to enter 
another territory illegally or clandestinely – being without a nationality, there is no 
state that is obliged to admit him. In the meantime, the stateless person may be 
detained or subject to other restrictions.75 Considering that in reality the 
implementation of an expulsion order is often unfeasible,76 there is a danger that 
detention becomes indefinite.77  
Although article 31 of the 1954 Statelessness Convention does therefore 
attempt to provide basic substantive and procedural guarantees against the 
expulsion of stateless persons, its value in practice is questionable since it does not 
resolve the problem of lawful access to a state in the first place. In this respect, the 
conclusion drawn by Special Rapporteur Maurice Kamto when studying the 
provision in the context of work on the “Expulsion of Aliens” for the International 
Law Commission is insightful:  
 
It seems that the rules for the expulsion of stateless persons too easily 
reproduce the wording of the rules for the expulsion of refugees.78  
                                                           
73 Nehemiah Robinson, Convention relating to the status of stateless persons - Its history and 
interpretation, UNHCR, Geneva: 1955, page 99; James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under 
International Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 2005, pages 685-686. 
74 Article 31, paragraph 2 of the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons. Note that 
adherence to due process of law is always required in the decision-making procedure, while the 
opportunity to seek a review of the decision may be restricted for “compelling reasons of national 
security”. See also James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge: 2005, page 675. The specification that states must allow the stateless 
person to appeal against the expulsion order is of great importance. In section 4 of this chapter we will 
see that while the 1954 Statelessness Convention offers a basic right of access to courts, there is no 
guarantee that a state’s judiciary will have subject-matter jurisdiction over all matters that may affect 
stateless persons. Thanks to article 31, states are required to provide at least some form of review by a 
competent body of decisions on expulsion – although admittedly this need not necessarily be a court of 
law. 
75 “The Contracting States reserve the right to apply during that period such internal measures as they 
may deem necessary”. Article 31, paragraph 3 of the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless 
Persons. 
76 Nehemiah Robinson, Convention relating to the status of stateless persons - Its history and 
interpretation, UNHCR, Geneva: 1955, page 100; Guy Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee in International 
Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 2007, page 264. 
77 A problem that will be looked at in more detail in section 7.1 below. 
78 International Law Commission, Third report on the expulsion of aliens, prepared by Special 






Recall that the latter are contained within an instrument that does broach the 
problem of admission alongside the question of non-expulsion. 
Finally, there is one other provision in the 1954 Statelessness Convention that  
should be mentioned since it has some bearing on a stateless person’s right to re-
enter the territory of a state from abroad. That is article 28 on travel documents. 
Once a stateless person is already lawfully staying within a state party, he is entitled 
to “travel documents for the purposes of travel outside their territory”. According to 
paragraph 13 of the Schedule that applies to such documents, the papers issued shall 
in principle enable him to “re-enter the territory of the issuing State at any time 
during the period of its validity”.79 To a greatly limited extent, this provision allows 
stateless persons to benefit from the same right to return as is granted to nationals of 
the host state, which – together with the travel documents themselves – will enable 
the stateless to exercise the right to leave and will facilitate international travel.80 
 
2.2.2 International human rights law 
 
A study of contemporary international standards relating to the admittance, non-
admittance and expulsion of non-nationals by Special Rapporteur Maurice Kamto 
for the International Law Commission concluded that customary international law 
recognises the right of every state to “set the conditions for the entry and residence 
of aliens in its territory” as well as “the right to expel them”.81 This means that, in 
principle, an individual may be refused admittance to – or expelled from – a state of 
which he is not a national.82 For the stateless: every state. The international freedom 
of movement of the stateless may therefore be severely curtailed.83 However, this 
                                                           
79 It should be noted that “compelling reasons of national security or public order” may be invoked by a 
state party in order to refuse travel documents to a lawfully staying stateless person. Article 28 of the 
1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons. Furthermore, it is possible for states to 
elaborate a statement on the travel document issued that waives the duty to re-admit the stateless 
person. Paragraph 13, section 1 of the Schedule to Article 28 of the 1954 Convention relating to the 
Status of Stateless Persons. 
80 The provision of documentation to stateless persons under the 1954 Convention relating to the Status 
of Stateless Persons is discussed further in chapter XII, section 2.1. 
81 International Law Commission, Preliminary report on the expulsion of aliens, prepared by Special 
Rapporteur Maurice Kamto, A/CN.4/554, 2 June 2005, pages 6-7. In other words, international law 
does not “spell out specific criteria for the granting of residence permits”. Human Rights Committee, 
Case of Tsjarov v. Estonia, CCPR/C/91/D/1223/2003, Geneva: 14 November 2007, paragraph 7.5. 
82 This is a corollary of the fact that, as introduced in chapter IX, section 1, one of the inherent functions 
of nationality is the right of access to the respective state’s territory - nationals are free to enter and 
remain in their state. 
83 Note that all human rights documents are in agreement in granting the right to leave to everyone in 
respect of any state. Nationality has become irrelevant to this question. See Article 13, paragraph 2 of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; Article 12, paragraph 2 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights; Article 5, paragraph (d)(ii) of the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination; Article 8, paragraph 2 of the Convention on the Protection of All 
Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families; Article 2, paragraph 2 of the Fourth Protocol to the 
European Convention on Human Rights; Article 22, paragraph 2 of the American Convention on 
Human Rights; and Article 12, paragraph 2 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. 
Moreover, included in the right to leave is the entitlement to the requisite travel documents. See Human 
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statement requires some nuance, for states’ discretion in these matters is not 
absolute and the overall international standard is more appropriately summarised as 
follows:  
 
The admission of aliens is in the discretion of each state – except where a State 
is bound by treaty to accord such admission.84  
 
Human rights law has begun to encroach upon the freedom of states to admit, refuse 
or expel non-nationals at will. Yet the right to move freely across state borders is 
still rather complicated as far as international human rights law is concerned 
because its content continues to be greatly influenced by a tension between 
consideration for the position of the individual and respect for the sovereignty and 
territorial supremacy of states – a tension that is particularly fraught in the context 
of immigration policy.85 Nevertheless, stateless persons may now be able to benefit 
from a variety of human rights norms in seeking to enter or remain in a particular 
country. 
                                                                                                                                               
Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment No. 27: Freedom of movement, Geneva: 2 November 
1999, para. 9. States may impose restrictions on the right to leave where this is necessary for reasons 
such as national security, but the measures must meet the same strict conditions as were outlined above 
with respect to limitations imposed on the internal freedom of movement  (section 2.1.2). However, the 
greatest practical limitation in effectuating the right to leave, in particular for stateless persons, is 
presented by the fact that there is not necessarily a corresponding right to enter another country – and 
with the world comprehensively divided into a patchwork of states, this question of access to territory is 
crucial. See further on the right to leave Hurst Hannum, The Right to Leave and Return in International 
Law and Practice, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht: 1987. 
84 Paul Weis, Nationality and Statelessness in International Law, Kluwer Academic Publishers Group, 
Dordrecht: 1979, page 45. Note that the state may also be bound by obligations arising from customary 
international law. The UN Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals Who are not Nationals of 
the Country in which They Live provides a similar account of the overall obligation of states in article 
2, paragraph 1 where it determines that none of its provisions shall “be interpreted as restricting the 
right of any State to promulgate laws and regulations concerning the entry of aliens and the terms and 
conditions of their stay […] However, such laws and regulations shall not be incompatible with the 
international legal obligations of that state”. 
85 It is of interest to note that since the early 1960s there have been numerous unsuccessful attempts to 
further elaborate the content of the right to international freedom of movement. See the three studies 
prepared for the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities (in 
1963, 1988 and 1997); the Draft Principles on Freedom and Non-Discrimination in respect of the Right 
of Everyone to Leave Any Country, including His Own, and to Return to His Country, prepared by 
Special Rapporteur José Ingles in 1963; a document of the same name approved by the UN Sub-
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities in 1963; the Declaration on 
the Right to Leave and the Right to Return, adopted by Uppsala Colloquium of legal and human rights 
experts in Uppsala, Sweden in 1972; and the Strasbourg Declaration on the Right to Leave and Return, 
adopted at a meeting of international lawyers convened by the International Institute of Human Rights 
in Strasbourg in 1986. The text of the draft declarations can be found in Hurst Hannum, The Right to 
Leave and Return in International Law and Practice, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht: 1987, 
pages 142-158. The most recent efforts focus on the “expulsion of aliens” and are being undertaken by 
the International Law Commission under the guidance of Special Rapporteur Maurice Kamto. At the 
time of writing he had submitted his third report on the subject which included a number of draft 
articles. International Law Commission, Preliminary report on the expulsion of aliens, prepared by 
Special Rapporteur Maurice Kamto, A/CN.4/554, 2 June 2005; Second report on the expulsion of 





The Human Rights Committee has identified three initial norms that restrict 
the aforementioned freedom of states to refuse entry to or expel non-nationals, 
including stateless persons, in its General Comment on the position of aliens under 
the ICCPR: 
 
It is in principle a matter for the State to decide who it will admit to its 
territory. However, in certain circumstances an alien may enjoy the 
protection of the Covenant even in relation to entry or residence, for 
example, when considerations of non-discrimination, prohibition of 
inhuman treatment and respect for family life arise.86 
 
States are therefore prevented from maintaining immigration policies that 
unjustifiably differentiate between different groups – for example on the grounds of 
religion or gender – by the international norm of non-discrimination or equality of 
treatment.87 The prohibition of refoulement, a fundamental principle of international 
law that is espoused in numerous documents,88 protects all non-nationals (including 
stateless persons) from being “deported to a country in which they may be subjected 
to persecution or abuse”.89 Finally, norms addressing the respect for and protection 
of family life – and private life - may provide a right to remain for non-nationals, 
including stateless persons, in certain circumstances.90 Indeed, in a case before the 
                                                           
86 Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment No. 15: The Position of Aliens under the 
Covenant, Geneva: Geneva: 11 April 1986, para. 5. See also UN Committee on the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination, General Recommendation 30: Discrimination against Non-citizens, 
CERD/C/64/Misc.11/Rev.3, New York: 2004, paras. 9, 25, 27 and 28. See for instance the case of 
Aumeeruddy-Cziffra v. Mauritius where the Human Rights Committee ruled that domestic immigration 
law that placed greater restrictions on the right of access to state territory for the non-national husbands 
of Mauritian women than for the non-national wives of Mauritian men violated the principle of equal 
treatment of the sexes and therefore constituted a violation of articles 2 (1), 3 and 26 of the ICCPR. 
Human Rights Committee, Case of Shirin Aumeeruddy-Cziffra and 19 other Mautitian women v. 
Mauritius, Communication No. 35/1978, Geneva: 9 April 1981. See also European Court of Human 
Rights, Family K and W v. The Netherlands, Application No. 11278/84, 1 July 1985. Both cases are 
discussed in UN Division for the Advancement of Women, Women, nationality and citizenship, June 
2003, pages 12-13.  
87 UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General Recommendation 30: 
Discrimination against Non-citizens, CERD/C/64/Misc.11/Rev.3, New York: 2004, paras. 9 and 25. 
Carmen Tiburcio, "Chapter IX. Public Rights" in The human rights of aliens under international and 
comparative law, Kluwer Law International, The Hague: 2001, page 216; See also the discussion of the 
East African Asians cases before the European Court of Human Rights in Richard Lillich, The human 
rights of aliens in contemporary international law, Manchester University Press, Manchester: 1984, 
pages 95-96. 
88 The principle of non-refoulement can be found in article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the 
status of Refugees and Article 22, paragraph 8 of the American Convention on Human Rights. It is also 
implicit in article 3 of the Convention Against Torture; article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights; article 3 of the European Convention of Human Rights; and article 12, paragraph 3 
of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.  
89 David Weissbrodt, Final Report on Prevention of Discrimination - The Rights of Non-Citizens, 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/23, 26 May 2003, para. 54.  
90 The relevant provisions are articles 17, 23 and 24 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights; Article 9 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child; Article 8 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights; Article 17 of the American Convention on Human Rights; and Article 18 of the African 
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UN Human Rights Committee, the two stateless parents of an Australian child 
successfully challenged the deportation order enacted by the Australian authorities, 
on the basis of rights related to the protection of the family and of the child.91 And 
in a series of remarkable cases brought against Latvia, the European Court of 
Human Rights found that the deportation of – or the prolonged refusal to grant a 
permanent residence status to – the stateless applicants violated their right to private 
life.92 
In addition to these three avenues that may offer stateless persons the right 
to enter or remain in a particular state in very specific circumstances, standards that 
relate to the expulsion of non-nationals generally may be relevant. According to 
these norms, collective expulsion is prohibited93 and (lawfully present) foreigners 
                                                                                                                                               
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. The UN Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals Who 
are not Nationals of the Country in which They Live also provides (in article 5, paragraph 4) for certain 
rights relating to entry and residence in a state on the basis of protection of the family unit. Some ILO 
standards are also relevant to the right to reunification of families, including Migrant Workers 
Recommendation No. 151 of 1975. According to the Human Rights Committee, “the right to found a 
family implies, in principle, the right to procreate and live together [and] the possibility to live together 
implies the adoption of appropriate measures, both at the internal level and as the case may be, in 
cooperation with other States, to ensure the unity or reunification of families”. Human Rights 
Committee, General Comment No. 19: Protection of the family, the right to marriage and equality of 
the spouses, Geneva: 27 July 1990, paragraph 5. 
91 Human Rights Committee, Winata and Lan Li v. Australia, CCPR/C/72/D/930/2000, Geneva: 2001, 
as cited in David Weissbrodt, Final Report on Prevention of Discrimination - The Rights of Non-
Citizens, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/23, 26 May 2003, para. 56. The European Court of Human Rights has 
developed extensive case law with respect to article 8 of the European Convention and its impact on the 
right to enter or remain in a state. See also David Weissbrodt, Final Report on Prevention of 
Discrimination - The Rights of Non-Citizens, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/23, 26 May 2003, paras. 49-51 and 
Add.2, paras. 9-11; Carmen Tiburcio, "Chapter V. Private Rights" in The human rights of aliens under 
international and comparative law, Kluwer Law International, The Hague: 2001, pages 118-128. 
92 The construction of the argument by the court in three cases is very similar. The court considered first 
that “during their time in Latvia the applicants have developed the personal, social and economic ties 
that make up the private life of every human being” and that the deportation order or refusal to grant 
permanent residence constituted an interference with that private life. Thereafter, the court declares that 
in those circumstances “only reasons of a particularly serious nature” could justify the state’s action. In 
all of the cases, the court found that the Latvian authorities exceeded their margin of appreciation in this 
sphere and did not strike a fair balance between the legitimate aim of the protection of national security 
/ preventing disorder and the interest of the protection of the applicant’s right to private life (article 8 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights). European Court of Human Rights, Case of Slivenko v. 
Latvia, Application No. 48321/99, 9 October 2003; Case of Sisojeva and others v. Latvia, Application 
No. 60654/00, 16 June 2005; Case of Kaftailova v. Latvia, Application No. 59643/00, 22 June 2006. 
93 This is explicitly elaborated in article 22, paragraph 1 of the Migrant Workers Convention; article 4 
of the Fourth Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights; article 22, paragraph 9 of the 
American Convention on Human Rights; and article 12, paragraph 5 of the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights. It is implicit in the procedural protection offered against expulsion of aliens in 
article 13 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. See Human Rights Committee, 
CCPR General Comment No. 15: The Position of Aliens under the Covenant, Geneva: Geneva: 11 
April 1986, para. 10; Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations: Dominican Republic, 
A/48/40 vol. I, Geneva: 1993, para. 460 and A/56/40 vol. I, Geneva: 2001, para. 78(16); See also UN 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General Recommendation 30: Discrimination 
against Non-citizens, CERD/C/64/Misc.11/Rev.3, New York: 2004, para. 26. It is also of interest to 





may only be expelled in accordance with a decision that is accompanied by due 
process guarantees.94 The procedural protection prescribed is of particular interest 
here for two reasons. Firstly, unlike in the 1954 Statelessness Convention, human 
rights law does not necessarily reserve procedural guarantees to lawfully present 
non-nationals. This is of critical importance since it is precisely in the context of the 
refusal to grant lawful admission, the decision to revoke an individual’s lawful 
immigration status or the issuance of an order to expel him, that the value of 
procedural protection lies. It is true that the formulation chosen for most of the 
relevant treaty articles refers to “aliens lawfully in the territory of a state party”. 
However, the Migrant Workers Convention does not make this distinction and the 
pertinent article is located in Part III of the Convention where the rights of all 
migrant workers – regular and irregular – are housed.95 The African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights has also deemed that even in the context of the 
(proposed) expulsion of unlawfully present immigrants, provision should be made 
for those who are subject to deportation to “plead their case before the competent 
national courts”, basing its conclusion on “the spirit and letter of the [African] 
Charter and international law”.96 Moreover, both the Human Rights Committee and 
the European Court of Human Rights have remarked on the fundamental 
importance of the opportunity to challenge both expulsion orders and the refusal to 
                                                                                                                                               
expulsion refers to “any measure compelling aliens, as a group, to leave a country, except where such a 
measure is taken on the basis of a reasonable and objective examination of the particular case of each 
individual alien in the group”, it found a violation of the prohibition of collective expulsion of aliens 
(article 4 of the 4th Protocol to the European Convention) in a case concerning the expulsion of just four 
people. David Weissbrodt, Final Report on Prevention of Discrimination - The Rights of Non-Citizens, 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/23, 26 May 2003, Add. 2, para. 13. In addition, in a case dealing with the mass 
expulsion of people from Angola in 1996, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
determined that the deportation may amount to a violation of numerous additional rights set out in the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights such as the right to property, right to work, right to 
education and right to family life. See Magdalena Sepulveda; Theo van Banning; Gudrun 
Gudmundsdotter; Christine Chamoun, Universal and Regional Human Rights Protection: Cases and 
Commentaries, University for Peace, Ciudad Colon: 2004, pages 377-378. See also the findings of the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights with regard to the expulsion of Haitians and Haitian-
Dominicans from the Dominican Republic. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Chapter V 
– Situation of Haitians in the Dominican Republic, in “Annual Report 1991”, OAE/Ser.L/V/II.81, Doc. 
6, Rev. 1,  14 February 1992; and Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Chapter IX – 
Situation of Haitian migrant workers and their families in the Dominican Republic, in “Report on the 
situation of human rights in the Dominican Republic”, OAE/Ser.L/V/II.014, Doc. 49, Rev. 1, 7 October 
1999. 
94 Article 13 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; article 1 of Protocol No. 7 to 
the European Convention on Human Rights; article 22, paragraph 6 of the American Convention on 
Human Rights; and Article 12, paragraph 4 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. 
Similar guarantees can be found in article 22, paragraphs 2-9 of the Migrant Workers Convention. See 
also article 7 of the UN Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals Who are not Nationals of the 
Country in which They Live. 
95 Be reminded once again, however, that stateless persons are in principle excluded from the scope of 
application of the Migrant Workers Convention. 
96 See Magdalena Sepulveda; Theo van Banning; Gudrun Gudmundsdotter; Christine Chamoun, 
Universal and Regional Human Rights Protection: Cases and Commentaries, University for Peace, 
Ciudad Colon: 2004, pages 377-378. 
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issue a residence permit on the basis of other human rights norms.97 These 
development suggest that the scope for relying on procedural protections under 
general human rights law is broader than that offered by the tailor-made 
statelessness instrument.  
Secondly, unlike the 1954 Statelessness Convention, the relevant human 
rights norms are strictly procedural and do not determine that expulsion must also 
be substantively justified,98 such as on the basis national security or public order 
considerations. The only exception is article 8 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights which specifies that an interference with the right to family or 
private life – for example through expulsion – must be justified on one of a number 
of grounds.99 Not withstanding this observation, in this respect, the Statelessness 
Convention seems to trump the protection offered under the general human rights 
framework. However, the overall procedural protection espoused under human 
rights law is also clearly designed to prevent arbitrary or abusive decision-making. 
Thus, bound up in the availability of a  review of an expulsion order is the 
opportunity to consider the substance of the decision and determine whether it was 
lawful and justified. So, even in the absence of pre-set criteria for making this 
determination, the procedural guarantees actually allow the decision to expel to be 
tested against the three standards outlined above - non-discrimination, non-
refoulement and protection of family or private life - as well as any other human 
rights-based considerations. 
Meanwhile, the Human Rights Committee has also suggested that a 
foreigner who is to be expelled “must be allowed to leave for any country that 
                                                           
97 In a case brought against Estonia for the refusal to issue a residence permit to the stateless applicant 
for national security considerations, the Human Rights Committee ruled that there had been no 
violation of the right to equal protection before the law (article 26), in part because the individual “had 
a right to have the denial of his application for permanent residence reviewed by the State party’s 
courts”. Human Rights Committee, Case of Tsarjov v. Estonia, CCPR/C/91/D/1223/2003, 14 
November 2007, at paragraph 7.5. The European Court of Human Rights found – again in a case 
involving a stateless individual - that even where the provision devoted to procedural guarantees in the 
context of expulsion of non-nationals (article 1 of Protocol 7 to the European Convention on Human 
Rights) cannot be invoked, “where there is an arguable claim that such an expulsion may infringe the 
foreigner’s right to respect for family life, article 13 in conjunction with article 8 of the Convention 
requires that States must make available to the individual concerned the effective possibility of 
challenging the deportation or refusal-of-residence order and of having the relevant issues examined 
with sufficient procedural safeguards and thoroughness by an appropriate domestic forum offering 
adequate guarantees of independence and impartiality”. European Court of Human Rights, Case of Al-
Nashif v. Bulgaria, Application No. 50963/99, 20 June 2002, at paragraph 133. 
98 Richard Lillich, The human rights of aliens in contemporary international law, Manchester 
University Press, Manchester: 1984, page 47. 
99 The grounds listed are: “national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, 
for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of 
the rights and freedoms of others”. Article 8, paragraph 2 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights. Moveover, such substantive requirements resurface in the draft articles on Expulsion of Aliens 
prepared for the International Law Commission and “danger to the community of the state” (evidenced 
by a conviction for a “particularly serious crime or offence” has been added to the list of grounds 
justifying expulsion. “Terrorism” has also been pencilled in as a grounds for further debate. See Draft 
article 6 on “Non-expulsion of stateless persons” in International Law Commission, Third report on the 





agrees to take him”100 – offering the stateless person, in a similar fashion to the 
1954 Statelessness Convention, the opportunity to choose his state of destination 
within the boundaries of the possibilities that are available to him. Furthermore, in 
the case of Harabi v. The Netherlands, the European Commission on Human Rights 
determined that  
 
the repeated expulsion of an individual, whose identity was impossible to 
establish, to a country where his admission is not guaranteed, may raise an 
issue under Article 3 of the Convention […] Such an issue may arise, a 
fortiori, if an alien is, over a long period of time, deported repeatedly from 
one country to another without any country taking measures to regularise 
his situation.101 
  
Therefore, within the European framework at least, human rights law provides an 
ultimate remedy against the worst cases of stateless persons stranded in a game of 
human ping-pong. 
If none of the standards discussed offers any solace to stateless persons 
seeking to enter or remain in a state then human rights law offers one more 
prospect. This lies in the discovery that the basic right to enter and remain in a 
country has two different formulations in human rights law.102 The first and 
narrower expression is that included in the European and American human rights 
conventions as well as one universal instrument – the Migrant Workers 
Convention.103 Following the traditional view of the matter, the relevant provisions 
determine that everyone has the right to enter and remain in the state of which he is 
a national.104 Lacking any nationality, the stateless will not enjoy this right in 
respect of any state. However, an alternative formulation offers more hope. It can 
be found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of Racial 
                                                           
100 Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment No. 15: The Position of Aliens under the 
Covenant, Geneva: Geneva: 11 April 1986, para. 9; Human Rights Committee, CCPR General 
Comment No. 27: Freedom of movement, Geneva: 2 November 1999, para. 8. 
101 Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights provides that “no one shall be subjected to 
torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”. European Commission on Human Rights, 
Case of Harabi v. The Netherlands, Application No. 10798/84, 5 March 1986, page 112. 
102 Note that the right to remain (freedom from expulsion) is mentioned explicitly in the European and 
American regional human rights instruments while it is considered implicit in the right to enter or return 
as formulated in the other human rights texts. Therefore, if an individual is entitled to the right to enter 
a certain country, he or she also enjoys the right to remain and reside there. See Human Rights 
Committee, CCPR General Comment No. 27: Freedom of movement, Geneva: 2 November 1999, para. 
19; See also Human Rights Committee, Stewart v. Canada, CCPR/C/58/D/538/1993, para. 12.2. 
103 Article 3 of the Fourth Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights; Article 22, 
paragraph 5 of the American Convention on Human Rights and Article 8, paragraph 2 of the 
Convention on the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families.  
104 Note that although the provision on freedom of movement in the Migrant Workers Convention refers 
not to the state of nationality but to the country of origin, this is defined elsewhere in the same 
instrument as meaning the country of which the person concerned is a national. See article 8, paragraph 
2 in conjunction with article 6, paragraph (a) of the Convention on the Rights of All Migrant Workers 
and Members of Their Families. 
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Discrimination and the African Human Rights Charter.105 The norm provides in 
essence that everyone has the right to enter or return to (and remain in) his own 
country.106 This wording appears broader in scope and may arguably entitle non-
nationals to be (re)admitted to (or protected from expulsion from) a given state 
under certain circumstances.  
The extent to which non-nationals are indeed considered co-beneficiaries of 
this latter provision remained a subject of serious contention for quite some time. 
Proponents in both camps – those who considered his own country to refer solely to 
the country of citizenship and the opposing group that interpreted the text more 
expansively, to also include the country with which an individual has a particularly 
close connection – argued their case on the basis of the same travaux préparatoires 
of the ICCPR.107 It was the treaty body responsible for monitoring the 
implementation of the ICCPR that eventually brought clarity to the situation. By the 
early 1990s, the Human Rights Committee had acknowledged that the notion “his 
own country” is broader than the concept of the country of nationality although its 
jurisprudence also betrayed some lasting disagreement on the precise scope of the 
norm.108 Then in 1999, the Committee issued a General Comment on the freedom 
of movement that elucidated and built on its jurisprudence on the subject. 
Importantly, this General Comment includes several statements on the scope of the 
right to enter “one’s own country” that are directly relevant to the situation of many 
stateless populations: 
  
                                                           
105 Article 13, paragraph 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; Article 12, paragraph 4 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; Article 5, paragraph (d)(ii) of the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and Article 12, paragraph 2 of the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. 
106 The formulation in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights deviates somewhat from 
that of the other instruments in providing – in place of an absolute right to enter or return – that “no one 
shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country”. The Human Rights Committee has 
explained that there are nevertheless “few, if any, circumstances in which deprivation of the right to 
enter one’s own country could be reasonable”. Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment No. 
27: Freedom of movement, Geneva: 2 November 1999, para. 21. Note moreover, that unlike the right to 
move freely within the borders of a state – and the right to leave any country – this right to enter is not 
subject to any restrictions on grounds such as national security or public health. See section 2.1.2 above 
at note 38. 
107 Hurst Hannum, The Right to Leave and Return in International Law and Practice, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, Dordrecht: 1987, pages 56-60. Note that “while in the drafting of article 12, paragraph 4 of 
the [Civil and Political Rights] Covenant the term ‘country of nationality’ was rejected, so was the 
suggestion to refer to the country of one’s permanent home”. The meaning of one’s own country 
therefore lies somewhere between these two counter poles. See Human Rights Committee, Stewart v. 
Canada, CCPR/C/58/D/538/1993, para. 12.5. 
108 See Human Rights Committee, Stewart v. Canada, CCPR/C/58/D/538/1993 including the dissenting 
opinions by E. Evatt, C. Quirogay, F. Urbina, C. Chanet and J. Vallejo; Human Rights Committee, 
Canepa v. Canada, CCPR/C/59/D/558/1993 including the concurring opinion by M. Scheinin and the 
dissenting opinions by E. Evatt, C. Quirogay and C. Chanet. See also Sarah Joseph; Jenny Schultz; 
Melissa Castan, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Cases, Materials and 
Commentary, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 2000, pages 261-267; David Weissbrodt, Final Report 






The scope of ‘his own country’ is broader than the concept ‘country of his 
nationality’. It is not limited to nationality in a formal sense, that is, 
nationality acquired at birth or by conferral; it embraces, at the very least, 
an individual who, because of his or her special ties to or claims in relation 
to a given country, cannot be considered to be a mere alien. This would be 
the case, for example, of nationals of a country who have been stripped of 
their nationality in violation of international law, and of individuals whose 
country of nationality has been incorporated in or transferred to another 
national entity, whose nationality is being denied them. The language of 
article 12, paragraph 4, moreover, permits a broader interpretation that 
might embrace other categories of long-term residents, including but not 
limited to stateless persons arbitrarily deprived of the right to acquire the 
nationality of the country of such residence.109  
 
This statement may be seen as an expression of the principle of non-discrimination 
which calls both for the same treatment in equal cases and for different treatment in 
clearly different cases.110 Thus, it would be unreasonable to treat all non-nationals 
equally where some, “because of his or her special ties or claims in relation to a 
given country, cannot be considered to be a mere alien” and the personal scope of 
the right to enter his own country must reflect this.111  
The three examples given by the Human Rights Committee – and these 
should be considered illustrative, rather than exhaustive112 – of circumstances in 
which a right to (re)enter and remain in a country could be claimed by a non-
national are all situations that are very familiar by now since they have already 
come up in the discussion of the statelessness phenomenon. Thus a stateless person 
whose nationality was lost through an act of denationalisation that ran counter to a 
state’s international obligations - such as the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of 
nationality - will be entitled to (re)enter or remain in that state regardless of the loss 
                                                           
109 Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment No. 27: Freedom of movement, Geneva: 2 
November 1999, para. 20. 
110 Recall the discussion of positive measures or affirmative action based on the principle of non-
discrimination in section 1 at note 19 . 
111 Moreover, while the European Court of Human Rights is not able to interpret the guarantee housed 
in Article 3 of the Fourth Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights expansively, because 
it clearly refers to nationality, the Court has found other ways of offering the same, broad protection to 
persons who have developed a connection with a country of which they are not a national. In the 
aforementioned cases brought against Latvia, the Court used article 8 on the right to private life to offer 
protect the stateless persons in question from expulsion or non-issancce of a residence permit. European 
Court of Human Rights, Case of Slivenko v. Latvia, Application No. 48321/99, 9 October 2003; Case of 
Sisojeva and others v. Latvia, Application No. 60654/00, 16 June 2005; Case of Kaftailova v. Latvia, 
Application No. 59643/00, 22 June 2006. See further note 92 above. 
112 In its Concluding Observations to the periodic report of Japan, the Human Rights Committee has 
referred to another category of person who may benefit from the guarantees under article 12, paragraph 
4 of the ICCPR. The Committee determined that depriving “foreigners who are second- or third-
generation permanent residents in Japan and whose activities are based in Japan” of their right to re-
enter the country is incompatible with article 12, paragraph 4 of the Covenant. Human Rights 
Committee, Concluding Observations: Japan, A/54/40 vol. I (1999) 36, para. 160. See also Human 
Rights Committee, Concluding Observations: New Zealand, A/57/40 vol. I (2002) 63, para. 81(12). 
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of citizenship.113 Where state succession has created statelessness, these individuals 
will also enjoy the right to (re)enter and reside in the successor state despite their 
lack of nationality.114 Finally, where statelessness is prolonged due to enduring 
denial of citizenship by the country of residence, this state is nevertheless to be 
considered the individual’s “own country” for the purposes of enjoying the right to 
(re)admission and residence. This category also encompasses the successive 
generations of stateless children who owe their situation to the continued refusal of 
nationality by the state.115  
 In each of the situations outlined, there is a link with a state that clearly should 
have been formalised through the attribution or continuation of citizenship and the 
absence of this bond of nationality is deemed not to excuse the state of its 
responsibilities towards the individual. So, a stateless person does not enjoy the 
right to enter or remain in any and every state by virtue of his statelessness, but only 
with respect to the state that has unjustifiably withheld or withdrawn citizenship. In 
view of the complexity of the international norms dealing with the attribution of 
nationality – as we saw in Part 2 – the task of identifying the state responsible and 
indeed enforcing this right of (re)admission or residence where the right to a 
nationality has broken down may not always be easy. Nevertheless, this progression 
towards a broader interpretation of the right to enter a country to the benefit of 
certain groups of stateless persons is of enormous importance because it offers an 
opportunity for (renewed) access to the territory of a state and by consequence 
provides the individuals in question with the chance to access and claim other rights 
– including those granted under the 1954 Statelessness Convention where the state 
                                                           
113 It is important to note that should the denationalisation of an individual be enacted in order for the 
state to shirk its obligation to allow the person to (re)enter or remain on its soil, this act may amount to 
a violation of the right to enter as protected under, for example, article 12, paragraph 4 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: “A State party must not, by stripping a person of 
nationality or by expelling an individual to a third country, arbitrarily prevent this person from 
returning to his or her own country”. Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment No. 27: 
Freedom of movement, Geneva: 2 November 1999, para. 21. See also Human Rights Committee, 
Concluding Observations: Syrian Arab Republic, A/56/40 vol. I (2001) 70, para. 81(21). Moreover, it 
has been argued that if denationalisation was combined with deprivation of the right to remain or return, 
this would necessarily result in an infringement of another state’s territorial supremacy by forcing non-
nationals upon them and refusing to re-admit them. Thus for the “maintenance of peaceful relations 
among States […] loss of nationality by denationalisation should […] not entail the loss of the right of 
sojourn; it should not relieve the State from the obligation to receive the former national back on its 
territory”. Paul Weis, Nationality and Statelessness in International Law, Kluwer Academic Publishers 
Group, Dordrecht: 1979, page 54. See also Hurst Hannum, The Right to Leave and Return in 
International Law and Practice, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht: 1987, pages 60-63. 
114 This is reaffirmed in Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations: Croatia, A/56/40 vol. I 
(2001) 65, para. 80 (15). See also article 20 of the European Convention on Nationality. 
115 See the comments of the Committee on the situation of the Bedoons in Kuwait: “The treatment of 
the Bedoons (included in the category of stateless persons) in Kuwait, who number several thousand, is 
of grave concern. In view of the fact that many of these people are born in or have been living in 
Kuwaiti territory for decades […] the sweeping statement of the delegation characterising Bedoons 
generally as ‘illegal residents’ is of grave concern. That many Bedoons long resident in Kuwait who left 
the country during the Iraqi occupation in 1990/91 are not permitted to return to Kuwait is of concern”. 





has ratified that instrument.116 Moreover, with the unbridled right to remain an 
implicit component of this right to enter, if a stateless person is found to enjoy the 
right to enter a particular state, he must also be deemed to enjoy protection from 
expulsion from that state.117 Many of the situations in which the withdrawal or 
refusal of nationality has been accompanied by (the threat of) deportation are thus 
likely to be in breach of this norm.118 This development, together with the other 
human rights standards that impact upon an individual’s international free 
movement – as discussed above – is a firm, positive step towards the assurance of a 
right for stateless persons to live somewhere. Nevertheless, more will need to be 
done to truly take advantage of the possibilities offered to the stateless under human 
rights law and to further clarify the application of these norms in the specific 
situation of statelessness. 
 
3 LEGAL PERSONHOOD 
 
The next issue to be considered is the right to legal personhood or the right to be 
recognised as a person before the law. The notion is that while “‘personality’ 
implies factual existence, ‘legal personality’ implies legal existence”.119 Legal 
personality is therefore required for an individual to be recognised as the bearer of 
rights – including human rights – and duties. As such, legal personhood is a basic 
requirement for the capacity to engage in various legal transactions, including 
contracting marriage, purchasing, selling or inheriting property or staking a claim in 
                                                           
116 To this end, it is certainly advantageous that the underlying norm is contained in one of the major 
universal human rights instruments - enjoying wide acceptance and not being limited in geographical 
application to a particular region only. Of interest to note is the fact that this provision attracted only 
one reservation (by the United Kingdom) from among all of the 160 state parties to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Moreover, the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees also implicitly acknowledges that stateless persons enjoy the right to return to their country of 
habitual residence, even in the absence of the bond of nationality. In assessing whether a stateless 
person falls within the definition of a “refugee”, it is the country of former habitual residence that is 
looked to (in place of the country of nationality). Guy Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee in International Law, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford: 2007, pages 67-70. 
117 Some authors have even gone so far as to assert that customary international law precludes the 
expulsion of any non-national who “by virtue of long residence, have prima facie acquired the effective 
nationality of the host state if no state allows them entry”. Yaffa Zilberschats, "Chapter 2 - Citizenship 
and International Law" in The Human Right to Citizenship, Transnational Publishers, Ardsley, NY: 
2002, page 43. 
118 Consider the case mentioned in the introduction to this issue where the Mauritanian nationality of 
60,000 black Africans was spontaneously disputed and they were subsequently expelled from the 
country. The situation in Ethiopia/Eritrea is another example of an infringement of this norm: 
denationalisation and expulsion of population groups both preceded and accompanied the conflict and 
even in the wake of independence, the non-recognition of nationality claims and deportations 
continued. See Maureen Lynch, Lives on hold: The human cost of statelessness, Washington: 2005, 
page 28; Human Rights Watch, The Horn of Africa: Mass Expulsions and the Nationality Issue, 30 
January 2003. 
119 Anna Meijknecht, Towards International Personality: The Position of Minorities and Indigenous 
Peoples in International Law, Intersentia, Antwerp: 2001, page 26. 
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court.120 As a result, the recognition of a person’s legal existence is critical to these 
and many other facets of his life.  
 It has been said that today, “no country expressly denies to aliens legal 
personality”.121 Nevertheless, since the capacity to acquire and exercise rights rests 
upon the recognition of legal personhood, many of the problems that stateless 
populations report could point to an underlying issue of denial of legal personality. 
One reported fact that is illustrative here is that crimes committed against stateless 
individuals are not always investigated. Indeed,  
 
if someone robs or rapes them, they may find they cannot lodge a complaint, 
because legally they do not exist and because the police require proof that they 
do before they can open an investigation.122  
 
However, it is unclear how widespread this complaint is and what factors have 
contributed to the non-investigation of crimes. Yet, it is certainly arguable that this 
problem, as well as the difficulties experienced by stateless persons with regards to 
respect for family life (including the official recognition and documentation of 
marriage and the registration of a child’s birth), property ownership, indefinite 
detention and many other areas, could be considered evidence of a lesser or lack of 
regard for their basic legal personhood. This is enough to warrant a brief 
investigation of the extent to which international law prescribes the recognition of 
the legal personality of stateless persons. 
 
3.1 The 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons 
 
The 1954 Statelessness Convention addresses the right to legal personhood 
indirectly in its article 12 that deals with “personal status”. According to the 
instrument’s commentary, the term personal status as used here refers to an 
individual’s:  
 
Legal capacity (age of majority, the rights of persons under age, capacity to 
marry, capacity of married women, the instances when a person may lose 
his legal capacity), their family rights (marriage, divorce, recognition and 
adoption of children, the powers of parents over their children or of 
husband over his wife and their mutual rights to support), the matrimonial 
regime (the mutual rights of spouses to property, for instance), and 
succession and inheritance (whom succeeds whom, what are the 
consequences of a will, who is considered to have survived in case of 
unknown date of death, etc).123 
                                                           
120 Just what rights a person holds and is entitled to exercise – his actual legal capacity - is regulated 
elsewhere in international and domestic law. 
121 Carmen Tiburcio, "Chapter V. Private Rights" in The human rights of aliens under international and 
comparative law, Kluwer Law International, The Hague: 2001, page 114. 
122 Philippe Leclerc and Rupert Colville, “In the shadows. Millions seek to escape the grim world of the 
stateless”, in Refugees Magazine, No. 147, Issue 3, 2007, page 6. See also Maureen Lynch and Perveen 
Ali, Buried Alive. Stateless Kurds in Syria, Report for Refugees International, January 2006, page 3. 
123 Nehemiah Robinson, Convention relating to the status of stateless persons - Its history and 






However, the provision addresses the question of jurisdiction rather than of rights or 
substance.124 It determines which state’s domestic law governs a particular stateless 
person’s personal status125 and provides for the recognition of “rights previously 
acquired by a stateless person and dependent on personal status, more particularly 
rights attaching to marriage”.126 The article thereby skips the question of whether 
stateless persons have legal personhood and moves straight onto the issue of 
jurisdiction in matters of personal status. This suggests that the 1954 Statelessness 
Convention considers the legal personality of stateless persons as a given and not in 
question. Furthermore, this implicit affirmation of the right to legal personhood for 
stateless persons is reinforced by the overall approach taken in the instrument 
whereby rights are prescribed on the basis of the legal status of “stateless person” – 
a status that could not be enjoyed unless the beneficiaries legal existence were also 
acknowledged. 
 
3.2 International human rights law 
 
When human rights law is consulted, we find that the right to legal personality has 
been dealt with explicitly.127 For instance, article 6 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights proclaims that “everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as 
a person before the law” – a provision that is echoed in, among other instruments, 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.128 The insertion of the 
word “everywhere” indicates that the right to legal personhood does not stop at the 
border - it is not territorially bound. Non-nationals also have the right to be 
recognised as a person before the law.129 Moreover, the very concept of human 
                                                           
124 The need to deal with the question of jurisdiction stems from the fact that in countries where the 
personal status of a foreigner is governed by the law of the country of nationality, “a person without a 
nationality (particularly if he never possessed one) does not possess, in theory, any status whatsoever, 
unless the law contains special provisions for stateless persons”. Nehemiah Robinson, Convention 
relating to the status of stateless persons - Its history and interpretation, UNHCR, Geneva: 1955, page 
49 
125 According to paragraph 1 of article 12: “1. The personal status of a stateless person shall be 
governed by the law of the country of his domicile or, if he has no domicile, by the law of the country 
of his residence”. 
126 Paragraph 2 of article 12. 
127 International law also knows a whole body of standards – private international law – that address 
jurisdictional questions related to personal status and other issues.  
128 The right to legal personhood can be found in article 16 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights. It can moreover be traced in article 24 of the Migrant Workers Convention, article 12 
of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, article 3 of the American Convention on 
Human Rights and article 5 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. The Committee on 
the Rights of the Child has also read the right to be recognised as a person before the law into article 7 
of the Convention on the Rights of the Child; see, among others, Committee on the Rights of the Child, 
Concluding Observations: Jamaica, CRC/C/38, Geneva: 1995, paragraph 148; Nicaragua, CRC/C/43, 
Geneva: 1995, paragraph 43; Nepal, CRC/C/54, Geneva: 1996, paragraph 180. 
129 Interestingly, according to Tiburcio it is the historical position of non-nationals that spurred the 
elaboration of the right to legal personhood in modern human rights instruments: “In Antiquity, aliens 
were not recognised as such, for they were denied the enjoyment and acquisition of all rights. Therefore 
many international conventions still emphasise this right”. Carmen Tiburcio, "Chapter V. Private 
 
 
Protecting the Civil and Political Rights of the Stateless 
 265 
rights presupposes legal personhood by bestowing people with substantive rights. 
Indeed the right to legal personhood is considered to be of such primary 
significance, for nationals and non-nationals alike, that it is among the non-
derogable standards that cannot be limited at all, under any circumstances.130 In 
conclusion then, on the basis of human rights law, any laws and practices that 
prevent stateless persons or any other group from “being treated or from 
functioning as full legal persons” should be eradicated.131 The 1954 Statelessness 
Convention and international human rights framework are thus in full agreement on 
this matter. 
 
4 ACCESS TO COURTS 
 
The right of access to courts is one element of a broader set of rights and principles 
that include the right to an effective remedy, the right to a fair trial and the principle 
of due process of law.132 These notions play a central role in the legitimacy of 
government and the individual enjoyment of rights. Indeed, the right of access to 
courts and related procedural rights “are of fundamental importance for they 
guarantee compliance with all other rights”.133 They provide an avenue for 
individuals to complain about - and seek redress for - arbitrary acts of government, 
but also means for settling a dispute that arises between private individuals or for 
ensuring the fair and impartial prosecution of criminal offences. Furthermore, 
access to court has long been considered pivotal in the protection of individual 
rights,134 including for non-nationals through the regime of diplomatic protection. 
There,  
 
the idea that individuals have a right to resort to local courts whenever their 
rights are violated is the basis of the local remedies rule in the context of 
diplomatic protection, according to which aliens have first to vindicate their 
rights in local courts before invoking their national State protective 
apparatus.135  
 
                                                                                                                                               
Rights" in The human rights of aliens under international and comparative law, Kluwer Law 
International, The Hague: 2001, page 112. 
130 See article 4, paragraph 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
131 See Human Rights Committee, General Comment 28: Equality of Rights between Men and Women, 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.10, Geneva: 29 March 2000, paragraph 19. 
132 Magdalena Sepulveda; Theo van Banning; Gudrun Gudmundsdotter; Christine Chamoun, Universal 
and Regional Human Rights Protection: Cases and Commentaries, University for Peace, Ciudad 
Colon: 2004, pages 477-560. 
133 Carmen Tiburcio, "Chapter X. Procedural Rights" in The human rights of aliens under international 
and comparative law, Kluwer Law International, The Hague: 2001, page 245. 
134 In other words, “human rights cannot be secured effectively without protection by effective, 
independent and impartial tribunals”. Magdalena Sepulveda; Theo van Banning; Gudrun 
Gudmundsdotter; Christine Chamoun, Universal and Regional Human Rights Protection: Cases and 
Commentaries, University for Peace, Ciudad Colon: 2004, page 560. 
135 Carmen Tiburcio, "Chapter X. Procedural Rights" in The human rights of aliens under international 





Similarly, the exhaustion of local remedies is a precondition for access to 
international human rights complaints bodies such as the UN Human Rights 
Committee,136 the European Court on Human Rights137 and the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights.138  
In the specific context of statelessness, this key right gains even greater 
value. Firstly, as a vulnerable group the stateless are known to commonly 
experience substantial human rights violations, heightening the need for access to 
courts as a means of redressing such treatment.139 For example, stateless persons 
may be subjected to lengthy or indefinite detention due to their status and the 
opportunity to contest such detention is an important tool in combating this 
conduct.140 Secondly, access to court provides the opportunity to contest the very 
decision(s) on attribution of nationality that have caused the (continued) 
statelessness of the individual. Where we have identified concrete obligations of 
states in the context of the right to a nationality, such as the prohibition of 
discriminatory deprivation of nationality, access to a court will enable the persons 
affected to actually enforce these guarantees. For instance, in a case in the 
Netherlands where a man was rendered stateless by the withdrawal of his Dutch 
nationality – after he had renounced his prior Egyptian citizenship – it was a 
domestic court that ensured that his nationality was reinstated.141 Finally, the right 
of access to courts also offers the stateless the opportunity to invoke their specific 
entitlements as “stateless persons”. To gain access to the rights attributed to 
stateless persons under the 1954 Statelessness Convention and elsewhere in 
international law, some form of status determination is needed.142 Where a state 
rejects an application by a stateless person for recognition as such, the prospect of 
demanding a review of the correctness and lawfulness of this decision becomes 
crucial.143 And, of course, it is also important that stateless persons are able to rely a 
state’s courts in the same way as any other individual, for the purpose of resolving 
civil and criminal cases. 
                                                           
136 Article 5, paragraph 2 of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, 1976. 
137 Article 35, paragraph 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
138 Article 46, paragraph 1 of the American Convention on Human Rights. 
139 Just as “in practice, refugees have often looked to their host country’s courts to secure respect for 
their rights”, this avenue provides similar opportunities to stateless persons. James Hathaway, The 
Rights of Refugees Under International Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 2005, page 628. 
140 Maureen Lynch, Lives on hold: The human cost of statelessness, Washington: 2005, page 7 ; Carol 
Batchelor The 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons: Implementation within the 
European Union Member States and Recommendations for Harmonisation 2004; UNHCR, Stateless 
persons: a discussion note, EC/1992/SCP/CRP.4, Geneva: 1 April 1992, para 9 and annex. The specific 
problem of detention – and the opportunity to appeal the lawfulness of detention – is discussed in 
section 7 below. 
141 Betty de Hart; Kees Groenendijk, "Multiple Nationality: The Practice of Germany and the 
Netherlands" in R. Cholewinski (ed) International Migration Law, TMC Asser Press, The Hague: 2007 
This case was introduced in chapter IV at note 155. 
142 See UNHCR and IPU, Nationality and statelessness. A handbook for parliamentarians, 2005, pages 
19-21. 
143 Compare what has been said of the role of the right of access to courts for an individual seeking 
recognition as a refugee in James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 2005, page 630. 
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 In practice, access to states’ judicial systems has reportedly been a problem for 
stateless persons as well as for non-citizens in general. For example, in the 
Advisory Board on Human Security’s study on the denial of citizenship it was 
reported that the difficulties experienced by non-citizens and the human rights 
violations they face are “further compounded by inadequate access to justice”.144 
UN Special Rapporteur on the rights of non-citizens, David Weissbrodt, has added 
that:  
 
Discrimination [against non-citizens] is aggravated when combined with 
insufficient possibilities to bring complaints and obtain reparation.145 
 
Disappointingly, neither of these reports elaborates any further on this problem.146 
Yet references to the difficulty that stateless persons face in accessing judicial 
systems and legal remedies can also be found in documents compiled by UNHCR 
and NGOs.147 Further investigation into state practice in this respect would be 
useful in mapping the implications of statelessness because these references are 
overwhelmingly brief and superficial. Here, however, the task is to give closer 
consideration to the international legal standards on the right of access to courts – 
and related rights - for stateless persons, starting with where it is espoused in the 
1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons. 
 
4.1 The 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons 
 
The right of access to courts was included in the 1954 Convention relating to the 
Status of Stateless Persons in precisely the same terms as in the 1951 Refugee 
Convention whereby “stateless person” was simply substituted for “refugee”.148 
Thus, the first paragraph of article 16 decrees that 
                                                           
144 Advisory Board on Human Security (prepared by Constantin Sokoloff), Denial of Citizenship: A 
Challenge to Human Security, February 2005, page 20. 
145 David Weissbrodt, Final Report on Prevention of Discrimination - The Rights of Non-Citizens, 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/23, 26 May 2003, Add.3, para. 3.  
146 In this context it should be noted that the content of the UN Special Rapporteur’s report on 
“Examples of practices in regard to non-citizens” – the inclusion of some issues and the exclusion of 
others – was guided by methodological considerations rather than any allocation of priority to certain 
problems over others. The fact that the issue of access to courts was not discussed in detail in this 
document should not be interpreted as an appraisal of the (lack of) seriousness or importance of this 
matter. See David Weissbrodt, Final Report on Prevention of Discrimination - The Rights of Non-
Citizens, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/23, 26 May 2003, Add.3, para. 1. 
147 See for example UNHCR, "Statelessness and Citizenship" in The State of the World's Refugees - A 
Humanitarian Agenda, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 1997, page 225; UNHCR Executive 
Committee, Conclusion on Identification, Prevention and Reduction of Statelessness and Protection of 
Stateless Persons, No. 106, 57th Session, Geneva, 2006, para. (v); Maureen Lynch, Lives on hold: The 
human cost of statelessness, Washington: 2005, page 3; Maureen Lynch and Perveen Ali, Buried Alive. 
Stateless Kurds in Syria, Report for Refugees International, January 2006, page 2; Youth Advocate 
Program International, Stateless Children - Youth Who are Without Citizenship, Washington: 2002, 
page 7. 
148 This provision was, in turn, derived from the refugee instruments that preceded the 1951 Refugee 






a stateless person shall have free access to the courts of law on the territory 
of all Contracting States.149 
 
This basic right to access the courts of law of any state party is granted to the 
stateless person directly and absolutely.150 It is not in any way dependent on the 
treatment accorded by the state to other groups of persons (nationals or non-
nationals). The level of attachment required to exercise this right is that of simple 
jurisdiction only. The only requirement is that the court be competent – have 
subject-matter jurisdiction – to try the case in question.151 Presence, lawful or 
otherwise, on the soil of the state party is not required. This is important because the 
right of access to courts may, for example, be invoked by a stateless person who 
faces detention, expulsion or other difficulties on the grounds of his unlawful status. 
It may also be possible for the aspirant stateless person to invoke the right of access 
to court in the context of the determination of his status, if such an opportunity is 
provided for under domestic law.  
However, states are not compelled, under the 1954 Statelessness Convention to 
ensure that their courts are competent to adjudicate in nationality matters. It can be 
recalled that the other statelessness instrument, the 1961 Convention on the 
Reduction of Statelessness, does provide for the opportunity for a review of at least 
some decisions relating to nationality – but concerns were raised about the limited 
scope of those guarantees and it is regrettable to see that the 1954 Statelessness 
Convention does not redress these.152 More troublesome is the failure of the 1954 
Statelessness Convention to elaborate a concrete right to a judicial remedy in the 
context of a “stateless person status” determination exercise, particularly in view of 
the difficulties inherent in the identification of statelessness.153 The only situation in 
which the 1954 Statelessness Convention actually calls for provision to be made for 
some kind of legal review of a decision – although not necessarily through access to 
court – is where an expulsion order for a lawfully present stateless person has been 
enacted.154 This fact significantly limits the value of this provision.  
                                                                                                                                               
Convention concerning the Status of Refugees coming from Germany. James Hathaway, The Rights of 
Refugees Under International Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 2005, page 644. 
149 Article 16, paragraph 1 of the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons.  
150 The Convention explicitly determines that no reservations may be made to this paragraph of article 
16, containing the core right of access to courts. See article 38 of the 1954 Convention relating to the 
Status of Stateless Persons. Furthermore, the provision is very straight-forward and requires little 
interpretation. Only the word “free” may be somewhat ambiguous, but the travaux préparatoires 
quickly clarify that it is ready access to court that is envisaged rather than access free of fees or charges. 
A stateless person may therefore be subject to the same fees as are levied against nationals. See also 
article 29 on the imposition of duties, charges and taxes. 1954 Convention relating to the Status of 
Stateless Persons. Paul Weis, The Refugee Convention, 1951, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 
1995, pages 131-134. 
151 James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge: 2005, pages 645-647. 
152 See chapter V, section 2.1. 
153 As discussed in chapter II, section 2 and chapter IX, section 3. 
154 The right to due process within the particular circumstance of expulsion from state territory is 
established separately in article 31 of the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons. 
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 Having established that all stateless persons have the right to petition a court, 
article 16 then makes an effort to facilitate the enjoyment of this right by tackling 
certain practical obstacles:155  
 
A stateless persons shall enjoy in the Contracting State in which he has his 
habitual residence the same treatment as a national in matters pertaining to 
access to the courts, including legal assistance and exemption from cautio 
judicatum solvi.156 
 
In comparison with the first paragraph, as cited above, both the level of attachment 
needed for enjoyment of this entitlement and the level of protection offered differ 
dramatically: the level of attachment required is habitual residence and the standard 
of protection offered is that on a par with the country’s nationals.157 By compelling 
states to treat stateless persons as though they were nationals, the provision can 
attain its objective of removing the practical difficulties that specifically affect non-
nationals when trying to gain access to courts. Two such issues are raised explicitly. 
Firstly, to the extent that legal assistance is available to nationals, this must also be 
made available to stateless persons. Here again, there is the limitation that the 
Convention does not oblige states to establish a system of legal aid generally or for 
stateless persons specifically, but stateless persons must enjoy access to any 
existing system on the same terms as nationals. The second matter dealt with is the 
cautio judicatum solvi: a security deposit that has historically been required of a 
non-national who brings a case before the court to cover the expenses of the 
                                                                                                                                               
The question of expulsion has already been dealt with in considering the right to freedom of movement 
in section 2.2 of this chapter. 
155 Nehemiah Robinson, Convention relating to the status of stateless persons - Its history and 
interpretation, UNHCR, Geneva: 1955, page 60; James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under 
International Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 2005, page 656. 
156 Article 16, paragraph 2 of the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons. 
157 There is some contention as to the interpretation of the expression “habitual residence” in the context 
of the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons – a similar ambiguity to that traced 
with regard to the use of this term in the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. There we 
found some evidence to support the possibility that habitual residence does not necessarily imply lawful 
residence. If that were the case here, then habitual residence would be an additional, hybrid level of 
attachment: a presence in the state that is comparable in durability to lawful stay, yet does not 
presuppose lawfulness. See chapter VII, at note 123. Nevertheless, Hathaway categorises this right 
together with those that specify lawful stay, thereby suggesting that stateless persons who are in a 
contracting state irregularly, for whatever duration, would be excluded. James Hathaway, The Rights of 
Refugees Under International Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 2005. Irregular stateless 
persons would have to fall back on article 7 of the 1954 Convention which offers them the same level 
of treatment as is granted to aliens generally. Sadly, the traveaux preparatiores of the Convention do 
not settle the matter one way or another, nor does the commentary to the text. Paul Weis, The Refugee 
Convention, 1951, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 1995, pages 117-123; Nehemiah 
Robinson, Convention relating to the status of stateless persons - Its history and interpretation, 
UNHCR, Geneva: 1955, page 55. States may certainly be able to take advantage of this enduring 
ambiguity and interpret the terms narrowly, to the exclusion of those stateless persons who are durably, 
but unlawfully, within their territory. Even if the expression is not subjected to this strict interpretation, 






opposing party in the event the non-national loses the case.158 To the extent that this 
is required of non-nationals by virtue of their possession of a foreign nationality, 
stateless persons must be exempted.159  
Thanks to the broad formulation of this provision, its benefits may extend 
beyond the two particular entitlements mentioned, which are clearly included as 
examples.160 Thus where nationals enjoy additional protection in relation to their 
access to courts, habitually resident stateless persons are entitled to the same 
treatment. Moreover, where a national enjoys certain advantages in accessing the 
courts in another state, the habitually resident stateless person must enjoy those 
same advantages.161 However, the guarantee of access to courts as contained within 
the 1954 Statelessness Convention fails to go beyond the question of access to 
existing remedies and address the need for, nature or quality of the judicial 
procedures that must be in place. It does dissolve any disadvantage experienced by 
the stateless on the basis of their lack of any nationality but stops disappointingly 
short of offering concrete prospects of a remedy against a violation of their rights. 
As we turn to alternative sources of protection of this civil right within the human 
rights field, we will see that these aspects come much more to the fore. 
   
4.2 International human rights law 
 
Turning to international human rights law and its treatment of the right of access to 
courts, we find that this issue is dealt with in two separate yet complimentary sets of 
provisions: those dealing with the right to an effective remedy and those providing 
for the right to a fair trial. This is illustrated well by the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, where article 8 determines that 
 
                                                           
158 “The origins of the security deposit – cautio judicatum solvi – lie in Roman Law […] At its origin, 
this deposit was due by any author, Roman or otherwise, as a guarantee to the defendant, who at the end 
of the suit could receive money as payment for costs and expenses incurred, in the case of the author 
losing the plea. Thus, this caution was necessary whenever the author was not solvent – mainly when 
the author was an alien and his property was located abroad. In the 16th century this institution changed 
its nature in most countries and was understood as linked to the status of being an alien”. Carmen 
Tiburcio, "Chapter X. Procedural Rights" in The human rights of aliens under international and 
comparative law, Kluwer Law International, The Hague: 2001, page 260. 
159 It has been noted that this explicit reference to the security deposit “has a psychological effect only, 
because nationals of the country where the court is located are not required to pay the cautio; therefore 
once a stateless person is assimilated to a national he could not be required to pay cautio judicatum 
solvi”. Nehemiah Robinson, Convention relating to the status of stateless persons - Its history and 
interpretation, UNHCR, Geneva: 1955, page 60. However, some countries have chosen to adopt a 
system whereby all insolvents and suspected insolvents are required to post a cautio – be they nationals 
or non-nationals. Carmen Tiburcio, "Chapter X. Procedural Rights" in The human rights of aliens under 
international and comparative law, Kluwer Law International, The Hague: 2001, page 264. 
160 At the time, these were “the two practical impediments of greatest concern to the drafters”. James 
Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 
2005, page 910. 
161 This is prescribed by the third paragraph of article 16: “A stateless person shall be accorded in the 
matters referred to in paragraph 2 in countries other than that in which he has his habitual residence the 
treatment granted to a national of the country of his habitual residence”. 1954 Convention relating to 
the Status of Stateless Persons. 
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everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national 
tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the 
constitution or by law. 
 
The purpose of the article is to provide individuals with a means of complaining 
and seeking redress for any violation of the rights attributed to them under domestic 
law.162 Thereafter, article 10 sets out that  
 
everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an 
independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and 
obligations and of any criminal charge against him. 163 
 
The Universal Declaration is, therefore, concerned with both access to and quality 
of judicial remedies. The wording of these provisions – granting the rights involved 
to everyone – allows nationals, non-nationals and stateless persons alike to benefit 
from the protection offered.164  
 Other major human rights documents follow suit with the Universal 
Declaration. The right to an effective remedy is housed, for instance, among the 
“fundamental principles” codified in Part II of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights. It calls for a system to be set in place for the alleged violations 
of the convention rights to be considered and redressed.165 Although these 
provisions do not unequivocally provide for access to a court for the consideration 
                                                           
162 Thereby indirectly also the rights espoused under international (human rights) law to the extent that 
these have direct effect in the state in question or have been transposed into municipal law. It should be 
noted that the formulation of this provision has raised some concerns for it provides only for access to 
courts to assert a right that has been granted under domestic law, while “it should be the role of the 
courts to verify whether the individual has or has not the right under dispute, that is to say, the right of 
access to courts should be granted anyway”. Carmen Tiburcio, "Chapter X. Procedural Rights" in The 
human rights of aliens under international and comparative law, Kluwer Law International, The 
Hague: 2001, page 247. 
163 Article 11 then adds certain guarantees related specifically to criminal proceedings. It determines 
that a criminal trial be public and that the defendant be assured “all the guarantees necessary for his 
defence”. Article 11, paragraph 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  
164 The irrelevance of nationality for the enjoyment of this right is reaffirmed in another non-binding yet 
important human rights document: the Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals Who are not 
Nationals of the Country in which They Live. Article 5 of this Declaration promulgates the right of 
non-nationals “to be equal before the courts, tribunals and all other organs and authorities administering 
justice” as well as the additional entitlement to the aid of an interpreter in criminal – and possibly other 
– proceedings. 
165 The article calls upon state parties to undertake: “To ensure that any person whose rights or 
freedoms as herein recognised are violated shall have an effective remedy [and] to ensure that any 
person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto determined by competent judicial, 
administrative or legislative authorities”. Article 2, paragraph 3 (a) and (b) of the ICCPR. Equivalent 
articles detailing the requirement of an effective remedy can be found in instruments such as the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (article 6); the Migrant Workers 
Convention (article 83); the European Convention on Human Rights (article 13), the American 






of a complaint,166 this right to an effective remedy is of great importance to 
nationals and non-nationals since “the enjoyment of the rights recognised, without 
discrimination, will often be appropriately promoted […] through the provision of 
judicial or other effective remedies”.167 There is no indication that the right to an 
effective remedy could be restricted to nationals. These provisions thereby provide 
an avenue for stateless persons to seek redress for difficulties that they encounter in 
their enjoyment of the rights elaborated – including indeed their right to a 
nationality168 and arguably also the specific entitlements due to them as stateless 
persons.169  
 The right to a fair trial can be found in the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights. Its article 14 concerns itself with the procedural guarantees that are 
to ensure “the proper administration of justice”.170 Although this article does not 
explicitly provide for the right of access to courts, this right is intrinsic to the 
concepts of a fair hearing and equality before the courts: 
 
It is inconceivable that international human rights instruments should 
prescribe in detail the procedural guarantees afforded to parties in a 
pending proceeding without guaranteeing that which alone makes it 
possible for them to benefit from such guarantees. The fair, public and 
expeditious characteristics of a judicial proceeding are of no value at all if 
there is no judicial proceeding. Accordingly, the right to a fair trial 
embodies the ‘right to a court’; of which the right to institute proceedings, 
i.e. the right of access, constitutes one aspect.171 
 
                                                           
166 The phrasing of these articles implies that the existence of a procedure for administrative review 
may also satisfy the requirement of affording persons an effective remedy against the violation of their 
rights – there need not necessarily be recourse to a court. See also Carmen Tiburcio, "Chapter X. 
Procedural Rights" in The human rights of aliens under international and comparative law, Kluwer 
Law International, The Hague: 2001, page 256.  
167 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 3: The Nature of States 
Parties Obligations, E/1991/23, New York and Geneva: 1990, para. 5. The Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights argued that the importance of an effective remedy is not limited to the 
context of the enjoyment of civil and political rights (generally considered more readily justiciable) but 
that states should equally aspire to ensuring an effective remedy in relation to certain economic, social 
and cultural rights “which would seem to be capable of immediate application by judicial and other 
organs in many national systems”. So, although the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights does not promulgate the right to an effective remedy, the Committee has read this into 
the overall human rights system.  
168 The relevance of these guarantees in the context of nationality disputes has already been dealt with 
in chapter V, section 2.2. 
169 Recall the statement made by the ESC Committee and cited in the previous note whereby even in the 
context of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which does not have its 
own provision on the right to an effective remedy, such a remedy must be made available by states.  
170 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 32 on Article 14: Right to equality before courts and 
tribunals and to a fair trial, CCPR/C/GC/32, Geneva: 23 August 2007, para. 2 (Replacing General 
Comment 13 on Article 14: Equality before the courts and the Right to a Fair and Public Hearing by an 
Independent Court Established by Law, A/39/40, 13 April 1984). 
171 Nihal Jayawickrama, “The Judicial Application of Human Rights Law”, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge: 2002, pages 481-481; as cited in James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under 
International Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 2005, page 650. 
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Thus article 14 of the ICCPR “encompasses the right of access to courts in the 
determination of criminal charges and rights and obligations in a suit at law”.172 
Similar guarantees can be found in many other human rights instruments.173 No-
where is there any suggestion that the enjoyment of the right to a (fair) hearing may 
be restricted to nationals only.174 In fact, the Human Rights Committee has now 
declared that 
 
The right of access to courts and tribunals and equality before them is not 
limited to citizens of State parties, but must also be available to all individuals, 
regardless of nationality or statelessness, or whatever their status, whether 
asylum seekers, refugees, migrant workers, unaccompanied children or other 
                                                           
172 Article 14, paragraph 1 of the ICCPR. Human Rights Committee, General Comment 32 on Article 
14: Right to equality before courts and tribunals and to a fair trial, CCPR/C/GC/32, Geneva: 23 
August 2007, para. 9. See also James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 2005, page 648; Magdalena Sepulveda; Theo van Banning; 
Gudrun Gudmundsdotter; Christine Chamoun, Universal and Regional Human Rights Protection: 
Cases and Commentaries, University for Peace, Ciudad Colon: 2004, page 527; Sarah Joseph; Jenny 
Schultz; Melissa Castan, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Cases, Materials 
and Commentary, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 2000, page 283. Recall that the guarantees 
encompassed in the right to a fair hearing are not necessarily directly applicable to the context of 
disputes on nationality attribution as these may not be deemed to fall within the ambit of criminal or 
civil suits. See chapter V, section 2. 
173 Article 6, paragraph 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights; Article 8 of American 
Convention on Human Rights (that explicitly promulgates the fundamental right of every person to a 
hearing); and article 7 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. In fact, in all, “the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Civil and Political Covenant have inspired fair trial 
provisions in no less than 20 global and regional human rights treaties and other instruments”. David 
Weissbrodt, The Right to a Fair Trial, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague: 2001, page 153. 
174 The Human Rights Committee included the right to a fair trial among the list of rights to which 
aliens are entitled under the covenant in its General Comment 15: The position of aliens under the 
covenant, Geneva: 11 April 1986, para. 7. The UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Non-Citizens, 
David Weissbrodt, concurs in his 2005 report on the rights of non-citizens that “they shall be equal 
before the courts and tribunals and shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing”. David Weissbrodt, The 
Rights of Non-Citizens, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
HR/PUB/05/1, Geneva 2005, para. 41. See also Diana Elles, International Provisions Protecting the 
Human Rights of Non-Citizens: Study, New York: , page 35; Magdalena Sepulveda; Theo van Banning; 
Gudrun Gudmundsdotter; Christine Chamoun, Universal and Regional Human Rights Protection: 
Cases and Commentaries, University for Peace, Ciudad Colon: 2004, page 546. Beyond the 
unambiguous conferral of this right on “all persons” there are numerous additional signals that such 
differentiation of treatment between nationals and non-nationals would be considered at odds with the 
right to equality before the courts and a fair hearing. Indeed a comparative study of domestic practice 
also uncovered that “as regards access to courts, the great majority of countries grant […] this right to 
everyone, without distinctions” so to both nationals and non-nationals (including stateless persons) 
alike. See also the examples of state legislation provided. Carmen Tiburcio, "Chapter X. Procedural 
Rights" in The human rights of aliens under international and comparative law, Kluwer Law 
International, The Hague: 2001, pages 252-253. Moreover, the importance attributed to the right of 
access to courts and the right to a fair trial has led to several aspects of this right being recognised as 
non-derogable. See David Weissbrodt, The Right to a Fair Trial, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The 





persons, who may find themselves in the territory or subject to the jurisdiction 
of the State party.175 
 
So all stateless persons, whatever their status in their host state, should be able to 
rely on the courts in the context of civil and criminal suits, on a basis of equality. 
This clear-cut statement shows that human rights law thereby negates the, 
somewhat more ambiguous, protection offered under the 1954 Statelessness 
Convention, as described above. 
International human rights law therefore guarantees stateless persons the 
fundamental right of access to courts (in the context of civil and criminal cases) and 
the right to an effective remedy in the event of a violation of their human rights. But 
are there also human rights norms that have the effect of removing some of the 
practical obstacles that may impair the access to court for non-nationals? On this 
question, human rights law is less forthcoming. Arguably, the overall guarantee of 
equality before the courts will limit the freedom of states to treat nationals and non-
nationals differently with regard to the conditions for petitioning a court and related 
matters. It can therefore be asked whether requiring (only) non-nationals to post a 
security deposit in order to bring a case before the court - the cautio judicarum solvi 
- can be maintained in the contemporary human rights climate. Demanding a 
security deposit of non-nationals, because they are non-nationals, would amount to 
discriminatory treatment.176 Where a cautio is demanded of insolvents or suspected 
insolvents, this condition must be applied to nationals and non-nationals equally. 
This means that stateless persons may not be wholly exempt from posting a security 
deposit, but may be subjected to this requirement on the same terms as a national. 
Human rights law has an identical impact on the rules for the provision of legal aid. 
The right of access to court “must be substantive, not just formal”177 and may 
therefore require positive obligations from the state. Any assistance that is provided 
must be available to nationals and non-nationals on equal terms.178 Stateless persons 
can, therefore, rely on the overall human rights field for the same guarantees as are 
explicitly set down in article 16 of the 1954 Statelessness Convention. 
                                                           
175 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 32 on Article 14: Right to equality before courts and 
tribunals and to a fair trial, CCPR/C/GC/32, Geneva: 23 August 2007, para. 9. 
176 Carmen Tiburcio, "Chapter X. Procedural Rights" in The human rights of aliens under international 
and comparative law, Kluwer Law International, The Hague: 2001, pages 264-265. See also the 1954 
Hague Convention on Civil Procedure and the 1980 Hague Convention on International Access to 
Justice which determine that a cautio cannot be demanded of a non-national purely on the basis of their 
foreign nationality. These Conventions were developed within the forum of the Hague Conference on 
Private International Law but have not been widely ratified (they currently count 44 and 22 state parties 
respectively). 
177 Magdalena Sepulveda; Theo van Banning; Gudrun Gudmundsdotter; Christine Chamoun, Universal 
and Regional Human Rights Protection: Cases and Commentaries, University for Peace, Ciudad 
Colon: 2004, page 546. 
178 In the context of criminal proceedings, for instance, the relevant human rights norms even determine 
that the state must provide legal assistance free of charge if the defendant does not have sufficient 
means to pay for it. Article 14, paragraph 3(d) of the ICCPR; Article 18, paragraph 3(d) of the CMW; 
Article 6, paragraph 3(c) of the ECHR; Article 8, paragraph 2(e) of the American Convention on 
Human Rights. The 1954 Hague Convention on Civil Procedure and the 1980 Hague Convention on 
International Access to Justice explicitly determine that free legal aid be granted to non-nationals under 
the same conditions as to nationals in both civil and criminal proceedings.  
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 Moreover, the international human rights regime introduces a wide range of 
additional guarantees regarding the nature and quality of judicial remedies. Human 
rights law is concerned not only with the availability of a trial but also with 
ensuring that the composition of the tribunal and course of the procedure are such 
that the hearing can be deemed fair. Thanks to human rights instruments, stateless 
persons can put their case to a court and are guaranteed that this court is 
“competent, independent and impartial [and] established by law”.179 The hearing 
must be public and – particularly in the event of the determination of a criminal 
charge – a number of procedural safeguards must also be in place.180 If a stateless 
person raises a complaint against a violation of his rights and the competent 
(judicial or administrative) authorities find in his favour, the state must also 
“undertake […] to ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies 
when granted”.181 Human rights law has thereby added further substance to the 
fundamental right of access to courts, going beyond the terms of the 1954 
Statelessness Convention. 
   
5 FREEDOM OF RELIGION 
 
It has been suggested that “the struggle for the freedom of religion precedes every 
other, in the history of human rights”182 and it undoubtedly retains its importance to 
this day. The liberty to determine and practice your own beliefs - closely bound up 
with the more general freedoms of thought and of expression - is central to core 
human needs.183 This is a fact that we will see reflected in the terms in which the 
freedom of religion is protected under international law. Although stateless persons 
are not generally reported to experience difficulties in practicing their freedom of 
religion as a direct consequence of their statelessness, restrictions on the religious 
freedom of non-nationals are not uncommon. A report by then United Nations 
Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance in 1989 “identified Bulgaria, 
                                                           
179 Article 14, paragraph 1 of the ICCPR. 
180 See for example article 14, paragraphs 2-7 of the ICCPR. For a discussion of the “qualitative 
requirements” of article 14, see also James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 2005, pages 653-655. See further David Weissbrodt, The 
Right to a Fair Trial, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague: 2001; Sarah Joseph; Jenny Schultz; 
Melissa Castan, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Cases, Materials and 
Commentary, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 2000, pages 277-339. 
181 Article 2, paragraph 3(c) of the ICCPR. The right to an effective remedy also embodies the 
possibility of offering effective interim measures wherever necessary. See the discussion of the case of 
Mamatkulov and Abdurasulovic v. Turkey before the European Court of Human Rights, 2003, in 
Magdalena Sepulveda; Theo van Banning; Gudrun Gudmundsdotter; Christine Chamoun, Universal 
and Regional Human Rights Protection: Cases and Commentaries, University for Peace, Ciudad 
Colon: 2004, pages 537-545. 
182 Carmen Tiburcio, "Chapter IX. Public Rights" in The human rights of aliens under international and 
comparative law, Kluwer Law International, The Hague: 2001, page 205. 
183 A person’s religion or belief has been described as “one of the fundamental elements of his 
conception of life”. Fourth preamble to the UN Declaration on Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance 
and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, adopted by the General Assembly on 25 November 
1981. See on the content and value of this Declaration Henry Steiner; Philip Alston, International 






Byelorussia, Cape Verde, Finland, Pakistan, Rwanda, Sudan, Syria, Ukraine and the 
United States as countries in which the religious freedom of non-citizens is less 
fully guaranteed than is that of citizens.”184 And the freedom of religion is certainly 
under no less pressure today than it was then – in fact, if anything, the tolerance for 
the religious beliefs and habits of foreigners has deteriorated since 11 September 
2001 and the attack on the World Trade Centre. It cannot be ruled out that stateless 
persons are among the groups affected. In fact, where statelessness afflicts a 
particular minority group, targeting on the basis of religion may be an element of 
the problem – think of the denationalisation of the Rohingya Muslim minority in 
Myanmar.185 In such cases, discrimination on religious grounds or attempts to 
suppress the religious beliefs or practices of the persons involved may surround the 
formal denial of citizenship.186 
 
5.1 The 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons 
 
The article housing the freedom of religion was given a position of honour right at 
the start of the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, in the 
chapter elaborating “general provisions”. Article 4 provides that  
 
the Contracting States shall accord to stateless persons within their 
territories treatment at least as favourable as that accorded to their nationals 
with respect to freedom to practice their religion and freedom as regards 
the religious education of their children.187 
 
The weight attributed to the freedom of religion is illustrated not only by this 
article’s positioning in the instrument, but also by the determination that no 
reservations to the provision are permitted.188 Importantly, it espouses both the 
freedom of stateless persons to practice their religion and the freedom to teach their 
beliefs to their children. This also implies the freedom to choose one’s religion. 
And, these rights are attributed to the stateless as soon as they are physically present 
in the state – there is no precondition of lawful presence or residence. Furthermore, 
the wording used is unique to this provision in that it generates a special standard of 
treatment that is not found elsewhere: treatment at least as favourable as that 
                                                           
184 James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge: 2005, page 569. Reference is made to the report by Elizabeth Benito, Elimination of All 
Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, UN Doc. E.89.XIV.3, 1989, 
paras. 35-46. Tiburcio also points out a number of countries that formally grant religious freedom to 
citizens only. See Carmen Tiburcio, "Chapter IX. Public Rights" in The human rights of aliens under 
international and comparative law, Kluwer Law International, The Hague: 2001, page 209. 
185 Maureen Lynch, Lives on hold: The human cost of statelessness, Washington: 2005, pages 31-32. 
186 See also Asma Jahangir, Annual Report of the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, 
E/CN.4/2005/61, 20 December 2004, para. 36 and the case of the Maldives in Abdelfattah Amor, 
Annual Report of the Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance, E/CN.4/2000/65, 15 February 2000, 
para. 64; Asma Jahangir, Annual Report of the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, 
A/HRC/4/21, 26 December 2006, para. 16.  
187 Note that the wording is identical to its counterpart in the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees. 
188 Article 38 of the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons. 
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accorded to nationals.189 The assertion of this standard stems from concern – 
expressed in particular by the Holy See at the time – that national treatment “would 
not do in countries where religious liberty was circumscribed”.190  
However, as Hathaway explains in relation to the 1951 Refugee 
Convention, the ultimate aim was not to grant a privileged position to refugees over 
a state’s own nationals but rather to ensure that there is “substantive equality of 
religious freedom for refugees [… achieved by obliging states…] to take account of 
the specificity of the religious needs of refugees”.191 But, this does not necessarily 
mean that individuals can claim “material facilities and economic assistance” for 
the purposes of practicing of their religion on the basis of this norm.192 Meanwhile, 
with regard to the freedom of religious education, a similar duty to respect – rather 
than necessarily fulfil – this right is envisaged by the 1954 Statelessness 
Convention: stateless parents  
 
are free (if they have the resources) to enrol their children in schools which 
provide the preferred form of religious instruction; and if they are not able to 
fund education of that kind, they enjoy the liberty to withdraw their children 
from any non-preferred form of religious instruction provided within the public 
school system.193  
 
Finally, it should be noted that the freedom of religion, as elaborated in the 1954 
Statelessness Convention, is not boundless. In accordance with article 2 of the same 
Convention, states may take measures “for the maintenance of public order” that 
may in effect impose restrictions on the freedom of stateless persons to practice or 
teach their religion.194  
 
                                                           
189 In chapter IX we saw that the 1954 Statelessness Convention prescribes three basic standards of 
treatment for the enjoyment of rights by stateless persons: treatment at least as favourable as aliens 
generally, national treatment and absolute rights. This is the only provision that deviates slightly from 
this overall approach. 
190 Nehemiah Robinson, Convention relating to the status of stateless persons - Its history and 
interpretation, UNHCR, Geneva: 1955, page 29. 
191 These comments are equally valid with respect to the 1954 Statelessness Convention into which, as 
noted, the provision on religious freedom was transposed unchanged. James Hathaway, The Rights of 
Refugees Under International Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 2005, pages 572-573. 
192 Nehemiah Robinson, Convention relating to the status of stateless persons - Its history and 
interpretation, UNHCR, Geneva: 1955, page 29. 
193 James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge: 2005, page 583. The right of stateless children to an education – and thus to access the 
public school system - is also dealt with in the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless 
Persons and will be dealt with in chapter XI, section 6. 
194 James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge: 2005, page 578. Note that in this context, “Public order is the translation of the French 
ordre public which has acquired a particular meaning in French and is also being used in international 
documents […] It covers everything essential to the life of the country, including its security”. 
Nehemiah Robinson, Convention relating to the status of stateless persons - Its history and 





5.2 International human rights law 
 
Guided by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which includes the freedom 
of religion in its article 18, all major human rights instruments promulgate the 
freedom of “thought, conscience and religion”.195 This right is clearly and 
unambiguously granted to everyone – the possession of a (particular) nationality is 
irrelevant for its enjoyment.196 In fact, the recognition of the freedom to practice the 
religion of one’s own choosing has been described as “one of the first signs of non-
discrimination between nationals and aliens […] as it implies the idea of tolerance 
towards others”.197 Under international human rights law, a stateless person 
therefore enjoys the freedom to  
 
have or to adopt a religion or belief of [his] choice, and freedom, either 
individually or in community with others and in public or private, to 
manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice or 
teaching.198 
 
The right is elaborated in direct terms, so nationals and non-nationals alike are to be 
guaranteed freedom of religion in accordance with this international standard – an 
obvious advantage over the provision in the 1954 Statelessness Convention that still 
effectively renders the enjoyment of freedom of religion contingent on the treatment 
by the state of nationals generally. Human rights law also protects the freedom to 
choose and change one’s religion which was not explicitly included in the 1954 
Statelessness Convention.199 In addition, human rights instruments protect 
                                                           
195 Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; Article 14 of the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child; Article 5, paragraph (d)(vii) of the Convention on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination; Article 12 of the Migrant Workers Convention; Article 9 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights; Article 12 of the American Convention on Human Rights; Article 8 of the African 
Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights. Also relevant are the UN Declaration on Elimination of All 
Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief; Article 27 of the ICCPR and 
Article 30 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the freedom of religion for members of 
minority groups; Article 13, paragraph 3 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights on the freedom to ensure the religious education of one’s children; and all non-
discrimination provisions, whereby religion is a prohibited ground for differential treatment.  
196 David Weissbrodt, Final Report on Prevention of Discrimination - The Rights of Non-Citizens, 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/23, 26 May 2003, para. 47. Note in this regard also article 5, paragraphs 1 (e) and 
(f) of the UN Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals Who are not Nationals of the Country in 
which They Live.  
197 Carmen Tiburcio, "Chapter IX. Public Rights" in The human rights of aliens under international and 
comparative law, Kluwer Law International, The Hague: 2001, page 206. 
198 Article 18, paragraph 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Note that in 
accordance with article 4, paragraph 2 of the Covenant,  this right is to be protected - and cannot to be 
derogated from - even in the event of an emergency. See for further details of the content of the norm 
on the freedom of religion also article 6 of the UN Declaration on Elimination of All Forms of 
Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief. 
199 Paragraph 2 of article 18 of the ICCPR even expressly prohibits the use of coercion to effect 
adherence to – or recantation of - a particular religion or belief. See also Human Rights Committee, 
General Comment 22: The Right to Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion, A/48/40 vol. I, 
Geneva: 1993, para. 5. 
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everyone’s right to freedom of opinion and expression,200 an important guarantee 
closely related to the freedom of religion that cannot be found in the 1954 
Statelessness Convention.   
 However, there is a highly significant aspect to the freedom of religion as 
protected under international human rights law that has yet to be mentioned. As far 
as the right to manifest one’s religion is concerned – the “active component of one’s 
religious freedom”201 – this is not guaranteed entirely without qualification. Under 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, restrictions may be placed 
on the freedom to manifest one’s beliefs on the grounds of “public safety, order, 
health or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others”.202 When 
comparing the opportunity to restrict the freedom of religion under human rights 
law to the terms of the 1951 Refugee Convention – and by extension the 1954 
Statelessness Convention – Hathaway expressed concern at what he described as 
the sanctioning of “other forms of limitation” that were in some cases even 
“specifically rejected by the drafters of the Refugee Convention”.203 He suggests 
that the refugee (or statelessness) convention offers broader protection than general 
human rights law and that a refugee (or stateless person) could “avoid the impact of 
[…] limitations on religious freedom by invoking the Refugee Convention”.204 But, 
as we have already noted, the refugee and statelessness conventions do not offer 
blanket protection of freedom of religion - they prescribe, at a minimum, national 
treatment. Therefore, where states have curtailed the freedom of religion generally 
on one of these grounds, there is nothing to stand in the way of also applying such 
                                                           
200 Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; Article 19 of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights; Article 13 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child; Article 5, 
paragraph (d)(viii) of the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination; Article 13 of the 
Migrant Workers Convention; Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights; Article 13 of 
the American Convention on Human Rights; Article 9 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights. 
201 As opposed to the “passive component, which consists of mere adherence to certain beliefs”. Sarah 
Joseph; Jenny Schultz; Melissa Castan, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
Cases, Materials and Commentary, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 2000, page 375. 
202 Article 18, paragraph 3 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Such limitations 
are only permitted so long as they are prescribed by law and necessary to protect the value for which 
they are invoked. The list of limitations is to be interpreted strictly and is limitative. Moreover, with 
regard to the term “morals” it is important to note that this concept “derives from many social, 
philosophical and religious traditions; consequently, limitations on the freedom to manifest a religion or 
belief for the purpose of protecting morals must be based on principles not deriving exclusively from a 
single tradition”. This ground cannot therefore be invoked in favour of the majority religion against the 
beliefs of minority groups. See Human Rights Committee, General Comment 22: The Right to Freedom 
of Thought, Conscience and Religion, A/48/40 vol. I (1993), para. 8. See further Sarah Joseph; Jenny 
Schultz; Melissa Castan, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Cases, Materials 
and Commentary, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 2000, pages 376-379.  Note that the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child, the Migrant Workers Convention and the American Convention on Human 
Rights maintain the same grounds while the European Convention on Human Rights has omitted public 
safety from the list and the African Charter refers only to “law and order”. 
203 As we saw, the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1954 Statelessness Convention only admit 
restrictions on the grounds of “public order”. James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under 
International Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 2005, pages 579-580. 
204 James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law, Cambridge University Press, 





restrictions to stateless persons. Moreover, it can be questioned whether to invoke 
the 1954 Statelessness Convention in favour of a more sweeping norm on freedom 
of religion would really be to the benefit of the overall human rights standard. 
Freedom of religion would certainly be advanced, but the other values which the 
ICCPR and similar instruments strive to protect through the allowance of 
restrictions on grounds such as the “rights and freedom of others” would then be 
endangered.205 From this perspective I would argue that the concern expressed by 
Hathaway at the scope of permissible limitations to the freedom of religion under 
general human rights law is, in fact, unwarranted and that the Statelessness 
Convention has no added benefit alongside the forceful, well-balanced and detailed 
norm contained in human rights instruments. 
 
6 RIGHT TO PROPERTY 
 
While reports describing the plight of stateless populations across the globe are 
relatively silent on issues relating to their freedom of religion, they are much more 
vocal on the difficulties that stateless persons face in renting, buying, inheriting or 
retaining property.206 For example, in Syria, it was reported that 
 
with no nationality, Kurds cannot obtain property deeds or register cars or 
businesses […] Some register their property under the names of friends or 
relatives who are nationals to circumvent these issues. Yet this arrangement 
forces them to rely upon the good faith of such persons, and the problem 
still remains that they cannot pass on ownership of property to their 
children.207 
 
Gaining legal title to land or other immovable assets – and protecting these from 
confiscation – appears to be a particular problem for stateless persons.208 Numerous 
countries impose restrictions on the ownership or real estate by non-nationals or 
simply forbid them outright from owning land.209 These policies stem from 
                                                           
205 Consider the importance for the protection of other fundamental rights – such as the right to be free 
from torture and the right to life - of being able to prohibit such practices as female genital mutilation, 
even where this is exercised on the basis of a certain religious belief. Henry Steiner; Philip Alston, 
International Human Rights in Context. Law, Politics and Morals, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 
2000, page 473. 
206 See for example UNHCR, "Statelessness and Citizenship" in The State of the World's Refugees - A 
Humanitarian Agenda, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 1997, page 241; Maureen Lynch, Lives on 
hold: The human cost of statelessness, Washington: 2005, page 23. 
207 Maureen Lynch and Perveen Ali, Buried Alive. Stateless Kurds in Syria, Report for Refugees 
International, January 2006, pages 6-7. 
208 This has been reported with regard to the Banyarwanda in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the 
Hill Tribes in Thailand, the Rohingya in Myanmar, the Black Africans in Mauritania, the ethnic 
Chinese in Brunei and the Meskhetian Turks in Russia. See Maureen Lynch, Lives on hold: The human 
cost of statelessness, Washington: 2005; Advisory Board on Human Security (prepared by Constantin 
Sokoloff), Denial of Citizenship: A Challenge to Human Security, February 2005, page 20. 
209 James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge: 2005, page 516; Carmen Tiburcio, "Chapter V. Private Rights" in The human rights of 
aliens under international and comparative law, Kluwer Law International, The Hague: 2001, pages 
137-144. See also Human Rights Committee, Case of Adam v. The Czech Republic, Comm. No. 
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considerations of sovereignty and national security.210 But ownership of other types 
of property may also be restricted.211 Are these practices in line with contemporary 
international law? 
 
6.1 The 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons 
 
The 1954 Statelessness Convention deals with the issue of property ownership in 
article 13, which states: 
 
The Contracting States shall accord to a stateless person treatment as 
favourable as possible and, in any event, not less favourable than that 
accorded to aliens generally in the same circumstances, as regards the 
acquisition of movable and immovable property and other rights pertaining 
thereto, and to leases and other contracts relating to movable and 
immovable property. 
 
Knowing by now what to look for, we can immediately ascertain that the level of 
attachment required for the enjoyment of this right is the lowest that is set by the 
Statelessness Convention (being subject to the jurisdiction of the state is enough), 
but that the standard of protection offered is also the weakest (not less favourable 
than aliens generally), although a higher standard is encouraged.212 No absolute 
right to acquire property can be garnered from this article. Two further observations 
can be made to clarify the scope of protection offered under this provision. Firstly, 
“it must be assumed that the word ‘property’ is used in the broad sense of the word, 
including not only tangible property but also the so-called ‘property rights’, for 
instance, securities, moneys, bank accounts”.213 This is important in view of the 
difficulties experienced by stateless persons in practice, as mentioned above. And 
secondly, where reference is made to the rights pertaining to moveable and 
immoveable property, this means that “sale, exchange, mortgaging, pawning, 
                                                                                                                                               
586/1994 (1996). This fact contributes to overcrowding in areas where the presence of stateless persons 
is tolerated - such as dedicated camps - and also has an impact on the individuals’ freedom of 
movement and right to (adequate) housing. See for example the account of the living conditions of the 
Bihari in Bangladesh in Maureen Lynch; Thatcher Cook, Citizens of nowhere. The stateless Biharis of 
Bangladesh, Washington: 2006.  
210 Carmen Tiburcio, "Chapter V. Private Rights" in The human rights of aliens under international and 
comparative law, Kluwer Law International, The Hague: 2001, page 138. 
211 One of the issues faces by the erased in Slovenia was reportedly the “denial of rights to property 
ownership, founding a company, opening bank accounts, mobile telephone subscriptions, register a car 
in their own name”. Brad Blitz, 'Statelessness and the Social (De)Construction of Citizenship: Political 
Restructuring and Ethnic Discrimination in Slovenia', in Journal of Human Rights, Vol. 5, 2006, page 
464. Consider also the case of Ivcher Bronstein v. Peru brought before the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights (Series C, No. 74, 6 February 2001) whereby Mr. Ivcher denationalised in order to 
subsequently deprive him of the ownership and therefore control of a television station. The underlying 
motivation was to suppress certain programming. See Magdalena Sepulveda; Theo van Banning; 
Gudrun Gudmundsdotter; Christine Chamoun, Universal and Regional Human Rights Protection: 
Cases and Commentaries, University for Peace, Ciudad Colon: 2004, pages 393-394.  
212 Note that no reservations have been made by contracting states to this provision. 
213 Nehemiah Robinson, Convention relating to the status of stateless persons - Its history and 





administration [and] income”214 are also covered. Stateless persons are therefore 
accorded not only the right to acquire property on terms at least as favourable as 
those accorded to aliens generally; they also enjoy the full use of that property by 
way of these related “contractual interests”.215 Following up on this last remark, it 
should be noted that article 30 of the 1954 Statelessness Convention is also relevant 
to the right to property because it elaborates the specific right to transfer assets out 
of the country in the context of resettlement.216  
 
6.2 International human rights law 
 
In considering how international human rights law deals with the issue, it should be 
noted from the outset that the right to property is “one of the more controversial and 
complex human rights”.217 Indeed, enduring disagreement on the need to protect 
private property as a value – a discussion that was long fuelled by the “capitalist-
socialist philosophical divide”218 – has inevitably had an enormous impact on the 
way that this right is proclaimed under human rights law. Although elaborated in 
several major regional instruments,219 the right to property as such has not been 
codified at the universal level beyond a very general formulation in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and a similar statement in the UN Declaration on the 
Rights of Non-Nationals:  
 
1. Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association 
with others. 
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.220 
                                                           
214 Nehemiah Robinson, Convention relating to the status of stateless persons - Its history and 
interpretation, UNHCR, Geneva: 1955, page 53. 
215 James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge: 2005, page 524. 
216 Article 30 of the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons determines the 
following: “1. A Contracting State shall, in conformity with its laws and regulations, permit stateless 
persons to transfer assets which they have brought into its territory, to another country where they have 
been admitted for the purposes of resettlement. 2. A Contracting State shall give sympathetic 
consideration to the application of stateless persons for permission to transfer assets wherever they may 
be and which are necessary for their resettlement in another country to which they have been admitted”.  
217 Magdalena Sepulveda; Theo van Banning; Gudrun Gudmundsdotter; Christine Chamoun, Universal 
and Regional Human Rights Protection: Cases and Commentaries, University for Peace, Ciudad 
Colon: 2004, page 373. See also Theo van Banning, The Human Right to Property, Intersentia, 
Antwerp: 2002, pages 2-6. 
218 James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge: 2005, page 518. See also Catarina Krause, "The right to property" in Rosas (ed) Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht: 1995, page 144.  
219 Article 1 of the Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights; Article 21 of the 
American Convention on Human Rights; and Article 14 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights. For a detailed discussion of the development of the right to property in regional context, see 
Theo van Banning, The Human Right to Property, Intersentia, Antwerp: 2002. 
220 Article 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Similar content can be traced in article 5, 
paragraph 2(d) and article 9 of the UN Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals Who are not 
Nationals of the Country in which They Live. The Migrant Workers Convention also includes a 
prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of property in its article 15. Note that although the ICCPR does not 
enunciate the right to property, issues relating to the enjoyment of property and property rights have 
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To the extent that human rights law deals with the right to property, it is to be 
enjoyed by both nationals and non-nationals alike. However, neither this provision 
in the Universal Declaration, nor the right to property as formulated under the 
aforementioned regional instruments, specify a right to acquire property. Stateless 
persons are therefore unable to rely on human rights law for an absolute right to 
acquire property that would clarify (or replace) their entitlement under the 1954 
Statelessness Convention which is contingent on the state’s treatment of non-
nationals generally.  
Instead, international human rights law – in particular through the relevant 
regional documents – provides for “the use and enjoyment of property, once it is 
acquired”.221 Protection of the “use and enjoyment” of property includes protection 
against restrictions on the capacity to invoke what were described in the 1954 
Statelessness Convention as rights pertaining to the right to property such as sale 
and mortgaging.222 Any interference with the peaceful enjoyment of property, or 
indeed deprivation or confiscation of property, will amount to a violation of this 
norm unless it can be justified under the permissible exceptions.223 As such, the 
interference or confiscation must serve the public need or the general interest, be 
provided for by law and be proportional – “a balance needs to be struck between the 
interests of the community and the fundamental rights of the individual”.224 Overall 
                                                                                                                                               
indirectly been dealt with by the Human Rights Committee on the basis of several provisions in the 
ICCPR, including article 14 (fair trial), article 26 (equal treatment) and article 27 (rights of minorities). 
Magdalena Sepulveda; Theo van Banning; Gudrun Gudmundsdotter; Christine Chamoun, Universal 
and Regional Human Rights Protection: Cases and Commentaries, University for Peace, Ciudad 
Colon: 2004, page 421. Nevertheless, “property rights are not a specifically protected interest under the 
Civil and Political Covenant”. James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 2005, page 520. 
221 Carmen Tiburcio, "Chapter V. Private Rights" in The human rights of aliens under international and 
comparative law, Kluwer Law International, The Hague: 2001, page 137. Protection of the right to 
property as “merely a civil liberty without any social elements”. Catarina Krause, "The right to 
property" in Rosas (ed) Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht: 
1995, page 149. 
222 See Magdalena Sepulveda; Theo van Banning; Gudrun Gudmundsdotter; Christine Chamoun, 
Universal and Regional Human Rights Protection: Cases and Commentaries, University for Peace, 
Ciudad Colon: 2004, pages 378-383. Note that with regard to the right to transfer assets abroad, found 
in article 30 of the 1954 Statelessness Convention in the context of resettlement of stateless persons, 
this also has a more explicit counterpart under human rights law. Article 5, paragraph 1(g) of the UN 
Declaration on non-nationals provides for “the right to transfer abroad earnings, savings or other 
personal monetary assets, subject to domestic currency regulations” and article 32 of the Migrant 
Workers Convention also offers some guarantees along these lines. 
223 These rights relating to the enjoyment of property and the protection from deprivation of property 
have been invoked in situations where the ownership of the property in question has not been 
formalised. See the discussion of the case before the European Court of Human Rights of The Holy 
Monestaries v. Greece (Appl. Nr. 13092/87 and 13984/88, 9 December 1994) in Magdalena Sepulveda; 
Theo van Banning; Gudrun Gudmundsdotter; Christine Chamoun, Universal and Regional Human 
Rights Protection: Cases and Commentaries, University for Peace, Ciudad Colon: 2004, pages 389-
393.   
224 Magdalena Sepulveda; Theo van Banning; Gudrun Gudmundsdotter; Christine Chamoun, Universal 
and Regional Human Rights Protection: Cases and Commentaries, University for Peace, Ciudad 





though, states are generally afforded a wide margin of appreciation in determining 
the legitimacy of an interference with acquired property rights to serve a public 
need.225 
Nevertheless, to the extent that international law or indeed national law 
recognises a right to property, this is to be guaranteed without discrimination. 
Although universal instruments were found to be relatively unforthcoming in 
professing a general right to property, they have been clear and explicit in 
prohibiting discrimination in the enjoyment of property rights.226 Moreover, on the 
basis of the overall right to equal treatment before the law227 and the mention (albeit 
summarily) of rights relating to property in such instruments as the UN Declaration 
on the Rights of Non-Nationals and the Migrant Workers Convention, it has been 
concluded that 
 
general international law provides that aliens should not be discriminated 
against in their enjoyment of property rights once they have been acquired. If 
alien property is nationalised whereas the property of nationals remains 
unaffected then that act is discriminatory and prohibited under international 
law.228 
 
So while stateless persons cannot rely on human rights law for a right to acquire 
property, in respecting the peaceful and continued enjoyment of property and any 
rights attributed by the state in this context, any differential treatment between 
nationals and non-nationals must pass muster as being “based on reasonable and 
justified criteria”.229 The same is true of distinctions between different categories of 
non-nationals, such as those that would operate to the particular detriment of 
                                                                                                                                               
provisions dealing with the right to property in the Universal Declaration and the UN Declaration on 
the Rights of Non-nationals. For the proportionality test to be met, compensation may be required. See 
in this respect also article 15 of the Migrant Workers Convention and article 21, paragraph 2 of the 
American Convention on Human Rights where compensation is explicitly required in the event of 
confiscation or deprivation of property. The extent to which this is recognised to be an absolute 
precondition for the legitimacy of deprivation of property is still subject to debate. See Catarina Krause, 
"The right to property" in Rosas (ed) Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, Dordrecht: 1995, page 151. 
225 Catarina Krause, "The right to property" in Rosas (ed) Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht: 1995, page 153. 
226 See in particular article 5, paragraphs d (v) and (vi) of the Convention on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination and numerous provisions of the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination 
Against Women. 
227 As espoused, for example, in article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
See also section 1 of this chapter. 
228 Warwick McKean, Equality and discrimination under international law, Clarendon Press, Oxford: 
1983, page 195. See also Catarina Krause, "The right to property" in Rosas (ed) Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht: 1995, page 148; Theo van Banning, The 
Human Right to Property, Intersentia, Antwerp: 2002, page 49; James Hathaway, The Rights of 
Refugees Under International Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 2005, pages 521-522.  
229 Recall the jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee as discussed in section 1, in particular 
Human Rights Committee, Case of Gueye et al. v. France, Comm. No. 196/1985 (1989), para. 9.4; 




Protecting the Civil and Political Rights of the Stateless 
 285 
stateless persons. The fact that a right to property stemming from human rights law 
cannot necessarily be relied on has no impact on this conclusion.230 In other words, 
where domestic law does offer non-nationals the right to acquire (certain types of) 
property, the same general norm of equal treatment under the law may be invoked 
to ensure that stateless persons benefit from this opportunity on equal terms with 
other non-nationals. Therefore, where the 1954 Statelessness Convention deals with 
the right to property by prescribing treatment for stateless persons equal to that of 
non-nationals generally, rather than an absolute right to acquire or enjoy property, 
its value over and above contemporary human rights standards is negligible. 
 
7 CIVIL AND POLITICAL  RIGHTS ABSENT FROM THE 1954 STATELESSNESS 
CONVENTION 
 
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, even a superficial comparison of 
the content of the 1954 Statelessness Convention with such documents as the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is sufficient to reveal that a 
number of internationally recognised civil and political rights were not included in 
the statelessness instrument. Among these are some of the most fundamental of 
civil rights and freedoms such as the right to life, the freedom from torture, arbitrary 
arrest and detention, and the prohibition of slavery.231 It is reported that the drafters 
deemed it unnecessary to reiterate these rights in an instrument geared to a 
particular category of persons (first refugees in the 1951 Convention and later 
stateless persons in this 1954 text) since the universal character of these norms was 
already accepted.232 Yet numerous human rights documents that have since been 
adopted have elected to reaffirm these rights in respect of particular groups, 
including children, persons with disabilities, non-nationals and migrant workers, 
which effectively nullifies this argument.233 Even less clear is why the right to 
privacy and to family life also remained absent from the 1954 Statelessness 
Convention.234 In view of its aim of establishing a minimum standard of treatment 
for stateless persons, it would have been favourable for the overall impact of - and 
                                                           
230 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 18: Non-discrimination, Geneva: 10 November 1989, 
para. 12. See also Human Rights Committee, Case of Gueye et al. v. France, Comm. No. 196/1985 
(1989), para. 9.4. After noting that “the Covenant does not protect the right to a pension as such”, the 
Committee went on to subject the policy in question to the test of reasonableness and objectiveness, 
finding a violation of article 26 of the ICCPR. 
231 Found, for example, in articles 6, 7 and 8 of the ICCPR respectively.  
232 James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge: 2005, page 94; Yaffa Zilberschats, "Chapter 2 - Citizenship and International Law" in The 
Human Right to Citizenship, Transnational Publishers, Ardsley, NY: 2002, page 41. 
233 See the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities, UN Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals Who are Not Nationals of the Country 
in which They Live and the Migrant Workers Convention as well as instruments as the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child and the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination.  
234 Note that a recommendation promoting respect for family life and family unity that was elaborated 
in the Final Act of the 1951 Refugee Convention (Recommendation “B”) was not transposed to the 
Final Act accompanying the 1954 Statelessness Convention. This is regrettable in view of the reports 
that statelessness may lead to situations of indefinite family separation. See UNHCR, Statelessness in 





the message sent by - the instrument had the 1954 Statelessness Convention 
reiterated these most basic rights and freedoms.  
For all of these issues, the only avenue open to stateless persons under the 
1954 Statelessness Convention is to rely on the broad and general provision in 
article 7 requiring equal treatment as accorded to non-nationals generally.235 
Contemporary human rights law has helped to give content to the obligations of 
states in respect of non-nationals by firmly establishing that everyone – nationals 
and non-nationals – is entitled to the protection of all of the fundamental rights 
mentioned above.236 Thus, if restrictions are to be placed on the exercise of these 
rights by stateless persons, they must be legitimated under the applicable system of 
permissible limitations provided for by the human rights regime itself. And, in fact, 
several of the rights in question are non-derogable with the result that they are not 
subject to restriction on any ground, even in exceptional circumstances such as a 
state of national emergency.237 Generally speaking then, the decision not to add 
provisions on these matters to the catalogue of rights elaborated in the 1954 
Statelessness Convention is of little consequence for the actual protection offered 
by international law as a whole. 
 
7.1 Freedom from arbitrary detention 
 
Some further comments are, nevertheless, due with regard to one of the rights listed 
above: freedom from arbitrary detention. There are two reasons for singling out this 
issue. Firstly, because one of the major problems facing stateless persons is (the 
threat of) prolonged or indefinite detention, as mentioned in section 2 above in the 
context of internal and international freedom of movement. Indeed, it has been 
reported that “unnecessary imprisonment is one of the most pervasive and most 
difficult problems faced by stateless persons”.238 The second noteworthy point 
about this subject is that - unlike the 1954 Statelessness Convention - the 1951 
Refugee Convention does to some extent deal with the question of arrest and 
                                                           
235 Article 7, paragraph 1 of the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons. 
236 The Human Rights Committee reaffirmed that these rights are in no way dependent on the 
possession of the nationality of the state and should be respected with respect to nationals and non-
nationals alike. Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment No. 15: The Position of Aliens 
under the Covenant, Geneva: Geneva: 11 April 1986, para. 7. Note further that some of these 
fundamental rights establish their authority not only on the basis of texts like the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights and such instruments as the ICCPR, they also have roots in norms of customary 
international law, even to some extent jus cogens. Consider the prohibition of slavery and of genocide 
and the freedom from torture. Carmen Tiburcio, "Chapter IV. Fundamental Rights" in The human rights 
of aliens under international and comparative law, Kluwer Law International, The Hague: 2001, page 
76; Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 2003, page 
537.  
237 Carmen Tiburcio, "Chapter IV. Fundamental Rights" in The human rights of aliens under 
international and comparative law, Kluwer Law International, The Hague: 2001, pages 75-77. 
238 David Weissbrodt; Clay Collins, 'The Human Rights of Stateless Persons', in Human Rights 
Quarterly, Vol. 28, 2006, page 267. Garbiela Rodriguez Pizarro, Specific Groups and Individuals - 
Migrant Workers, Geneva: 30 December 2002, paragraph 37; Refugees International, “Refugee Voices: 
Detained Stateless People in Kuwait”, 24 September 2007; Stephanie Grant, "The Legal Protection of 
Stranded Migrants" in R. Cholewinski (ed) International Migration Law, TMC Asser Press, The 
Hague: 2007, pages 29-47. 
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detention by limiting the freedom of contracting states to impose penalties on 
refugees for unlawful entry in the country and allowing only provisional detention 
to be imposed for unlawfully present refugees until such time as their refugee status 
is determined.239 In this manner, the refugee instrument offers guidance as to what 
must be considered arbitrary in relation to the arbitrary detention of refugees. 
Since a similar determination of the specific application of standards dealing with 
arbitrary detention has not been made for situations involving stateless persons 
through the 1954 Statelessness Convention, the stateless must rely on the general 
human rights system.  
Human rights norms do not provide a blanket prohibition of arrest or 
detention. To the contrary, depriving an individual of his or her liberty is considered 
to be a legitimate action by the state in a variety of circumstances, so long as certain 
procedural guarantees are met.240 One of the instances in which detention of a 
person is considered permissible is “to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry 
into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to 
deportation or extradition”.241 In practice, the detention of stateless persons will 
often stem precisely from their uncertain or unlawful immigration status:  
 
Without proof of identity or nationality, stateless persons often cannot re-
enter their state of habitual residence. Furthermore, the detaining state cannot 
resolve the question of where to deport the stateless detainee, and it is 
unwilling to let them illegally reside within its territory. In such cases, 
stateless persons have been held in prolonged or ‘indefinite detention’ only 
because the question of where to send them remains unresolved.242 
 
                                                           
239 See James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge: 2005, page 370 onwards. 
240 See the provisions on freedom from arbitrary detention or the right to liberty and security of the 
person: Article 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; Article 9 of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights; Article 37 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child; Article 16 of the 
Migrant Workers Convention; Article 7 of the American Convention on Human Rights; Article 5 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights; and Article 6 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights. 
241 See article 5, paragraph 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights which provides an 
exhaustive list of the circumstances in which a person may be deprived of his liberty. This particular 
situation can be found in sub-paragraph f. In practice, “migrants are particularly vulnerable to 
deprivation of liberty. On the one hand there is a tendency to criminalise violations of immigration 
regulations and to punish them severely, in an attempt to discourage irregular migration. On the other 
hand, a great number of countries resort to administrative detention of irregular migrants pending their 
deportation”. Garbiela Rodriguez Pizarro, Specific Groups and Individuals - Migrant Workers, Geneva: 
30 December 2002, para. 65. See also Shyla Vohra, "Detention of Irregular Migrants and Asylum 
Seekers" in R. Cholewinski (ed) International Migration Law, TMC Asser Press, The Hague: 2007, 
page 49. 
242 Moreover, “the problem of prolonged or unwarranted imprisonment is often exacerbated when 
states, having failed to resolve the question of where to send a particular stateless person, nonetheless 
attempt to rid themselves of the stateless person by deporting him or her to another state that is also 
unwilling to receive the person. In such cases, a stateless person may spend years in detention, being 
passed from state to state like an unwanted pariah”. David Weissbrodt; Clay Collins, 'The Human 





With this in mind, the failure to transpose the provision on the non-imposition of 
penalties for unlawful entry from the 1951 Refugee Convention to the 1954 
Statelessness Convention becomes all the more regrettable and the discussion of a 
stateless person’s right to enter or return to “his own country” all the more 
pertinent.243 The prohibition of arbitrary detention, as established within the broader 
human rights framework, does nonetheless include some elements of protection that 
can be vital for the stateless. One such guarantee is “the right to control by a court 
of the legality of detention [which] applies to all persons deprived of their liberty by 
arrest or detention”.244 And since a review of the arbitrariness of detention also 
includes such considerations as appropriateness and justice, human rights law 
hereby provides an opportunity to take the specific circumstance of statelessness 
into account.245 Moreover, this question as to the legality and non-arbitrariness of 
detention is something that should be subject to continuous review. Detention that 
was lawful and reasonable to begin with may become arbitrary if it becomes too 
prolonged, as the Human Rights Committee explained in a succession of cases 
brought by detained non-citizens against Australia: in order not to be characterised 
as arbitrary, “detention should not continue beyond the period for which a State 
party can provide appropriate justification”.246 Therefore, while human rights law 
does not rule out the detention of stateless persons in the context of immigration 
regulations, it does present an avenue for stateless persons to challenge the 
permissibility of unduly prolonged or indefinite detention.247 Similarly, human 
rights norms offer protection against continued detention when there is no (longer 
any) real prospect of expelling the individual.248 Finally, human rights law does also 
                                                           
243 The intrinsic link between this latter question and the protection of stateless persons from arbitrary 
detention should therefore not be overlooked. See section 2.2 above. 
244 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 8: Right to liberty and security of persons, 
Geneva: 30 June 1982, paragraph 1. 
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of Bakhtiyari v. Australia, Comm. No. 1069/2002, Geneva: 29 October 2003, paragraph 9.2; Case of D 
and E. v. Australia, Comm. No. 1050/2002, Geneva: 11 July 2006, paragraph 7.2; Case of Shams et. al. 
v. Australia, Comm No. 1255, 1256, 1259, 1260, 1266, 1268, 1270, 1288/2004, Geneva: 20 July 2007, 
paragraph 7.2. See also Garbiela Rodriguez Pizarro, Specific Groups and Individuals - Migrant 
Workers, Geneva: 30 December 2002, paragraphs 35-38; Shyla Vohra, "Detention of Irregular Migrants 
and Asylum Seekers" in R. Cholewinski (ed) International Migration Law, TMC Asser Press, The 
Hague: 2007, pages 58-60. 
247 In the cases listed above, the Human Rights Committee found a violation of article 9, paragraph 1 of 
the ICCPR where the claimants (all non-citizens) were subjected to anywhere upwards of two years of 
detention.  
248 Human Rights Committee, Case of Jalloh v. The Netherlands, Comm. No. 794/1998, Geneva: 23 
March 2002, para. 8.2. See also Human Rights Committee, Concluding observations: United Kingdom, 
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offers a broad range of standards relating to the conditions of detention which may 
be relied upon by any detained person – stateless or otherwise.249  
 
7.2 Freedom of opinion, expression and (political) assembly 
 
The absence of political rights as well as rights that can be perceived as politically-
tinted from the text of the 1954 Statelessness Convention requires more reflection. 
Whereas the aforementioned “oversights” involved norms that may have been 
considered so evidently universal that their reaffirmation would be an unnecessary 
exercise, this is not the case for the other rights that the Convention has neglected. 
To begin with, all attempts to codify the freedom of opinion and expression as well 
as the freedom of (political) assembly were deliberately rejected. While these are 
perhaps not strictly-speaking political rights – being those rights which enable a 
person to have “a direct influence in the structure of the State”250 – they may be 
exercised to the benefit of political activity in the broadest possible sense and 
certainly play an important role in the overall empowerment of an individual.251 The 
exclusion of these rights from the final text of the Convention was, therefore, 
motivated by a desire to allow states to restrict the political activity of stateless 
persons on their territory.252 Through this choice, the instrument also fails to offer 
                                                                                                                                               
CCPR A/57/40 vol. I, Geneva: 2002, para. 16; European Court of Human Rights, Case of Chahal v. the 
United Kingdom, 23 EHRR 413, 15 November 1996; European Commission on Human Rights, Case of 
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Cholewinski (ed) International Migration Law, TMC Asser Press, The Hague: 2007. 
250 Carmen Tiburcio, "Chapter VIII. Political Rights" in The human rights of aliens under international 
and comparative law, Kluwer Law International, The Hague: 2001, page 177. 
251 The Human Rights Committee explains that “freedom of expression, assembly and association are 
essential conditions for the effective exercise of the right to vote”. Human Rights Committee, General 
Comment No. 25: The right to participate in public affairs, voting rights and the right of equal access 
to public service, Geneva: 12 July 1996, paragraph 12. The entire set of political and quasi-political 
rights have also been collectively referred to as “democratic rights” – even including the freedom of 
movement. Susan Marks, Andrew Clapham, International Human Rights Lexicon, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford: 2005, page 64. 
252 This is another example of a decision that was taken in the drafting process of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention that went on to have an indelible effect on the content of the 1954 Statelessness 
Convention, without there necessarily being any consideration for the difference in characteristics and 
needs of the two groups. Note that article 2 of both conventions - where the general obligations 
orfrefugees and stateless persons are set out – was also introduced with a particular view to affording 
states the opportunity to curtail the political activities of these individuals. Nehemiah Robinson, 
Convention relating to the status of stateless persons - Its history and interpretation, UNHCR, Geneva: 
1955, pages 23-24. See also James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 2005, pages 94 and 887. It is conceivable that a similar 





the stateless the right to assemble or to freely hold and express opinions in relation 
to other, non-political matters.   
However, the omission of these politically-tinged rights from the 1954 
Statelessness Convention is now obviated by general human rights law which 
proclaims each of these rights to the benefit of all, nationals and non-nationals alike. 
If a state is concerned about the political activities of stateless persons on its 
territory – or indeed of any individual or sub-set of the population – then 
restrictions may be imposed within the constraints of the limitation clauses 
established in the relevant human rights provisions. For example, where article 19 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides for the freedom 
of opinion and of expression (paragraphs 1 and 2) it also recognises that there may 
be reason to restrict these rights in order to protect other esteemed values such as 
the rights of others or national security (paragraph 3). States may therefore continue 
to restrict the political activities of non-nationals under certain circumstances, so 
long as the policy falls within the ambit of the permissible limitations.253 However, 
a blanket denial of these quasi-political rights to stateless persons could not be 
legitimated under such clauses.254 Cases such as the reported arrest and detention of 
stateless Kurds in Syria for openly campaigning for the reinstatement of their 
nationality are also clearly a violation of these international standards.255 Moreover, 
the Human Rights Committee has explicitly expressed concern about “legislation 
prohibiting non-citizens from being members of political parties”.256 Human rights 
law hereby makes an important contribution to the overall protection of the rights of 
the stateless by guaranteeing their right to express their opinion on their own 
situation and granting them some basic tools of empowerment that will allow them 
to stand up for their own needs and rights.  
 
7.3 Right to participate in government 
 
As we go on to consider the protection offered to stateless persons in the enjoyment 
of “true” political rights – the right to vote, to be elected and to work in public 
service257 – we can immediately observe that the 1954 Statelessness Convention 
does not touch upon these rights in any way. Since we have already established that 
states were keen to clamp down on the political activities of stateless persons by 
omitting even the most basic politically tinged rights discussed above, it comes as 
                                                           
253 The European Convention on Human Rights provides even more leeway to states in this matter by 
explicitly admitting that despite the guarantees of freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and 
prohibition of discrimination, states remain free to impose restrictions on the political activity of non-
nationals. Article 16 of the European Convention on Human Rights.  
254 See, for example, Human Rights Committee, Concluding observations: Estonia, A/51/40, Geneva: 
1996 paragraph 120. 
255 Maureen Lynch and Perveen Ali, Buried Alive. Stateless Kurds in Syria, Report for Refugees 
International, January 2006, pages 8-9; Human Rights Committee, Concluding observations: Syrian 
Arab Republic, CCPR/CO/84/SYR, 9 August 2005, paragraph 13.  
256 Human Rights Committee, Concluding observations: Estonia, A/58/40, Geneva: 2003, paragraph 79 
(17). 
257 Public service functions include such jobs as cabinet minister, diplomat and judge. Diana Elles, 




Protecting the Civil and Political Rights of the Stateless 
 291 
little surprise that the right to directly participate in government is not granted to the 
stateless, even at the highest level of attachment. This means, once again, falling 
back on the general clause in article 7 of the Convention requiring stateless persons 
to be treated not less favourably than non-nationals generally. In looking to see how 
contemporary human rights law demands that states treat non-nationals generally, 
we find political rights to be expressed in (variations of) the following terms: 
 
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity […] to take part in 
the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen 
representatives; to vote and to be elected […]; to have access, on general 
terms of equality, to public service in his country.258 
 
The norm applies to everyone but offers these political rights only in relation to a 
person’s country of citizenship. States are fully entitled to exclude non-nationals 
from these rights.259 As such, human rights law as it stands today does not provide 
the stateless with any claim - direct or indirect - to the right to participate in 
government.  
 Let us consider the implications of this finding. With the stateless unable to 
exercise political rights in any country - thanks to their status as non-nationals 
everywhere - neither the 1954 Statelessness Convention nor general human rights 
law have taken a stand against their lack of empowerment. Unlike other non-
nationals, the stateless do not have the option of returning to their country of 
citizenship to reclaim their political rights or exercising them long-distance through 
special arrangements.260 Formally voiceless and disenfranchised, the stateless are 
without access to the necessary procedures that would enable them to defend 
themselves against any (perceived) injustices they suffer and influence policy that 
affects them.  
Leaving aside any moral arguments, there are to my mind a number of very 
tangible objections to this state of affairs. Firstly, in countries with large stateless 
populations, this absolute lack of empowerment may ultimately be a greater threat 
to national security - a common ground for restricting the political activity of non-
nationals - than there would be in granting political rights. With normal routes for 
                                                           
258 Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. See also article 21 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights; Article 2; Article 23 of the American Convention on Human 
Rights; and Article 13 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. The Human Rights 
Committee explains that this is one of the human rights which is exceptionally reserved for citizens. 
Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment No. 15: The Position of Aliens under the 
Covenant, Geneva: Geneva: 11 April 1986, para. 2;  Human Rights Committee, CCPR General 
Comment No. 25: The right to participate in public affairs, voting rights and the right of equal access 
to public service, Geneva: 12 July 1996, para. 3. 
259 In other words, the “disqualification of aliens from exercising political rights has never been held to 
be discriminatory but a legitimate and reasonable restriction”. Warwick McKean, Equality and 
discrimination under international law, Clarendon Press, Oxford: 1983, page 199; See also Diana Elles, 
International Provisions Protecting the Human Rights of Non-Citizens: Study, New York: , page 42; 
Yaffa Zilberschats, "Chapter 2 - Citizenship and International Law" in The Human Right to Citizenship, 
Transnational Publishers, Ardsley, NY: 2002, page 59. 
260 See for example also article 41 of the Migrant Workers Convention that provides for the facilitation 





effectuating change closed to them, in every state, the stateless may resort to much 
more destructive means of attracting attention to their need and opinions and 
conflict may result.261 Secondly, if the participation of foreign nationals in 
government is restricted because it is perceived as a threat to national security or 
other values on the grounds of their allegiance to another state, 262 this particular 
reasoning should not stand in the way of granting political rights to stateless 
persons. The stateless differ from other non-nationals in that they do not owe formal 
allegiance to a foreign country so the idea that they may engage in subversive or 
malignant action against the state as pawns of a foreign authority is unfounded. 
Recall, in this context, the discussion of the principle of non-discrimination in 
section 1 of the present chapter, where it was made clear that different cases should 
also be treated differently. Then, there is the danger that a state will use the tool of 
denial of citizenship in order to deliberately effectuate the disenfranchisement of 
individuals or groups: anyone whose political activity is considered unfavourable or 
a threat to the policy of the ruling power. It has already been noted that political 
motivations underlie many cases of denial of citizenship and that this is becoming a 
common feature in states that have newly introduced a multi-party democratic 
system.263 If a state has withdrawn or withheld citizenship in contravention of 
international legal standards, it should be possible to also qualify the subsequent 
exclusion of the stateless person from the political process as a violation of human 
rights. The importance of this is that it may allow the person concerned to access 
additional mechanisms for redressing his situation.264 The approach adopted by the 
UN Human Rights Committee to the personal scope of the right to enter, as 
discussed earlier in this chapter, would seem a more appropriate model for the 
attribution of political rights than an outright exclusion of all non-nationals.265 And 
                                                           
261 For instance, it has been widely reported that the denial of citizenship of much of the Banyarwanda 
population in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) – was a major contributor to the many 
conflicts that have plagued the Great Lakes Region. Advisory Board on Human Security (prepared by 
Constantin Sokoloff), Denial of Citizenship: A Challenge to Human Security, February 2005, page 20 
and 26-27. See on the link between statelessness and civil unrest also Dorothy Jean Walker, 
“Statelessness: Violation or Conduit for Violation of Human Rights?” in Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 
3, No. 1, 1981, pages 107-108. 
262 It is asserted that non-nationals are excluded from certain professions because these require loyalty 
to the state, “which only citizens owe” and the same argument partly underscores the attribution of 
political rights to nationals only. Yaffa Zilberschats, "Chapter 2 - Citizenship and International Law" in 
The Human Right to Citizenship, Transnational Publishers, Ardsley, NY: 2002, pages 34 and 38. See on 
the link between “loyalty” and political rights also Diana Elles, International Provisions Protecting the 
Human Rights of Non-Citizens: Study, New York: , pages 37-38 Alexander Aleinikoff; Douglas 
Klusmeyer, Citizenship Policies for an Age of Migration, Carnegie Empowerment for International 
Peace, Washington D.C.: 2002, page 47. 
263 See chapter V, including the case of the denationalisation of Kenneth Kaunda, former president of 
Zambia. 
264 For example, while the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does not elaborate 
standards relating to the attribution of nationality (beyond the general right of every child to acquire a 
nationality), it does provide for the political rights of citizens. Submitting a complaint against the 
violation of the right to participate in government – even though technically citizenship is required for a 
claim - would be a means for a stateless person to nevertheless access the individual complaints 
procedure before the Human Rights Committee. 
265 See section 2.2.2. 
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finally, I submit that a more tempered approach to restricting the political rights and 
activities of non-nationals that allows account to be taken of the specific situation of 
the stateless would be in better keeping with the overall system of human rights 
protection. As was explained in chapter IX, the universality of the human rights 
regime in spite of the inclusion of some “citizens rights”, is only kept intact thanks 
to the elaboration of the right to a nationality. Where states are failing – individually 
or collectively – to ensure that everyone enjoys the bond of citizenship somewhere, 
this assertion of universality begins to crumble unless special provision is made for 
those persons who find themselves excluded by the system: the stateless.  
It is clear, however, that to start to dislocate political rights from citizenship 
is such a radical step, that even the aforementioned considerations may be 
insufficiently persuasive. Political participation is an issue that is intrinsically 
linked not only with notions such as allegiance and national security, but also with 
the fundamental concept of sovereignty. Only those who are “members” of the 
sovereign body are entitled to a say in the decision-making.266 The world is 
currently arranged in a particular way, with sovereignty resting at state level and 
nationality being the mark of membership. Yet the world is also changing and with 
it are the notions of sovereignty and membership.267 There is a trend towards the 
recognition of new levels of membership that can also result in the enjoyment of 
(certain) political rights. For example, an increasing number of countries grant non-
national residents the right to vote or be elected in local elections.268 Within the 
European Union, the special voting rights of “EU citizens” have been formalised: 
all EU citizens are entitled to vote in and stand for local elections of any member 
                                                           
266 The right to self-determination strengthens this consideration by providing for “the right of all 
peoples to pursue freely their economic, social and cultural development without outside interference 
[linked to] the right of every citizen to take part in the conduct of public affairs”. Emphasis added, 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, CERD General Recommendation XXI: Right 
to Self-Determination, A/51/18, New York: 1996, para. 9. Although again, the question must be raised 
whether the stateless can really be perceived as an outside influence since they hold no (other) 
allegiance. 
267 Sovereignty is becoming more a “elastic” as opposed to “absolute” concept in this age of 
globalisation and this is in turn effecting notions of citizenship. Yaffa Zilberschats, "Chapter 2 - 
Citizenship and International Law" in The Human Right to Citizenship, Transnational Publishers, 
Ardsley, NY: 2002, page 170. This has prompted much discussion on the meaning that is or should be 
attributed to citizenship today. See for example Guy Goodwin-Gill, 'International Law and Human 
Rights: Trends Concerning International Migrants and Refugees', in International Migration Review, 
Vol. 23, 1989, pages 531-532; Yasemin Soysal, Limits of citizenship - Migrants and postnational 
membership in Europe, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago: 1994; Vincenzo Ferrari, 
"Citizenship: Problems, Concepts and Policies" in Torre (ed) European Citizenship - An Institutional 
Challenge, Kluwer Law International, The Hague: 1998; Stephen Castles; Alastair Davidson, 
Citizenship and Migration. Globalisation and the Politics of Belonging, Macmillan Press, London: 
2000; Douglas Klusmeyer; Alexander Aleinikoff, From Migrants to Citizens: Membership in a 
Changing World, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC: 2000; Seyla 
Benhabib, Transformations of Citizenship - Dilemmas of the Nation State in the Era of Globalisation, 
Koniklijke van Gorcum, Assen: 2001; Alexander Aleinikoff; Douglas Klusmeyer, Citizenship Policies 
for an Age of Migration, Carnegie Empowerment for International Peace, Washington D.C.: 2002; 
Keith Faulks, Citizenship, Routledge, London: 2003.  
268 This is largely in reaction to increasing levels of international migration and therefore growing 





state in which they have acquired residence.269 But also elsewhere, countries have 
granted political rights at the local-level to non-nationals who meet certain 
conditions.270 This new type of membership – somewhere between citizenship and 
non-citizenship – is described as denizenship or quasi-citizenship.271 The UN treaty 
bodies, in particular the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 
have been very encouraging of these and other developments towards the increased 
participation of non-nationals in political processes.272 
However, the disentanglement of nationality and political rights for the 
purposes of local level politics is by no means a universal trend, nor is it necessarily 
suggestive of a broader move away from nationality as a precondition for exercising 
other political rights. One important point that has been made is that local politics 
are considered to be a very different sort of matter to national politics: 
 
At local level, the political process pertains only to matters which may 
affect normal living, such as urbanisation, matters related to education and 
health services, for instance, while participation at national level would 
mean giving access to the alien to influence the foreign policy of the 
country, national security, public debt, the making of national legislation 
and other issues, considered beyond aliens’ interests.273 
 
                                                           
269 All EU citizens are also entitled to vote in and stand for European Parliament elections – an 
embodiment of “membership” at a regional level that brings with it corresponding political rights. Note 
that EU citizenship, although a regional concept, is actually dependent upon “membership” at national 
level. An EU citizen is any person who is a national of one of the EU member states. Articles 17 and 19 
of the Treaty Establishing the European Community. See Stephen Castles; Alastair Davidson, 
Citizenship and Migration. Globalisation and the Politics of Belonging, Macmillan Press, London: 
2000, pages 97-100; Yaffa Zilberschats, "Chapter 6 - Recent Political Changes and Citizenship" in The 
Human Right to Citizenship, Transnational Publishers, Ardsley, NY: 2002, pages 171-176. Moreover, 
there have been moves to expand the political rights attributed on the basis of EU citizenship and 
residence, as opposed to nationality. For a discussion of the suggestions tabled, see Helen Staples, The 
Legal Status of Third Country Nationals Resident in the European Union, Kluwer Law International, 
The Hague: 1999, pages 335-355; Kay Hailbronner, "Free Movement of EU Nationals and Union 
Citizenship" in R. Cholewinski (ed) International Migration Law, TMC Asser Press, The Hague: 2007, 
page 325. 
270 These include Israel, Paraguay and Argentina. Many European countries also extend local-level 
political rights to non-nationals who are not EU citizens. See Carmen Tiburcio, "Chapter VIII. Political 
Rights" in The human rights of aliens under international and comparative law, Kluwer Law 
International, The Hague: 2001, pages 181-182; Alexander Aleinikoff; Douglas Klusmeyer, Citizenship 
Policies for an Age of Migration, Carnegie Empowerment for International Peace, Washington D.C.: 
2002, pages 51-54. 
271 Stephen Castles; Alastair Davidson, Citizenship and Migration. Globalisation and the Politics of 
Belonging, Macmillan Press, London: 2000, page 94. 
272 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding Observations: Sweden, 
A/52/18, New York: 1997, para. 499; Estonia, A/55/18, New York: 2000, para. 77; Lithuania, A/57/18 
New York: 2002, para. 167; Liechtenstein, CERD A/57/18, New York: 2002, para. 149. Human Rights 
Committee, Concluding Observations: Portugal, A/52/40 vol. 1 Geneva: 1997, paras. 322 and 326; 
Switzerland, A/57/40 vol. 1, Geneva: 2002, para. 76. See also article 42, paragraph 3 of the Convention 
on the Rights of Migrant Workers. 
273 Carmen Tiburcio, "Chapter VIII. Political Rights" in The human rights of aliens under international 
and comparative law, Kluwer Law International, The Hague: 2001, page 182. 
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Nevertheless, the possibility of bypassing the requirement of citizenship for the 
exercise of political rights for specific persons or in particular circumstances has 
effectively been tabled by the emergence of denizenship.  
Furthermore, when calling upon states to provide information on the 
implementation of any such policies in their periodic reports, the Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination appears open to the possibility that further 
steps may be taken towards uncoupling citizenship from political rights: 
 
State parties should report whether any groups, such as permanent 
residents, enjoy [political] rights on a limited basis, for example, by having 
the right to vote in local elections or to hold particular public service 
positions.274 
 
Meanwhile, in the context of the protection of the rights of minorities, the need to 
consider ways in which ensure the effective participation of persons belonging to 
minorities in “decisions on the national and, where appropriate, regional level 
concerning the minority to which they belong or the regions in which they live”275 
has added a new dimension to the question of offering political participation in the 
absence of nationality. As Asbjorn Eide explains in a paper on minority rights and 
non-citizens: 
 
Non-citizens do not under international human rights law have an 
unconditional right to elect and be elected to public office. Nevertheless, 
where sizeable and stable minorities exist with many of their members 
being non-citizens, States should seek ways to involve their representatives, 
at least on a consultative basis, in decisions affecting them as a group.276 
 
In future, this problem of the participation of minorities may further contribute to 
interest in the concept of denizenship and the process of uncoupling nationality 
from political rights.  
It seems then that it is no longer entirely inconceivable that (at least some) 
political rights could be separated from the formal concept of nationality277 - if not 
generally, then at least to the benefit of the stateless in view of their particular 
situation and the arguments raised above. If a new or additional instrument were to 
be envisaged for the protection of the rights of the stateless then states may now be 
more receptive to the idea of filling the gap left by the 1954 Statelessness 
Convention. This move could be founded upon a greater understanding of the plight 
                                                           
274 Emphasis added, Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment No. 25: The right to 
participate in public affairs, voting rights and the right of equal access to public service, Geneva: 12 
July 1996, para. 3. 
275 Article 2.3 of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National, Ethnic, Religious 
or Linguistic Minorities,18 December 1992. 
276 Asbjorn Eide, “Citizenship and the minority rights of non-citizens”, Working Paper prepared for the 
UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.5/1999/WP.3, 15 April 1999, paragraph 53. 
277 “A franchise for noncitizens is not a utopian goal; is has become a democratic norm in several 
countries”. Alexander Aleinikoff; Douglas Klusmeyer, Citizenship Policies for an Age of Migration, 





of the stateless (as distinct from the situation of refugees), the objections presented 
above to the enduring exclusion of stateless persons from political rights and the 
opportunities created by the concept of denizenship. Again, the carefully-tailored 
approach that human rights law is now taking to the right to enter – an expansive 
interpretation that favours particular groups of stateless persons – could provide the 
model for such a new approach to political rights. 
 
7.4 Minority rights 
 
At the close of this section on civil and political rights that were omitted from the 
1954 Statelessness Convention I would like to make a few comments about one 
further provision that appears in the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights but was not given a place in the statelessness instrument: the article on 
minority rights. Article 27 of the ICCPR proclaims that 
 
in those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, 
persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the rights, in 
community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own 
culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own 
language.278  
 
The UN Independent Expert on Minorities reports that “evidence demonstrates that 
discriminatory denial or deprivation of citizenship disproportionately affects 
persons belonging to minorities”.279 So, a great many of the world’s larger stateless 
communities are ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities who have long resided in 
the state in which they are found. The Hill Tribes in Thailand and the Russians in 
Latvia and Estonia are just two examples.  
According to the wording of article 27 of the ICCPR, the statelessness of these 
minority groups should not be a bar to their enjoyment of minority rights – no 
precondition of nationality may be set. This interpretation has been confirmed by 
the Human Rights Committee.280 However, many countries continue to enforce 
                                                           
278 Note that “this article establishes and recognizes a right which is conferred on individuals belonging 
to minority groups and which is distinct from, and additional to, all the other rights which, as 
individuals in common with everyone else, they are already entitled to enjoy under the Covenant”. 
Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 23: The Rights of Minorities, Geneva: 8 April 1994, 
para. 1. 
279 Gay McDougall, Promotion and Protection of all Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development – Report of the Independent Expert on 
Minority Issues, A/HRC/7/23, 28 February 2008, para. 15. 
280 In the context of the broader discussion of the rights of non-nationals, the Committee declared that 
“in those cases where aliens constitute a minority within the meaning of article 27, they shall not be 
denied the right, in community with other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess 
and practice their own religion and to use their own language”. Human Rights Committee, General 
Comment 15: The position of aliens under the covenant, Geneva: 11 April 1986, paragraph 7. Later, the 
Committee explained that specifically with regard to minority rights, “the individuals designed to be 
protected need not be citizens of the State party. In this regard, the obligations deriving from article 2.1 
are also relevant, since a State party is required under that article to ensure that the rights protected 
under the Covenant are available to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction, 
except rights which are expressly made to apply to citizens, for example, political rights under article 
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policies whereby only citizens can be recognised as belonging to a minority and 
granted rights accordingly, thereby fuelling the ongoing debate on the definition of 
a “minority” or “national minority”.281 With the close relationship between the two 
issues – “most stateless persons today are members of minority groups”282- it would 
have been beneficial to the protection of minority rights for the statelessness 
instrument to have explicitly referred to the capacity of stateless persons to claim 
such entitlements. The decision, for whatever reason,283 not to include the issue of 





The exercise of going through each of the civil and political rights contained within 
the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons clearly reveals just 
how much of an impression the drafting process has left on the instrument. On the 
one hand, as a result of the decision to stick closely to the text of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention, the two documents appear indistinguishable at first, apart from the 
obvious difference in the delineation of personal scope. Certainly many of the civil 
and political rights have simply been transposed directly from the Refugee 
Convention into the Statelessness Convention without any alterations. Moreover, 
the Statelessness Convention only deals with those issues that were already 
                                                                                                                                               
25. A State party may not, therefore, restrict the rights under article 27 to its citizens alone”. Human 
Rights Committee, General Comment No. 23: The Rights of Minorities, Geneva: 8 April 1994, para. 
5.1. See also Yvonne Donders, Towards a Right to Cultural Identity?, Intersentia, Oxford: 2002, page 
170; David Weissbrodt, Final Report on Prevention of Discrimination - The Rights of Non-Citizens, 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/23, 26 May 2003, para. 42. 
281 The creation of special instruments on the rights of national minorities within the context of the 
Council of Europe and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe has not resolved this 
debate on definition. Among the countries that continue to consider the term “national minority” to 
refer only to citizens is Estonia, where the stateless Russians cannot claim the benefit of such 
instruments as the Council of Europe Framework Convention on National Minorities to which Estonia 
is a party. See for further discussion of this issue Ineta Ziemele, State Continuity and Nationality: The 
Baltic States and Russia. Past, Present and Future as Defined by International Law, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, Leiden: 2005, pages 375-380; For details on how “citizenship” factors into the definition of 
or approach to minorities adopted by various international mechanisms see Rianne Letschert, The 
Impact of Minority Rights Mechanisms. The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, the UN 
Working Group on Minorities and the CoE Advisory Committee on Minorities, T.M.C. Asser Press, The 
Hague: 2005, pages 64, 101 and 174. 
282 Gay McDougall, Promotion and Protection of all Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development – Report of the Independent Expert on 
Minority Issues, A/HRC/7/23, 28 February 2008, summary. 
283 Be reminded once more that it was the content of the 1951 Refugee Convention that largely pre-
determined what the 1954 Statelessness Convention would and would not deal with. Perhaps in the 
formulation of the refugee instrument it was felt that the refugee would could not be considered a 
minority in this sense because he is by definition a newcomer to the state of refuge. This may be a valid 
argument for the refugee - although there are now also situations conceivable where refugees form a 
“new” minority similarly to other migrants in their host state, in particular where protracted refugee 
situations are concerned, and may be entitled to minority rights on that basis. However, the plight of the 
stateless is not always directly comparable to that of the refugee and as mentioned, statelessness has 





carefully debated and approved as part of the refugee instrument. This approach 
appears to have had a somewhat damaging effect on the protection offered to 
stateless persons because in practice the assumption that the situation of stateless 
populations is largely comparable to that of refugees has proven unfounded. For 
example, where a provision on the right to freedom of opinion and expression was 
rejected in the drafting process of the 1951 Refugee Convention because of the 
desire to allow states to control the political activities of foreigners, this reasoning is 
not appropriate for excluding the article from an instrument geared towards stateless 
persons. So too the failure to include a reference to minority rights – perhaps a 
logical choice for a tool that addresses refugee situations, but a dubious one for a 
document upon which large stateless minority groups may wish to rely. Had the 
drafters started from scratch or fully re-opened the debate on each civil and political 
right (both those present in the draft and those rejected), it is feasible that the 
outcome may have been quite different and indeed more relevant.  
On the other hand, the areas in which the text of the 1954 Statelessness 
Convention do deviate from that of its precursor raise even greater concern. Each of 
the changes amounts to a weakening of the protection offered – most notably 
through the omission of one particular guarantee that is absolutely central to the 
overall system of the Convention. I refer here to the right to enter and remain. The 
prohibition of non-refoulement espoused in the 1951 Refugee Convention indirectly 
provides the refugee with an avenue for claiming (continued) access to the territory 
of the state of asylum. The Convention itself establishes the possibility of gaining 
and maintaining physical and even lawful presence for the purposes of accessing 
the remainder of the rights espoused. However the 1954 Statelessness Convention 
provides no such opportunity. State parties to the Statelessness Convention are free 
to refuse, detain or expel any stateless person seeking access to their soil without 
the proper authorisation. This is in spite of the fact that physical, lawful and even 
durable presence is still set as a precondition for accessing the vast majority of the 
substantive guarantees contained in the instrument. Thus, the failure to deal with the 
issue of entry and residence rights is arguably the single greatest flaw of the 1954 
Statelessness Convention. The stateless are thereby compelled to rely on the 
goodwill of a state party for (continued) access to its territory in order to claim their 
convention rights. 
 With this in mind it became all the more pressing to search the international 
human rights framework for alternative and supplementary protection. It was noted 
that access to territory is also important for the enjoyment of rights under human 
rights law - not because human rights norms tend to set the precondition of lawful 
residence, but because as long as the state remains free to expel the stateless person 
at will, it can choose to purge the stateless person from its jurisdiction at any 
moment, making it impossible to physically access any rights. And since no other 
state is necessarily compelled to admit a stateless person, this can result in 
indefinite detention or the “ping-pong” effect of enduring limbo where the 
individual is passed from one state to another indefinitely or, alternatively, trapped 
in indefinite detention. Although human rights law, in principle, only recognises the 
right of a person to enter or remain in “his own country” and this generally refers to 
the country of nationality, recent developments suggest the beginnings of an answer 
to the plight of the stateless in this respect. In particular, the UN Human Rights 
Committee has determined that in various cases a state must act as a person’s “own 
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country” even in the absence of a bond of nationality.284 It will not necessarily be 
easy to identify which state should be obliged to admit, regularise or refrain from 
expelling a particular stateless person because this effectively involves identifying 
the state that arguably should be attributing its nationality to that person (closest 
genuine connection) and this, in turn, means falling back on the complex norms 
relating to the prevention of statelessness discussed in Part 2. However, there is 
scope to build upon the initiative taken by the Human Rights Committee to interpret 
the term “his own country” in a broad manner and guidelines could be developed to 
further elucidate these ideas and apply them to the specific situation of the 
stateless.285 This would rectify the oversight committed by the 1954 Statelessness 
Convention and in fact render the instrument instantly more effective.  
In this chapter it was also suggested that the failure of the 1954 
Statelessness Convention to address the lack of empowerment of stateless persons – 
the omission of any political rights – could be dealt with along similar lines.286 This 
would admittedly be a radical move and unlikely to garner widespread support at 
this time. However, the system of modern human rights law and the changing 
practices of states with regard to political rights at the local level both suggest that 
the granting of political rights in the absence of citizenship where the circumstances 
so demand is not entirely and definitively out of the question. Once all of the 
dimensions of the protection of the stateless have been discussed, we will be able to 
consider the manner in which these and other ideas to improve upon the protection 
offered could be further developed and implemented.287  
For now I would like to draw a conclusion on the existing content of the 
1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons and its role in protecting 
the substantive rights of the stateless. On the basis of the assessment made over the 
course of this chapter, the unavoidable verdict seems to be that the contribution of 
the 1954 Statelessness Convention to the enjoyment of civil and political rights by 
the stateless is virtually nil. The instrument proclaims a somewhat random and 
notably incomplete selection of civil and political rights. The decision to omit 
various fundamental issues (that are dealt with in human rights law) is neither 
logical nor necessarily appropriate. Each one of the rights that is elaborated can be 
found in similar or stronger wording in contemporary human rights instruments. 
Those provisions with the greatest value and significance in its precursor, the 1951 
Refugee Convention, find no counterpart in the text of the 1954 Statelessness 
                                                           
284 The three situations covered explicitly were: where denationalisation has been implemented in 
violation of a state’s international obligations, where nationality is denied following state succession 
and where there is an enduring denial of citizenship to long-term residents. In each case, the state that 
should have attributed or maintained citizenship is deemed to owe the stateless person the right to enter 
and remain on its territory.   
285 For example, where more than one state is identified as being “responsible” for a particular stateless 
persons, bilateral negotiations or the implementation of a right of option would be possible avenues to 
determining in which country the stateless person may enjoy residence. 
286 Hence once the state has been identified in which the stateless person should be entitled to enjoy 
(continued) residence, this state could also be required or at least encouraged to afford the stateless 
person certain political rights – for example, only the right to work in public service or also the right to 
vote and be elected. Additional conditions could be set such as a minimum period of residence before 
these political rights can be exercised.  





Convention - these key articles were simply deleted. And the instrument fails to 
deal with some of the most fundamental issues of concern that face stateless persons 
as a specific vulnerable group, such as the right to (continued) residence (including 
the right to return), protection from arbitrary detention and the right to political 
participation. In the following chapters the value of this 1954 Statelessness 
Convention for the protection of first the economic, social and cultural rights and 
then the special needs of the stateless will be assessed before coming to an overall 
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The second major category of substantive provisions in the 1954 Convention 
relating to the Status of Stateless Persons comprises economic, social and cultural 
rights (ESC rights). Here, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) forms the reference point for grouping the articles. The 
economic, social and cultural rights thus found within the 1954 Statelessness 
Convention – in the order in which they will be dealt with below – are: the right to 
work and labour-related rights (articles 17, 18, 19 and 24, paragraph 1(a)), freedom 
of association (article 15), right to social security and assistance (articles 23 and 
24), right to an adequate standard of living (articles 20 and 21), right to education 
(article 22) and intellectual property rights (article 14).1 It is an impressive array of 
provisions - in fact double the number that is devoted to civil and political rights in 
this statelessness instrument. This is a promising discovery, but the stateless are 
nevertheless reported to experience widespread difficulties in exercising a range of 
economic, social and cultural rights2 and it is not until the content of these articles 
has been analysed that any conclusions can be drawn on their value. In the 
upcoming paragraphs, the rights will be dealt with in turn in order to assess the role 
of the 1954 Statelessness Convention within the system of contemporary human 
rights law for the protection of the ESC rights of the stateless. At the same time, we 
will be on the lookout for areas in which the overall system is perhaps letting down 
                                                           
1 Be reminded once more that the distinction between civil and political rights, on the one hand, and 
economic, social and cultural rights, on the other, is largely artificial. Particularly evident in reference 
to such rights as the right to property (dealt with in chapter 10 among the civil and political rights, yet a 
fundamental guarantee for the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights) and the freedom of 
association (which is a fundamental freedom that may be exercised to the benefit of political activities 
and is closely tied up with the freedom of assembly yet is dealt with in this chapter among the 
economic, social and cultural rights in view of its role in backing up labour-related rights).  
2 The problem is illustrated well by a quote from a stateless Bidoon living in the United Arab Emirates: 
“We can’t get jobs, we can’t move, we are like boats without ports. Access to education and healthcare 
are also problems. I couldn’t finish high school or go to college. I can only see a doctor in a private 
hospital, not in the government ones.” cited in UNHCR and IPU, Nationality and statelessness. A 
handbook for parliamentarians, 2005, page 17. See also UNHCR, "Statelessness and Citizenship" in 
The State of the World's Refugees - A Humanitarian Agenda, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 1997, 
page 241; Maureen Lynch, Lives on hold: The human cost of statelessness, Washington: 2005, page 3; 
Advisory Board on Human Security (prepared by Constantin Sokoloff), Denial of Citizenship: A 





the stateless and consider ways in which the protection of the rights of this 
vulnerable group could be enhanced. 
 
1 NON-NATIONALS, NON-DISCRIMINATION AND THE ENJOYMENT OF ECONOMIC, 
SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 
 
Before we discuss the content of these rights in detail, we must pause again to 
consider the influence of the principle of non-discrimination on the position of non-
nationals, this time within the overall system of economic, social and cultural 
rights. Most fundamentally, as with civil and political rights, the ICESCR and other 
relevant standard-setting instruments are firmly founded on the notion of 
universality and elaborate protections to the benefit of “everyone”. In principle 
then, non-citizens including stateless persons, are also entitled to enjoy economic, 
social and cultural rights.3 Yet, in an identical approach to that taken in the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the ICESCR does not 
explicitly prohibit distinctions based on nationality in its enunciation of the 
principle of non-discrimination.4 This means that such distinctions would have to be 
assessed under the heading of “other status”. The difficulty is that: 
 
Non-nationals cannot necessarily count on receiving the treatment enjoyed 
by citizens, as neither treaty monitoring body of the two Covenants 
[ICCPR and ICESCR] has unequivocally held that non-nationals are to 
enjoy all social and economic rights without distinction with nationals.5 
 
Nevertheless, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights6 not entirely 
refrained from considering the legitimacy of differential treatment between citizens 
and non-citizens. In fact, it has taken an active stance in assessing the compliance 
                                                           
3 David Weissbrodt, Preliminary Report on the Rights of Non-Citizens, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/20, Geneva: 
6 June 2001, para. 56. 
4 Article 2, paragraph 2 of the ICESCR states: “The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to 
guarantee that the rights enunciated in the present Covenant will be exercised without discrimination of 
any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status”. The list of prohibited grounds is identical to that found in article 2, 
paragraph 1 and article 26 of the ICCPR 
5 Emphasis added. John Dent, Research Paper on the Social and Economic Rights of Non-Nationals in 
Europe, Brussels: 1998, page 12. See also Matthew Craven, The International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights. A Perspective on its Development, Clarendon Press, Oxford: 1998, page 
173; Tang Lay Lee, “Statelessness, Human Rights and Gender. Irregular migrant workers from Burma 
in Thailand”, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden 2005, page 93. The recently elaborated General 
Comment on the right to social security is the only instance in which the ESC Committee plainly 
declares that “Article 2(2) proscribes discrimination on ground of nationality”. See ESC Committee, 
General Comment No. 19 - The Right to Social Security, Advanced unedited version, 4 February 2008, 
para. 36. This stands in marked contrast to the position of the UN Human Rights Committee in its 
general comment on the position of aliens under the ICCPR on the permissibility of distinctions 
between citizens and non-citizens in the enjoyment of civil and political rights where a much harder 
stance is taken against such distinctions. See chapter X, section 1. 
6 Hereafter referred to as the ESC Committee. 
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with the Covenant of such situations.7 To sum up the position of the Committee: 
“even though equality of treatment is not necessarily prescribed, discrimination on 
the basis of nationality is by no means legitimate”.8 When it comes to it, this 
question of legitimacy can only be answered by reference to the content of the 
particular ESC right in relation to which the differential treatment is established. 
And this is where the nature of ESC rights comes into play. 
The resource-intensive character of many (aspects of) ESC rights impedes the 
prospect of their direct implementation and their prescription with immediate 
binding force. In contrast to the system of civil and political rights then, the 
ICESCR allows for flexibility by enunciating most rights in such a way as to 
demand progressive rather than immediate achievement: 
 
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps […] to the 
maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the 
full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all 
appropriate means.9  
 
No overall timeframe is set as to when full realisation is to be achieved (nor is it 
made clear what full realisation exactly entails) and states are generally granted a 
wide margin of discretion in determining what resources are available for 
improving the enjoyment of these rights. Because states are thereby afforded greater 
discretion in the implementation of these norms, it is difficult to claim a very 
concrete entitlement under many ESC rights and harder for supervising bodies such 
as courts to determine where there has been a violation. And, for the stateless, this 
basically flexible nature of many ESC rights complicates the question of whether 
states are bound to afford non-nationals – and the stateless – the same level of 
protection as their own citizens. 
Nevertheless, the flexibility inherent in the demand to work towards 
progressive achievement is not limitless. The ESC Committee has determined that 
“a minimum core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum 
essential levels of each of the rights is incumbent upon every State Party”.10 Failure 
to fulfil such a minimum core obligation amounts to a prima facie violation of the 
Covenant that can only exceptionally be justified.11 Breaking down each ESC right 
                                                           
7 As we will see over the course of this chapter, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights - as well as the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination and the Committee on 
the Rights of the Child - have considered questions relating to the enjoyment of ESC by non-nationals 
on numerous occasions both in the formulation of general comments and in response to state party 
reports. 
8 Matthew Craven, The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. A Perspective 
on its Development, Clarendon Press, Oxford: 1998, page 174.  
9 Article 2, paragraph 1 of the ICESCR. Compare this to article 2, paragraph 1 of the ICCPR which 
determines that “each State party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all 
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognised in the present 
Covenant”.  
10 ESC Committee, General Comment No. 3: The nature of state parties obligations, E/1991/23, 14 
December 1990, para. 10. 
11 Ibid. More recently, in the context of the right to health, the ESC Committee has even held that “a 





into those components that are considered to be “core obligations” and those that 
are considered subject to progressive realisation is thus an invaluable interpretative 
mechanism for assessing compliance with the Covenant. This characteristic trait of 
ESC rights has an impact on the way in which the principle of non-discrimination is 
applied, in particular in relation to non-citizens, because  
 
the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has forcefully asserted 
that no group should be denied the ‘minimum core content’ of the ICESCR 
rights.12  
 
Thus non-nationals, including stateless persons, enjoy the minimum standards at the 
heart of each ESC right and the failure to ensure their enjoyment of this core 
content will be considered a prima facie breach of the Covenant. Beyond these 
minimum core obligations, states may offer their own citizens a greater level of 
protection of ESC rights. Nevertheless, any differentiation in treatment between 
nationals and non-nationals in an area that does not belong to the minimum core 
content must still pass a basic “reasonableness” test.13  
 Deconstructing each ESC right into elements that are considered to be core 
obligations and those that may be achieved progressively is therefore the first step 
towards understanding the influence of the non-discrimination principle on the 
enjoyment of these rights by stateless persons. Where an assessment must be made 
of the reasonableness of distinctions between nationals and non-nationals outside 
the sphere of the core minimum content, there are a number of further interpretative 
tools that can be helpful. In the first place, where the ESC Committee has 
elaborated on the interpretation of a norm and the protection to be enjoyed by 
(certain categories of) non-nationals, either through general comments and 
recommendations or through its response to the situation on the ground in state 
parties, this is a direct source of information on the influence of the non-
discrimination principle in that particular context. 
 Secondly, account must be taken of a remarkable statement found early on in 
the ICESCR, namely paragraph 3 of its second article: 
 
Developing countries, with due regard to human rights and their national 
economy, may determine to what extent they would guarantee the 
economic rights recognized in the present Covenant to non-nationals. 
 
Developing states are hereby expressly permitted to restrict the economic rights of 
non-citizens – and thereby also stateless persons – on their territory. At first, it 
                                                                                                                                               
obligations […] which are non-derogable”. ESC Committee, General Comment No. 14: The right to the 
highest attainable standard of health, E/C.12/2000/4, 11 August 2000, para. 47. 
12 Emphasis added. John Dent, Research Paper on the Social and Economic Rights of Non-Nationals in 
Europe, Brussels: 1998, page 12. See also Matthew Craven, The International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights. A Perspective on its Development, Clarendon Press, Oxford: 1998, page 
174. 
13 Note that the distinction drawn on the basis of citizenship must also not be implemented in such a 
way as to amount to de facto or indirect discrimination on one of the prohibited grounds set out in 
article 2, paragraph 2 of the ICESCR. John Dent, Research Paper on the Social and Economic Rights of 
Non-Nationals in Europe, Brussels: 1998, page 12.  
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seems difficult to place this provision in the overall system of ESC rights. It has 
been described as elaborating the exception to a general rule of equality in the 
enjoyment of ESC rights.14 However, we have already seen that the application of 
the principle of non-discrimination to non-nationals in the context of ESC rights has 
not resulted in an outright prescription of equality with citizens. How then, does this 
extraordinary clause contribute to the overall picture? The historical background to 
this paragraph does not shed much light on this question,15 although it is of interest 
to note that it was only narrowly adopted, which suggests that the subject was 
already highly controversial at the time.16 This may explain the use of what has 
been described as “unconscionably vague”17 terminology – the references to 
developing countries18 and economic rights19 - that is not defined anywhere within 
                                                           
14 David Weissbrodt, Final Report on Prevention of Discrimination - The Rights of Non-Citizens, 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/23, 26 May 2003, para. 19. The express allowance for restrictions to the economic 
rights of non-nationals contained in article 2, paragraph 3 of the ICESCR has been hailed in some 
instances as evidence of a general rule of equality between citizens and non-citizens in the enjoyment of 
ESC rights in all other situations. Matthew Craven, The International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights. A Perspective on its Development, Clarendon Press, Oxford: 1998, pages 172-173; 
Carmen Tiburcio, "Chapter VI. Social and Cultural Rights" in The human rights of aliens under 
international and comparative law, Kluwer Law International, The Hague: 2001, page 147. 
15 The only explanation offered is that “the sole aim of the proposals in question was to rectify the 
situation which frequently existed in the developing countries particularly those which recently won 
their independence. In such countries, the influence of non-nationals on the national economy – a 
heritage of the colonial era – was often such that nationals were not in a position to fully enjoy the 
economic rights set forth in the draft covenant”. From the report of the Third Committee of the General 
Assembly on the drafting of the ICESCR as cited in E. Dankwa, 'Working Paper on Article 2(3) of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights', in Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 9, 
1987, page 235. See also Carmen Tiburcio, "Chapter VII. Economic Rights" in The human rights of 
aliens under international and comparative law, Kluwer Law International, The Hague: 2001, page 
171. 
16 The amendment which introduced paragraph 3 to article 2 of the ICESCR was adopted by 41 votes to 
38, with 12 abstentions. E. Dankwa, 'Working Paper on Article 2(3) of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights', in Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 9, 1987, page 236. 
17 Warwick McKean, Equality and discrimination under international law, Clarendon Press, Oxford: 
1983, page 201. 
18 Although the concept of developing countries does enjoy widespread usage, there is no single, 
authoritative source which elaborates a list of (criteria to identify) states that belong to this category. 
This leaves article 2, paragraph 3 open to misuse. See E. Dankwa, 'Working Paper on Article 2(3) of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights', in Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 9, 
1987, pages 236-238. 
19 There is no agreement as to the categorisation of particular norms as economic rights, as distinct from 
social and cultural rights. The ICESCR does not group its provisions along these lines. At one end of 
the spectrum, scholars such as Elles include the rights to work, to form trade unions, to social security, 
to adequate standard of living and to health among so-called economic rights. At the other end, Tiburcio 
considers only the right to invest or take part in profitable activities to be categorised as an economic 
right for the purposes of this provision – qualifying most other rights as social. Even the description of 
economic rights provided by Dankwa as “rights that enable a person to earn a living or that relate to that 
process” does not fully settle the discussion as to which matters are to be included. Again, states may 
take advantage of this lack of clarity and deliberately construe the category of economic rights broadly. 
Diana Elles, International Provisions Protecting the Human Rights of Non-Citizens: Study, New York: 
1980, pages 30-34; Carmen Tiburcio, "Chapter VII. Economic Rights" in The human rights of aliens 





the Covenant’s text and remains ambiguous to this day.20 The Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has yet to elaborate a general comment on 
either the scope of these terms for the purposes of the application of this provision 
or the intent and effect of the paragraph as a whole.21 Would reliance on this 
provision allow developing countries to deprive non-nationals of even the core 
minimum content of economic rights? Considering the emphasis placed on the 
importance of always ensuring that minimum essential levels of each ESC right are 
guaranteed as outlined above, this would be an extremely undesirable and indeed 
highly improbable understanding of the norm. Instead I would suggest that the 
explicit acceptance of restrictions upon the economic rights of non-nationals by 
developing countries should be used as an interpretative tool in assessing the 
appropriateness or “reasonableness” of a distinction between citizens and non-
citizens in the enjoyment of everything beyond the core content of this category of 
rights. Thus, if the ESC Committee is called upon to assess the compliance with the 
Covenant of a restriction on the enjoyment by non-nationals of what it determines 
(for the purposes of the case) to be an economic right by a state that it determines 
(for the purposes of the case) to be a developing country, the state shall be afforded 
a wider margin of discretion and the reasonableness test will be more lax. 
 A final consideration that may assist in delineating the scope of the 
“reasonableness” test for differential treatment between citizens and non-citizens is 
the question whether - and in what form - the ESC right involved also appears in the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Migrant Workers Convention or other 
relevant instruments. The Convention on the Rights of the Child, for instance, 
elaborates both civil and political rights and economic, social and cultural rights in 
much the same way, to the benefit of all children. The principle of non-
discrimination again enjoys a prominent position and is enunciated in article 2 of 
the Convention. Although the terms of the prohibition of discrimination in the 
enjoyment of child rights are the same as those of the non-discrimination provision 
in the ICESCR, the Committee on the Rights of the Child has gone to great lengths 
to affirm that:  
 
                                                                                                                                               
Tiburcio, "Chapter VI. Social and Cultural Rights" in The human rights of aliens under international 
and comparative law, Kluwer Law International, The Hague: 2001; E. Dankwa, 'Working Paper on 
Article 2(3) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights', in Human Rights 
Quarterly, Vol. 9, 1987, pages 239-240; Matthew Craven, The International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights. A Perspective on its Development, Clarendon Press, Oxford: 1998, page 
172; James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge: 2005, pages 488 and 601. 
20 It is, however, suggested that the provision as a whole should be “narrowly construed”, an assertion 
that would favour a strict interpretation of these undefined concepts. David Weissbrodt, Final Report 
on Prevention of Discrimination - The Rights of Non-Citizens, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/23, 26 May 2003, 
para. 19. 
21 Nor has the recent work of the special-rapporteur on the rights of non-citizens clarified this question. 
James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge: 2005, page 151. There are several possible explanations for the lack of elaboration on this 
issue by the Committee. The issue could be too controversial to be settled at this time or it could be a 
deliberate stance of the Committee in order to retain flexibility in assessing state policies under this 
provision in light of the overall system of protection of ESC rights.  
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The enjoyment of rights stipulated in the Convention is not limited to 
children who are citizens of a State party and must therefore, if not 
explicitly stated otherwise in the Convention, also be available to all 
children […] irrespective of their nationality, immigration status or 
statelessness.22  
 
So where a certain ESC right is also espoused in the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child, the “reasonableness” test as to distinctions between national and non-
national children must be applied more strictly, leaving less room for state 
discretion. As an instrument addressed to (a particular subsection of) non-nationals, 
the Migrant Workers Convention can also be instrumental in determining the extent 
to which certain ESC rights are extended to non-nationals and under what terms. So 
too can the UN Declaration on the Rights of Individuals Who are not Nationals of 
the Country in which They Live and additional standards set for example within the 
forum of the International Labour Organisation. In sum, the question of the 
tolerance of the human rights regime for restrictions on the enjoyment of ESC rights 
by non-nationals is a complex one that depends on many different factors. These 
considerations will be taken into account as we look more closely at the enjoyment 
by stateless persons of the full range of economic, social and cultural rights over the 
course of the rest of this chapter. 
 
2 RIGHT TO WORK AND LABOUR-RELATED RIGHTS 
 
Employment is arguably one of the most fundamental issues dealt with in the field 
of economic, social and cultural rights. Together with the right to education and the 
right to social security or assistance, the right to work ensures that an individual has 
the tools that are needed to provide for his or her basic needs and the subsistence of 
his or her family.23 In addition, labour is now viewed as an important value, playing 
a central role in a person’s “self-realisation and the development of human 
personality”.24 In accordance with this perspective, the right to work as we 
understand it today is not only about access to employment and the right to earn a 
living, it is also concerned with freedom from forced labour, freedom of choice in 
employment and freedom to work independently (self-employed). Work-related 
                                                           
22 Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 6: Treatment of unaccompanied and 
separated children outside their country of origin, 1 September 2005, para. 12. See also Thomas 
Hammarberg, "Children" in Rosas (ed) Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, Dordrecht: 1995, page 293; Geraldine van Bueren, The International Law on the Rights of 
the Child, Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht: 1995, page 362; John Dent, Research Paper on the Social and 
Economic Rights of Non-Nationals in Europe, Brussels: 1998, page 32. This interpretation has been put 
into practice by the Committee on the Rights of the Child in, for example, Committee on the Rights of 
the Child, Concluding Observations: Kyrgyzstan, CRC/C/97, Geneva: 2000, para. 288 and 289. 
23 It has even been argued that in view of this role, these social rights can be seen as “a prerequisite to 
the enjoyment of civil and political rights”. Carmen Tiburcio, "Chapter VI. Social and Cultural Rights" 
in The human rights of aliens under international and comparative law, Kluwer Law International, The 
Hague: 2001, page 147.  
24 Krysztof Drzewicki, "The Right to Work and Rights in Work" in Rosas (ed) Economic, Social and 





rights then add to this picture the right to a safe and healthy work environment and 
other rights relating to the assurance of just and favourable labour conditions.25  
 Stateless persons are reported to experience difficulties in many of the areas 
that have just been outlined. As non-citizens, they fall within the category of 
individuals that commonly encounter  
 
poor working conditions, including difficult, dangerous, and dirty jobs; verbal 
abuse; violence; racism; discriminatory attitudes; cramped living conditions; 
intimidating workplace environments; and low salaries (which are often 
withheld).26  
 
Furthermore, there are widespread accounts of stateless groups being subjected to 
restrictions in accessing (lawful) employment.27 In some instances, the stateless are 
prevented from taking a job in a particular field or engaging in certain professions.28 
In others, the measures are more extreme. During the late 1980s in Kuwait for 
example, the authorities set in motion a policy whereby the country’s stateless 
Bidoons were dismissed from government jobs and private employers were 
subsequently obliged to follow suit.29 Such deliberate curtailment of access to the 
formal labour market and the influence that the overall situation of statelessness has 
on employment prospects compels many individuals to seek their livelihood 
through participation in the informal circuit.30 This pattern serves only to add to 
their (economic) marginalisation and their vulnerability to the troublesome practices 
mentioned.31 
                                                           
25 See for a full overview of the components of the right to work Magdalena Sepulveda; Theo van 
Banning; Gudrun Gudmundsdottir; Christine Chamoun; Willem van Genugten, Human Rights 
Reference Handbook, University for Peace, Ciudad Colon: 2004, pages 259-260. 
26 David Weissbrodt, Final Report on Prevention of Discrimination - The Rights of Non-Citizens, 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/23, 26 May 2003, Add.3, para. 11. 
27 UNHCR, "Statelessness and Citizenship" in The State of the World's Refugees - A Humanitarian 
Agenda, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 1997, page 225; David Weissbrodt, Final Report on 
Prevention of Discrimination - The Rights of Non-Citizens, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/23, 26 May 2003, 
Add.3, para. 11; Open Society Justice Initiative, Racial Discrimination and the Rights of Non-Citizens. 
Submission to the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the occasion of its 
64th Session, New York: 2004; Maureen Lynch, Lives on hold: The human cost of statelessness, 
Washington: 2005, page 3. 
28 Maureen Lynch, "Syria: Follow Through on Commitment to Grant Citizenship to Stateless Kurds" 
Refugees International Bulletin, Washington: 2005 
29 Open Society Justice Initiative, Racial Discrimination and the Rights of Non-Citizens. Submission to 
the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the occasion of its 64th Session, 
New York: 2004. 
30 Advisory Board on Human Security (prepared by Constantin Sokoloff), Denial of Citizenship: A 
Challenge to Human Security, February 2005, page 20;  
31 For example, the stateless refugees from Bhutan who live in camps in Nepal are forced to work 
illegally due to the restrictions in place and “they are vulnerable to extortion and discrimination, and 
generally have weakened bargaining power”. Hiram Ruiz; Michelle Berg, "Unending Limbo: 
Warehousing Bhutanese Refugees in Nepal" in UNHCR (ed) World Refugee Survey 2004, UNHCR, 
Geneva: 2004, page 102. There are also cases of stateless persons being subjected to forced labour, for 
example, the Rohingya in Myanmar. Open Society Justice Initiative, Racial Discrimination and the 
Rights of Non-Citizens. Submission to the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
on the occasion of its 64th Session, New York: 2004. 
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2.1 The 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons 
 
The 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons contains three full 
provisions relating to the right to work, housed in their own chapter on “gainful 
employment”. The first, article 17, addresses access to wage-earning employment 
and declares that  
 
the Contracting States shall accord to stateless persons lawfully staying in 
their territory treatment as favourable as possible and, in any event, not 
less favourable than that accorded to aliens generally in the same 
circumstances, as regards the right to engage in wage-earning 
employment.32  
 
Adopting the same technique as in the previous chapter and identifying the level of 
attachment and standard of treatment set out here, we can immediately establish that 
only the stateless who are lawfully staying in a state will benefit from this norm and 
that they are assimilated to aliens generally for the enjoyment of this aspect of the 
right to work, although more favourable treatment is encouraged. The provision 
thus combines a relatively stringent level of attachment with a level of protection 
that in effect goes no further than the general rule of article 7 of the Convention 
whereby stateless persons are to be treated in an equal manner to non-nationals 
generally. However, there follows a second paragraph in which contracting states 
pledge to give “sympathetic consideration to assimilating the rights of all stateless 
persons with regard to wage-earning employment to those of nationals”.33 States are 
thereby obliged to give due consideration to any request by a stateless person 
(whether lawfully staying or otherwise) to be treated on a par with the country’s 
nationals for the purposes of the right to engage in wage-earning employment and 
deny such a request only with proper motivation.34 In spite of the explicit 
encouragement to provide treatment as favourable as possible or even national 
treatment to stateless persons in their enjoyment of this element of the right to work, 
this remains a discretionary standard. If the article is distilled such that only the 
binding norm remains then the foregoing observation still stands: the provision 
lacks teeth and adds nothing to the general rule set out in article 7 of the 
Statelessness Convention. It is somewhat of a mystery then why lawful stay is 
required before the stateless can benefit under this article.35  
                                                           
32 Article 17, paragraph 1 of the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons. 
33 The provision adds that this is encouraged in particular for “those stateless persons who have entered 
their territory pursuant to programmes of labour recruitment or under immigration schemes”. Article 
17, paragraph 2 of the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons. Note that there are 
no requirements set with regard to the level of attachment that must be met. 
34 Nehemiah Robinson, Convention relating to the status of stateless persons - Its history and 
interpretation, UNHCR, Geneva: 1955, page 48. 
35 It is of interest to note that in spite of the “weak” approach to the right to work, several countries still 
felt the need to submit reservations to this article. See UNHCR, Declarations and Reservations to the 






This disappointing finding becomes all the more noteworthy when the wording 
of the article is compared with its counterpart in the 1951 Refugee Convention. To 
begin with, we find that refugees are guaranteed an higher overall standard of 
treatment with regards to their right to engage in wage-earning employment: “the 
most favourable treatment accorded to nationals of a foreign country”.36 Then, an 
entire additional paragraph ensures that refugees are exempted from any restrictions 
imposed on the access of non-nationals to the national labour market if they meet 
one of a number of criteria such as the completion of three years’ residence.37 
Governments somehow managed to wave aside all of the usual concerns relating to 
the competition between non-nationals and citizens for domestic employment 
opportunities that “could very easily have resulted in either the failure to guarantee 
refugees the right to work, or no more than a minimalist commitment at the lowest 
common denominator”.38 What the drafters of the 1951 Refugee Convention 
achieved instead was a bold step and a huge innovation over previous refugee 
instruments in establishing a far-reaching right of refugees to participate in the 
domestic workforce.39 Yet when this article came up for discussion in the drafting 
of the 1954 Statelessness Convention, it was dismantled and weakened until only a 
minimalist commitment at the lowest common denominator remained: treatment on 
a par with non-nationals generally – the baseline standard of treatment offered by 
the instrument.40 This has had a significant impact on the value of the 1954 
Statelessness Convention in guaranteeing stateless persons’ right to work as well as 
                                                           
36 Article 17, paragraph 1 of the 1951 Convention relating to the status of Refugees. This standard of 
treatment amounts to “the best treatment which is given to nationals of any other country by treaty or 
usage” and is not to be found anywhere in the 1954 Statelessness Convention. Nehemiah Robinson, 
Convention relating to the status of stateless persons - Its history and interpretation, UNHCR, Geneva: 
1955, page 56. Be reminded that the proviso “in the same circumstances” that is included in the article 
on the right to engage in wage-earning employment in both the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1954 
Statelessness Convention ensures that refugees and stateless persons respectively may nevertheless be 
held to “obtain work permits, or otherwise satisfy the routine administrative requirements for the 
employment of non-citizens”. James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 2005, page 753. 
37 Other qualifying factors for exemption are that it had already been granted to the refugee before entry 
into force of the Convention or that the refugee is married to a national of the country in question or has 
a child who is a national of that country.  Such exemption applies only to measures that have the 
purpose of protecting the domestic labour market from foreign competition. Article 17, paragraph 2 of 
the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. Note that the duty to give sympathetic 
consideration to according national treatment in respect of the right to engage in wage-earning 
employment is found in the third paragraph of article 17 of the 1951 Refugee Convention in the same 
terms as it is included in the 1954 Statelessness Convention where it is paragraph 2. 
38 James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge: 2005, page 744. 
39 James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge: 2005, pages 742-747. 
40 A report of the discussions surrounding the drafting of article 17 of the 1954 Statelessness 
Convention can be found in Nehemiah Robinson, Convention relating to the status of stateless persons 
- Its history and interpretation, UNHCR, Geneva: 1955, pages 61-62. Consider also the comments 
made by delegations in favour of the most-favoured-national treatment included in the 1951 Refugee 
Convention as recounted in James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 2005, page 750. 
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the overall standard set by international law, as we will see when we turn to the 
human rights regime in the following section.  
Meanwhile, the other two articles that are housed in the chapter on “gainful 
employment” in the 1954 Statelessness Convention address self-employment41 and 
the right to work within the sphere of the liberal professions.42 Rather than going 
into a detailed discussion on the content of these norms, it is sufficient to point out 
that all three articles on the right to work provide the same low level of protection, 
calling for treatment as favourable as possible while determining that the minimum 
standard is that accorded to non-nationals generally. For the purposes of the 1954 
Statelessness Convention then, “in practice, it will make little difference […] 
whether a person is labelled ‘professional’ or ‘self-employed’ or a ‘wage-earner’, 
because the treatment is the same”.43  
 Having dealt with the articles that relate to the right to work and access to 
various types of employment, we can now move on to consider the standards set for 
the conditions of work – the labour-related rights. Article 24 of the 1954 
Statelessness Convention obliges states to afford lawfully staying stateless persons 
the same treatment as nationals in the following matters:  
 
remuneration, hours of work, overtime arrangements, holidays with pay, 
restrictions on home work, minimum age of employment, apprenticeship and 
training, women’s work and the work of young persons, and the enjoyment of 
the benefits of collective bargaining.44  
 
                                                           
41 Article 18 of the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons. This provides the 
stateless with the right to engage independently in agriculture, industry, handicrafts and commerce in 
order to earn their keep. 
42 Article 19 of the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons. This article deals with 
employment as, for example, a doctor, dentist, lawyer, teacher or architect. Note that the category 
“liberal profession” remains undefined, so “the local authorities will decide in each case whether a 
person falls under the rubric ‘liberal profession’ or any other heading”. Nehemiah Robinson, 
Convention relating to the status of stateless persons - Its history and interpretation, UNHCR, Geneva: 
1955, page 65. See also James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge: 2005, pages 798-799. 
43 The only substantive differences are the level of attachment required (which is lower in the case of 
self-employment - only lawful presence is required) and the inclusion of an additional condition for the 
practicing of a liberal profession (the possession of a recognised, requisite diploma). Nehemiah 
Robinson, Convention relating to the status of stateless persons - Its history and interpretation, 
UNHCR, Geneva: 1955, page 65. Hathaway’s assessment of the role of the same article within the 
1951 Refugee Convention differs due to the divergence between the norms on wage-earning 
employment between the two instruments. He concludes that “in pith and substance, [article 19 is] most 
appropriately understood not so much as a source of refugee entitlement, but as a clawback provision 
directed to a subset of refugees who would otherwise have been able to invoke the more generous 
provisions of either Art. 17 on wage-earning employment or Art. 18 on self-employment”. James 
Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 
2005, page 794. 
44 To the extent that “such matters are governed by laws or regulations or are subject to the control of 






States agreed to grant a high standard of protection - national treatment - with 
respect to these labour-related rights. This was, however, thanks as much to 
economic protectionism as to any moral arguments or concern for individual rights: 
 
The placing of foreigners and national workers on the same footing not 
only met the demands of equity but was in the interests of national 
wage-earners who might have been afraid that foreign labour, being 
cheaper that their own, would have been preferred.45 
 
As we go on to consider the scope and content of work-related rights as set down in 
human rights instruments, we will uncover to what extent this line of thought has 
permeated the overall international legal regime. On the basis of the 1954 
Statelessness Convention at least, once a stateless person has achieved lawful stay 
in a state and has gained access to the labour market, he must enjoy the same basic 
working conditions as citizens. The irregularly situated stateless person will, 
however, miss out on these work-related guarantees. 
 
2.2 International human rights law 
 
Labour and labour-related rights are issues that the international community has 
long taken an interest in. The development of labour standards took place both 
through and in parallel to the development of human rights. By the time that the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights elaborated the right to work and to just and 
favourable work conditions,46 the International Labour Organisation (ILO) had 
already achieved the codification of a wide range of work-related issues in almost 
100 specialised conventions.47 As of the time of writing, 187 Conventions have 
been settled within the forum of the ILO and these now form an indispensable 
compliment to the human rights framework. Centre stage of the human rights 
system “proper” for the purposes of this section – and indeed the rest of this chapter 
– is the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The right 
to work can be found in article 6 of this instrument while labour-related rights are 
elaborated in article 7.48 Importantly, the point of departure for both the ICESCR 
                                                           
45 James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge: 2005, page 765. See also Nehemiah Robinson, Convention relating to the status of stateless 
persons - Its history and interpretation, UNHCR, Geneva: 1955, page 72. 
46 See articles 23 and 24 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948. 
47 The International Labour Organisation (ILO) was founded in 1919 with the specific aim of promoting 
“decent and productive work in conditions of freedom, equity, security and human dignity”. ILO, About 
the ILO, information retrieved from http://www.ilo.org/global/About_the_ILO/lang--en/index.htm. The 
instruments settled cover everything from minimum age for employment to hours of work and from 
forced labour to paid holidays. According to the Preamble to the Constitution of the International 
Labour Organisation, one specific area of concern is the protection of non-national workers. Note that 
the ILO instruments dealing with the rights of migrant workers do not allow for the exclusion of 
stateless persons from the scope of application in the way that the Migrant Workers Convention does, 
so they may be a source of direct rights for the stateless. 
48 Provisions dealing with (some aspect of) the right to work and labour standards can also be found in 
article 5, paragraph e(i) of the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination; Article 11 of 
the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women; Articles 25, 52, 54 and 55 of the 
Convention on the Rights of Migrant Workers; Articles 1-8 of the European Social Charter; Article 26 
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and the aforementioned ILO labour standards is the attribution of these rights to 
“everyone”, irrespective of citizenship, and thereby also to the stateless.49 However, 
the question of the enjoyment of a right to work and of labour-related rights by non-
nationals cannot be answered that easily. We must also consider to what extent the 
non-discrimination norm, as described above, influences our understanding of the 
application of these international human rights provisions to the situation of the 
stateless.  
It is time to look more closely at the content of the right to work. 
According to article 6 of the ICESCR: 
 
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right to work, which 
includes the right of everyone to the opportunity to gain his living by work 
which he freely chooses or accepts, and will take appropriate steps to safeguard 
this right.50  
 
Since the right to work is formulated in such a way as to require progressive 
realisation – as encapsulated by the pledge to “recognise” the right to work - 51 it is 
important to be on the lookout for any core minimum obligations that this right may 
entail as we discuss its content. Central to the discussion here is the question of 
access to employment.52 The ESC Committee has determined that the right of non-
                                                                                                                                               
of the American Convention on Human Rights read in conjunction with article 34, paragraph g of the 
Charter of the Organisation of American States (refers to labour conditions only) and Articles 6 and 7 
of the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights; and article 15 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. The 
prohibition of forced labour is dealt with separately in these and other human rights instruments. Note 
that stateless persons cannot rely on the protection offered by the European Social Charter because its 
personal scope is limited to nationals of contracting states. 
49 John Dent, Research Paper on the Social and Economic Rights of Non-Nationals in Europe, 
Brussels: 1998, page 4; David Weissbrodt, Final Report on Prevention of Discrimination - The Rights 
of Non-Citizens, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/23, 26 May 2003, para. 15; Matthew Craven, The International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. A Perspective on its Development, Clarendon 
Press, Oxford: 1998, page 153; Carmen Tiburcio, "Chapter VI. Social and Cultural Rights" in The 
human rights of aliens under international and comparative law, Kluwer Law International, The 
Hague: 2001, page 146; James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge: 2005, page 485. 
50 Article 6, paragraph 1 of the ICESCR. In paragraph 2 of this provision, some of the steps that state 
parties should take towards realising the right to work are outlined, such as the provision of technical 
and vocational guidance. Note that the right to work “encompasses all forms of work, whether 
independent work or dependent wage-paid work” so this provision deals in one go with all of the 
categories of employment that the 1954 Statelessness Convention addressed. Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 18: The Right to Work, E/C.12/GC/18, 6 February 
2006, para. 6. The Migrant Workers Convention also deals with both employed and self-employed 
workers. ILO standards on the rights of migrants are, however, only applicable to those who are 
employed “otherwise than on his own account”. 
51 The right to work “should not be understood as an absolute and unconditional right to obtain 
employment”. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 18: The 
Right to Work, E/C.12/GC/18, 6 February 2006, para. 6. 
52 The right to work as provided for under the ICESCR encompasses several elements. Craven lists 
three main aspects to the right to work – access to employment, freedom of choice in employment and 





discriminatory access to employment belongs to the core and immediately effective 
obligations of the right to work.53 If non-nationals have the right to enjoy this 
minimum core content, it would seem that they also enjoy the right to access 
employment. However, the minimum core content refers to equality of access, not 
access itself - it merely requires that where non-nationals are granted access to 
employment, this should be on the basis of non-discrimination.54 And although the 
“core obligation” elaborated by the ESC Committee also requires states to “ensure 
the right of access to employment, especially for disadvantaged and marginalised 
groups, permitting them to live in dignity”, which could arguably include the 
stateless,55 it has been suggested that the Committee is in fact  
 
likely to allow States considerable latitude to differentiate in favour of their 
citizens […] in the right to access work, unless such differentiations are 
‘unreasonable’.56  
 
The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination also recognises that 
states “may refuse to offer jobs to non-citizens without a work permit”.57 
Nevertheless, the ESC Committee has recently determined that “the labour market 
must be open to everyone under the jurisdiction of State parties”.58 Thus, while 
states are free to regulate the access of non-nationals to their territory (and thereby 
jurisdiction) through immigration policy,59 this statement suggests that once access 
has been granted, access to the labour market should follow. However, there are 
many groups of non-citizens, in particular temporary visitors such as tourists or 
persons in transit, who are admitted to state soil but for whom access to 
employment may be inappropriate. A more considered reading of the ESC 
Committee’s general comment on the right to work leads to the understanding that 
                                                                                                                                               
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. A Perspective on its Development, 
Clarendon Press, Oxford: 1998, page 205. See also Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, General Comment No. 18: The Right to Work, E/C.12/GC/18, 6 February 2006, para. 6. 
53 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 18: The Right to Work, 
E/C.12/GC/18, 6 February 2006, paras. 19 and 31. This norm is reinforced by article 5, paragraph e(i) 
of the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. 
54 Note that nationality as a ground of discrimination is also absent from the list proscribed by the ILO 
Convention No. 111 concerning Discrimination in Employment and Occupation (1958). 
55 Emphasis added. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 18: 
The Right to Work, E/C.12/GC/18, 6 February 2006, para. 31 (a). 
56 John Dent, Research Paper on the Social and Economic Rights of Non-Nationals in Europe, 
Brussels: 1998, page 45. Other scholars have even held that it is still “readily accepted that foreign 
workers may be required to obtain special authorisations (or permits) in order to work”. Matthew 
Craven, The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. A Perspective on its 
Development, Clarendon Press, Oxford: 1998, page 213. See also Diana Elles, International Provisions 
Protecting the Human Rights of Non-Citizens: Study, New York: 1980, page 30. 
57 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General Recommendation 30: 
Discrimination against Non-Citizens, New York: 1 October 2004, para. 35. The Migrant Workers 
Convention also admits that states may set conditions for both the granting of entry into the state and of 
authorisation to work. See for example articles 37, 49 and 55. 
58 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 18: The Right to Work, 
E/C.12/GC/18, 6 February 2006, para. 12. 
59 Within certain constraints. See chapter X, section 1.2. 
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it is “migrant workers and members of their families” – a sub-category of non-
citizens - for whom access to the labour market should be ensured.60  
Under the current state of international human rights law, it would 
therefore seem that stateless persons will only benefit from the right to access 
employment if they have gained lawful access to the state’s jurisdiction61 and will 
have the best chance of claiming protection under the human rights regime if they 
also fall into the category of migrant workers or members of their families.62 This 
will not always provide solace to the situation of the stateless. So although the ESC 
Committee has occasionally taken an interest in the access of non-citizens to the 
labour market,63 and the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination is 
calling for the removal of obstacles “that prevent the enjoyment of economic, social 
and cultural rights by non-citizens, notably in the [area] of […] employment”,64 the 
underlying norm remains too narrow and too uncertain to be heralded as a decisive 
aid for the stateless. Moreover, thanks to article 2, paragraph 3 of the ICESCR, any 
state that plays the card of the “developing country” could potentially further curtail 
any of its obligations towards non-nationals in respect of the right to work that is 
widely acknowledged to be an economic right.65 Exclusion from employment 
opportunities only serves to seriously compound the overall marginalisation and 
disempowerment of the stateless. Had the 1954 Statelessness Convention followed 
the line taken in the 1951 Refugee instrument, it would have been a valuable asset 
to the protection of the right to work for stateless persons.66 As it stands, this 
opportunity was lost. 
                                                           
60 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 18: The Right to Work, 
E/C.12/GC/18, 6 February 2006, paras. 18 and 23. 
61 This is further indicated by the fact that for non-nationals, lawful presence on state territory is 
required for the protection of other elements of the right to work such as the (limited) freedom of choice 
of work under the Migrant Workers Convention, including recognition of diploma’s to that effect 
(articles 52 and 53) and protection against dismissal, in the Migrant Workers Convention (article 54) or 
ILO Convention No. 143 concerning Migrant Workers (1975).  
62 Note that while the Migrant Workers Convention explicitly excludes stateless persons from the 
personal scope of application, the term “migrant worker” is of more widespread usage and stateless 
persons may thus benefit as migrant workers from the protections of such instruments as the ICESCR 
and ILO standard-setting convention. Under ILO Convention No. 143 concerning Migrant Workers 
(1975), the term migrant worker is defined as “a person who migrates or who has migrated from one 
country to another with a view to being employed otherwise than on his own account” (article 11). Note 
that the concept of a migrant worker generally excludes the self-employed. 
63 ESC Committee, Concluding observations: Finland, E/1997/22, New York and Geneva: 1996, para. 
307; Denmark, E/2000/22, New York and Geneva: 1999, para. 115; Italy, E/2005/22, New York and 
Geneva:  2004, para. 435. 
64 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General Recommendation 30: 
Discrimination against Non-Citizens, New York: 1 October 2004, para 29. The Committee has also 
addressed this matter in reaction to numerous state reports. See for example CERD, Concluding 
observations: Norway, A/49/18, New York: 1994, para. 264; Latvia, A/58/18, New York: 2003, para. 
451. 
65 See James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge: 2005, pages 740-742. It is regrettable that the ESC Committee did not address the impact 
of article 2, paragraph 3 of the ICESCR on the right to work in its General Comment on this topic.  
66 Hathaway is (quite rightly) full of praise for the impact of article 17 of the 1951 Convention relating 
to the Status of Refugees in setting a standard on the right to work that explicitly benefits refugees and 





The situation as far as labour-related rights are concerned is less 
troublesome since the applicability of relevant human rights norms to the situation 
of non-nationals is more clearly defined. Article 7 of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights outlines the main components that make up 
the “just and favourable conditions of work” that everyone is to enjoy. These 
include issues such as fair remuneration, safe and healthy working conditions and 
adequate rest.67 This provision is, in fact, worded in such a way as to demand 
immediate, rather than progressive, realisation and there is no indication that non-
nationals cannot benefit from the guarantees on equal footing to nationals.68 In its 
general comment on non-citizens, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination explicitly stated that “all individuals are entitled to the enjoyment of 
labour and employment rights […] once an employment relationship has been 
initiated until it is terminated”.69 Rather than being attached to citizenship, labour 
rights are thus attributed on the basis of the existence of an employment 
relationship: to be enjoyed by all workers as workers.70 A plethora of ILO 
instruments addressing labour-related rights vouch for this fact.71 The Migrant 
Workers Convention provides that migrant workers are entitled to treatment on a 
par with the host state’s nationals for the purposes of the enjoyment of labour-
related rights72 and, unlike the 1954 Statelessness Convention, bestows these rights 
regardless of the (ir)regularity of the individual’s situation.73 The Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights has also held that labour rights are to be respected 
regardless of immigration status.74 So, “the right of non-nationals to equal treatment 
                                                                                                                                               
law. See James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge: 2005, page 741 onwards. 
67 The list differs somewhat from that found in the 1954 Statelessness Convention – which mimics the 
ILO standards - but can be considered largely comparable. For an in depth comparison of the content of 
these norms see James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge: 2005, pages 765-769. 
68 The ESC Committee has yet to issue a General Comment on article 7 of the ICESCR. Although 
admitting that this norm is interdependent with article 6 on the right to work, the Committee expressed 
the preference to deal with it separately. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General 
Comment No. 18: The Right to Work, E/C.12/GC/18, 6 February 2006, para. 8. However, the 
Committee has considered and expressed concern at the working conditions faced by non-nationals or 
the curtailment of labour rights of non-citizens in its assessment of country reports, for example in ESC 
Committee, Concluding Observations: Libyan Arab Jamariya, E/C.12/1/Add.15, New York and 
Geneva: 1997, para. 16; Portugal, E/C.12/1/Add.53, New York and Geneva: 2000, para. 11. 
69 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General Recommendation 30: 
Discrimination against Non-Citizens, New York: 1 October 2004, paras. 33 and 35. 
70 See also Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion on Juridical Condition and the 
Rights of Undocumented Migrants, OC-18/03, 17 September 2003, paragraph 148. 
71 See also David Weissbrodt, Final Report on Prevention of Discrimination - The Rights of Non-
Citizens, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/23, 26 May 2003, para. 15. 
72 Article 25 of the Migrant Workers Convention. 
73 The provision is located in Part III of the CMW where the rights of all migrant workers, both regular 
and irregular, are housed. 
74 The Court found “that the migratory status of a person cannot constitute a justification to deprive him 
of the enjoyment and exercise of human rights, including those of a labour-related nature. When 
assuming an employment relationship, the migrant acquires rights that must be recognised and ensured 
because he is an employee, irrespective of his regular or irregular status in the State where he is 
employed. These rights are a result of the employment relationship”. Inter-American Court of Human 
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in conditions of work […] is well entrenched”75 and can generally be expected to 
benefit stateless persons regardless of their immigration status.76 So, labour-related 
rights are attributable to everyone equally, regardless of citizenship and the 1954 
Statelessness Convention therefore simply reflects – in weaker terms – the existing 
international norm with respect to the enjoyment of labour standards.77  
 
3 FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 
 
The next ESC right to be discussed is considered to be closely linked to the right to 
work and is sometimes even described as a labour-related right: the freedom of 
association.78 It is dealt with in a separate section here because it is a 
multidimensional right that has a political and cultural aspect alongside its strong 
social and economic role and, as such, warrants independent consideration.79 A 
major element is the right to associate in the form of trade unions in order to 
                                                                                                                                               
Rights, Advisory Opinion on Juridical Condition and the Rights of Undocumented Migrants, OC-18/03, 
17 September 2003, decisions of the court, paragraph 8.  
75 John Dent, Research Paper on the Social and Economic Rights of Non-Nationals in Europe, 
Brussels: 1998, page 45. 
76 Under human rights law, “states are required to […] provide minimum legal protection to migrant 
workers whose situations are irregular; basic human rights are not conditional upon the circumstances 
of residence”. These include norms relating to basic labour conditions. Guy Goodwin-Gill, 
'International Law and Human Rights: Trends Concerning International Migrants and Refugees', in 
International Migration Review, Vol. 23, 1989, page 535. A minor incongruity can be found in the ILO 
standards on migrant workers (article 6 of the ILO Convention No. 97 concerning Migration for 
Employment) – which also provide for national treatment in respect of labour conditions – and the UN 
Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals Who are not Nationals of the Country in which They 
Live (article 8). These texts are more cautious and attribute the respective labour-related rights to 
lawfully present non-citizens only. However, the beneficiaries of the general labour standards set out in 
other ILO Conventions and Recommendations are such categories as “all employed persons” or “all 
workers” in a particular industry – confirming the overriding approach that these rights are attributed to 
workers as workers. 
77 It has been argued that the added value of a provision relating specifically to the stateless (or rather to 
refugees for it was in reference to the 1951 Refugee Convention) lies in the universal application of this 
norm. If developing states were to try to evade their obligations with respect to the labour-related rights 
of non-nationals on the basis of article 2, paragraph 3 of the ICESCR, all lawfully-residing stateless 
persons would be exempted from this restricted protection. However, in view of the inclusion of these 
work-related rights in numerous other international instruments from which non-nationals may also 
benefit - and indeed the possible adverse effect on local labour that would be created if non-citizens 
have the “competitive edge” because labour standards need not be respected – it seems an unlikely 
scenario that this provision could be relied upon to justify differential treatment between nationals and 
non-nationals for the purposes of protecting the national economy. See James Hathaway, The Rights of 
Refugees Under International Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 2005, page 769. 
78 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 18: The Right to Work, 
E/C.12/GC/18, 6 February 2006, para. 8. 
79 Be reminded that the freedom of association could have been considered in the previous chapter, as it 
is closely related to the freedom of expression and of assembly. It is a norm that can be found in both 
the ICCPR and the ICESCR and the extent to which it is considered a civil and political right or an ESC 
right depends very much on the circumstances in which it operates. The decision was taken to deal with 
this right here because of the formulation of the norm in the 1954 Statelessness Convention with its 





promote and protect social and economic rights and interests.80 In this context, it 
includes the right to strike.81 Yet the freedom of association also “allows individuals 
to join together to pursue and further collective interests in groups, such as sports 
clubs, political parties [and] NGOs”.82 Importantly for non-nationals and minority 
groups, associations may also be formed in order to facilitate the preservation of a 
language, culture or religious belief.83 Therefore, as a vehicle for defending or 
advancing a wide variety of concerns, the freedom of association is of vital interest 
to all individuals and groups, but in particular to vulnerable populations like the 
stateless. Yet it is not unheard of for the stateless to experience difficulties in 
respect of this right, as they do in so many other areas. One example is offered by 
the Kuwaiti government’s treatment of the country’s stateless Bidoon: all “private 
clubs and associations” were reportedly ordered to dismiss any Bidoon members.84 
Let us consider the scope of the international norms that have a bearing on such 
practices. 
 
3.1 The 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons 
 
The freedom of association is guaranteed to stateless persons by the 1954 
Statelessness Convention’s article 15: 
 
As regards non-political and non-profit-making associations and trade 
unions the Contracting States shall accord to stateless persons lawfully 
staying in their territory treatment as favourable as possible and, in any 
event, not less favourable than that accorded to aliens generally in the 
same circumstances.85 
 
The drafting history of this provision once again reveals a pattern of weakening of 
language and narrowing of protection offered. When the draft article was first put 
forward for debate in the context of the formulation of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention, the freedom of association was expressed in absolute terms – rather 
than being made contingent upon the protection offered to any other group – and 
                                                           
80 “The right to form and join trade unions […] is a particular aspect of the right to freedom of 
association joined with the right to work. This right includes, for instance, the right of unions to 
administer their own affairs, join federations and international organisations and draw up their own 
rules. It encompasses the rights of persons to be elected to and act within unions without intimidation 
and the right not to join without fear of retribution”. Magdalena Sepulveda; Theo van Banning; Gudrun 
Gudmundsdottir; Christine Chamoun; Willem van Genugten, Human Rights Reference Handbook, 
University for Peace, Ciudad Colon: 2004, page 303. 
81 Carmen Tiburcio, "Chapter IX. Public Rights" in The human rights of aliens under international and 
comparative law, Kluwer Law International, The Hague: 2001, page 237 
82 Magdalena Sepulveda; Theo van Banning; Gudrun Gudmundsdottir; Christine Chamoun; Willem van 
Genugten, Human Rights Reference Handbook, University for Peace, Ciudad Colon: 2004, page 302. 
83 James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge: 2005, page 875. 
84 Open Society Justice Initiative, Racial Discrimination and the Rights of Non-Citizens. Submission to 
the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the occasion of its 64th Session, 
New York: 2004. 
85 Note that no reservations have been lodged in reference to this article by contracting states. 
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was granted to all refugees regardless of status.86 While the text that was eventually 
adopted for the refugee instrument already lowered the standard of treatment to that 
of most favoured non-citizen and raised the level of attachment required to lawful 
stay, the wording eventually reverted to in the 1954 Statelessness Convention 
establishes for lawfully staying stateless persons only the same level of treatment as 
non-nationals generally - although again more preferential treatment is encouraged. 
In the main, the steady stripping down of the norm until only minimal guarantees 
remain can be explained by reference to the political tinge that the freedom of 
association has and the desire of state governments to restrict the political activities 
of (refugees and later) stateless persons.87  
 The motives that caused states to elevate the level of attachment and lower the 
standard of protection in respect of the freedom of association have also had an 
impact on the scope of the norm. Rather than expressing an overall right to 
associate, the provision only protects association in non-political and non-profit-
making associations and trade unions. Once more, the main objective pursued 
through this approach is the exclusion of political association from the sphere of 
activities protected. While the freedom of association for economic, social and 
cultural pursuits is maintained, the deliberate exclusion of political activities (as 
well as the omission of the freedom of assembly from the 1954 Statelessness 
Convention) is disappointing.88 Hathaway said of this right in the Refugee 
Convention that  
 
overall, the best that can be said for Art. 15 is that it is an important affirmation 
of the right of refugees – at least once they are lawfully staying and to the same 
extent as most-favoured foreigners – to undertake quite a broad range of 
associational activities, including not only the right to join trade unions, but 
also to participate in the activities of a diverse array of associations, including 
those with cultural, sporting, social or philanthropic aims.89  
 
Yet even this only marginally positive conclusion must be tempered further in 
relation to the Statelessness Convention which did not manage to hold onto the 
most-favoured-foreigner treatment. In order to discover the standard of treatment 
prescribed for non-nationals generally – and thereby also the stateless - under 





                                                           
86 James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge: 2005, page 881. 
87 For an account of the modifications made to this norm during the drafting process of the 1951 
Refugee Convention and the reasoning behind the changes, see James Hathaway, The Rights of 
Refugees Under International Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 2005, pages 881-888; For 
the 1954 Statelessness Convention see Nehemiah Robinson, Convention relating to the status of 
stateless persons - Its history and interpretation, UNHCR, Geneva: 1955, pages 57-58. 
88 See further on this matter chapter X, section 7. 
89 James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law, Cambridge University Press, 





3.2 International human rights law 
 
Under human rights law, the freedom of association enjoys a privileged position as 
it is included in both the civil and political rights and ESC rights instruments. Thus, 
article 22 of the ICCPR and article 8 of the ICESCR are both relevant to the 
protection of this right under human rights law and, as such, will be discussed 
together here. Plus, there are many additional instruments that espouse one or more 
aspects of the freedom of association.90 In principle, non-citizens are to benefit from 
the guarantees offered by each of these norms and are considered to enjoy the 
freedom of association.91 However, as we look more closely at the actual scope of 
the protection offered to non-nationals, the picture becomes greatly complicated and 
is riddled with inconsistencies.  
We will start with the provision found in the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights. Article 22 provides for a broad freedom of association – 
including participation in trade unions - that can be relied upon to protect the 
participation in any form of (political, social, cultural or economic) association.92 
On the basis of this article, which attributes the right to everyone, it has been 
asserted that even “membership in political parties, for example, should be open to 
non-citizens”.93 So the freedom of association as guaranteed under the ICCPR deals 
with a much wider range of associational activities than the 1954 Statelessness 
Convention (that explicitly excludes political and profit-making associations). 
Moreover, individuals may not only join such associations, they may also form 
                                                           
90 In the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, the freedom of association and of assembly are 
espoused in one and the same provision, article 20. The Convention on the Elimination of Racial 
establishes non-discriminatory enjoyment of both the freedom of assembly and of association in article 
5, paragraph d (ix), where they are categorised as civil rights, then the right to form and join trade 
unions in article 5, paragraph e(ii) which is grouped with the ESC rights. Other sources of these rights 
are article 15 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child; Articles 26 and 40 of the Migrant Workers 
Convention; Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights; Article 16 of the American 
Convention on Human Rights (which mentions association for “ideological, religious, political, 
economic, labour, social, cultural, sports, or other purposes”) and article 8 of the Additional Protocol to 
the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; and 
Article 10 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. We will also be looking at ILO 
standards, in particular the ILO Convention No. 87 concerning Freedom of association and Protection 
of the Right to Organise (1948). 
91 Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment No. 15: The Position of Aliens under the 
Covenant, Geneva: 11 April 1986, para. 7; David Weissbrodt, Final Report on Prevention of 
Discrimination - The Rights of Non-Citizens, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/23, 26 May 2003, para. 48; Carmen 
Tiburcio, "Chapter IX. Public Rights" in The human rights of aliens under international and 
comparative law, Kluwer Law International, The Hague: 2001, page 239; James Hathaway, The Rights 
of Refugees Under International Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 2005, page 895. 
92 The freedom of association is found in article 22 of the ICCPR where the purpose to be served is 
simply the protection of “interests” which is further unspecified. Thus, “religious societies, political 
parties, commercial undertakings and trade unions are as protected by art. 22 as cultural or human 
rights organisations, soccer clubs or associations of stamp collectors”. From Nowak’s commentary on 
the ICCPR as cited in James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge: 2005, page 895. 
93 David Weissbrodt, Final Report on Prevention of Discrimination - The Rights of Non-Citizens, 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/23, 26 May 2003, para. 48. 
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them. Since non-nationals benefit equally from this provision,94 any restrictions on 
their enjoyment of the freedom of association must be justified through the system 
of permissible limitations outlined in its second paragraph.95 In this regard, we can 
note that the ICCPR is comparably lenient in allowing for curtailment of this right: 
“public safety” and “public health or morals” are grounds that can be invoked under 
the ICCPR but are not admitted elsewhere in the context of limitations to the 
freedom of association.96  
Next, in the ICESCR, the freedom of association is declared in much 
narrower terms. Its article 8 refers only to the right to participate in trade unions, 
with the more limited aim of the “promotion and protection of […] economic and 
social interests”.97 Again though, it is both the right to join and to form such 
associations that is protected. As ever we must be mindful of the nature of ESC 
rights in assessing the scope of protection offered to non-nationals under this norm. 
Unlike the provision where the right to work is “recognised” and which is therefore 
a matter for progressive realisation, this article is worded as an obligation that is 
subject to immediate implementation.98 As such, the entire provision could be 
qualified as the “minimum core obligation” in the field of trade union rights and 
non-nationals are to benefit fully from its terms.99 Restrictions on the exercise of 
these rights may only be imposed on citizens and non-citizens through the system 
of permissible limitations.100 Meanwhile, in view of the very particular perspective 
of this article, with its focus on associational rights in the employment and thus 
economic sphere, it is conceivable that developing states may try to curtail the 
                                                           
94 Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment No. 15: The Position of Aliens under the 
Covenant, Geneva: 11 April 1986, para. 7; Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 
General Recommendation 30: Discrimination against Non-Citizens, New York: 1 October 2004, para. 
35. 
95 “No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those which are prescribed by 
law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public 
safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the 
rights and freedom of others”. Article 22, paragraph 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights. 
96 See in this respect article 8, paragraph 1(a) of the ICESCR; Article 26, paragraph 2 and article 40, 
paragraph 2 of the Migrant Workers Convention and Article 8, paragraph 1(b) of the UN Declaration on 
the Rights of Non-nationals. 
97 Meanwhile, participation in cultural associations may be protected under article 15, paragraph 1 of 
the ICESCR where the right to participate in cultural life is recognised. This right will be discussed in 
more detail in section 7 below. 
98 Matthew Craven, The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. A 
Perspective on its Development, Clarendon Press, Oxford: 1998, pages 249 and 251. 
99 The ESC Committee has, on several occasions, determined that blanket restrictions on the 
participation of non-nationals in trade unions violate article 8 of the ICESCR. See ESC Committee, 
Concluding Observations: Costa Rica, E/1991/23, New York and Geneva: 1990, para. 194; Panama, 
E/1992/23, New York and Geneva: 1991, para. 138; Senegal, E/1994/23, New York and Geneva: 1993, 
para. 266 and E/2002/22, New York and Geneva: 2001, para. 348. See also Matthew Craven, The 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. A Perspective on its Development, 
Clarendon Press, Oxford: 1998, pages 265-266. Nevertheless, a general comment on this article is still 
outstanding and would be valuable in clarifying the exact nature and scope of the right, including the 
position of non-nationals in this regard. 
100 Be reminded that this is identical to the system found in the ICCPR provision, with the exclusion of 





enjoyment of these rights by non-citizens by relying on article 2, paragraph 3 of the 
ICESCR.101 However, since the freedom of association is also espoused in the 
ICCPR (which does not provide for special measures for the treatment of non-
nationals by developing states) any aspects of article 8 of the ICESCR that overlap 
with the provision in the ICCPR should be considered exempted from the sphere of 
influence of article 2, paragraph 3 of the ICESCR.102 
While the ICCPR and the ICESCR permit the curtailment of the freedom of 
association under certain circumstances, at the same time they expressly remind 
states that the ILO standards that have been elaborated in this area must also be 
respected. Both provisions determine that  
 
nothing in this article shall authorise State Parties to the International 
Labour Organisation Convention of 1948 concerning Freedom of 
Association and Protection of the Right to Organise to take legislative 
measures which would prejudice, or apply the law in such a manner as 
would prejudice, the guarantees provided for in that Convention.103 
 
The ILO Convention referred to here (No. 87) has now been ratified by 149 states – 
almost as many as are a party to the two international Covenants.104 Since the ILO 
instrument grants associational rights to all “workers and employers, without 
distinction whatsoever”,105 non-nationals are irrefutably deemed to benefit from its 
provisions. They are thus assured the right to both join and form associations which 
are geared to “furthering and defending the interests of workers or of employers”,106 
the most prevalent of which are trade unions. The ICCPR and ICESCR agree that 
this ILO document establishes a basic minimum standard that must be respected, 
regardless of nationality.  
So far, the position of non-nationals under the various provisions on the 
freedom of association discussed is relatively straight forward and has yet to show 
any major inconsistencies. Yet the complex picture for which I have forewarned at 
the beginning of this section has yet to be coloured in. The difficulties arise in 
connection with those human rights and ILO documents that specifically address 
the rights of (certain categories of) non-nationals. First there is the Migrant Workers 
Convention. On a positive note, this instrument protects a broad freedom of 
association – not only for economic pursuits but also for “cultural and other 
interests” that may be interpreted to include political associations.107 However, 
irregular migrant workers are only attributed the right to join such associations, a 
regular migratory status being required for the enjoyment of the right to form 
                                                           
101 See James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge: 2005, page 897. 
102 For example, the right to join and form trade unions is protected in both the ICCPR and the ICESCR 
whereas the right to strike is only explicitly guaranteed in the ICESCR. 
103 Article 22, paragraph 3 of the ICCPR and article 8, paragraph 3 of the ICESCR. 
104 Be reminded that the ICCPR currently has 162 state parties and the ICESCR has 159. 
105 Article 2 of ILO Convention No. 87 concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right 
to Organise (1948). 
106 Article 10 of ILO Convention No. 87 concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the 
Right to Organise (1948). 
107 See article 26, paragraph 1 and article 40, paragraph 1 of the Migrant Workers Convention. 
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associations.108 This approach suggests that states may restrict the rights of non-
nationals to form associations without having to rely on the regime of permissible 
limitations, so long as those non-nationals are not lawfully present – a step 
backwards from the terms of the ICCPR and ICESCR and towards the less 
generous terms of the 1954 Statelessness Convention. The UN Declaration on the 
rights of Non-nationals goes even further along this path and adds to the confusion 
by offering non-citizens only the right to join associations and trade unions (albeit 
likely in the pursuit of all interests) and only once lawful residence has been 
acquired.109 The ILO standards elaborated specifically for migrant workers are 
similarly restrictive, granting national treatment only in respect of membership of 
trade unions and only to lawfully present migrant workers.110  
It is fortunate that the more favourable and expansive norms are to be 
found in those instruments that enjoy a much wider acceptance, as evidenced by the 
higher level of ratification, and are thereby more likely to reflect the current 
standing of international law on this matter. Nevertheless, the reluctance to directly 
transpose these standards into documents that deal specifically with the rights of 
non-citizens – a trend that was already set with the drafting of the relevant provision 
in the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1954 Statelessness Convention – is cause 
for concern. We have seen that several of the human rights treaty bodies have 
expressed the opinion that non-citizens are protected under the norms on freedom of 
association. So, there is certainly potential for guaranteeing to stateless persons all 
aspects of the freedom of association on the basis of the ICCPR and the ICESCR.111 
However, there remains a need for clarification of the scope of the provisions found 
in these instruments and their application to the situation of non-nationals in order 
to prevent the divergence in standards uncovered from enabling states to reduce 
their obligations to the lowest common denominator to the detriment of non-
nationals, including the stateless. 
 
4 RIGHT TO SOCIAL SECURITY  
 
Social security programmes are designed to function as a safety net for those whose 
circumstances temporarily or permanently prevent them from providing for 
themselves. Social security thus means income security in times of economic or 
social distress. It is all about ensuring the “minimum conditions for survival”112 or, 
                                                           
108 Article 26 elaborates the right to join trade unions and other associations. It is housed in the section 
of the Convention devoted to the rights of all migrant workers regardless of status. Meanwhile article 
40 contributes the right to form associations and trade unions, but this is found in the section on the 
rights of regular migrant workers. 
109 Article 8, paragraph 1(b) of the UN Declaration on the rights of Non-nationals. 
110 Article 6, paragraph 1 a (ii), of ILO Convention No. 97 concerning Migration for Employment 
(1948). 
111 Hathaway is optimistic about the role of these norms, in particular the ICCPR provisions, in 
redressing some of the damage done by the incorporation of such limited terms into the refugee (and 
stateless) convention(s). James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge: 2005, pages 891-892. 
112 Magdalena Sepulveda; Theo van Banning; Gudrun Gudmundsdottir; Christine Chamoun; Willem 






more precisely, enabling everyone to enjoy an adequate standard of living.113 Social 
security should be seen as an umbrella term that covers two different phenomena. 
The first - also referred to as social security in the narrow sense or social insurance - 
comprises compensation or benefits that are financed through a social insurance 
system closely linked to employment. In other words, it addresses “contribution-
based initiatives designed to compensate workers unable to continue working”.114 
The second kind of social security programme - often termed social or public 
assistance, relief or welfare - is a separate form of “needs-based assistance from 
public funds, raised through tax revenues”.115 In reality, the two types of scheme 
will often be required to work in conjunction in order to meet the needs of all 
persons who are not in a position to earn their own living.   
 Before we look at how the right to social security is framed under the 1954 
Statelessness Convention and international human rights law, a few brief comments 
can be made on the problems experienced by non-nationals generally and stateless 
persons specifically in accessing social security benefits. To begin with, it is 
important to note that social security is a typical area in which the treatment of non-
nationals has been shaped by the conclusion of reciprocal agreements whereby a 
citizen of country A is granted social security benefits in country B on a par with 
that state’s nationals, so long as country A offers the same treatment to nationals of 
country B.116 As we will see, this approach can also be identified in a number of 
multilateral instruments, including some ILO documents. Without any nationality, 
the stateless have no country of their own that can offer to reciprocate the favoured 
treatment and are therefore not in a position to benefit from any such agreements. 
We will be looking to see whether the instruments in question take this predicament 
of the stateless into account. Leaving aside the question of reciprocity, access to 
social security is another area in which the stateless are generally reported to 
experience difficulties. The lack of a nationality is said to present an obstacle to 
making use of “public services”117 and is barring access to social security for groups 
like the Meskhetians in Russia118 and the Hill Tribes in Thailand.119 With this in 
mind, it is time again to consider the content of the relevant international norms.  
 
 
                                                           
113 The right to an adequate standard of living is another well-established ESC right and will be dealt 
with in section 5 of this chapter. 
114 James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge: 2005, page 775. See also John Dent, Research Paper on the Social and Economic Rights of 
Non-Nationals in Europe, Brussels: 1998, page 63. 
115 Martin Scheinin, "The Right to Social Security" in Rosas (ed) Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht: 1995, page 159. 
116 Diana Elles, International Provisions Protecting the Human Rights of Non-Citizens: Study, New 
York: 1980, page, page 32; James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 2005, page 773. 
117 UNHCR, "Statelessness and Citizenship" in The State of the World's Refugees - A Humanitarian 
Agenda, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 1997, page 225. 
118 Open Society Justice Initiative, Racial Discrimination and the Rights of Non-Citizens. Submission to 
the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the occasion of its 64th Session, 
New York: 2004.  
119 Maureen Lynch, Lives on hold: The human cost of statelessness, Washington: 2005, page 8. 
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4.1 The 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons 
 
In addressing the right of the stateless to social security, the 1954 Convention 
relating to the Status of Stateless Persons splits this overall entitlement into its two 
component parts. Thus article 23 deals with the right to “public relief and 
assistance” and article 24 looks at access to “social security”.120 The two provisions 
(both transposed word-for-word from the text of the 1951 Refugee Convention) 
offer the same basic standard of treatment and agree on the level of attachment 
required for eligibility to this protection: lawfully staying stateless persons are to 
enjoy national treatment. While the level of attachment required may pose 
problems for a lot of stateless individuals, the prescription of national treatment is a 
higher standard than offered in respect of many of the Convention’s rights. 
Furthermore, by making the protection offered contingent on national treatment, 
rather than the treatment of (particular categories of) non-nationals, the 1954 
Statelessness Convention neatly bypasses any difficulties that might otherwise have 
been raised by the requirement of reciprocity for the enjoyment of rights.121 
However, since the actual protection offered is still contingent upon the treatment of 
the state’s own nationals and there is no absolute obligation to provide for a system 
of either social security or public relief, the stateless may still be unassisted by these 
provisions.122 Furthermore, both articles were the subject of ardent debate during 
the drafting of the convention – their inclusion having to eventually be agreed by 
vote – and have since attracted a significant number of reservations, thereby 
limiting their impact.123 And, as we look more closely at the details set out under 
each provision, there is another troubling discovery in store. 
Turning first to the article on social security, we find that the guarantees 
elaborated are applicable to  
 
legal provisions in respect of employment injury, occupational diseases, 
maternity, sickness, disability, old age, death, unemployment, family 
responsibilities and any other contingency which according to national laws or 
regulations, is covered by a social security scheme.124  
 
The content of the concept of social security is thereby identified on the basis of the 
type of measure and appears indifferent to whether the benefits are funded through 
a contribution-based scheme or from the public coffers. Following this definition of 
terms are two sub-paragraphs in which permissible limitations to the general 
standard of national treatment are elaborated.125 The most noteworthy of these is 
                                                           
120 Recall that paragraph 1(a) of article 24 deals with labour-related rights, while the rest of the 
provision addresses social security matters. 
121 Recall that, as mentioned in chapter IX, at note 70, the 1954 Statelessness Convention also 
specifically exempts the stateless from the requirement of reciprocity in certain cases. 
122 See also James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge: 2005, page 809. 
123 A total of 8 states have submitted some form of reservation to article 23, while 11 states have made 
reservations to (one or more of) the paragraphs dealing with the right to social security in article 24. 
124 Article 24, paragraph 1(b) of the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons. 
125 The rest of article 24 (paragraphs 2 to 4) is devoted to detailed arrangements for certain situations in 





the determination that states may restrict the enjoyment by stateless persons of 
“such portions of the social security benefits which are payable wholly out of public 
funds”.126 Although this limitation is reportedly designed to allow governments to 
refuse stateless persons supplementary benefits,127 the clause is formulated in much 
broader terms. And it is here, where the provision on social security touches upon 
the right of the stateless to access benefits paid for by public moneys, that a certain 
tension with article 23 on public relief can be traced.  
While article 23 establishes national treatment for lawfully staying stateless 
persons in respect of “public relief and assistance”, it actually fails to elaborate on 
the meaning of this expression.128 The scope of protection offered is thus effectively 
left to domestic law and can cover the full spectrum of assistance provided for 
through public funds. Various parties have attempted to offer examples of measures 
that (could) fall under the term “public relief”, referring, amongst other things, to 
benefits bestowed for sickness, invalidity and old age.129 In substance then, it 
appears possible that “public relief” may overlap, in part, with “social security”, 
rendering it very hard to establish how a particular measure should be qualified. 
With this in mind, it has nonetheless been suggested that “no difficulties will, as a 
rule, arise in practice concerning the delimitation between public relief and 
assistance, on the one hand, and social security, on the other, because the 
Convention provides for the same treatment, in both instances”.130 However, the 
same commentary goes on to confess that the treatment does differ where the 
restrictions admitted by article 24 come into play.131 The broader implications of 
this observation are not considered, yet an important question thus arises as to the 
reach of the permissible exception to national treatment found in article 24.132 Can 
                                                                                                                                               
Nehemiah Robinson, Convention relating to the status of stateless persons - Its history and 
interpretation, UNHCR, Geneva: 1955, pages 72-73 and James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees 
Under International Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 2005, pages 777 and 781-785. 
126 Nehemiah Robinson, Convention relating to the status of stateless persons - Its history and 
interpretation, UNHCR, Geneva: 1955, page 72. 
127 James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge: 2005, page 781. 
128 This was a deliberate decision by the drafters of the 1951 Refugee Convention who felt that it would 
not be possible to enumerate a complete list of situations covered by or beneficiaries of public relief. 
James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge: 2005, page 810. 
129 James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge: 2005, page 810. 
130 Nehemiah Robinson, Convention relating to the status of stateless persons - Its history and 
interpretation, UNHCR, Geneva: 1955, page 70. 
131 Nehemiah Robinson, Convention relating to the status of stateless persons - Its history and 
interpretation, UNHCR, Geneva: 1955, page 70. In his extensive commentary of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention, Hathaway comes to the same conclusion in respect of this instrument’s identical 
provisions. See James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge: 2005, page 811. 
132 Note that the entire text of article 24, paragraph 1(b), including permissible limitations, was derived 
from a pre-existing ILO instrument. See article 6, paragraph 1(b) of ILO Convention No. 97 
Concerning Migration for Employment (1949). This may help to explain the lack of attention for any 
incongruity between articles 23 and 24 of the 1954 Statelessness Convention at the time of its adoption, 
since the ILO document deals only with social security and “need-based basic subsistence benefits […] 
to a large extent fall outside the ILO concept of social security”. Martin Scheinin, "The Right to Social 
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public relief granted through a state-funded system be withheld from the stateless so 
long as the state in question labels the benefit “social security”?  
If we must defer to domestic legislation in order to determine whether a 
particular measure is categorised as social security or as public relief there is a 
definite risk of misuse of the indistinctness of the two concepts under the 1954 
Statelessness Convention and of the permissible limitation admitted by article 24. 
The existence of an obligation to grant national treatment without exception in the 
field of public relief may arguably negate the rule included in the provision on 
social security whereby the stateless can be excluded from enjoying publicly funded 
benefits. At the very least, it calls for highly reserved usage of this permissible 
exception. Nevertheless, alongside the issues raised by the substantial number of 
reservations to both articles 23 and 24 and the high level of attachment required 
before either provision can be relied upon, this ambiguity of obligation may 
severely weaken the impact of the 1954 Statelessness Convention on the protection 
of the overall right to social security for stateless persons. Time now to see how this 
approach compares with that taken under human rights law generally.   
 
4.2 International human rights law 
 
After the detailed elaboration of the right to social security in not one, but two 
provisions of the 1954 Statelessness Convention, it comes as something of a 
surprise to find that the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights contents itself with the following statement: 
 
The State Parties to the present Covenant recognise the right of everyone 
to social security, including social insurance.133 
 
While this delineation is certainly concise and appears rather vague, the Committee 
has clarified that it covers such “branches” as “medical care, cash sickness benefits, 
maternity benefits, old-age benefits, invalidity benefits, survivors’ benefits, 
employment injury benefits, unemployment benefits [and] family benefits”.134 
Again, it is a right that is in principle guaranteed to “everyone”.135 Moreover, the 
                                                                                                                                               
Security" in Rosas (ed) Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht: 
1995, page 163.  
133 Article 9 of the ICESCR. The right to social security is also dealt with in articles 22 and 25 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights; Article 5, paragraph e (iv) of the Convention on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination; Article 26 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child; Articles 
27, 43, 45 and 54 of the Migrant Workers Convention; Article 9 of the Additional Protocol to the 
American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; Articles 
12, 13 and 14 of the European Social Charter and various ILO instruments including Convention No. 
102 concerning Social Security (Minimum Standards) (1952) and Convention No. 118 concerning 
Equality of Treatment (Social Security) (1962). 
134 ESC Committee, Revised general guidelines regarding the form and contents of reports to be 
submitted by state parties under articles 16 and 17 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, E/C.12/1991/1, 17 June 1991. This list is virtually identical to that set out in the 
1954 Statelessness Convention and the relevant ILO standards. 
135 The UN treaty bodies have been active in encouraging access to social security benefits for non-
nationals and expressing concern where the enjoyment of these rights by non-citizens is restricted. 





right housed in this article is given further body by a number of closely related 
norms that all have a bearing on the obligation to provide a basic safety-net for 
dignified human survival. Among these are the right to life, the right to an adequate 
standard of living, the right to health, the right to protection of the family, including 
special provision for the protection of mother and child and even the prohibition of 
torture.136 Yet the right to social security remains an independent concept, 
concerned with access to benefits with a view to the (continued) enjoyment of the 
other rights mentioned and thereby often plays a central role in their realisation.137 
 The wording of the right to social security in the ICESCR immediately 
clarifies two important points in respect of this norm. Firstly, that since states 
“recognise” the right to social security, it is progressive realisation that is envisaged 
rather than an obligation with immediate binding force. This means that beyond any 
minimum core obligations, states will be allowed some leeway in determining to 
what extent non-nationals may benefit from this provision. The second significant 
observation that can be made is that the right to social security includes social 
insurance systems, but its scope is not limited to such schemes. In other words, the 
measures taken to realise this right can include both contribution-based schemes 
(such as social insurance), and non-contributory schemes (such as universal 
schemes or targeted social assistance schemes).138 Therefore, the right to social 
security under international human rights law matches the 1954 Statelessness 
Convention by touching upon both social security in its narrower sense as social 
insurance and what the Statelessness Convention termed “public relief”. What we 
must consider here is the scope of protection offered to non-nationals – or indeed 
specifically to stateless persons – with regard to both types of scheme. 
                                                                                                                                               
Observations: Saudi Arabia, A/58/18, New York: 2003, para. 206; Slovenia, A/58/18, New York: 2003, 
para. 241; France, A/60/18, New York: 2005, para. 118. Human Rights Committee, Concluding 
Observations: Thailand, A/60/40 vol. I, Geneva: 2005, para. 95(23). ESC Committee, Concluding 
Observations: Israel, E/2004/22, New York and Geneva: 2003, para. 251; Kuwait, E/2005/22, New 
York and Geneva: 2004, para. 193; Spain, E/2005/22, New York and Geneva: 2004, para. 230. 
Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations: Uzbekistan, CRC/C/111, Geneva: 
2001, para. 549; Republic of Korea, CRC/C/124, Geneva: 2003, paras. 136-137. 
136 Martin Scheinin, "The Right to Social Security" in Rosas (ed) Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht: 1995, pages 160-161; John Dent, Research Paper on the Social 
and Economic Rights of Non-Nationals in Europe, Brussels: 1998, page 64; James Hathaway, The 
Rights of Refugees Under International Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 2005, page 807; 
Magdalena Sepulveda; Theo van Banning; Gudrun Gudmundsdottir; Christine Chamoun; Willem van 
Genugten, Human Rights Reference Handbook, University for Peace, Ciudad Colon: 2004, page 264; 
ESC Committee, General Comment No. 19 - The Right to Social Security, Advanced unedited version, 
4 February 2008, para. 1. The close relationship between the right to social security and these other 
fundamental rights has allowed social security matters to be addressed on occasion through the 
numerous related international norms. 
137 “Benefits, whether in cash or in kind, must be adequate in amount and duration in order that 
everyone can realise his or her rights to family protection and assistance, an adequate standard of living 
and adequate access to health care […] but other measures are necessary to compliment the right to 
social security”. ESC Committee, General Comment No. 19 - The Right to Social Security, Advanced 
unedited version, 4 February 2008, paras. 22 and 28. 
138 ESC Committee, General Comment No. 19 - The Right to Social Security, Advanced unedited 
version, 4 February 2008, para. 4. The Committee goes on to suggest that “in almost all state parties, 
non-contributory schemes will be required since it is unlikely that every person could be adequately 
covered through an insurance-based system”. 
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 Where social security is offered through a system of social insurance, there is a 
growing indication that non-nationals must enjoy equal protection under such 
schemes as nationals. Although this is an area in which states have traditionally 
granted national treatment to foreigners on the basis of reciprocal bilateral or 
multilateral arrangements,139 there are indications that stateless persons should be 
exempted from the demands of reciprocity. For example, the relevant ILO 
Convention expressly waives the condition of reciprocity with respect to the 
stateless (and refugees) so that they enjoy an absolute right to national treatment in 
social security matters under the instrument.140 Meanwhile, human rights law 
generally operates on the idea that entitlement to social insurance benefits is 
actually accrued through participation in the contributory mechanism, similarly to 
the way in which labour-related rights are entitlements attributed to workers. As 
long as a non-national makes the requisite contribution to the particular social 
insurance fund, he or she must be free to access the benefits that flow from it. This 
entitlement should not be contingent on the possession of a (specific) nationality.141 
This was brought to the fore in a case before the UN Human Rights Committee in 
which the petitioners complained against France’s differential treatment of pension 
entitlements for former soldiers, between persons who held French citizenship and 
those who possessed Senegalese nationality. The Committee found a violation of 
article 26 of the ICCPR, the principle of equal treatment, by determining that  
 
[since] it was not the question of nationality which determined the 
granting of pensions to the authors but the services rendered by them in 
the past [...] a subsequent change in nationality cannot by itself be 
considered as a sufficient justification for different treatment, since the 
basis for the grant of the pension was the same service which both they 
and the soldiers who remained French had provided.142 
 
                                                           
139 Consider the reference to “applicable bilateral and multilateral treaties” in the article dealing with 
the enjoyment of social security in the Migrant Workers Convention – migrant workers must meet the 
requirements of any such treaties if they are to enjoy equal treatment to nationals; See also Article 12, 
paragraph 4(a) of the European Social Charter and ILO Convention No. 118 concerning Equality of 
Treatment (Social Security) (1962) both of which provides for equality of treatment on the basis of 
reciprocity between state parties. 
140 Article 10 of ILO Convention No. 118 concerning Equality of Treatment (Social Security) (1962). 
Note that this instrument has been ratified by only 37 states and each state is, in fact, entitled to 
establish upon ratification which types of social security are to be covered by its terms, so the scope of 
obligations is different for each state party. 
141 ESC Committee, General Comment No. 19 - The Right to Social Security, Advanced unedited 
version, 4 February 2008, para. 36. Note that this General Comment on social security is somewhat 
ambiguous on the question of access to social insurance schemes, skipping this question and moving 
straight on to the enjoyment of benefits under such schemes, where non-nationals have participated. 
However, it seems unlikely that states would want to prevent non-nationals from contributing to social 
insurance schemes, since this would create an uneven playing field in the domestic labour market (see 
the motivation behind the attribution of equal labour-related rights) and would leave the non-nationals 
uninsured for such situations as employment injury and thereby reliant on public assistance paid for 
from tax revenue.  






Moreover, the enjoyment of social insurance benefits is protected not only by the 
right to social security but also by the right to property.143 This offers additional 
scope for tackling social insurance benefits made contingent upon nationality. Even 
the European Court on Human Rights has thus been able to rule on the 
permissibility of nationality-based distinctions in the field of social security – in 
spite of the absence of any right to social security under the Convention or its 
protocols – and has found such measures to be in violation of article 14 of the 
Convention (non-discrimination) and article 1 of the first protocol (right to 
property).144 On the basis of these observations it can be concluded that human 
rights law widely acknowledges the right of stateless persons to the same treatment 
as nationals under any contribution-based social security scheme in which they are 
participating, thereby echoing the guarantee set out in the 1954 Statelessness 
Convention.  
 The enjoyment by non-nationals of non-contributory social security is a less 
straightforward matter. Both the UN Declaration on the Rights of Non-nationals 
and the Migrant Workers Convention offer non-citizens certain guarantees with 
regards to “social services”145 or “social and health services [and] unemployment 
benefits”.146 These provisions arguably include non-contribution based social 
assistance. Yet the articles are only applicable to non-nationals who are lawfully 
present or residing and even then states are free to set additional preconditions for 
the enjoyment of these benefits.147 Yet the UN Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights has noted the need for social assistance for all population groups, 
including non-citizens, that is “adequate to ensure a minimum standard of 
living”.148 This would suggest that human rights law does prescribe access to at 
least basic social assistance from non-contributory schemes as a means of ensuring 
that this standard is met. Regrettably little more has been formally undertaken to 
                                                           
143 Martin Scheinin, "The Right to Social Security" in Rosas (ed) Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht: 1995, pages 160-161. 
144 European Court of Human Rights, Case of Gaygusuz v. Austria, No. 17371/90, 16 September 1996. 
As Tiburcio explains, the court “examined the refusal of Austrian authorities to provide a Turkish 
unemployed with an advance on his pension in the form of ‘emergency assistance’. In this case the 
individual complied with all legal requirements to benefit from this measure and the Court verified that 
the refusal was due only to the fact that he did not have Austrian nationality, which was required under 
the Emergency Insurance Act”. Carmen Tiburcio, "Chapter VI. Social and Cultural Rights" in The 
human rights of aliens under international and comparative law, Kluwer Law International, The 
Hague: 2001, page 165. 
145 Article 8, paragraph 1(c) of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Non-nationals. 
146 Article 43, paragraph 1(e); article 45, paragraph 1(c); and article 54, paragraph 1(b) of the Migrant 
Workers Convention. 
147 Moreover, in the case of the UN Declaration, the enjoyment of such benefits is only prescribed so 
long as “undue strain is not placed on the resources of the State”. This is a remarkable provision given 
the general categorisation of social security as a social right whereby it is not subject to specific 
restrictions against non-nationals (by developing states) by reference to the national economy under 
article 2, paragraph 3 of the ICESCR. 
148 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations: Ukraine, E/1996/22 
(1995) 50, para. 266. 
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clarify the scope of the norm and its application to non-nationals,149 so this is an 
area of international (human rights) law that remains shrouded in “imprecision and 
lack of objectivity”.150  
The General Comment on social security by the ESC Committee does 
provide some much-needed clarification. The Comment confirms that “access to a 
social security scheme that provides a minimum essential level of benefits to all 
individuals and families that will enable them to acquire at least essential health  
care, basic shelter and housing, water and sanitation, foodstuffs, and the most basic 
forms of education” belongs to the minimum core obligations of the right to social 
security.151 As such, this basic protection should also be available to stateless 
persons. Moreover, for the first time in any General Comment by the ESC 
Committee, the situation of the stateless is explicitly dealt with: 
 
Refugees, stateless persons and asylum-seekers, and other 
disadvantaged and marginalized individuals and groups, should enjoy 
equal treatment in access to non-contributory social security schemes, 
including reasonable access to health care and family support, 
consistent with international standards.152  
 
While this pronouncement does unequivocally affirm that stateless persons may be 
entitled to public assistance, its terms are regrettably ambiguous. In particular, it is 
unclear what is meant by “equal treatment” in this context. A literal reading would 
suggest that states are obliged to grant the same treatment to refugees, asylum 
seekers and stateless persons, without distinction between or within these groups. 
However, this would be a very hollow guarantee as it would in no way proscribe 
restrictions on access to social security for all of these vulnerable groups. This 
interpretation would seem to contradict the overall gist garnered from an earlier 
section of the General Comment whereby non-nationals are seen as one of the 
vulnerable groups who “traditionally faced difficulties in exercising [the right to 
social security]” and for which special attention is needed.153 It is therefore arguable 
that the proper interpretation of “equal treatment” here is national treatment.154  
                                                           
149 Note, for example, that the CERD does not mention (access to) social security in its General 
Recommendation on the rights of non-citizens. Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 
General Recommendation 30: Discrimination against Non-Citizens, New York: 1 October 2004. 
150 Carmen Tiburcio, "Chapter VI. Social and Cultural Rights" in The human rights of aliens under 
international and comparative law, Kluwer Law International, The Hague: 2001, page 165. See also 
James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge: 2005, page 136. 
151 ESC Committee, General Comment No. 19 - The Right to Social Security, Advanced unedited 
version, 4 February 2008, para. 59 (a). 
152 ESC Committee, General Comment No. 19 - The Right to Social Security, Advanced unedited 
version, 4 February 2008, para. 38. Note that paragraph 37 of the same General Comment provides for 
access of non-nationals generally to “non-contributory schemes for income support, affordable access 
to health care and family support” and that “any restrictions, including a qualification period, must be 
proportionate and reasonable”. 
153 ESC Committee, General Comment No. 19 - The Right to Social Security, Advanced unedited 
version, 4 February 2008, para. 31. 






In conclusion it would seem that human rights law does offer a certain 
minimum standard of non-contributory social security to all, including non-
nationals, and that there is an increasing onus on states to carefully justify 
differences in treatment between citizens and non-citizens in the enjoyment of any 
social assistance that goes beyond this basic level of protection. Nevertheless, until 
such questions are fully elucidated, the 1954 Statelessness Convention will retain 
some value in prescribing national treatment with respect to this public assistance, 
with the proviso that all effort is made to ensure that the impact of this statelessness 
instrument is not irreparably impaired by difficulties of interpretation as discussed 
above. 
 
5 RIGHT TO AN ADEQUATE STANDARD OF LIVING 
 
The right to an adequate standard of living is concerned with providing for every 
individual’s basic needs so as to ensure that “every individual shall be able, without 
shame and without unreasonable obstacles, to be a full participant in ordinary, 
everyday interaction with other people”.155 In this respect, it is very closely related 
to the right to social security and equally central to dignified human survival.156 
Since much has thus already been said about the right to the fulfilment of basic 
needs, here the focus will be on the scope of those subsistence needs and additional 
state obligations - alongside norms relating to social security - geared towards their 
realisation. Where social security dealt largely with the provision of “benefits” 
generally, the right to an adequate standard of living looks specifically at the 
availability of several primary necessities of life: food (including water), clothing 
and housing.157 The right to an adequate standard of living is also said to 
encapsulate the right to adequate health(care) and education, but these will be dealt 
with at a later stage since they are detailed in separate articles of the ICESCR.158 
Food (including water) and shelter (i.e. clothing and housing) are such 
elemental human needs that the elaboration of an international norm to ensure their 
fulfilment seems almost bizarre. But the same feeling may be conjured by many 
other human rights and reality has betrayed the fact that none is so universally 
respected and enjoyed as to render its elaboration as a legal norm nonsensical. And 
indeed it has been found that 
 
the right to an adequate standard of living has been violated ‘more 
comprehensively and systematically than probably any other right’ [and] 
that the realisation of the right is overlaid by issues of economic 
                                                           
155 Asbjorn Eide, "The Right to an Adequate Standard of Living Including the Right to Food" in Rosas 
(ed) Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht: 1995, page 89. 
156 Matthew Craven, The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. A 
Perspective on its Development, Clarendon Press, Oxford: 1998, pages 287. 
157 Asbjorn Eide, "The Right to an Adequate Standard of Living Including the Right to Food" in Rosas 
(ed) Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht: 1995, pages 89 - 
91; Magdalena Sepulveda; Theo van Banning; Gudrun Gudmundsdottir; Christine Chamoun; Willem 
van Genugten, Human Rights Reference Handbook, University for Peace, Ciudad Colon: 2004, page 
267.  
158 In fact, the right to health also distinguishes itself by its absence from the 1954 Convention relating 
to the Status of Stateless Persons. It will be addressed in section 8 of this chapter. 
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development, agrarian reform, principles of nutrition, international trade 
and aid (to name but a few).159 
 
The stateless once again show their colours as a vulnerable group and report 
difficulties in their enjoyment of the right to an adequate standard of living.160 
Inadequate access to housing is a particular problem - as we already saw when 
looking at the right to property, the stateless are often unable to buy immovable 
property or land and there have been cases of confiscation of this property.161 But 
inadequate food can also be a serious issue and the stateless may find themselves 
the victims of multiple neglect:  
 
While the Bangladesh government has hosted stateless Bihari for more 
than three decades, the already desperate living conditions worsened over 
the last year [2004]. The delivery of government-subsidised food aid was 
ended, and there was a substantial loss of homes to tornado, fire and 
eviction.162 
 
This segment of a report from a mission by Refugees International to document the 
plight of the stateless in Bangladesh is illustrative of how hard it can be for stateless 
groups across the world to assert their right to dignified human survival.163  
 
5.1 The 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons 
 
In the previous section we discovered that the 1954 Convention relating to the 
Status of Stateless Persons includes a broadly formulated provision attributing 
national treatment to stateless persons in respect of public relief and assistance. 
This article offers some scope for ensuring that the stateless enjoy an adequate 
standard of living, but it provides for national treatment and not an absolute right to 
(benefits that allow for) adequate housing, food and clothing. Moreover, it can only 
                                                           
159 Matthew Craven, The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. A 
Perspective on its Development, Clarendon Press, Oxford: 1998, pages 288. 
160 It has been pointed out that “asylum seekers, refugees and displaced persons do not have the same 
opportunity as others to achieve an adequate standard of living on the basis of their own efforts. They 
therefore require, to a larger extent than the ordinary public, direct provisions, until conditions are 
established in which they can obtain their own entitlements”. Asbjorn Eide, "The Right to an Adequate 
Standard of Living Including the Right to Food" in Rosas (ed) Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht: 1995, page 105. The same assessment can be made of the 
circumstances in which the stateless live – they too have been shown to experience difficulties in 
earning their own living.  
161 See chapter X, section 6. 
162 Maureen Lynch, Lives on hold: The human cost of statelessness, Washington: 2005, page 13. 
163 Other examples include situations in Syria, where the stateless Kurds cannot access food subsidies; 
in Côte d’Ivoire, where thousands of non-citizens were evicted from their homes; and in Russia, where 
the revocation of land from the stateless Meskhetian Turks “brought them to the brink of famine” 
because they no were no longer able to grow their own food. Maureen Lynch, Lives on hold: The 
human cost of statelessness, Washington: 2005, pages 40-43 and 46; David Weissbrodt, Final Report 
on Prevention of Discrimination - The Rights of Non-Citizens, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/23, 26 May 2003, 
Add.3, para. 24; Advisory Board on Human Security (prepared by Constantin Sokoloff), Denial of 





be relied upon by stateless persons who are lawfully staying on state territory. Here 
then, we will consider the alternatives offered under the 1954 Statelessness 
Convention to ensuring that the stateless enjoy an adequate standard of living. 
There are just two short articles in the 1954 Statelessness Convention that in some 
way touch upon (aspects of) this issue: article 20 that deals with “rationing” and 
article 21 on “housing”. 
 In the provision on “rationing”, the 1954 Statelessness Convention offers 
stateless persons national treatment in accessing any system “which applies to the 
population at large and regulates the general distribution of products in short 
supply”.164 Food is a commodity that has historically been subjected to rationing 
during periods of scarcity, but rationing may impact upon access to any consumer 
good,165 including for example clothing. In this sense it has a bearing on the ability 
to enjoy an adequate standard of living. The stateless are granted equal treatment as 
nationals at the lowest level of attachment – as soon as they are subject to the state’s 
jurisdiction, even if this is by way of unlawful presence in the territory. However, 
all that is offered is equal treatment under an existing rationing system. There is no 
guarantee of access to adequate food or other goods, nor any obligation to provide 
these commodities to the stateless free of charge.166 Regrettably, this provision  
 
is therefore not a basis for [stateless persons] to assert a right of access to 
public welfare or comparable systems which allocate basic necessities (or 
funds to acquire them) on the basis of economic need, rather than because 
of the scarcity of the products themselves.167 
 
It is in relation to this article then, that the 1954 Statelessness Convention is most 
evidently – and lamentably - a product of its time: post World War II, when 
rationing was in place in many countries. As we will see, international human rights 
law has moved ahead greatly in elaborating the right to an adequate standard of 
living and a plethora of state obligations flowing from it to ensure that basic 
subsistence needs are met. So although article 20 of the Statelessness Convention 
initially appears to address access to food and other basic goods, the actual 
contribution of this outdated provision is now questionable. 
 As far as its substantive scope is concerned, article 21 of the Statelessness 
Convention on “housing” appears to be much more promising. It is applicable to 
any housing matter that is “regulated by laws or regulations or is subject to the 
                                                           
164 Article 20 of the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons. Note that this article is 
identical to its counterpart in the 1951 Refugee Convention, was accepted without debate and has not 
been the subject of any reservations by state parties. 
165 Nehemiah Robinson, Convention relating to the status of stateless persons - Its history and 
interpretation, UNHCR, Geneva: 1955, page 66; James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under 
International Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 2005, page 468. 
166 Nehemiah Robinson, Convention relating to the status of stateless persons - Its history and 
interpretation, UNHCR, Geneva: 1955, page 66; James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under 
International Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 2005, page 467. 
167 James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge: 2005, page 470. This statement originally pertained to refugees and the 1951 Refugee 
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control of public authorities”.168 Unlike rationing, which has largely gone out of 
fashion, housing regulation in one form or another is pervasive to this day, so the 
article is still very relevant. And the broad wording of the provision allows it to be 
invoked in the context of any housing question regulated by any public authority at 
any level of government, from “rent control and assignment of apartments” to “any 
social welfare measures taken by States with a view to providing housing 
accommodation”.169 However, to draw an entitlement from this article, the stateless 
person must first meet the high level of attachment required – lawful stay – and 
will, even then, benefit only from a guarantee to treatment on a par with non-
nationals generally. There is no absolute right to housing or any qualitative 
guarantee as to the nature of housing that must be available or the matters that 
should be regulated. In effect then, this provision adds little to what is already 
offered to stateless persons elsewhere in the Convention.  
To begin with, we have seen that under article 13, on the right to property, the 
stateless benefit from all housing-related property rights on equal terms to non-
nationals generally (and at a much lower level of attachment), which would 
arguably include such matters as rent control.170 Furthermore, 
 
initiatives which provide housing benefits to sub-populations on the basis 
of need should be deemed in pith and substance to be forms of relief or 
assistance subject to the requirements of Art. 23.171  
 
This means that in the context of housing assistance, the stateless should enjoy 
national treatment under article 23 on public relief – and at the same level of 
attachment as is set in the provision specifically geared to housing. So the inclusion 
of article 21 on housing in the terms in which it is expressed in fact introduces a 
certain risk as far as the enjoyment by the stateless of an adequate standard of living 
is concerned. The danger is that states will refer to this article in any housing-
related matter and offer the stateless treatment on a par with non-nationals generally 
rather than acknowledging that under article 23 on public assistance they are 
obliged to satisfy a higher level of protection. All in all then, the 1954 Statelessness 
Convention is found to lack any satisfactory expression of the right to an adequate 
standard of living, or any of its substantive elements, beyond what has already been 
discussed in section 4 in the context of the right to social security.172 
                                                           
168 Article 21 of the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. Identically to article 20 on 
rationing, this provision on housing was adopted in the same terms as it is included in the 1951 Refugee 
Convention, it was passed without discussion and has attracted no reservations from state parties. 
169 Nehemiah Robinson, Convention relating to the status of stateless persons - Its history and 
interpretation, UNHCR, Geneva: 1955, page 67; James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under 
International Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 2005, pages 823-824. 
170 See chapter X, section 6.1. 
171 James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge: 2005, page 824. 
172 Here again, the absence of an equivalent to article 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention in the 
statelessness instrument is clearly felt: “In some cases, depriving refugees of the necessities of life may 
give rise to a breach of the duty of non-refoulement. Repatriation under coercion, including situations in 
which refugees are left no real option but to leave, is in breach of Art. 33 of the Refugee Convention”. 






5.2 International human rights law 
 
In contrast to the 1954 Statelessness Convention, the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and indeed its Committee, have had much 
more to say on the right to an adequate standard of living – as a right independent 
from the right to social security. Thus article 11 of the Covenant opens with the 
following declaration: 
 
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognise the right of everyone 
to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including 
adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of 
living conditions.173  
 
Here explicit mention is made of the rights to adequate food, clothing and housing 
that are inherent in the concept of the right to an adequate standard of living, 
although the overall obligation is, again, one of progressive realisation. The ESC 
Committee has gone on to elaborate on the content of both the right to food and to 
housing, as well as the right to water which is also considered to stem from this 
provision.174 These documents are instrumental in determining the scope of state 
obligations generally and with regards to non-nationals and the stateless 
specifically. 
 As far as the right to adequate food is concerned, we find that the second 
paragraph of this article in the ICESCR already provides some clues as to the core 
minimum content of the norm: state parties also recognise “the fundamental right of 
everyone to be free from hunger”.175 In view of this, “States have a core obligation 
                                                                                                                                               
Cambridge: 2005, page 464. No such ultimate fall-back clause can be found in the 1954 Statelessness 
Convention. 
173 Article 11, paragraph 1 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.  
Note that as a social right, the right to an adequate standard of living is not subject to the terms of 
article 2, paragraph 3 of the ICESCR. Other sources of (elements of) the right to an adequate standard 
of living are article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; Article 5, paragraph e(iii) of the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Racial Discrimination; Articles 24 and 27 of the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child; Articles 43 and 70 of the Migrant Workers Convention; Article 12 of the 
Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (right to food); Articles 30 and 31 of the European Social Charter; and Article 20, 
paragraph 2 of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child. Note that neither the overall 
right to an adequate standard of living, nor any of its constituent parts, is elaborated in the UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Non-nationals. 
174 ESC Committee, General Comment 4: The right to adequate housing, 13 December 1991; ESC 
Committee, General Comment 7: The right to adequate housing – forced evictions, 20 May 1997; ESC 
Committee, General Comment 12: The right to adequate food, 12 May 1999; and ESC Committee, 
General Comment 15: The right to water, 20 January 2003. The right to adequate clothing, as an aspect 
of the right to an adequate standard of living, has had “little attention either from the Committee or 
independent commentators [and] the impression given is that clothing is not a matter in which the State 
may exercise a great deal of control, nor one that the Committee feels is of great importance”. Matthew 
Craven, The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. A Perspective on its 
Development, Clarendon Press, Oxford: 1998, page 349. 
175 Article 11, paragraph 2 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
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to take the necessary action to mitigate and alleviate hunger […] even in times of 
natural or other disasters”.176 There is a concrete and immediate obligation for states 
to prevent starvation, strengthened by the connection with the right to life espoused 
elsewhere in human rights instruments.177 But the core minimum content of the 
right to food stretches further, encompassing obligations linked to the requirement 
that the food be adequate. This adds another dimension by prescribing  
 
the availability of food in a quantity and quality sufficient to satisfy the dietary 
needs of individuals, free from adverse substances, and acceptable within a 
given culture.178  
 
Such food must be available and accessible to everyone, including non-nationals 
and stateless persons.179 Moreover, “inextricably related” to the right to food is the 
right to water and this is also protected under article 11 of the ICESCR.180 The ESC 
Committee has detailed the core obligations that are encapsulated within this norm 
as well, which include the obligation 
 
to ensure access to the minimum essential amount of water, that is sufficient 
and safe for personal and domestic uses to prevent disease; to ensure the right 
of access to water and water facilities and services on a non-discriminatory 
basis, especially for disadvantaged and marginalized groups [and] to adopt 
relatively low-cost targeted water programmes to protect vulnerable and 
marginalized groups.181 
 
These core minimum standards are to be enjoyed by “everyone without 
discrimination, within the jurisdiction of the State party”182 and the Committee 
acknowledges that special measures may be needed to ensure the full enjoyment of 
                                                           
176 ESC Committee, General Comment 12: The right to adequate food, 12 May 1999, para. 6. In 
paragraph 14 of the General Comment the Committee confirms the applicability of this minimum core 
content to everyone, regardless of nationality: “Every State is obliged to ensure for everyone under its 
jurisdiction access to the minimum essential food which is sufficient, nutritionally adequate and safe, to 
ensure their freedom from hunger”. 
177 Matthew Craven, The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. A 
Perspective on its Development, Clarendon Press, Oxford: 1998, page 307. 
178 ESC Committee, General Comment 12: The right to adequate food, 12 May 1999, para. 8. The 
meaning of each of the components of this phrase is then elaborated upon in some detail by the 
Committee. See also Asbjorn Eide, "The Right to an Adequate Standard of Living Including the Right 
to Food" in Rosas (ed) Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht: 
1995, page 90; Magdalena Sepulveda; Theo van Banning; Gudrun Gudmundsdottir; Christine 
Chamoun; Willem van Genugten, Human Rights Reference Handbook, University for Peace, Ciudad 
Colon: 2004, pages 270-271. 
179 Note that the accessibility of food refers to both “economic accessibility” and “physical 
accessibility” and that vulnerable groups may require assistance in either or both areas through special 
programmes. ESC Committee, General Comment 12: The right to adequate food, 12 May 1999, para. 
13.  
180 ESC Committee, General Comment 15: The right to water, 20 January 2003, para. 3. 
181 The Committee lists six further core obligations relating to the right to water. ESC Committee, 
General Comment 15: The right to water, 20 January 2003, para. 37. 





these standards by various vulnerable groups, including minority groups, refugees, 
asylum seekers and migrant workers.183 By extension then, the stateless are also to 
benefit fully from this norm. The right to an adequate standard of living as espoused 
under the ICESCR and elsewhere therefore offers the stateless a detailed and sturdy 
basis for the protection of two basic subsistence needs: adequate food and water.184  
 The right to adequate housing also contains certain elements that are deemed 
to be core obligations, but these are less clearly enunciated than the minimum core 
standards relating to the right to adequate food and water.185 The two General 
Comments elaborated by the ESC Committee to “identify the principle issues” fail 
to fully elucidate the question of core obligations.186 The Committee does explain 
that it is more than pure “shelter” that is envisioned by the right to adequate 
housing, it is “the right to live somewhere in security, peace and dignity”.187 
Thereafter, numerous instructions are provided as to how to determine the adequacy 
of accommodation for the purposes of the (eventual) full realisation of this norm.188 
This has been described as the core content of the right to adequate housing,189 
however it is not presented as such in the General Comment. Instead, this core 
content is more likely to be formed by what the Committee describes as “steps 
which must be taken immediately” by states which include “a commitment to 
facilitating ‘self-help’ by affected groups” and “the abstention by the Government 
from certain practices [… in particular…] forced eviction”.190 At least with respect 
                                                           
183 ESC Committee, General Comment 15: The right to water, 20 January 2003, para. 16. 
184 Note that the specific issue of the enjoyment by non-nationals of the right to adequate food and/or 
water has yet to raise significant attention in the consideration of state reports by the UN treaty bodies, 
although concern has been expressed at the level of enjoyment of these rights by groups such as the 
Roma (which may include stateless persons), internally displaced persons and refugees. See for 
example Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding Observations: Albania, 
A/ 58/18, New York: 2003, para. 315; Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations: Slovakia, 
A/59/18, Geneva: 2004, para. 388; Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations: 
Greece, CRC/C/114, Geneva: 2002, para. 156; ESC Committee, Concluding Observations: Serbia and 
Montenegro, E/2006/22, New York and Geneva: 2005, para. 290 and Azerbaijan, E/2005/22, New 
York and Geneva: 2004, para. 517.  
185 James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge: 2005, page 504. 
186 ESC Committee, General Comment 4: The right to adequate housing, 13 December 1991; ESC 
Committee, General Comment 7: The right to adequate housing – forced evictions, 20 May 1997. See 
also John Dent, Research Paper on the Social and Economic Rights of Non-Nationals in Europe, 
Brussels: 1998, page 108.  
187 ESC Committee, General Comment 4: The right to adequate housing, 13 December 1991, para. 6. 
188 This includes considerations such as the availability of services, materials, facilities and 
infrastructure as well as the affordability of the housing. See ESC Committee, General Comment 4: The 
right to adequate housing, 13 December 1991, para. 8. 
189 Magdalena Sepulveda; Theo van Banning; Gudrun Gudmundsdottir; Christine Chamoun; Willem 
van Genugten, Human Rights Reference Handbook, University for Peace, Ciudad Colon: 2004, page 
272. 
190 ESC Committee, General Comment 4: The right to adequate housing, 13 December 1991, paras. 10 
and 18. For a full discussion of the scope of the prohibition of forced eviction, see ESC Committee, 
General Comment 7: The right to adequate housing – forced evictions, 20 May 1997. 
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to these dimensions of the right to adequate housing, there is no question that the 
stateless are to benefit from the relevant human rights norms.191 In addition,  
 
a State in which any significant number of individuals is deprived of […] basic 
shelter and housing is, prima facie, failing to discharge its obligations under 
the Covenant.192  
 
This must be deemed the case whether the individuals concerned possess the 
nationality of the state or not. Beyond these core commitments, it remains 
somewhat ambiguous what scope of protection is offered to non-nationals, 
including stateless persons. Nevertheless, the UN treaty bodies have taken a broader 
interest in the housing situation of non-nationals, beyond this narrowly construed 
core content, discussing instead their overall enjoyment of the right to adequate 
housing.193  
Moreover, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has 
called upon states to “guarantee equal enjoyment of the right to adequate housing 
for citizens and non-citizens”.194 It appears then that there is a strong onus on states 
to offer non-nationals and stateless persons the same treatment with respect to all 
aspects of the right to adequate housing, including those geared towards progressive 
realisation, as is offered to citizens. In fact, with respect to the right to an adequate 
standard of living generally, the human rights regime shows a substantial 
commitment to non-citizens, which offers far greater scope for the protection of the 




                                                           
191 Consider the concern expressed at the (circumstances of the) eviction of non-citizens in Slovenia. 
See Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding Observations: Slovenia, 
A/58/18, New York: 2003, para. 241;  
192 ESC Committee, General Comment 3: The nature of State parties obligations (Art. 1, par. 1), 1990, 
para. 10; See also Scott Leckie, "The Right to Housing" in Rosas (ed) Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht: 1995, page 112.  
193 See for example Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding Observations: 
France, A/60/18, New York: 2005, para. 106; Luxembourg, A60/18, New York: 2005, para. 198. ESC 
Committee, Concluding Observations: Azerbaijan, E/2005/22, New York and Geneva: 2004, paras 517 
and 519; Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations: Estonia, CRC/C124 (2003) 
9, para. 45. See also Matthew Craven, The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights. A Perspective on its Development, Clarendon Press, Oxford: 1998, page 338;  David 
Weissbrodt, Final Report on Prevention of Discrimination - The Rights of Non-Citizens, 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/23, 26 May 2003, para. 67. 
194 Emphasis added. Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General Recommendation 
30: Discrimination against Non-Citizens, New York: 1 October 2004, para. 32. See also the decision of 
the Committee in CERD, Case of F.A. v. Norway, CERD/C/58/D/18/2000,  21 March 2001. Note in 
addition that the Migrant Workers Convention provides for national treatment in relation to “access to 
housing, including social housing schemes, and protection against exploitation in respect of rents”. 
Later, the same instrument compels states to offer migrant workers the same assistance as nationals in 
promoting “living conditions […] in keeping with the standards of fitness, safety, health and principles 
of human dignity”. However it must be recalled that these provisions benefit migrant workers with a 





6 RIGHT TO EDUCATION 
 
By now we are familiar with the interconnectedness of human rights and the role 
that one right may play in ensuring the enjoyment of another. So it comes as no 
surprise that the right to education is another norm that is considered absolutely 
pivotal in the overall system of human rights – it is said to “epitomise the 
indivisibility and interdependence of all human rights”.195 This is because education 
offers human beings the basic knowledge and understanding needed for the full 
enjoyment of rights such as the freedom of opinion or the right to work, while at the 
same time promoting “increased awareness of human rights and mutual 
tolerance”.196 As we will see in more detail in a moment, because of the many roles 
that education plays, this is a complex and multidimensional right. It deals with a 
variety of issues from access to basic schooling to the freedom of choice in cultural 
or religious education.  
In conjunction, there are a multitude of ways in which the stateless can – and 
do - experience difficulties in the field of education.197 The number of cases in 
which access to education is reportedly obstructed, restricted or simply denied to 
stateless populations is genuinely worrying and the geographical spread of the 
problem spans the globe.198 Since education has also been described as a “vehicle 
for empowerment”,199  
 
if governments wish to prevent certain groups from equally participating 
in the political, social, economic or cultural life in their countries, one of 
the most efficient methods is to deny them equal access to education.200 
 
The problems that the stateless encounter in enjoying an education thus contribute 
to their progressive and enduring disempowerment and marginalisation, in turn 
                                                           
195 ESC Committee, General Comment 11: Plans of action for primary education, 10 May 1999, para. 
2. 
196 Manfred Nowak, "The Right to Education" in Rosas (ed) Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht: 1995, pages 188-189. On the importance of education as a 
human right, see also Advisory Board on Human Security (prepared by Constantin Sokoloff), Denial of 
Citizenship: A Challenge to Human Security, February 2005, page 22. 
197 Access to education is a generally-reported issue for the stateless. See for example UNHCR, 
"Statelessness and Citizenship" in The State of the World's Refugees - A Humanitarian Agenda, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford: 1997, page 241; Maureen Lynch, Lives on hold: The human cost of 
statelessness, Washington: 2005, pages 3 and 21; UNHCR and IPU, Nationality and statelessness. A 
handbook for parliamentarians, 2005, page 6; Youth Advocate Program International, Stateless 
Children - Youth Who are Without Citizenship, Washington: 2003, pages 6-7. 
198 Access to (some forms of) education is reported to be a problem for stateless populations in 
Bangladesh, Syria, Myanmar, the Dominican Republic, Ukraine, the United Arab Emirates, Russia, 
Turkmenistan and many other places, including in particular for Roma populations across Europe. See 
Maureen Lynch, Lives on hold: The human cost of statelessness, Washington: 2005, pages 27 – 46. 
199 It is explained that “education can give marginalized adults and children a means to escape from 
poverty and participate meaningfully in society”. Magdalena Sepulveda; Theo van Banning; Gudrun 
Gudmundsdottir; Christine Chamoun; Willem van Genugten, Human Rights Reference Handbook, 
University for Peace, Ciudad Colon: 2004, page 291.  
200 Manfred Nowak, "The Right to Education" in Rosas (ed) Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht: 1995, page 202. 
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presenting a growing obstacle to the resolution of their plight.201 Enough cause 
then, to delve into the international legal protection of the right of the stateless to 
education. 
 
6.1 The 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons 
 
Sandwiched between the right to housing and the right to public relief in the 1954 
Statelessness Convention is an article that deals exclusively with the right to 
education. The provision is composed of two distinct parts, the first addressing 
“elementary education” while the second is applicable to all other levels or forms of 
education.202 Thus, paragraph 1 of article 22 states: 
 
The Contracting States shall accord to stateless persons the same 
treatment as is accorded to nationals with respect to elementary 
education.203 
 
This is one of the strongest provisions in the 1954 Statelessness Convention, 
offering stateless persons national treatment without first requiring a stringent level 
of attachment to be met. As far as elementary education is concerned, the stateless 
must be treated on a par with nationals, whatever their status in the country 
concerned. The second paragraph of article 2 is also applicable to all stateless 
persons as soon as they are subject to a state’s jurisdiction. However, it provides for 
treatment at least as favourable as non-nationals generally, in the same 
circumstances. So wherever non-elementary education is concerned, in particular 
“access to studies, the recognition of foreign school certificates, diplomas and 
degrees, the remission of fees and charges and the award of scholarships”,204 the 
stateless can only claim treatment on a par with similarly situated non-citizens and 
this may be greatly influenced by their immigration status in the country concerned. 
 Although this article on the right to education is largely straightforward, a few 
comments should be made as to the exact scope of protection offered. Firstly, in 
view of the title that was given to the provision as a whole – “public education” – 
its terms are only considered to be applicable to education that is provided by public 
authorities or funded or subsidised by public funds.205 Private schooling is entirely 
beyond the scope of the obligations contained in both paragraphs and so the 
stateless cannot discern any entitlement to access private education from the 1954 
Statelessness Convention. This limitation may have an impact on the enjoyment by 
the stateless of the freedom of choice in education (including the freedom to found 
                                                           
201 Advisory Board on Human Security (prepared by Constantin Sokoloff), Denial of Citizenship: A 
Challenge to Human Security, February 2005, page 22. 
202 Note that the wording of the entire article is identical to that found in the 1951 Refugee Convention 
and that this provision was adopted by a convincing vote after only minimal discussion. Nehemiah 
Robinson, Convention relating to the status of stateless persons - Its history and interpretation, 
UNHCR, Geneva: 1955, page 68.  
203 Just one reservation has been lodged with respect of article 22: by Zambia, to the effect that this first 
paragraph will be treated as a recommendation only. 
204 Article 22, paragraph 2 of the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons.  
205 Nehemiah Robinson, Convention relating to the status of stateless persons - Its history and 





educational institutes), another major component of the right to education as we will 
see when we turn to human rights law.206 A second clarification of scope centres on 
the expression “elementary education”. No definition is given in the instrument 
itself, leaving it open to debate whether the term addresses only “primary 
education” or covers all “fundamental education”. The former is a term used to 
differentiate a certain level of schooling from secondary or higher education, while 
the latter is a more open notion that takes in “basic education in all its forms 
(including, for example, adult education}”.207 In the event, by neglecting to clarify 
this point, the 1954 Statelessness Convention leaves it to states to establish what 
“elementary education” is under domestic law and accordingly to determine the 
level of protection that must be attributed to the stateless.208 The statelessness 
instrument therefore grants states substantial discretion to determine first to what 
extent non-primary education is to be considered elementary for the purposes of the 
Convention and thereafter to restrict access to non-elementary education, so long as 
non-nationals are generally subjected to such a policy. Finally, it is important to 
note that in prescribing a contingent standard of treatment with regard to both 
elementary and other forms of education, the 1954 Statelessness Convention 
remains silent on vital questions as to the actual availability of schooling generally 
and the type and quality of education that must be offered. As we come to consider 
human rights law, we find that these are details that do come to the fore in the 
relevant instruments. 
 
6.2 International human rights law 
 
In order to “eliminate practices of depriving any person or group access to 
education”,209 some fifty years ago the international community adopted an 
independent legal instrument dedicated to outlawing discrimination in education: 
the UNESCO Convention against Discrimination in Education. This instrument - 
settled even before the ICESCR was elaborated - demands that resident non-citizens 
be provided equal access to education as a state’s own nationals.210 This first step 
towards ensuring that all individuals enjoy the right to an education, regardless of 
nationality, provided the basis for an ever-growing catalogue of affirmations to this 
effect in international legal instruments and the work of the UN treaty bodies.211 
                                                           
206 Note that article 4 of the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons was found to 
offer freedom of choice in religious education as a component of the overall prescription of the freedom 
of religion. See chapter X, section 5.1. 
207 James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge: 2005, pages 596-597.  
208 Nehemiah Robinson, Convention relating to the status of stateless persons - Its history and 
interpretation, UNHCR, Geneva: 1955, page 68. 
209 Manfred Nowak, "The Right to Education" in Rosas (ed) Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht: 1995, page 202. 
210 Article 3, paragraph e of the UNESCO Convention against Discrimination in Education, 14 
December 1960. At the time of writing, the Convention counted 94 state parties, all of which have 
accepted the instrument’s obligations in full (reservations are not permitted according to article 9 of the 
Convention).  
211 One or more aspects of the right to education can be found in Article 26 of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights; Articles 13 and 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; article 
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Thus where the ICESCR attributes the right to education to “all persons” in its 
voluminous article 13, the full spectrum of rights elaborated – from the right to 
enjoy an education as such, to the need for such education to be directed towards 
certain aims such as the “full development of the human personality” and the 
importance of free choice in education - is to be enjoyed by everyone, citizens and 
non-citizens alike.212  
The ESC Committee has confirmed this interpretation on numerous 
occasions, both through its General Comments and its response to state party 
reports. For example, a core obligation is the prohibition of discrimination in all 
aspects of education and this applies to “all persons of school age residing in the 
territory of a State party, including non-nationals, and irrespective of their legal 
status”.213 The position that lack of citizenship should not in any way effect a 
persons’ enjoyment of the right to education has led the Committee to express 
concern at instances of impeded or unequal access to education for non-citizens 
across the globe, from Sri Lanka to Switzerland and from Italy to Canada.214 Not 
only must there be equal enjoyment of (free and compulsory) primary education – 
another core obligation of the right to education215 – but access to secondary and 
higher education must also be assured.216 Thus,  
                                                                                                                                               
5, paragraph e(v) of the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination; Articles 28 and 29 of 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child; Articles 30, 43 and 45 of the Migrant Workers Convention; 
Article 2 of the first Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights and Article 17 of the 
European Social Charter; Articles 13 and 16 of the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on 
Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; Article 17 of the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights and many other instruments. 
212 Diana Elles, International Provisions Protecting the Human Rights of Non-Citizens: Study, New 
York: 1980, page 34; David Weissbrodt, Final Report on Prevention of Discrimination - The Rights of 
Non-Citizens, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/23, 26 May 2003, para. 66. For a breakdown of the elements of the 
right to education, use can be made of the “right to education matrix” devised by Coomans, see 
Magdalena Sepulveda; Theo van Banning; Gudrun Gudmundsdottir; Christine Chamoun; Willem van 
Genugten, Human Rights Reference Handbook, University for Peace, Ciudad Colon: 2004, pages 293-
294. 
213 ESC Committee, General Comment 13: The right to education, 8 December 1999, para. 34. 
214 See, among others, ESC Committee, Concluding Observations: Sri Lanka, E/1999/22, New York 
and Geneva: 1998, para. 72; Switzerland, E/1999/22, New York and Geneva: 1998, para. 371; Italy, 
E/2005/22, New York and Geneva: 2004, para. 435; Canada, E/1999/22 , New York and Geneva: 
1998, paras. 414 and 424. 
215 See article 13, paragraph 2(a) of the ICESCR and ESC Committee, General Comment 13: The right 
to education, 8 December 1999, para. 57. Moreover, under article 14 of the ICESCR, where 
compulsory and free primary education has yet to be fully achieved, for example due to inadequate 
funds, state parties are “unequivocally” required to adopt a plan of action to ensure the swift realisation 
of this core obligation. See also ESC Committee, General Comment 11: Plans of action for primary 
education, 10 May 1999, para. 2. The ESC Committee has since for example expressed concern that 
Azerbaijan “does not provide free compulsory education to non-Azerbaijani children”. See also ESC 
Committee, Concluding Observations: Azerbaijan, E/2005/22, New York and Geneva: 2004, para. 498; 
China, E/2006/22, New York and Geneva: 2005, para. 195. 
216 Consider the call for the Canadian government to “develop and expand adequate programmes to 
address the financial obstacles to post-secondary education for low-income students, without any 
discrimination on the basis of citizenship status”. ESC Committee, Concluding Observations: Canada, 






while poorer states may rely on the Economic Covenant’s general duty of 
progressive implementation to justify an overall insufficiency of 
secondary education opportunities or the failure to progressively make 
such education free of charge, there must be no discrimination against 
non-citizens in granting access to […] education.217 
 
Again, the Committee holds that the immigration status of non-citizens is irrelevant 
for the enjoyment of this right.218 The protection offered of the right to education 
under the ICESCR thereby surpasses that which is guaranteed under the 1954 
Statelessness Convention.  
 Under the Convention on the Rights of the Child, where the right to education 
is housed in articles 28 and 29, the same stance has been taken on the right of non-
nationals to education. As we have seen earlier, the Committee on the Rights of the 
Child has made it clear that the Convention elaborates entitlements to be enjoyed by 
all children, regardless of citizenship or statelessness.219 In responding to state party 
reports, the Committee on the Rights of the Child has been even more active than 
the ESC Committee in asserting the need for non-citizens to be granted equal 
protection of the right to education. Over the last decade, the Committee has 
expressed praise for states for the adoption of measures to promote the fuller 
enjoyment of education by non-nationals and concern over impeded access to 
(satisfactory) education on over a dozen occasions.220 In one instance, the 
Committee even explicitly referred to the irrelevance of statelessness for the 
enjoyment of an education, where it recommended that Iran 
 
                                                                                                                                               
access to higher education for […] immigrants”. ESC Committee, Concluding Observations: 
Switzerland, E/1999/22, New York and Geneva: 1998, para. 371. 
217 James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge: 2005, pages 611-612. Elsewhere, Hathaway admits that there may be scope for arguing that 
(some aspects of) the right to an education falls into the category of “economic rights”, allowing 
developing states to rely on article 2(3) of the ICESCR to restrict the enjoyment of this right by non-
nationals. Indeed the ESC Committee has declared that the right to education “has been variously 
classified as an economic right, a social right and a cultural right”. However, in view of the approach 
taken by the ESC Committee in its assessment of state practice, an appeal to this exception clause is 
nevertheless unlikely to hold water in relation to the right to education. See James Hathaway, The 
Rights of Refugees Under International Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 2005, page 601; 
ESC Committee, General Comment 11: Plans of action for primary education, 10 May 1999, para. 2. 
218 China is called upon to “amend its legislation to provide for the right to education of all school-age 
children in its jurisdiction, including children of migrants without the leave to remain”. ESC 
Committee, Concluding Observations: China, E/2006/22, New York and Geneva: 2005, paras. 218 and 
230. 
219 Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 6: Treatment of unaccompanied and 
separated children outside their country of origin, 1 September 2005, para. 12. See also section 1 of 
this chapter. 
220 See for example Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations: Panama, 
CRC/C/62, Geneva: 1997, para. 115; Belize, CRC/C/84, Geneva: 1999, para. 75; Djibouti, CRC/C/97, 
Geneva: 2000, para. 556; Spain, CRC/C/118, Geneva: 2002, para. 509; Iceland, CRC/C/124, Geneva: 
2003, para. 496; Krgyzstan CRC/C/143, Geneva: 2004, para. 294. 
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ensure that all children, including refugee children, have equal 
opportunities on all levels of the education system without discrimination 
based on gender, religion, ethnic origin, nationality or statelessness.221 
 
On the basis of recommendations made to numerous other state parties, it is clear 
that this Committee also considers restrictions imposed on the grounds of 
immigration status to be contrary to state obligations.222 Moreover, the obligation to 
ensure that non-nationals fully enjoy the right to education may require the states 
concerned to take particular account of their situation in providing educational 
opportunities, for example by ensuring that the “system of education [is] adequate 
to their cultural values and identity”223 or that non-nationals are “not disadvantaged 
by the educational programme and teaching methods [including through] language 
problems”.224 Under international human rights law, it is therefore not enough that 
states provide for equal access to educational facilities, they must also take steps to 
ensure that non-nationals enjoy “equal access to the same standard of services [as 
nationals] in the field of education”.225 Furthermore, all of the foregoing is 
confirmed by the work of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination.226 
 While we have already ascertained that ESC rights are generally expounded to 
the benefit of everyone, it is clear that with respect to the right to education, every 
effort has been taken to ensure that this right really is universally and equally 
enjoyed. Here, the irrelevance of citizenship status has been clearly and frequently 
pronounced. And, not only should the lack of a(ny) nationality have no impact on 
the enjoyment of education, but the right to education as such is also defined in 
detail. Under human rights law, stateless persons should be able to enjoy not just 
                                                           
221 Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations: Iran, CRC/C/146, Geneva: 2005, 
para. 496. 
222 Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations: Russian Federation, CRC/C/90, 
Geneva: 1999, para. 113; Argentina, CRC/C/121, Geneva: 2001, para. 81; Ukraine, CRC/C/121, 
Geneva: 2002, para. 355; The Netherlands (Netherlands and Aruba), CRC/C/137, Geneva: 2004, para. 
367; Krgyzstan CRC/C/143, Geneva: 2004, para. 294 
223 Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations: Panama, CRC/C/62, Geneva: 
1997, para. 115. 
224 Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations: Luxembourg, CRC/C/146, 
Geneva: 2005, para. 206. 
225 Emphasis added. Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations: Luxembourg, 
CRC/C/146, Geneva: 2005, para. 207. 
226 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General Recommendation 30: 
Discrimination against Non-Citizens, New York: 1 October 2004, para. 30. See also CERD, 
Concluding Observations: Sweden, A/52/18, New York: 1997, para. 500; Finland, A/54/18, New York: 
1999, para. 71; Canada, A/57/18, New York: 2002, para. 337; Republic of Korea, A/58/18, New York: 
2003, para. 489; Argentina, A/59/18, New York: 2004, para. 235. As to the equal entitlement to the 
right to education regardless of residence status, note also that article 30 of the Migrant Workers 
Convention guarantees access to education to the children of regular and irregular migrant workers 
alike. It is unfortunate that the UNESCO Convention Against Discrimination in Education only 
guarantees resident foreigners equality of treatment with nationals in respect of access to education and 
that the UN Declaration on Non-nationals offers an even more limited provision concerning the right to 
education (article 8, paragraph 1(c)). However, these instruments predate the developments mentioned 





“access to public educational institutions and programmes” at all levels,227 but the 
education offered must meet certain standards – be directed towards certain goals228 
– and the stateless are to enjoy freedom of choice in education, including the 
freedom to establish educational institutions.229 Human rights law therefore 
duplicates and moves unmistakably beyond the guarantees made to stateless 
persons under the 1954 Statelessness Convention. 
 
7 THE RIGHT TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
 
The term “intellectual property” refers to all of the “legal rights which result from 
intellectual activity in the industrial, scientific, literary and artistic fields”.230 One of 
the main purposes of intellectual property rights is to protect the moral and material 
interests of inventors and authors.231 From a human rights perspective, the right to 
intellectual property forms one element of a cluster of rights broadly referred to as 
the right to participate in or enjoy cultural life or simply “cultural rights”. The 
proclamation of these rights is grounded on the understanding that culture forms an 
indispensable attribute of human identity: 
 
The basic source of identity for human beings is often found in cultural 
traditions into which he or she is born and brought up. The preservation 
of that identity can be of crucial importance to well-being and self-
respect.232 
 
For the stateless, a cultural identity distinct from that of the majority of the state 
population is often a contributing factor to their plight – in many cases “citizenship 
inequalities and citizenship denial are historically and culturally produced”233 – and 
                                                           
227 At primary and secondary level education should be made “generally available and accessible to 
all”. Article 13, paragraph 2 (a) and (b) of the ICESCR and article 28, paragraph 1(a) and (b) of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child. Meanwhile, higher education “shall be made equally accessible 
to all, on the basis of capacity”, allowing states to deny access to those who do not possess the required 
expertise. Article 13, paragraph 2(c) of the ICESCR and article 28, paragraph 1(c) of the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child. States must also “take measures to encourage regular attendance at schools and 
the reduction of drop-out rates”. Article 28, paragraph 1 (e) of the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child. 
228 See article 13, paragraph 1 of the ICESCR and article 29, paragraph 1 of the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child. 
229 See article 13, paragraphs 3 and 4 of the ICESCR and article 29, paragraph 2 of the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child. 
230 World Intellectual Property Organisation, WIPO Intellectual Property Handbook: Policy, Laws and 
Use, WIPO Publication No. 489(E), Geneva 2004, page 3. 
231 Another broad goal of intellectual property law has been to “promote, as a deliberate act of 
Government policy, creativity and the dissemination and application of its results and to encourage fair 
trading which would contribute to economic and social development”. World Intellectual Property 
Organisation, WIPO Intellectual Property Handbook: Policy, Laws and Use, WIPO Publication No. 
489(E), Geneva 2004, page 3. 
232 Asbjorn Eide, "Cultural Rights as Individual Human Rights" in Rosas (ed) Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht: 1995, page 231. 
233 Emphasis added. Advisory Board on Human Security (prepared by Constantin Sokoloff), Denial of 
Citizenship: A Challenge to Human Security, February 2005, page. 35. 
 
 
Protecting the Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of the Stateless 
 347 
difficulties enjoying that distinct cultural life are not uncommon.234 However, 
cultural rights have a long and complicated history that has been marred by 
controversy and today this area remains the subject of much disagreement and the 
norms involved are poorly defined.235 Instead the importance of cultural 
considerations has strongly infiltrated the overall human rights regime through the 
protection of other rights, such as the right to education, the freedom of expression 
and minority rights, which have already been dealt with.236 With this in mind, a 
very brief investigation will suffice. Meanwhile, intellectual property rights have 
tended to be the subject of international agreements outside the human rights 
field237 – rescuing them in a sense from the overall cultural rights impasse – and this 
will also be touched upon in the following assessment of the state of play of 
international law. 
 
7.1 The 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons 
 
In this section we come to consider the last ESC right housed in the 1954 
Statelessness Convention, indeed the last substantive provision that can be classed 
as an expression of either a civil and political right or an economic, social and 
cultural right. Article 14 is entitled “artistic rights and industrial property”238 and 
provides for the right to intellectual property in the following terms: 
 
In respect of the protection of industrial property, such as inventions, 
designs or models, trade marks, trade names, and of rights in literary, 
artistic and scientific works, a stateless person shall be accorded in the 
country in which he has his habitual residence the same protection as is 
accorded to nationals of that country.239 
 
The purpose of this article is to provide protection of “the totality of creations of the 
human mind”.240 As the type of protection remains unspecified, we can assume that 
all aspects of protection are covered, whether they relate to economic or moral 
                                                           
234 As a minority group in many countries, the stateless experience severe difficulties in expressing and 
retaining their culture. For example, the Syrian government is reported to enforce a prohibition of 
Kurdish cultural celebrations. Maureen Lynch, Lives on hold: The human cost of statelessness, 
Washington: 2005, page 46. 
235 Magdalena Sepulveda; Theo van Banning; Gudrun Gudmundsdottir; Christine Chamoun; Willem 
van Genugten, Human Rights Reference Handbook, University for Peace, Ciudad Colon: 2004, page 
296. 
236 See chapter X, section 7 and section 6 of the present chapter. 
237 From the late 19th century onwards, intellectual property rights have been the subject of multilateral 
conventions. The system is now coordinated through the World Intellectual Property Organisation 
(WIPO) – one of the UN’s specialised agencies. 
238 Industrial property and artistic rights (also known as copyright) are the two main fields of 
intellectual property. World Intellectual Property Organisation, WIPO Intellectual Property Handbook: 
Policy, Laws and Use, WIPO Publication No. 489(E), Geneva 2004, page 3. 
239 Note that this article was adopted in identical wording to the equivalent provision in the 1951 
Refugee Convention. No reservations have been lodged in respect of this provision by state parties to 
the 1954 Statelessness Convention.  
240 Nehemiah Robinson, Convention relating to the status of stateless persons - Its history and 





interests in the intellectual property. Moreover, for the purposes of such protection 
of intellectual property, it is unimportant what mechanism the state has introduced, 
be it copyrighting, patenting or another system.241 What is, however, relevant is that 
in order to benefit from this provision, a stateless person must have acquired 
habitual residence in the state in question. As we have previously noted, there is 
every potential for this phrase to be interpreted as a highly demanding level of 
attachment, requiring not only “residence of a sufficiently long duration to consider 
him as locally connected with the country”,242 but also lawfulness of stay.243  
Once a stateless person has established  his status as a habitual resident, he 
will, nevertheless, be able to enjoy national treatment. In addition, thanks to the 
second sentence of this provision, the stateless person is to be treated by other state 
parties as if he or she is a national of the country of habitual residence for the 
purposes of intellectual property rights.244 This means that the stateless can benefit 
from reciprocal agreements that may be in place even though they lack a formal 
bond of nationality. However, without obtaining the status of a habitual resident – 
for example through lack of lawful stay – a stateless person is unable to benefit 
from either of these guarantees and will enjoy only that treatment which is generally 
accorded to similarly situated non-nationals.245 Furthermore, article 15 limits its 
attention to intellectual property rights and does not deal with cultural rights more 
generally. Nor is there any other provision in the 1954 Statelessness Convention 
that explicitly addresses this subject. And as to those rights which may indirectly 
touch upon the right to enjoy or participate in cultural life, the 1954 Statelessness 
Convention also comes up considerably short. It fails to offer any protection of 
minority rights, the freedom of expression or, for example, a guarantee of the 
qualitative aspect of education.246 The only solace is that provided by the articles on 
the freedom of religion and the freedom of association.247  
 
7.2 International human rights law 
 
The right to intellectual property can be found in article 15 of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, where paragraph 1(c) declares: 
 
                                                           
241 James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge: 2005, page 834. 
242 Nehemiah Robinson, Convention relating to the status of stateless persons - Its history and 
interpretation, UNHCR, Geneva: 1955, page 55. 
243 See the previous discussion of this difficulty the discussion of the right of access of to courts in 
chapter X, at note 157. 
244 The second sentence of article 14 of the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons 
reads: “In the territory of any other Contracting State, he shall be accorded the same protection as is 
accorded in that territory to nationals of the country in which he has his habitual residence”. 
245 This is the “residual standard” prescribed by article 7, paragraph 1 of the 1954 Statelessness 
Convention. See also James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge: 2005, page 839. Note again that under article 7, paragraphs 2-5, the 
stateless may benefit from an exemption from reciprocity. See chapter IX. 
246 See chapter X, section 7 and section 6.1 of the present chapter. 
247 See chapter X, section 5.1 and section 3.1 of the present chapter. 
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The States Parties to the present Covenant recognise the right of everyone 
[…] to benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests 
resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is 
the author.248 
 
As we found in the context of the 1954 Statelessness Convention, the protection 
envisaged relates to all “creations of the human mind”.249 Just as the provision 
indicates, the “protection” covers moral and material interests, which means both 
the right to be recognised as the author of a work and to object to its misuse as well 
as the right to benefit economically from the work produced with a view to the 
enjoyment of an adequate standard of living.250 With regards to the question to what 
extent non-nationals may invoke this right, the simple answer lies in the 
understanding that intellectual property rights are attributed to authors of such 
works, as “authors”, so citizenship should not be relevant.251 Moreover, according 
to the ESC Committee, the core content of this right includes the obligation to 
protect the moral interests of authors, respect and protect the material interests of 
authors in order to allow them to enjoy an adequate standard of living and “ensure 
equal access […] to administrative, judicial or other appropriate remedies enabling 
authors to seek and obtain redress in case their moral and material interests have 
been infringed”.252 These basic standards apply to everyone - nationals, non-
nationals and stateless persons.  
 However, beyond this enunciation of the core minimum obligations, the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has evaded the question of the 
scope of protection offered by article 15, paragraph 1(c) of the ICESCR to non-
                                                           
248 This provision was clearly inspired by the identically worded article 27, paragraph 2 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. The only other source of this right in a major human rights instrument is 
article 14, paragraph 1(c) of the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in 
the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
249 ESC Committee, General Comment No. 17: The right of everyone to benefit from the protection of 
the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he 
or she is the author, E/C.12/GC/17, 12 January 2006, para. 9. 
250 ESC Committee, General Comment No. 17: The right of everyone to benefit from the protection of 
the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he 
or she is the author, E/C.12/GC/17, 12 January 2006, paras. 13 and 15. The right to property (dealt with 
in chapter X, section 6) is also relevant for the enjoyment of the material rights connected to intellectual 
property. See also Asbjorn Eide, "Cultural Rights as Individual Human Rights" in Rosas (ed) 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht: 1995, page 232. 
251 Throughout the general comment on this article, the ESC Committee refers to the rights enjoyed by 
“authors” and no-where is citizenship mentioned. ESC Committee, General Comment No. 17: The right 
of everyone to benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any 
scientific, literary or artistic production of which he or she is the author, E/C.12/GC/17, 12 January 
2006. More generally, all “cultural rights” are considered to be espoused to the benefit of nationals and 
non-nationals alike. Diana Elles, International Provisions Protecting the Human Rights of Non-
Citizens: Study, New York: 1980, page 34; David Weissbrodt, Final Report on Prevention of 
Discrimination - The Rights of Non-Citizens, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/23, 26 May 2003, para. 47; 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General Recommendation 30: Discrimination 
against Non-Citizens, New York: 1 October 2004, para. 37. 
252 ESC Committee, General Comment No. 17: The right of everyone to benefit from the protection of 
the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he 





nationals. This is neither dealt with in the General Comment on this provision, nor 
touched upon in any concluding observations on state party reports – whether for 
lack of interest or lack of any problems to comment on, it is difficult to say.253 What 
the Committee has clearly asserted, is that it is “important not to equate intellectual 
property rights with the human right recognised in article 15, paragraph 1(c)”.254 
Although there is undoubtedly a significant substantive overlap, the exact content 
and purpose of this human rights provision differs from the content and purpose of 
intellectual property rights and agreements elaborated independently of the human 
rights regime. The relationship between the two systems is a complex question that 
continues to occupy various scholars and institutions.255 In the meantime, the ESC 
Committee seems to have adopted the position that the regulation of intellectual 
property rights is a matter to be dealt with under the specialised regime that is 
watched over by the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO).256 Nowhere 
does the ESC committee contest the legitimacy of the approach taken under the 
numerous intellectual property conventions, which generally establish a system of 
reciprocity for the recognition and enjoyment of intellectual property rights.257 
Under this system, the lack of a nationality through which to invoke the benefits of 
a reciprocal agreement places the stateless in a severely disadvantaged position. Yet 
upon closer inspection, the two main intellectual property conventions at least, also 
                                                           
253 In fact, the subject of intellectual property rights is generally very rarely raised in response to state 
party reports – these focus much more on issues relating to the preservation and enjoyment of cultural 
identities. Note moreover that in their treatment of “cultural rights”, the issue of intellectual property 
rights tends also to receive only a passing mention by human rights scholars. See for example 
Magdalena Sepulveda; Theo van Banning; Gudrun Gudmundsdottir; Christine Chamoun; Willem van 
Genugten, Human Rights Reference Handbook, University for Peace, Ciudad Colon: 2004, pages 296-
298 and Asbjorn Eide, "Cultural Rights as Individual Human Rights" in Rosas (ed) Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht: 1995, pages 233 and 236. 
254 ESC Committee, General Comment No. 17: The right of everyone to benefit from the protection of 
the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he 
or she is the author, E/C.12/GC/17, 12 January 2006, para. 3. 
255 Lauwence Helfer, Human Rights and Intellectual Property: Conflict or Coexistence? in Minnesota 
Journal of Law, Science & Technology, Vol. 5, 2003, pages 47-61. For example, the World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO) collaborated with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Human Rights to organise a panel discussion on “Intellectual Property and Human Rights” in 1998. 
A full report of this event and the background papers discussed can be found at 
http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/hr/paneldiscussion/. See in particular Silke von Lewinski, Intellectual 
Property, Nationality and Non-Discrimination, paper presented at the “Panel Discussion on Intellectual 
Property and Human Rights”, Geneva, 9 November 1998. See also the UN Sub-Commission on Human 
Rights, Resolution on Intellectual Property and Human Rights, 25th Meeting, Geneva, 17 August 2000. 
256 24 treaties relating to intellectual property are currently administered by the WIPO. 
257 Since intellectual property rights are traditionally dealt with at the domestic level, they tend to be 
limited territorially: “they exist and can be exercised only within the jurisdiction of the country or 
countries under whose laws they are granted”. In order to secure a more uniform practice between states 
and the regulation of intellectual property rights across borders, international conventions have been 
settled. The contracting states agree to accord national treatment to one another’s citizens on the basis 
of reciprocity through participation in the requisite multilateral agreement. See World Intellectual 
Property Organisation, WIPO Intellectual Property Handbook: Policy, Laws and Use, WIPO 
Publication No. 489(E), Geneva 2004, page 7; Silke von Lewinski, Intellectual Property, Nationality 
and Non-Discrimination, paper presented at the “Panel Discussion on Intellectual Property and Human 
Rights”, Geneva, 9 November 1998, section 3. 
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provide for national treatment for certain categories of people who are not the 
citizens of a participating state. This may enable the stateless to invoke the 
protection offered – providing that they meet the conditions set which, similarly to 
the 1954 Statelessness Convention, relate to the residence status of the individuals 
concerned. Indeed a protocol to the Universal Copyright Convention now explicitly 
provides for national treatment for habitually resident stateless persons.258 Thus 
between the minimum core obligations elaborated in this area under the ICESCR 
and the possibilities that the international intellectual property regime offer for 
protecting stateless persons, the added value of the stateless-specific protection of 
intellectual property rights as outlined in the 1954 Statelessness Convention is 
limited.259 
 In the meantime, where the 1954 Statelessness Convention failed to address 
any other “cultural rights”, international human rights law shows a much greater 
interest in this subject. The rest of article 15 of the ICESCR is devoted to these 
rights, which include  
 
the right to participate in cultural life; the right to enjoy culture; the right to 
choose to belong to a group; linguistic rights; and protection of cultural and 
scientific heritage.260  
                                                           
258 Protocol concerning the application of that Convention to works of Stateless Persons and Refugees 
(adopted in Paris on the 24th of July 1971) to the Universal Copyright Convention, adopted in Geneva 
on the 6th of September 1952 (and revised in 1971). Meanwhile, the Paris Convention for the Protection 
of Industrial Property, adopted on the 20th of March 1883 (and since revised on several occasions), 
provides in article 3 that citizens of non-state parties, a category that should include the stateless, shall 
enjoy national treatment if they “are domiciled or […] have real and effective industrial and 
commercial establishments in the territory of one of the [state parties]”. And the Berne Convention for 
the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, adopted on the 9th of September 1886 (and since revised 
on several occasions), establishes in its article 3 that the stateless (or any national of a non-state party) 
shall benefit from the terms of the convention if they either have their habitual residence in a state party 
or where their work is first published in a state party.  
259 Upon a comparison of the 1951 Refugee Convention with the terms of various instruments of the 
international intellectual property regime, Hathaway concludes that “in sum, the primary purpose of 
Art. 14 as conceived by the drafters – to allow refugees to enforce their literary and artistic rights 
outside their country of citizenship despite the prevalence of reciprocity agreements – is today largely 
superseded by the amended Berne Convention. But Art. 14 remains of value in ensuring that the 
industrial property rights of refugees who are habitually resident, even if not domiciled, in a state party 
can be enforced outside the asylum country. It also ensures that refugees benefit from new forms of 
intellectual property protection [...] even when […] non-citizens are not otherwise enfranchised”. His 
assessment is equally applicable to the 1954 Statelessness Convention. James Hathaway, The Rights of 
Refugees Under International Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 2005, page 840. 
260 Yvonne Donders, Towards a Right to Cultural Identity?, Intersentia, Oxford: 2002, page 15; 
Magdalena Sepulveda; Theo van Banning; Gudrun Gudmundsdottir; Christine Chamoun; Willem van 
Genugten, Human Rights Reference Handbook, University for Peace, Ciudad Colon: 2004, page 297. 
For an in depth analysis of the content of these norms see generally Yvonne Donders, Towards a Right 
to Cultural Identity? Intersentia, Oxford: 2002; and Asbjorn Eide, "Cultural Rights as Individual 
Human Rights" in Rosas (ed) Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
Dordrecht: 1995, pages 233-240. See also the rights set out in article 27 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights; Article 5, paragraph e(vi) of the Convention on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination; Article 31 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child; Article 45 of the Migrant 






These rights are elaborated to the benefit of everyone, including non-citizens, and 
the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has explicitly asked 
states to “take the necessary measures to prevent practices that deny non-citizens 
their cultural identity”.261 Moreover, the UN Declaration on the Rights of Non-
nationals provides to all non-citizens, regardless of immigration status, the right “to 
retain their own language, culture and tradition”.262 Sadly, the continuing 
controversy surrounding cultural rights has impeded the ESC Committee from 
adopting a general comment with respect to these dimensions of article 15 of the 
ICESCR.263 However, as mentioned in the introduction to this section, the 
recognition of the importance of preserving culture and promoting participation in 
cultural life has infiltrated many other areas of human rights law and is having an 
enormous influence on the interpretation of such matters as the right to health and 
the right to education.264 So, while there is still great scope for the clarification of 
“cultural rights” and the obligations imposed on states with respect to (nationals 
and) non-nationals, the stateless should already be benefiting from this overall 
recognition of the intrinsic human need to enjoy culture where the 1954 
Statelessness Convention remains silent. 
  
8 ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS ABSENT FROM THE 1954 
STATELESSNESS CONVENTION 
 
In the foregoing sections we identified several areas in which the 1954 Statelessness 
Convention was found to come up short in the protection of (aspects of) the 
economic, social and cultural rights of the stateless. It is now time to consider an 
area which the convention has overlooked almost entirely: the right to health. While 
it is true that provision for hospital care or some forms of (ill)health-related benefits 
may indirectly be addressed by the article of the Convention that deals broadly with 
“public relief” or indeed social security, these norms in no way guarantee that states 
will address this issue under either type of programme.265 Where the 1954 
Statelessness Convention did go on to at least touch upon, for example, the right to 
                                                                                                                                               
Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; and Article 17 of the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights.  
261 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General Recommendation 30: 
Discrimination against Non-Citizens, New York: 1 October 2004, para. 37. See also David Weissbrodt, 
Final Report on Prevention of Discrimination - The Rights of Non-Citizens, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/23, 26 
May 2003, para. 47.  
262 Article 5, paragraph 1(f) of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Non-nationals. 
263 Magdalena Sepulveda; Theo van Banning; Gudrun Gudmundsdottir; Christine Chamoun; Willem 
van Genugten, Human Rights Reference Handbook, University for Peace, Ciudad Colon: 2004, page 
296. 
264 Asbjorn Eide, "Cultural Rights as Individual Human Rights" in Rosas (ed) Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht: 1995, page 232. A Day of General Discussion 
was held on article 15 of the ICESCR in 1992 but this has regrettably not yet been succeeded by a 
General Comment. See also Yvonne Donders, Towards a Right to Cultural Identity?, Intersentia, 
Oxford: 2002, pages 154-156. 
265 See section 4.1 above and James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 2005, page 810. 
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adequate food and housing,266 there is no mention whatsoever of the need to protect 
the health of the stateless. Yet health(care) is another area in which the stateless 
report grave difficulties.267 This fact is made all the more troubling by the 
understanding that the circumstances in which many stateless populations live can 
contribute to susceptibility to poor general health – due to inadequate housing, food 
and sanitation – as well as mental health problems: 
 
Denial of citizenship has also severe consequences on mental health. 
Those confined to camps are particularly vulnerable to depression, which 
in turn leads to violence, suicide and increased emotional and 
psychological strain on the community. The mental health of many 
Lhotshampas men living in the refugee camps of South East Nepal has 
degraded over the past ten years and alcoholism, domestic violence and 
suicide are not uncommon.268 
 
The last question to be answered in this chapter on ESC rights is therefore to what 
extent human rights law steps in to compensate for the omission of the right to 
health from the 1954 Statelessness Convention. 
 The right to health is enshrined in article 12 of the ICESCR, which opens with 
the declaration that “the State Parties to the present Covenant recognise the right of 
everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental 
health”.269 The wording of this paragraph indicates that the right to health is another 
typical ESC right which requires largely progressive realisation. It also shows that 
the human rights regime is not just concerned with access to healthcare but with a 
                                                           
266 See section 5.1 of this chapter. 
267 Restricted access to or a blanket exclusion from health care services has been reported in relation to 
many stateless populations, including the Meskhetian Turks in Russia, the Rohingya in Myanmar, the 
Estate Tamils in Sri Lanka, Kurds in Syria, Haitians in the Dominican Republic and the Biharis in 
Bangladesh. See Open Society Justice Initiative, Racial Discrimination and the Rights of Non-Citizens. 
Submission to the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the occasion of its 
64th Session, New York: 2004; Maureen Lynch, Lives on hold: The human cost of statelessness, 
Washington: 2005; Advisory Board on Human Security (prepared by Constantin Sokoloff), Denial of 
Citizenship: A Challenge to Human Security, February 2005, page 20. Specific problems have also 
been cited in relation to access to child healthcare, including vaccination programmes. See Youth 
Advocate Program International, Stateless Children - Youth Who are Without Citizenship, Washington: 
2003, page 6. 
268 Be reminded that the Lhotshampas are a group made stateless by Bhutan, many of whom are still 
living as refugees in neighbouring Nepal. Advisory Board on Human Security (prepared by Constantin 
Sokoloff), Denial of Citizenship: A Challenge to Human Security, February 2005, page 22. 
269 Article 12, paragraph 1 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
Expressions of the right to health can also be found in Article 25, paragraph 1 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights; Article 5, paragraph e(iv) of the Convention on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination; Article 24 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child; Articles 28, 43 and 45 of the 
Migrant Workers Convention; Article 26 of the American Convention on Human Rights read in 
conjunction with article XI of the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man and Article 
10 of the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights;  Article 11 of the European Social Charter; and Article 16 of the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. For a concise analysis of these provisions, see Magdalena 
Sepulveda; Theo van Banning; Gudrun Gudmundsdottir; Christine Chamoun; Willem van Genugten, 





person’s overall physical and psychological or social well-being.270 Importantly 
though, the right to health “is not to be understood as the right to be healthy”.271 It 
is about promoting the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health, a 
standard that “obviously varies in time and place”.272 What has been established, 
however, is the scope of the minimum core obligations in respect of the right to 
health, which states must assure to everyone and for which non-compliance is 
considered unjustifiable in any circumstances.273 These core obligations include the 
duty to ensure non-discriminatory access to healthcare as well as to ensure access to 
basic food, shelter, housing, sanitation and potable water and to provide certain 
essential drugs.274 Besides elaborating these minimum guarantees that non-citizens 
and stateless persons should also benefit from, the ESC Committee has explicitly 
determined that states must refrain from  
 
denying or limiting equal access for all persons, including […] asylum seekers 
and illegal immigrants, to preventive, curative and palliative health services.275  
 
Lack of citizenship (and even legal status in the state) should therefore not be a 
ground for restricting access to existing healthcare opportunities.276 Moreover, with 
                                                           
270 Among the steps that the ICESCR goes on to outline for the realisation of this right is, for example, 
“the improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene” (article 12, paragraph 2(b) of 
the ICESCR). The Convention on the Rights of the Child also mentions measures to “combat disease 
and malnutrition, including within the framework of primary health care, through, inter alia, the 
application of readily available technology and through the provision of adequate nutritious foods and 
clean drinking water, taking into consideration the dangers and risks of environmental pollution” 
(article 24, paragraph 2(c)). See also Katarina Tomasevski, "Health Rights" in Rosas (ed) Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht: 1995, pages 125-126 and 128. 
271 ESC Committee, General Comment No. 14: The right to the highest attainable standard of health, 
E/C.12/2000/4, 11 August 2000, para. 8. 
272 Katarina Tomasevski, "Health Rights" in Rosas (ed) Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht: 1995, page 125. See also John Dent, Research Paper on the Social and 
Economic Rights of Non-Nationals in Europe, Brussels: 1998, page 80; James Hathaway, The Rights of 
Refugees Under International Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 2005, page 511. 
273 See ESC Committee, General Comment No. 14: The right to the highest attainable standard of 
health, E/C.12/2000/4, 11 August 2000, para. 47. 
274 ESC Committee, General Comment No. 14: The right to the highest attainable standard of health, 
E/C.12/2000/4, 11 August 2000, para. 43. This core content has been derived from the work of the 
World Health Organisation. Beyond these minimum standards, the ESC Committee has also set out a 
number of obligations that should be implemented as a matter of priority (found in paragraph 44 of the 
same General Comment). See also Magdalena Sepulveda; Theo van Banning; Gudrun Gudmundsdottir; 
Christine Chamoun; Willem van Genugten, Human Rights Reference Handbook, University for Peace, 
Ciudad Colon: 2004, page 283. 
275 ESC Committee, General Comment No. 14: The right to the highest attainable standard of health, 
E/C.12/2000/4, 11 August 2000, para. 34. The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
made a similar statement in Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General 
Recommendation 30: Discrimination against Non-Citizens, New York: 1 October 2004, para. 36. See 
also ESC Committee, General Comment No. 19 - The Right to Social Security, Advanced unedited 
version, 4 February 2008, para. 38. 
276 This is a matter that the two UN treaty bodies have taken up on a number of occasions in their 
comments on state practice. See for example ESC Committee, Concluding Observations: Nepal, 
E/2002/22, New York and Geneva: 2001, para. 545. Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
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regards to child health and emergency medical care, the possession of a (certain) 
nationality is also irrelevant.277 The stateless should therefore garner substantial 
protection of the right to health from contemporary human rights law – thus 




In the previous chapter, as the consideration of civil and political rights was drawn 
to a close, we were forced to conclude that the contribution of the 1954 Convention 
relating to the Status of Stateless Persons in offering the stateless a basis for 
enjoying such rights was negligible. It was on a note of optimism then, that this 
chapter opened with the discovery that the 1954 Statelessness Convention devoted 
twice as much attention (double the number of provisions) to economic, social and 
cultural rights. And we did indeed find that the statelessness instrument covers most 
ESC rights, at least to some extent, whereas it overlooked quite a number of civil 
and political rights.278 However, as the analysis of the content of the relevant 
articles got underway and their position in the overall scheme of the international 
legal protection of the ESC rights of the stateless became clearer, this optimism 
made way for disillusionment. The, by now familiar, weaknesses in the approach 
taken to the elaboration of rights once again came to the fore: many of the rights are 
conditioned by a high level of attachment – all but two of the ESC rights require at 
least lawful presence279 - and all of them prescribe a certain level of contingent 
treatment rather than absolute rights. Moreover, we again identified a significant 
                                                                                                                                               
Discrimination, Concluding Observations: Saudi Arabia, A/58/18, New York: 2003, para. 206; 
Argentina, A/59/18, New York: 2004, para. 235; Bahrain, A/60/18, New York: 2005, para. 84. See also 
David Weissbrodt, Final Report on Prevention of Discrimination - The Rights of Non-Citizens, 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/23, 26 May 2003, paras. 66 and 68; James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees 
Under International Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 2005, pages 512-514. 
277 Recall the previous comments on the application of the Convention on the Rights of the Child to all 
children, regardless of citizenship. It has further been commented that “the priority accorded to 
children’s rights is evidenced in the high degree of consensus concerning the protection of their health 
and their access to health care” and that Article 24 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
provides a clear obligation for state parties to “extend to all children access to facilities for the 
treatment of illness and rehabilitation of health”. Katarina Tomasevski, "Health Rights" in Rosas (ed) 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht: 1995, pages 134-135. 
See also John Dent, Research Paper on the Social and Economic Rights of Non-Nationals in Europe, 
Brussels: 1998, page 87 and Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations: Panama, 
CRC/C/62, Geneva: 1997, para. 116;  Kyrgyzstan, CRC/C/97, Geneva: 2000, para. 311; Djibouti, 
CRC/C/97, Geneva: 2000, para. 551; France, CRC/C/140, Geneva: 2004, para. 621. With regards to 
access to emergency medical care, article 28 of the Migrant Workers Convention determines that all 
migrant workers and members of their families, whether in a regular or irregular situation have the right 
to receive “any medical care that is urgently required for the preservation of their life or the avoidance 
of irreparable harm to their health on the basis of equality of treatment with nationals of the State 
concerned”.  
278 Compare chapter X, section 7 and section 8 of this chapter. 
279 Only the provision that deals with rationing (which, as discussed, is somewhat obsolete in this day 
and age) and that addressing the right to education were elaborated to the benefit of all stateless 
persons, regardless of status. In contrast, the civil and political rights protected under the 1954 
Statelessness Convention were generally less demanding in respect of the level of attachment required 





watering down of protection as the norms from the 1951 Refugee Convention were 
transposed into this statelessness instrument. The terms of some of the more 
forceful and valuable provisions of the 1951 Refugee Convention – such as article 
17 on the right to work - were redrafted with detrimental effect. The combined 
result of offering only a diluted, contingent standard of treatment at a high level of 
attachment casts severe doubt upon the overall value of the 1954 Statelessness 
Convention for the protection of ESC rights.280  
The nature of ESC rights and the manner in which they are guaranteed 
under human rights law makes this conclusion all the more rueful. There are many 
areas in which the exact treatment owed to non-nationals in their enjoyment of ESC 
rights through the human rights regime remains uncertain: the core minimum 
standards have not been universally elucidated and the scope of the principle of 
non-discrimination in respect of distinctions between citizens and non-citizens is 
not entirely clear in each case. Thus  
 
while non-nationals are clearly beneficiaries of ICESCR rights, the exact 
treatment owed to them by States Parties is not well defined.281  
 
In addition, article 2, paragraph 3 of the ICESCR grants “developing countries” the 
opportunity to restrict the enjoyment of “economic rights” by non-nationals, a 
provision clouded by ambiguous terms that may be (mis)used to deny a variety of 
rights to stateless persons.282 This is particularly worrying in the context of the 
protection of statelessness, since many of the large populations of stateless persons 
live in countries that could play this “developing country” card.283 In an area where 
a stateless-specific instrument could therefore have made an invaluable contribution 
to enunciating and clarifying the protection to be enjoyed by the stateless, the 1954 
Statelessness Convention stops woefully short of fulfilling this purpose. By 
prescribing a contingent standard, particularly where this is limited to treatment on 
a par with non-nationals generally, the 1954 Statelessness Convention does nothing 
more than simply force us to turn back to other sources of international law to 
determine what actual protection this standard of treatment entails. The conclusion 
to be drawn as to the role of this statelessness instrument in guaranteeing the basic 
rights of the stateless is therefore the same as that in chapter X: its added value in 
light of contemporary human rights law is negligible. 
 Meanwhile, the search for norms relating to the enjoyment of ESC rights by 
non-nationals and stateless persons in the overall human rights field revealed a 
complex picture that is difficult to decipher in places. In some areas, the UN treaty 
                                                           
280 One possible exception is the elaboration of a right to public assistance on a par with nationals since 
this is an area in which the human rights norms are less clear. However, the impact of the standards set 
by the 1954 Statelessness Convention may be severely restricted due to the ambiguous relationship 
between the article dealing with public assistance and that dealing with social security financed from 
public funds. See section 4.1 above. 
281 John Dent, Research Paper on the Social and Economic Rights of Non-Nationals in Europe, 
Brussels: 1998, page 45. 
282 See also James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge: 2005, pages 122-123. 
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bodies have taken a clear stance on the importance of ensuring that non-citizens 
enjoy the applicable rights and are actively monitoring and reacting to the treatment 
of non-nationals across the world. The right to an adequate standard of living and 
the right to education provide examples of this approach. In contrast, the question of 
what scope of protection must be offered to non-nationals remains considerably 
neglected in respect of various other ESC rights, like the right to work or cultural 
rights. Nor has much attention been devoted to the specific plight and needs of the 
stateless, as a distinct group, in any area. Here and there are signs of 
acknowledgement of the fact that the particular nature of statelessness is such that it 
warrants a differentiated approach from that set out for non-citizens generally. 
Consider, for instance, the recently adopted General Comment of the ESC 
Committee on social security that explicitly includes the stateless among the 
marginalized groups in need of special attention.284 Moreover, the motivation for 
according the stateless protection that is more commensurate with their situation 
also remains active in the minds of human rights scholars – as it was at the time that 
the 1954 Statelessness Convention was adopted with a view to achieving this very 
goal.285 However, we have yet to see this reasoning fully permeate the system of 










                                                           
284 See section 4.2 above. 
285 Human rights scholar Asbjorn Eide is one voice that has clearly enunciated the need to distinguish 
carefully between different groups of non-nationals and has expressed the need, also with regard to 
economic and social rights, to accord treatment that takes into account the specifics of their situation. 
See Asbjorn Asbjorn Eide, "Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as Human Rights" in Rosas (ed) 
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359 
After separating the protection offered to the stateless into the two main classes of 
human rights and dealing with both in some depth, the question arises what more 
there is to discuss. This brings us to a residual category of guarantees elaborated in 
the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons that is best referred 
to as protecting the “special needs” of the stateless. Thus, alongside the 
promulgation of various minimum (human rights) standards for the stateless to 
enjoy – and thereby following once more in the footsteps of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention - the statelessness instrument offers the stateless certain “facilities”1 
that are necessitated by their very statelessness.2 These can be found in Chapter V 
of the Statelessness Convention entitled Administrative Measures.3  
Arguably the greatest special need of the stateless is the decisive resolution 
of their plight through the bestowal of citizenship. In line with this reasoning, the 
most important of the special measures included in the 1954 Statelessness 
Convention is article 32 that deals with naturalisation and thereby with access to a 
nationality. In the upcoming section we will look closely at the obligations of states 
to undertake to resolve statelessness under the 1954 Statelessness Convention and 
compare these with the duties that emanate from general international (human 
rights) law. Thereafter, the Convention’s approach to a second special need of the 
stateless will be discussed: documentation. And, finally, we must consider whether 
there are further concerns that affect the stateless as stateless persons that the 1954 
Statelessness Convention has neglected to attend to and whether other areas of 
international law compensate for any such oversight.  
 
 
                                                           
1 Guy Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee in International Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 2007, page 
512.   
2 These special measures have also been described, in the context of the 1951 Refugee Convention, as 
“standards applicable to refugees as refugees” or “refugee-specific concerns”. See Guy Goodwin-Gill, 
The Refugee in International Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 2007, pages 510 – 524 and James 
Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 
2005, page 121. 
3  The internal freedom of movement, expulsion, fiscal charges and transfer of assets are also dealt with 
in the chapter of the 1954 Statelessness Convention on “Administrative Measures” but have already 








It goes without saying that the prospect of naturalisation would be hugely beneficial 
to all stateless persons since the conferral of nationality is tantamount to lifting 
them out of this severely vulnerable group.4 Naturalisation is thus an indispensable 
tool in working towards the resolution of the ultimate “special need” of the stateless 
- addressing their actual lack of a nationality. Meanwhile, the elaboration of a 
(facilitated) right or opportunity to gain citizenship through naturalisation, is 
effectively also an expression of the right to a nationality. As such, it could have 
been presented for consideration in chapter X where we looked at the civil and 
political rights attributed to stateless persons through the 1954 Statelessness 
Convention and other instruments. However, the issue was set aside for 
consideration in the present chapter to allow the measures prescribed to be 
evaluated in their proper context. We are not concerned here with the right to a 
nationality in general terms or the bearing it has on the prevention of statelessness – 
matters dealt with in detail in part 25 – but with naturalisation as a means to meet 
the need of existing stateless populations. It is from this perspective that an 
assessment will be made of the scope of protection offered under the 1954 
Statelessness Convention and other areas of international law. 
  It is important to realise that naturalisation policies vary substantially from one 
state to the next in accordance with the (perceived) national identity and state 
interests.6 The enduring lack of sufficient willpower or mettle to redress situations 
of (large-scale) statelessness finds its roots in the overwhelming sensitivity of this 
question as to which outsiders are worthy of admission to full membership of the 
political community. Political motivations can thus contribute to the adoption of a 
restrictive naturalisation policy and the prescription of rigorous conditions for 
eligibility to citizenship.7 In extreme cases, we have discovered that the conditions 
elaborated for naturalisation may be deliberately exclusionary so as to manipulate 
or impede access to citizenship for particular groups.8 However, even where the 
requirements set are not particularly stringent, they may, at times, be difficult to 
                                                           
4 “The condition of being stateless will ipso facto terminate when one acquires a nationality”. Carol 
Batchelor The 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons: Implementation within the 
European Union Member States and Recommendations for Harmonisation 2004, page 17. For an 
introduction to the concept attribution of nationality through naturalisation, see chapter III. 
5 Whereby the separate 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness which is focussed on the 
prevention of statelessness and the realisation of the right to a nationality was discussed.  
6 Manley Hudson, Report on Nationality, including Statelessness, A/CN.4/50, 21 February 1952, page 
57; Paul Weis, Nationality and Statelessness in International Law, Kluwer Academic Publishers Group, 
Dordrecht: 1979, page 100; Ruth Donner, "Chapter 2: The Principle of the "Link" in Nationality Law" 
in The Regulation of Nationality in International Law, Transnational Publishers, New York: 1994, 
pages 33-34; Douglas Klusmeyer; Alexander Aleinikoff, From Migrants to Citizens: Membership in a 
Changing World, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC: 2000, page 14. 
7 A strong notion of national identity can have a similar impact, contributing to the enduring exclusion 
of minority groups. Thus, while “integration would ideally require citizenship […] citizenship is 
sometimes made conditional on requirements that in effect demand assimilation”. Asbjorn Eide, 
“Citizenship and the minority rights of non-citizens”, Working Paper prepared for the UN Sub-
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.5/1999/WP.3, 15 April 1999, paragraph 5. 
8 See chapter V, section 1 on arbitrary deprivation of nationality. 
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meet. Consider the common condition of a prolonged period of (lawful and 
habitual) residence: difficult for numerous categories of non-citizens to achieve and 
for the stateless especially so because of the difficulties inherent in gaining or 
retaining access to a state’s territory in the absence of the bond of nationality.9 
Furthermore, states may also make certain stipulations in their naturalisation policy 
that “create particular difficulties in the naturalisation of stateless persons”, such as 
the need to prove the absence of any other bond of citizenship or to produce an 
assortment of documents.10 
These interrelated problems of technical impediments and the issue of 
political will contribute to a poor overall prospect for the acquisition of nationality 
by stateless persons. Consequently, in many instances – in particular where large 
caseloads are involved – statelessness has proven to be a long, drawn-out affair. 
Consider the stateless Russian minority in Latvia and Estonia for whom the 
acquisition of citizenship by naturalisation (or otherwise) proved untenable until the 
laws were relaxed many years down the line11 or the Kurds in Syria who are still 
waiting for a (real) opportunity to acquire nationality.12 And there are a plethora of 
other examples of the protracted nature of the phenomenon of statelessness.13 
Naturalisation then, although an obvious solution to this dramatic form of non-
citizenship, is by no means an easy one. Yet the attribution of citizenship under the 
domestic laws and regulations of a state is the only viable solution to statelessness. 
Only the state itself is empowered to actually confer nationality and this task cannot 
be assumed by another state or an international organisation.14 And there is no 
alternative to domestic citizenship – the idea of developing a form of international 
                                                           
9 For a discussion of problems relating to residence status for stateless persons, see chapter X, section 
2.2. Manley Hudson, Report on Nationality, including Statelessness, A/CN.4/50, 21 February 1952, 
page 57. In his 1950s report, Hudson also listed the following issues that can commonly impair 
naturalisation: complicated and expensive procedures and stringent requirements as to the possession of 
property. These days, proof of integration through language and history or civics exams often also 
proves to be a challenging requirement for newcomers or members of a minority group to meet.  
10 Manley Hudson, Report on Nationality, including Statelessness, A/CN.4/50, 21 February 1952, page 
57; Rosa da Costa, Rights of Refugees in the Context of Integration: Legal Standards and 
Recommendations, Geneva: June 2006, page 188. 
11 The group of ethnic Russians and former citizens of the Soviet Union became stateless in the 
aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the independence of Latvia and Estonia. They were 
not granted an automatic right of citizenship and prospects for naturalisation were initially severely 
restricted: many categories of person were excluded outright and others were required to meet very 
stringent language and other requirements. These laws were later relaxed, partly as a result of the EU 
and NATO accession process. See Nida Gelazis, "An Evaluation of International Instruments that 
Address the Condition of Statelessness: A Case Study of Estonia and Latvia" in R. Cholewinski (ed) 
International Migration Law, T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague: 2007, pages 297 – 308. 
12 The Kurds in Syria can trace their statelessness back to a 1962 government census. Maureen Lynch, 
"Syria: Follow Through on Commitment to Grant Citizenship to Stateless Kurds" Refugees 
International Bulletin, Washington: Date 2005; Curtis Doebbler, 'A Human Rights Approach to 
Statelessness in the Middle East', in Leiden Journal of International Law, Vol. 15, 2002, page 545. 
13 This is in spite of the finding in the 2003 Questionnaire on statelessness that 59.5% of respondent 
states do provide for facilitated naturalisation for stateless persons who are lawfully and permanently 
resident. UNHCR, Final report concerning the Questionnaire on statelessness pursuant to the Agenda 
for Protection, Geneva: March 2004, page 30. 
14 Carol Batchelor, 'Statelessness and the Problem of Resolving Nationality Status', in International 





citizenship, although raised many times, never gained any real ground.15 It will 
therefore be of great interest to see to what extent a right to a solution has been 
delineated under international law and whether – and in what circumstances – the 
stateless may now enjoy a right to (be considered for) naturalisation under the 
relevant norms.  
 While naturalisation is an important route towards the resolution of 
statelessness, it is not the only mechanism through which existing cases can be 
redressed. The acquisition of nationality may also be achieved automatically by 
operation of the law or through a simple procedure of registration, declaration or 
option.16 A state may, for instance, adopt new legislation with a view to reducing 
the incidence of statelessness on its territory. This was seen in Sri Lanka where 
parliament passed the “Grant of Citizenship to Persons of Indian Origin Act” in 
2003 to confer nationality upon the country’s stateless Estate Tamils. Individuals 
were able to acquire citizenship under this law through one of two routes: 
automatically, by the entry into force of the law itself if they are stateless and meet 
the basic conditions set or through a straight-forward declaration exercise if they 
hold a defunct Indian passport.17 In other cases, it may be the re-visiting of the 
                                                           
15 Roberto Córdova discusses the notion of an international nationality in his 1954 report. Roberto 
Córdova, Nationality, Including Statelessness. Third Report on the Elimination or Reduction of 
Statelessness by Roberto Córdova, Special Rapporteur, A/CN.4/81, New York: 11 March 1954, page 
29. Since then, other scholars have investigated the theory of this concept. See for example Haro van 
Panhuys, "Chapter XI: Final Reflections" in The Role of Nationality in International Law, A.W. 
Sijthoff's Uitgeversmaatschappij, Leiden: 1959; Vincenzo Ferrari, "Citizenship: Problems, Concepts 
and Policies" in Torre (ed) European Citizenship - An Institutional Challenge, Kluwer Law 
International, The Hague: 1998; Seyla Benhabib, Transformations of Citizenship - Dilemmas of the 
Nation State in the Era of Globalisation, Koniklijke van Gorcum, Assen: 2001; Rainer Bauböck, 
Transnational Citizenship. Membership and Rights in International Migration, Edward Elgar, 
Cheltenham: 2002. The only development that remotely reflects such ideas is the introduction of 
“European Union citizenship”. However, although trans-national in scope, this form of citizenship is 
essentially based on regular domestic nationality – Union citizenship is enjoyed once one of the 
members of the EU attributes domestic citizenship. To this day there is therefore no replacement for 
nationality as conferred by nation-states.  
16 Automatic conferral of citizenship on an existing population is a technique that is generally adopted 
in the context of state succession because such cases involve the delineation of the initial body of 
citizens that constitute the (new) state. In other instances, automatic conferral of citizenship by 
operation of the law, other than at birth, has been described as imposition of nationality and may run 
counter to international law where it is realised without the consent of the individual involved. See Ruth 
Donner, "Chapter 3: The Imposition and Withdrawal of Nationality" in The Regulation of Nationality in 
International Law, Transnational Publishers, New York: 1994. Nevertheless, where the automatic or 
compulsory conferral of nationality involves persons who were initially stateless, this is more widely 
considered to be acceptable under international law. See Paul Weis, Nationality and Statelessness in 
International Law, Kluwer Academic Publishers Group, Dordrecht: 1979, pages 101-115; and Article 
8, paragraph 2 of the Draft Articles on nationality in relation to state succession, International Law 
Commission, 'Draft Articles on Nationality of Natural Persons in Relation to the Succession of States - 
With Commentaries', in Yearbook of the International Law Commission, Vol. II, 1999, page 31. It is 
therefore a viable means of resolving cases of statelessness. 
17 “Any person of Indian origin who, on the date of the coming into operation of this act, (a) has been a 
permanent resident of Sri Lanka since October 30, 1964; or (b) is a descendent, resident in Sri Lanka, of 
a person who has been a permanent resident of Sri Lanka since October 30, 1964, shall be granted the 
status of citizen of Sri Lanka, with effect from such date […] provided however, the grant of status of a 
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regulations that underlie problems of statelessness in the country, such as a gender-
sensitive jus sanguinis law, that provides an opportunity for dealing with existing 
cases of statelessness. Thus, in Morocco, where the nationality code was modified 
in 2007 so as to allow women to transmit citizenship to their children, provision 
was made for the retrospective application of this amendment. It has been reported 
that “many children born to foreign fathers have already requested Moroccan 
nationality and have been able to acquire it”.18 The automatic conferral of 
nationality or acquisition of citizenship through registration, declaration or option 
are therefore also recognised tools in tackling statelessness. Indeed these 
mechanisms may be a more foolproof alternative to naturalisation since they require 
that prospective citizens meet only basic conditions for eligibility and do not leave 
the room for discretion that naturalisation procedures acknowledge. Nevertheless, in 
this section we will concentrate on naturalisation as a right of solution prescribed, 
for example, by the 1954 Statelessness Convention. The use of alternative 
mechanisms for the (re)instatement of nationality was already covered by default in 
part 2, since it is the rules that were discussed there in the context of the prevention 
of statelessness that can, by extension, be applied for the purposes of the reduction 
of existing cases.19 
 
1.1 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons 
 
Before discussing how the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless 
Persons deals with the question of conferral of citizenship it is of interest to once 
more delve into the historical development of the international statelessness 
instruments. We have already discussed how the 1954 and 1961 Statelessness 
Conventions were developed and adopted,20 but the subject of a third potential 
                                                                                                                                               
citizen of Sri Lanka to a permanent resident, who on the date of coming into operation of this Act, 
holds an Indian passport or other similar document, shall be effective only on his forwarding to the 
Commissioner a declaration […] stating his intention to voluntarily acquire citizenship of Sri Lanka”. 
Article 2 of the Grant of Citizenship to Persons of Indian Origin Act, 2003. 
18 Mark Manly, “Sorry, wrong gender” in Refugees Magazine, Number 147, Issue 3, 2007, page 25. 
19 In some cases, the reduction of statelessness through the use of the norms relating to the prevention 
of statelessness is explicitly elaborated. See, for instance, chapter IV where the possibility was 
discussed of “preventing” statelessness at birth by offering nationality jus soli, while actually confer 
this citizenship only at a later date upon application by the individual concerned. And chapter VI where 
the use of option was discussed in the context of the attribution of nationality following state 
succession. In reality, all of the rules that are espoused for the prevention of statelessness can equally be 
invoked for the resolution of existing cases, where the origin of statelessness is a violation of one of 
these norms. Thus, for example, where a person loses his citizenship as a result of a criminal conviction 
and is thereby rendered stateless, he could challenge this decision before a court and achieve an order 
for the reinstatement of his nationality. Involving, as it does, an individual who is already stateless, this 
type of situation does, in a sense, deal with the resolution of existing cases. Even where the resolution 
of statelessness involves the adoption of a new law to rectify a long-standing injustice (such as in the 
example of Sri Lanka given above where statelessness followed state succession), such a law may be 
seen achieve the delayed implementation of standards for the prevention of statelessness. Clearly then, 
there is a fine line between prevention and reduction. In this chapter, where the focus is on 
naturalisation, we are especially interested in “new” opportunities for stateless persons to acquire a 
nationality – as distinct from the reliance on international standards for the prevention of statelessness.  





document deliberated over by the international community has yet to be raised. 
Roberto Córdova, Special Rapporteur to the International Law Commission on 
nationality, including statelessness, also prepared draft texts on the reduction or 
elimination of present statelessness.21 The proposals essentially involved attributing 
citizenship (or a special status of “protected national”) to various categories of 
stateless person, in order to fully restore their rights. Naturalisation was also 
encouraged under these draft documents. However, “in view of the great difficulties 
of a non-legal nature which beset the problem of present statelessness”, by the time 
these proposals were put before the General Assembly it was accepted that an 
international instrument of any kind may be beyond reach and governments should 
simply view the articles as “suggestions”.22 Thereafter, the General Assembly did 
not take any action on the issue of existing cases of statelessness – a decision that 
was motivated in part by reference to the recent successful adoption of the 1954 
Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons.23 And no action has since 
been taken on the matter. 
Meanwhile, the protection offered to stateless persons through the 1954 
Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons was actually always 
envisaged as an interim measure to ensure that certain minimum standards are 
enjoyed until such time as a nationality can be procured.24 So, perhaps the most 
important provision of the 1954 Statelessness Convention, and the very last of its 
substantive guarantees, is article 32 which offers that crucial “right of solution” by 
considering access to citizenship.25 It addresses the naturalisation of stateless 
persons, as follows: 
                                                           
21 Four draft instruments were prepared in all, allowing for a choice to be made on the basic substance 
(between a far-reaching instrument aimed at eliminating present statelessness and a less extreme variant 
devised to reduce present statelessness) and on the form (between an independent convention and a 
protocol to the convention that would go on to be adopted as the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of 
Statelessness). It was the draft convention on the reduction of present statelessness that went on to be 
considered by the International Law Commission. For the text of all four proposals, see Roberto 
Córdova, Nationality, Including Statelessness. Third Report on the Elimination or Reduction of 
Statelessness by Roberto Córdova, Special Rapporteur, A/CN.4/81, New York: 11 March 1954. 
22 UN, 'Statelessness', in Yearbook of the United Nations, Vol. 1954, page 417. 
23 UN, 'Statelessness', in Yearbook of the United Nations, Vol. 1954, pages 418-419. 
24 The protection offered under the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons was 
never intended to be a substitute for granting nationality. UNHCR and IPU, Nationality and 
statelessness. A handbook for parliamentarians, 2005, page 26. 
25 James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge: 2005. According to Hathaway, the 1951 Refugee Convention proposes four rights of 
solution – repatriation, voluntary reestablishment, resettlement and naturalisation. Although there is 
some indication that resettlement may also be constructive in the context of statelessness - for example 
through the retention of provisions dealing with the transfer of assets and the movement of a stateless 
person from one (contracting) state to another – “there is only one durable solution to the problem of 
statelessness, and that is the acquisition of nationality”. This may of course be preceded and facilitated 
by resettlement. Carol Batchelor, "The International Legal Framework Concerning Statelessness and 
Access for Stateless Persons", European Union Seminar on the Content and Scope of International 
Protection: Panel 1 - Legal basis of international protection, Madrid: 2002, page 6. See also UNHCR 
Executive Committee, Conclusion No. 95: General Conclusion on lnternational Protection, Geneva: 10 
October 2003, para. (v); UNHCR and IPU, Nationality and statelessness. A handbook for 
parliamentarians, 2005, page 26; and UNHCR, Resettlement Handbook, Geneva, November 2004, 
chapter 5.1 on Stateless Persons. 
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The Contracting States shall as far as possible facilitate the assimilation 
and naturalisation of stateless persons. They shall in particular make 
every effort to expedite naturalisation proceedings and to reduce as far 
as possible the charges and costs of such proceedings.26 
 
This is the only provision to deal with the resolution of statelessness. Nowhere does 
the 1954 Statelessness Convention elaborate a right to acquire a nationality by other 
means, such as registration, declaration or option.27 Furthermore, from the 
phraseology chosen for this article it is immediately clear that it is not a right to (be 
considered for) naturalisation that is envisaged for the stateless but, at most, an 
opportunity to enjoy facilitated naturalisation. Stateless persons cannot demand 
access to a naturalisation procedure or even insist upon the lowering of the requisite 
conditions in their favour. Under the 1954 Statelessness Convention, states are 
strongly urged to facilitate naturalisation, but it remains within their discretion to do 
so.28 Offering a solution to statelessness through access to citizenship never 
becomes obligatory, even in severely protracted cases.29 Nor does the specific 
reference to the expedition of proceedings and the reduction of related costs mean 
that either of these measures are mandatory – states must simply (be seen to) “make 
every effort” to assist stateless persons in these procedural matters.  
Nevertheless, the encouragement of naturalisation through this article is 
considered to be of value and the provision  
 
has real legal force in at least extreme cases [where stateless persons] are 
effectively barred without sound reasons from accessing the usual process to 
acquire citizenship.30  
                                                           
26 Only one state party – Mexico – has lodged a reservation to this article of the 1954 Statelessness 
Convention. Note further that where the provision refers to “assimilation”, this word “is not used in the 
usual meaning of loss of the specific identity of the persons involved but in the sense of integration into 
the economic, social and cultural life of the community”. Nehemiah Robinson, Convention relating to 
the status of stateless persons - Its history and interpretation, UNHCR, Geneva: 1955, page 102. See 
also James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge: 2005, pages 983-984. 
27 Stateless individuals will have to fall back on the 1961 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless 
Persons as discussed in part 2 for any opportunity to acquire citizenship through simple application. 
28 Nehemiah Robinson, Convention relating to the status of stateless persons - Its history and 
interpretation, UNHCR, Geneva: 1955, page 101; Carol Batchelor, "The International Legal 
Framework Concerning Statelessness and Access for Stateless Persons", European Union Seminar on 
the Content and Scope of International Protection: Panel 1 - Legal basis of international protection, 
Madrid: 2002, page 6.  
29 A recent conclusion elaborated by the Executive Committee of the UNHCR on, among other things, 
the reduction of statelessness confirms this reading of the 1954 Statelessness Convention. The 
Committee “encourages States to actively disseminate information regarding access to citizenship, 
including naturalisation procedures” - implying that such procedures should be available to stateless 
persons but in no way suggesting that they enjoy a right to access nationality. UNHCR Executive 
Committee, Conclusion No. 106: Conclusion on Identification, Prevention and Reduction of 
Statelessness and Protection of Stateless Persons, Geneva: 6 October 2006, para. (r). 
30 James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law, Cambridge University Press, 






What is more, the provision applies broadly to all stateless persons – it is framed, in 
that sense, in absolute terms. It does not address itself only to the state, if any, in 
which the stateless person is lawfully and habitually residing, it addresses all 
contracting states without further specification. This means that stateless persons 
may be able to benefit from facilitated naturalisation on grounds other than lawful 
and habitual residence, for example on the basis of a connection with the state 
through birth or marriage, or even simple de facto habitual residence. On the other 
hand, through this technique, the provision omits any indication as to the form or 
content that should be given to naturalisation procedures generally or for the 
stateless specifically. And even where it encourages the “facilitation” of 
naturalisation, it does not offer any suggestion as to which pre-conditions for 
eligibility for naturalisation are considered legitimate and which may not justifiably 
be required of the stateless.31 It will be interesting to see whether international 
(human rights) law provides more concrete guidance in this respect or indeed a 
stronger legal norm for resolving statelessness. 
 
1.2 International (human rights) law 
 
Looking to other sources of contemporary international law for norms relating to 
the conferral of nationality to the stateless, we automatically arrive at provisions 
that elaborate or are related to the right to a nationality.32 We therefore find that the 
question of a right to (be considered for) naturalisation has already been raised in 
part 2 where we discussed the international legal response to the various causes of 
statelessness. It was there that we discovered that international law limits state 
discretion in setting naturalisation policy33 and that the prohibition of arbitrary 
deprivation of nationality can have a particular bearing on this matter. So while this 
issue has already been given some consideration,34 here we will be looking more 
closely at naturalisation as a “right of solution” and, thereby, at access to 
naturalisation procedures specifically for stateless persons as stateless persons.  
Then we see that there is evidence of a progressive development towards a 
right to (be considered for) naturalisation for stateless persons – and certain other 
categories of non-nationals - under human rights law. This observation stems from a 
number of sources. Firstly, the explicit comment by the UN Human Rights 
                                                           
31 This is in spite of the work prepared prior to elaboration of the Convention by Special Rapporteur 
Hudson in identifying substantive areas in which the stateless may experience difficulties. See Manley 
Hudson, Report on Nationality, including Statelessness, A/CN.4/50, 21 February 1952, page 57. It may 
be possible to interpret the explicit encouragement given to the expedition of proceedings expansively 
as an appeal to states to not only ensure that the process of applying for citizenship is not unduly time-
consuming but also that where a number of years residence is required for eligibility to apply for 
nationalisation, this period be shortened for the stateless. See James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees 
Under International Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 2005, page 986. 
32 For an overview of the relevant articles, see chapter III, section 2. 
33 Be reminded of the ruling given within the Inter-American human rights system: Inter-American 
Court on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion on the Proposed Amendments to the Naturalisation 
Provision of the Constitution of Costa Rica, OC-4/84, 19 January 1984, para. 36. Cited above in chapter 
V, section 1.2.  
34 See in particular chapter V, section 1.2 and chapter VII, section 2.2. 
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Committee in the case of Stewart v. Canada that it is possible for a stateless person 
to be arbitrarily deprived of his “right to acquire the nationality of the country of 
residence”.35 Secondly, the recommendation by the UN Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination that states should “pay due attention to 
possible barriers to naturalisation that may exist for long-term or permanent 
residents”36, suggesting that non-nationals develop a right to naturalise after a 
certain period of residence. And thirdly, the clear acknowledgement in the 
European Convention on Nationality that residence will, over time, lead to a right to 
apply for nationality through naturalisation procedures.37  
After a certain period of time then, a stateless person may be able to claim 
a right to apply for naturalisation in the state in which he has established lawful and 
habitual residence, on the basis of developing international norms.38 Moreover, 
various texts and bodies have begun to elaborate on a number of substantive 
questions relating to naturalisation, including on the appropriateness – in general or 
in the specific context of statelessness – of various conditions for eligibility. One 
example of a very concrete standard is provided by the European Convention on 
Nationality which determines that states may not demand more than ten years of 
lawful residence as a pre-condition to naturalisation.39 Another is the determination 
by the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination that states should 
refrain from  
 
practices that deny non-citizens their cultural and ethnic identity, such as 
requirements that non-citizens change their name in order to be naturalised.40 
 
Consider also the overall impact of the principle of non-discrimination and 
standards of due process on state discretion in naturalisation procedures, as 
discussed in chapter V. And a further possible limitation to the freedom of states to 
set the conditions for naturalisation has been argued on the basis of article 15 of the 
ICCPR. It is suggested that where the conviction for a criminal offence forms a bar 
for the opportunity to apply for naturalisation, this amounts to “ex post facto 
                                                           
35 UN Human Rights Committee, Individual complaint of Stewart v. Canada, case number 538/1993, 
A/52/40, vol. II, 1 November 1996, para. 12.4.  
36 CERD General Recommendation 30: Discrimination against Non-Citizens 2004, para. 13. 
37 Article 6, paragraph 3 of the European Convention on Nationality. For a discussion of the place and 
importance of the European Convention on Nationality in contemporary international law, please refer 
to Chapter III, Section 2. See also Carol Batchelor, 'Statelessness and the Problem of Resolving 
Nationality Status', in International Journal of Refugee Law, Vol. 10, 1998, pages 162-163 and Carol 
Batchelor, "Developments in International law: The Avoidance of Statelessness Through Positive 
Application of the Right to a Nationality" in Council of Europe's First Conference on Nationality, 
Strasbourg: 2001, page 56. In contrast, however, it should be noted that neither the UN Declaration on 
the Rights of Non-nationals or the Convention on Migrant Workers mentions (a right to) naturalisation. 
38 For a discussion of the problems associated with access to naturalisation for individuals holding an 
irregular immigration status, see chapter VII, section 2. 
39 Article 6, paragraph 3 of the European Convention on Nationality.  
40 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “The Rights of Non-citizens”, prepared by 
David Weissbrodt, Geneva 2006. See also Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 





punishment to the individual who committed the crime” which is outlawed under 
the aforementioned article.41 
For the benefit of stateless persons as stateless persons, several additional 
standards may be helpful in their quest for naturalisation. To begin with, we have 
seen that a state may not discriminate against any particular group or nationality in 
determining the conditions for access to naturalisation.42 Where a state directly or 
indirectly blocks access to naturalisation procedures for stateless persons 
specifically – as opposed to other groups of non-nationals – this would amount to 
an unreasonable and thus prohibited distinction. Let us also recall that, more 
generally, states may not uphold “unreasonable impediments” to the achievement of 
citizenship through naturalisation.43 This submission can be an important 
interpretative tool in assessing the compliance with human rights standards of any 
obstacles that stateless persons encounter within the context of naturalisation. It 
becomes possible to evaluate naturalisation procedures on two levels: firstly to 
consider whether the conditions set may generally be considered appropriate and 
secondly, whether the requirements, while initially deemed legitimate, in fact 
amount to unreasonable impediments when applied with respect to the stateless. 
For instance, while states may reasonably demand that non-nationals produce 
various documents to support their application for naturalisation, to insist that a 
stateless person presents the full range of documentation – without for example 
allowing alternative forms of evidence to be utilised where certain documents 
cannot be delivered – may nevertheless be unreasonable.44 Thus by taking into 
account the circumstance of statelessness the expression “unreasonable 
impediments” gains a very specific content and a form of facilitated naturalisation 
can be promoted for persons belonging to this vulnerable group. 
Again, the European Convention on Nationality goes one step further and 
delineates a concrete obligation for states to facilitate the naturalisation of stateless 
persons.45 Unlike the commentary to the 1954 Statelessness Convention, the 
accompanying explanatory report to the European Convention on Nationality 
                                                           
41 Human Rights Watch, Roma in the Czech Republic Foreigners in Their Own Land, 1 June 1996. 
42 Article 1, paragraph 3 of the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination; 
CERD General Recommendation 30: Discrimination against Non-Citizens 2004, para. 13. See chapter 
V, section 1.2. 
43 UN Human Rights Committee, Individual complaint of Capena v. Canada, case number 558/1993, 
A/52/40, vol. II, 3 April 1997, para. 11.3. Again, see also chapter V, section 1.2. 
44 Recall the identification by Hudson of problematic areas for the stateless in the context of 
naturalisation in Manley Hudson, Report on Nationality, including Statelessness, A/CN.4/50, 21 
February 1952, page 57. Consider here the development of standards in the context of the attribution of 
nationality following the succession of states, where the Council of Europe Convention on the 
avoidance of statelessness in relation to State succession determined that the documentary requirements 
usually set may not be “reasonable” in the context of the avoidance of statelessness. These standards 
(discussed in chapter VI, section 3) could also be a useful interpretative device for applying this notion 
of “unreasonable impediments” in the overall context of the naturalisation of the stateless. See also 
Rosa da Costa, Rights of Refugees in the Context of Integration: Legal Standards and 
Recommendations, Geneva: June 2006, pages 186-191. 
45 Article 6, paragraph 4 (g) of the European Convention on Nationality. Note that the Council of 
Europe Convention on the avoidance of statelessness in relation to State succession (article 9) also 
prescribes the facilitated naturalisation of persons who, in spite of the various guarantees, were 
rendered stateless in the context of state succession. 
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discusses the substantive implications of this duty to facilitate the acquisition of 
nationality by the stateless. In particular, it means ensuring that there are 
“favourable conditions” in place, which may include  
 
a reduction of the length of required residence, less stringent language 
requirements, an easier procedure and lower procedural fees.46  
 
Here the cost and complexity of naturalisation procedures is addressed – as it was in 
the 1954 Statelessness Convention – but so too is the lowering of other conditions. 
In 1999, the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers elaborated on the idea of 
facilitated naturalisation for the stateless in a recommendation on the “Avoidance 
and Reduction of Statelessness”.47 Again, the cost and complexity of procedures, 
the pre-condition of a certain period of residence and a certain level of knowledge 
of the language are addressed. In addition, the recommendation calls upon states to  
 
ensure that offences, when they are relevant for the decision concerning the 
acquisition of nationality, do not unreasonably prevent stateless persons 
seeking the nationality of a state.48 
 
The message that the Council of Europe is thereby sending is that, unlike in the 
context of “regular” naturalisation procedures, where the naturalisation of stateless 
persons is concerned, the objective of tackling statelessness should be weighed into 
the equation at all times. Thus, any barriers to the naturalisation of stateless persons 
must be especially carefully considered and justified. 
The overall picture painted by international (human rights) law as it stands 
today is that states may be required to simplify or relax some of their naturalisation 
requirements to facilitate – or at least not impede – access to citizenship for the 
stateless. International law is thereby much more concerned with how the substance 
of naturalisation policy affects the stateless and provides more guidance as to what 
may be considered to be reasonable requirements and what are seen as 
inappropriate, even unlawful, stipulations. However, there is one common theme 
that can be traced throughout the references to naturalisation in the human rights 
field: for the stateless, or any non-national, to benefit from a right to (facilitated) 
naturalisation, they must first establish lawful and habitual residence on the territory 
of the state in question. At most, states may be obliged to admit stateless persons to 
their naturalisation procedures after a condensed period of residence, but nowhere is 
it suggested that the stateless should have access to naturalisation without first 
gaining (lawful and habitual) residence. This is perhaps a logical approach, since 
                                                           
46 This is a list of examples of “favourable conditions” and should not be considered exhaustive. 
Council of Europe, European Convention on Nationality: Explanatory report, Strasbourg: 1997, page 
35. 
47 Council of Europe, Recommendation R (1999) 18 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States 
on the Avoidance and Reduction of Statelessness, Strasbourg, 17 September 1999. 
48 Paragraph (d) of section IIB. Council of Europe, Recommendation R (1999) 18 of the Committee of 
Ministers to Member States on the Avoidance and Reduction of Statelessness, Strasbourg, 17 
September 1999. Consider in this respect also the arguments raised above with respect to the 






naturalisation is most commonly offered on the basis of jus domicilli, whereby the 
acquisition of citizenship reflects the genuine link that is developed between the 
individual and his state of residence.49 Nevertheless, this approach poses a serious 
problem. As we have seen in chapter X, it can be very difficult for stateless persons 
to achieve lawful residence – a matter which is neither provided for under the 1954 
Statelessness Convention nor decisively settled in human rights instruments.50 And 
indeed, if a right to (facilitated) naturalisation is earned after a certain period of 
lawful and habitual residence, states may become even less willing to formally 
admit stateless persons to their territory. Dealing with the interaction between 
statelessness, immigration law and naturalisation policy is therefore central to the 
ultimate resolution of (protracted) cases of statelessness.51 In the meantime, it is 
important to recall that long-term residence is not the only credible indicator of a 
genuine link between an individual and a state that could form the basis of a claim 
to citizenship.52  From this point of view, the more general formulation used in the 
1954 Statelessness Convention may provide more scope for assisting the stateless to 
access naturalisation for it does not limit its attention to resident stateless persons. 
However, since this provision is drafted in such facultative terms, states must still 
volunteer to offer access to (facilitated) naturalisation to unlawfully present 





The second special need of the stateless that is addressed in the 1954 Convention 
relating to the Status of Stateless Persons can be summarised as the need for 
“documentation”. As UNHCR explains: 
 
The need for some form of personal documentation is a constant of daily life 
in most modern societies […] Establishing one’s identity may be essential 
for a wide range of activities, including the registration of births and deaths, 
contracting marriages, obtaining employment, housing, hospital care or 
rations, qualifying for social benefits, entering educational institutions, or 
requesting the issuance of official documents and permits.53 
 
                                                           
49 See chapter III, section 1. 
50 See chapter X, section 2.2. 
51 Attuning immigration and citizenship policy is also important from the point of view of ensuring that 
where the stateless are granted lawful residence in a state, the actual status attributed is compatible with 
naturalisation requirements. See Rosa da Costa, Rights of Refugees in the Context of Integration: Legal 
Standards and Recommendations, Geneva: June 2006, page 187.  
52 Consider the proposed instruments on the reduction or elimination of present statelessness that also 
used jus soli and jus sanguinis connections to promote the attribution of nationality in existing cases of 
statelessness. See Roberto Córdova, Nationality, Including Statelessness. Third Report on the 
Elimination or Reduction of Statelessness by Roberto Córdova, Special Rapporteur, A/CN.4/81, New 
York: 11 March 1954 
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To this list, we can add “travel” as another aspect of life for which the proper papers 
are essential.54 For the stateless, who earn special entitlements on the basis of their 
status as a stateless person, documentation gains a heightened importance as a tool 
for accessing these benefits.55 
Similarly to the subject of naturalisation, we have already touched upon 
this issue of documentation - albeit indirectly - in the consideration of related 
issues. Thus, in chapter X, section 2.2, where we discussed international freedom of 
movement we raised the importance of the passport for travel across international 
frontiers, noting that since passports are normally issued by a state to its citizens the 
stateless are typically unable to obtain this important document.56 Access to travel 
documents is therefore one aspect of the “special needs” of the stateless as far as 
documentation is concerned. Another is access to a more general type of document: 
identity papers. Again, commonly issued by the authorities of the state of 
nationality, identity documents can play a crucial role in accessing a host of rights 
and facilities by attesting to various key aspects of an individual’s personal 
particulars. Proof of statelessness is especially indispensable and proof of lawful 
immigration status (if held) equally so. Other important documents are those that 
give evidence of civil status and other facts such as date and place of birth or 
educational and professional qualifications.57  
Where do the stateless currently stand in relation to this “special need”? In 
response to a 2003 survey by the UNHCR, almost four out of five respondent states 
declared that they provided identity and travel documents to stateless persons 
lawfully and permanently resident on their territory.58 Nevertheless, for many 
stateless populations around the world, in particular those with an uncertain 
immigration status, the acquisition of any documents – for travel or proof of 
identity or status – is reportedly very difficult and costly, if not impossible.59 And 
earlier in this work we have already seen what a problem access to birth and 
marriage certificates can pose for the stateless.60 In the upcoming sections we will 
                                                           
54 Recall in particular the quote that “a passport has become a legal as well as a practical necessity” for 
travel between states. Hurst Hannum, The Right to Leave and Return in International Law and 
Practice, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht: 1987, page 21. 
55 A similar conclusion was drawn with reference to the situation of refugees: “The refugee, in order to 
benefit from treatment in accordance with internationally accepted standards, needs to be able to 
establish vis-à-vis government officials not only his identity but also his refugee character”. UNHCR, 
“Identity documents for Refugees”, UN Doc. EC/SCP/33, Geneva, 20 July 1984, paragraph 2. 
56 Hurst Hannum, The Right to Leave and Return in International Law and Practice, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, Dordrecht: 1987, page 21; John Torpey, The Invention of the Passport. Surveillance, 
Citizenship and the State, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 2000, page 161; Carmen Tiburcio, 
"Chapter IX. Public Rights" in The human rights of aliens under international and comparative law, 
Kluwer Law International, The Hague: 2001, page 217. 
57 Such papers may even play a role in the fight against (the perpetuation or continuation of) 
statelessness and have, therefore, already been dealt with to some extent in Part 2. 
58 UNHCR, Final report concerning the Questionnaire on statelessness pursuant to the Agenda for 
Protection, Geneva: March 2004, page 29. Be reminded that only 74 states completed this 
questionnaire. 
59 See the description of the situation of, among others, the Bidoon in the United Arab Emirates, the 
Batwa in Burundi and the stateless ethnic Chinese in Indonesia. Maureen Lynch, Lives on hold: The 
human cost of statelessness, Washington: 2005. 





therefore consider how effectively the 1954 Statelessness Convention and other 
sources of international law address the documentation needs of the stateless. 
 
2.1 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons 
 
In considering access to documentation for the stateless, we come to the final three 
provisions of the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons to be 
discussed. We also will pause for one last time to consider the historical origins of 
this instrument because it was in fact precisely the issue of documentation that first 
induced the international community to settle international agreements to deal with 
refugees and later the stateless. The system of “Nansen certificates” or “Nansen 
passports”, developed in the 1920s, was a means of offering refugees travel papers 
and proof of identity and status as a refugee.61 These international documents issued 
in lieu of a national passport  
 
represented the first step toward resolving at the supranational level the internal 
contradictions of a system of movement controls rooted in national 
membership.62 
 
An accompanying task bestowed upon the League of Nations was to offer 
“surrogate consular protection” to refugees and provide them with other forms of 
documentation as needed, like proof of civil status or educational qualifications.63 
These arrangements became the inspiration for the provisions of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention that address the documentation needs of refugees – and these, in turn, 
were transposed to become articles 25, 27 and 28 of the 1954 Statelessness 
Convention. The result is that when “read together, these three articles form a single 
system of protection of the [stateless person’s] entitlement to identity and 
documentation”.64 Working in reverse order, so starting with article 28, the content 
and scope of these provisions will now be presented. 
 In order to ensure that stateless persons would be empowered to travel outside 
their host state, the 1954 Statelessness Convention offers the stateless the 
opportunity – and in some cases the right – to obtain a Convention Travel 
Document or “CTD” equivalent to that provided to refugees under the 1951 
Refugee Convention.65 States must provide these papers to a stateless person who is 
                                                           
61 Nehemiah Robinson, Convention relating to the status of stateless persons - Its history and 
interpretation, UNHCR, Geneva: 1955, page 80; Guy Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee in International Law, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford: 2007, pages 513 - 516. 
62 John Torpey, The Invention of the Passport. Surveillance, Citizenship and the State, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge: 2000, page 129. 
63 James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge: 2005, page 85. 
64 Guy Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee in International Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 2007, page 
512. 
65 Article 28 of the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons reproduces paragraph 1 
of article 28 of the Refugee Convention word-for-word. Paragraph 2 was not transposed to the 
statelessness instrument for the simple reason that it deals with the recognition of documents issued 
under previous refugee agreements so has no relevance for the situation of the stateless. Note that 
article 28 of the 1954 Statelessness Convention has attracted just one blanket reservation (Finland) and 
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lawfully staying in their territory and wishes to make an international journey – be it 
for business, pleasure or resettlement purposes.66 In such a case, the issuance of a 
travel document may only be refused if there are “compelling reasons of national 
security or public order”.67 Meanwhile, states are free to supply travel documents to 
stateless persons who are not lawfully staying at their own discretion,68 so it is 
possible that the benefits of holding a CTD could be extended to any stateless 
person. One of these benefits is detailed in paragraph 1 of the “Schedule to Article 
28” that elaborates the further terms relating to the issuance and recognition of 
travel documents:  
 
The travel document referred to in article 28 of this Convention shall 
indicate that the holder is a stateless person under the terms of the 
Convention.69   
 
So the Convention Travel Document is not only about facilitating travel,70 it 
provides evidence of the individual’s status as a stateless person and should help to 
ensure access to the privileges that accompany this status when the stateless person 
is abroad.71 It should nevertheless be noted that the documentation of the status of 
                                                                                                                                               
one declaration restricting the scope of application of the provision (Czech Republic, acknowledges a 
right to travel documents for permanently resident stateless persons only). 
66 James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge: 2005, page 846. 
67 Article 28 of the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons. The word “compelling” 
indicates that the national security or public order issue must be very serious for the stateless person to 
be denied a travel document and that this restriction to the right to such a document should be 
interpreted restrictively. Nehemiah Robinson, Convention relating to the status of stateless persons - Its 
history and interpretation, UNHCR, Geneva: 1955, page 82; Guy Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee in 
International Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 2007, page 516. 
68 In the final segment of text in article 28 of the 1954 Statelessness Convention, states are explicitly 
encouraged to provide travel documents where the stateless person in question is unable to acquire such 
papers from their country of lawful residence. 
69 Paragraph 1, section 1 of the Schedule to Article 28 of the Convention relating to the Status of 
Stateless Persons. 
70 To that end, Contracting States are obliged to recognise the validity of travel documents issued under 
the 1954 Statelessness Convention (paragraph 7 of the Schedule to Article 28). See Nehemiah 
Robinson, Convention relating to the status of stateless persons - Its history and interpretation, 
UNHCR, Geneva: 1955, page 88. Note that paragraph 14 of the Schedule to Article 28 clarifies that the 
possession of a Convention Travel Document does not in any way affect the authority of states to 
delineate and impose their own immigration policy, it merely functions in lieu of a passport while the 
stateless person is still required to meet whatever conditions may be set for admission to the territory of 
another state. However, as mentioned briefly in chapter X, section 2.2.1, another important quality of 
the CTD is that, in principle, it vouches for an entitlement to re-enter the territory of the state that issued 
it: a stateless person may re-enter the issuing state for as long as the CTD is valid, unless the document 
contains a specific statement to the contrary. Paragraph 13, section 1 of the Schedule to Article 28 of 
the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons. 
71 This is a step forward from the terms of the equivalent Schedule attached to the 1951 Refugee 
Convention that does not specify that the Convention Travel Document issued to refugees should also 
indicate the possession of refugee status. In reality, although “not designed to be proof of refugee status 
or any other status” the Convention Travel Document issued to refugees has been widely recognised as 





the stateless person through the provision of travel documents in no way affects 
“the status of the holder, particularly as regards nationality”.72 
 In the event that a stateless person does not acquire a Convention Travel 
Document – or any other form of travel papers – article 27 of the 1954 Statelessness 
Convention introduces the guarantee of at least some basic form of identity 
document:  
 
the Contracting States shall issue identity papers to any stateless person in their 
territory who does not possess a valid travel document.  
 
Whereas states are only obliged to issue travel documents to lawfully staying 
stateless persons (and even then there are two approved grounds for non-issuance), 
this back-up article prescribes an absolute right to an identity document for stateless 
persons to be issued by the state in which the person is physically present.73 The 
two provisions are intended to act in conjunction to ensure that every stateless 
person benefits from one form of documentation or another.74 The identity papers 
envisaged in article 27 fulfil a dual purpose: on the one hand, establishing certain 
facts relating to the identity of the person while, on the other hand, vouching for his 
or her status as a stateless person.75 Again, this second dimension is of paramount 
importance for it ensures that the stateless are able to effectively lay claim to the 
entitlements bestowed upon them by virtue of their status. Similarly to the 
Convention Travel Document, an identity document does not have any affect on the 
status of the stateless person. Thus, while unlawfully present stateless persons may 
                                                                                                                                               
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 2005, pages 851-853; UNHCR and IPU, Nationality and 
statelessness. A handbook for parliamentarians, 2005, page 24. 
72 Paragraph 15 of the Schedule to Article 28 of the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless 
Persons. This can be taken to mean that the provision of a travel document does not amount to the 
conferral of nationality. It is of interest to note that on the model travel document, as set out under the 
1954 Statelessness Convention, the following line would be included: “This document is issued solely 
with a view to providing the holder with a travel document which can serve in lieu of a national 
passport. It is without prejudice to and in no way affects the holder’s nationality”. This statement has 
been transposed word-for-word from the model travel document for refugees (as elaborated under the 
1951 Refugee Convention). While it is not difficult to infer that what is meant here is, again, that the 
issuance of such a document does not result in the attribution of citizenship. However, the wording is 
peculiar when read in the context of statelessness: the document will in no way affect “the holder’s 
nationality” even though the stateless, by definition, do not hold a nationality. In practice, this minor 
detail is of no consequence, but it is further evidence of the haste in which the provisions of the 1951 
Refugee Convention were recycled into the 1954 Statelessness Convention with little added thought to 
the difference in circumstances between these two groups.    
73 Note that this article has attracted five reservations by state parties: Germany and Latvia elaborating a 
blanket reservation to the provision while Romania, Slovakia and the Czech Republic have limited the 
personal scope to those stateless persons who are permanent residents only. 
74 Guy Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee in International Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 2007, page 
515. See on the deliberate separation of the entitlement to travel documents and to identity papers, 
James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge: 2005, page 619. 
75 James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge: 2005, pages 620-623. 
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acquire identity papers on the basis of article 27 of the 1954 Statelessness 
Convention, these documents do not provide a right to stay in the country.76 
 The 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons is clearly keen 
to ensure that those individuals who qualify for protection under its terms are 
provided with documentation attesting to their status as stateless persons. With this 
in mind, it is once more rather astounding to reflect that the instrument provides 
absolutely no guidance as to how “stateless person status” is to be established or 
when it is considered to be proven.77 When addressing the documentation of 
stateless persons the Convention skirts once more around this issue, although 
clearly it is only once a stateless person has been identified as such that his status 
can be documented. And, realistically, it is only after he has acquired proof of his 
status that he will be able to invoke the corresponding rights and benefits. This is an 
issue that undeniably requires further consideration and we will come back to it 
again in the next chapter.78  
 Lastly we come to article 25 entitled “administrative assistance”. Based on the 
concept of “surrogate consular protection” that existed under the League of Nations 
refugee regime,79 this article allows stateless persons to enjoy services and obtain a 
range of other sorts of documents that usually require the involvement of the state 
of nationality. As examples of what is deemed to fall within the scope of this article, 
Robinson lists: 
 
Services which nationals of a country ordinarily receive from their 
juridical, administrative or consular authorities [including issuance] of 
documents relating to their family position (birth, marriage, adoption, 
death, or divorce certificates) or their special position (school or 
professional certificates), certifications (copies or translations of 
documents, regularity of documents or their conformity with the law of 
the country) [and] identity.80 
 
Such services and related documentation shall be provided by (or through) the state 
in which the stateless person is residing.81 The article is worded in such a way as to 
                                                           
76 Nehemiah Robinson, Convention relating to the status of stateless persons - Its history and 
interpretation, UNHCR, Geneva: 1955, page 79. The eligibility of unlawfully present stateless persons 
to identity documents is nevertheless crucial since several of the rights elaborated in the 1954 
Statelessness Convention are accrued on the basis of statelessness status or simple presence alone. See 
also James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge: 2005, page 626; UNHCR and IPU, Nationality and statelessness. A handbook for 
parliamentarians, 2005, page 24. 
77 Recall chapter IX, section 3. 
78 Chapter XIII, section 4. 
79 Above at note 61. See also James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 2005, page 94. 
80 Nehemiah Robinson, Convention relating to the status of stateless persons - Its history and 
interpretation, UNHCR, Geneva: 1955, page 74.  
81 Note that this is a move away from the system in place under the League of Nations whereby it was 
the League of Nations High Commissioner for Refugees that fulfilled this role. See James Hathaway, 
The Rights of Refugees Under International Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 2005, pages 
627-628. Nine states have elaborated reservations to – all or part of – article 25 of the 1954 





suggest that stateless persons may invoke its terms at a low level of attachment – 
habitual residence or even lawful presence is not required, the reference to the state 
of residence of the stateless merely serves to settle the question of jurisdiction for 
the implementation of this norm.82 The documents issued “shall stand in stead of 
the official documents” which they serve to replace and are presumed to establish 
the correct facts unless evidence to the contrary surfaces.83 On the basis of this 
provision it should be possible for any pressing documentary needs of the stateless 
to be satisfied. Overall then, the 1954 Statelessness Convention responds well to 
this particular “special need” of the stateless, providing opportunities for accessing 
travel and identity papers as well as a host of other documents. Time now, to look 
to other areas of international law to see how they compare and whether any 
additional guarantees can be found. 
  
2.2 International (human rights) law 
 
Within the human rights field, recognition has also been given to the importance of 
documentation. In particular, human rights bodies have acknowledged the vital role 
that documentation plays in claiming rights-related entitlements. The following 
quote from a report by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights is a 
case in point: 
 
The Committee is concerned that the non-issue of personal 
documentation to refugees and asylum-seekers by the State authorities 
seriously hinders their enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights, 
including the rights to work, health and education.84 
 
The Committee confirms that access to various rights and services is not just 
affected by the fact of being a refugee or asylum seeking – or a stateless person - 
but also by the lack of documentation that commonly afflicts them. However, 
nowhere does any human rights instrument proclaim an all-encompassing right to 
documentation. Instead, this question has been addressed to one extent or another 
on the basis of a number of individual norms. We have seen evidence of this in the 
consideration of the freedom of international movement and the attention paid 
within that context to the issue of travel papers.85 In addition, we have discovered 
the value attributed to the documentation of certain events or facts such as through 
                                                                                                                                               
countries that, as such, maintain a system of affidavits for establishing these facts and do not require the 
documents involved. See also Guy Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee in International Law, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford: 2007, page 514. 
82 James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge: 2005, pages 637-639. 
83 Article 25, paragraph 3 of the Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons. See also 
Nehemiah Robinson, Convention relating to the status of stateless persons - Its history and 
interpretation, UNHCR, Geneva: 1955, page 77. 
84 ESC Committee, Concluding Observations: Venezuela, E/2002/22, New York and Geneva: 2001, 
para. 84. See also Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations: Thailand, 
CRC/C/80, Geneva: 1998 35, para. 71; Kyrgyzstan, CRC/C/97, Geneva: 2000, paras. 320-321; 
Mauritania, CRC/C/111, Geneva:  2001, paras. 74-75; Lebanon, CRC/C/114, Geneva: 2002, para. 82.  
85 See chapter X, section 2.2. 
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the registration and certification of births and marriages.86 This means that we have 
already uncovered and discussed several of the relevant standards. In this section, 
we will be recalling what has been said about these norms and taking a fresh overall 
look at how the human rights regime addresses the documentation needs faced by 
the stateless. 
 Let us begin once more with access to travel documents. This issue was 
brought to the fore by the Human Rights Committee in its General Comment on the 
freedom of movement where a right to travel documents was coupled to the right to 
leave any country, including one’s own.87 We can recall from chapter X, section 
2.2.2 that the Committee acknowledged the importance of travel documents for 
movement between states and in consequence declared that “the right to leave a 
country must include the right to obtain the necessary travel documents”.88 
Although in the same paragraph, the Committee explicitly refers to passports and 
acknowledges that “the issuing of passports is normally incumbent on the State of 
nationality of the individual”,89 it does not rule out the possibility that a state may 
be required to offer travel documents to non-nationals in order to guarantee their 
right to leave.90 Indeed, since the right to leave – as opposed to the right to enter – is 
very clearly granted to everyone in respect of any state,91 the stateless should also 
be able to invoke the relevant provisions in order to obtain travel documents.92 
Restrictions may only be placed on the right to leave and thereby also on the 
issuance of travel documents if they are “necessary to protect national security, 
                                                           
86 Important also with a view to preventing statelessness. See chapter VII, section 1.2. 
87 The right to leave is espoused in article 13, paragraph 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights; article 12, paragraph 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; article 2, 
paragraph 2 of the Fourth Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights; Article 22, 
aparagraph 2 of the American Convention on Human Rights; article 12, paragraph 2 of the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. See also article 5, paragraph (d)(ii) of the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and article 8, paragraph 2 of the Convention on the 
Protection of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families. 
88 Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment No. 27: Freedom of movement, Geneva: 2 
November 1999, para. 9. See also the “Uruguayan passport cases” before the Human Rights 
Committee, as cited in Sarah Joseph; Jenny Schultz; Melissa Castan, The International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights. Cases, Materials and Commentary, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 2000, 
pages 250-251. Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations: Belarus, A/47/40, Geneva: 1992, 
para. 560; Mongolia, A/47/40, Geneva: 1992, para. 601; Azerbaijan, A/49/40 vol. I, Geneva: 1994, 
para. 300; Zimbabwe, A/53/40 vol. I, Geneva: 1998, para. 228. Indeed, “the refusal to issue travel 
documents is permissible only in those special circumstances in which the individual’s right to travel 
may be restricted”. Hurst Hannum, The Right to Leave and Return in International Law and Practice, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht: 1987, page 21. 
89 Emphasis added, Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment No. 27: Freedom of 
movement, Geneva: 2 November 1999, para. 9. 
90 See in this respect also Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding 
Observations: Latvia, A/54/18, New York: 1999, para. 398. 
91 Hurst Hannum, The Right to Leave and Return in International Law and Practice, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, Dordrecht: 1987, page 60. 
92 Whether they are subsequently able to actually travel to another state will nevertheless depend upon 






public order, public health or morals and the rights and freedoms of others”.93 None 
of these grounds can be invoked in order to justify a blanket refusal to issue travel 
documents to stateless persons. The jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee 
confirms that a refusal, without proper justification, of a travel document violates 
the terms of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.94 At the same 
time, the Committee noted that where the situation involved a citizen who is 
resident abroad – whose status there is that of a non-national – both the country of 
citizenship and the country of residence have a duty to protect his right to leave and 
coinciding right to travel documents.95 It is therefore conceivable to argue that the 
country of residence of a stateless person, or the country identified as “his own 
country” for the purposes of the right to (re)enter the state,96 could be held 
accountable for the provision of travel documents. However, an unambiguous norm 
prescribing such a duty towards the stateless has yet to crystallise and with the 
current focus of human rights bodies on the role of the state of nationality in these 
matters, the reality is that it may still be difficult for the stateless to rely on human 
rights instruments for access to a travel document.  
 The contribution that the human rights regime can make to ensuring the 
acquisition of identity documents by the stateless is even less clear. It may be 
possible, for example, to distil a right to identity papers for children at least from 
the guarantee in the Convention on the Rights of the Child relating to the 
preservation of identity.97 More generally, proof of identity may also be seen as a 
component of the recognition of legal personhood.98 And it is true that, as the 
citation above illustrated, organs such as the Committee on the Rights of the Child 
and the ESC Committee have expressed criticism on the non-issuance of identity 
                                                           
93 Article 12, paragraph 3 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The Human 
Rights Committee has actively monitored the implementation of these restrictions, commenting on 
policies relating to the issuance of passports in many states. See for example, Human Rights 
Committee, Concluding Observations: Azerbaijan, A/49/40 vol. I, Geneva: 1994, para. 300; Morocco, 
A/55/40 vol. I, Geneva: 2000, para. 114; Syrian Arab Republic, A/56/40 vol. I, Geneva: 2001, para. 81 
(21). See also Colin Harvey; Robert Barnidge, 'Human Rights, Free Movement, and the Right to Leave 
in International Law', in International Journal of Refugee Law, Vol. 19, 2007, page 6. 
94 See, for example, Human Rights Committee, Case of El Ghar v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 
1107/2002, A/60/40 vol. II, Geneva: 2 November 2004, para. 8. 
95 Human Rights Committee, Case of Martins v. Uruguay, R.13/57, A/37/49, Geneva: 23 March 1982, 
para. 7; Case of Lichtenszteijn v. Uruguay, R.19/77, A/38/40, Geneva: 3 March 1983, paras. 6.1 and 
8.3. See for a full discussion of these and other “Uruguayan passport cases”, Sarah Joseph; Jenny 
Schultz; Melissa Castan, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Cases, Materials 
and Commentary, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 2000, pages 250-251; Colin Harvey; Robert 
Barnidge, 'Human Rights, Free Movement, and the Right to Leave in International Law', in 
International Journal of Refugee Law, Vol. 19, 2007, pages 7-9. See also the consideration of state 
party reports by the Human Rights Committee, for instance in Concluding Observations: Syrian Arab 
Republic, CCPR, A/56/40, Geneva: 2001, paragraph 81 (21). 
96 Chapter X, section 2.2.2. 
97 Under article 8 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, “States Parties undertake to respect the 
right of the child to preserve his or her identity, including nationality, name and family relations as 
recognized by law without unlawful interference”.  See also Committee on the Rights of the Child, 
Concluding Observations: Rwanda, CRC/C/140, Geneva: 2004 36, paras. 189-192. 
98 See, for instance, Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment 3: HIV/AIDS and the 
Rights of the Child, CRC/GC/2003/3, Geneva: 17 March 2003, para. 32. 
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documents to certain categories of individuals, including refugees.99 However, the 
general association of identity documents with access to rights and services has not 
yielded the promulgation of a concrete right to such papers in any human rights 
instrument. In fact, when reflecting on the lack of documentation of refugees, the 
UN treaty bodies appear to rely on the provisions of the 1951 Refugee Convention 
as the legal foundation for access to identity papers.100 There is certainly no other 
legal basis for the acquisition of (identity) papers attesting to statelessness status 
than the 1954 Statelessness Convention itself – the very instrument that brings this 
status into being. It is not without reason then that the tailor-made refugee and 
statelessness instruments were so deliberate in their attention to documentation 
needs. For identity papers – and to a large extent also travel documents – the 
importance of regulating these matters through a specially-designed legal regime 
seems not to have lost its significance even with the developments traced in human 
rights law.101  
 An area in which contemporary human rights law does provide comprehensive 
protection, including for the stateless, is with respect to the issuance of 
documentation relating to births and marriages. In chapter VII we uncovered a 
global consensus on the right to birth registration – including the issuance of a birth 
certificate – as a right of every child, regardless of (immigration) status or 
nationality.102 Equally, although less attention has been paid to the right to marriage 
registration and documentation, where this is espoused there is no indication that 
the stateless could not benefit from the relevant norms.103 Yet, the documentation of 
births and marriages were just two examples of the types of assistance that the 
stateless could rely on under article 25 of the 1954 Statelessness Convention. The 
certification of educational or professional qualifications and the translation of 
official documents are matters for which a basis for protection under human rights 
law is far less apparent. No doubt where the lack of (recognition of) requisite 
documents impedes stateless persons’ access to work, (further) education or other 
rights, this subject may be taken up in the overall assessment of the conformity of 
                                                           
99 See for example Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations: Kyrgyzstan, 
CRC/C/97, Geneva: 2000, paras. 320-321 and ESC Committee, Concluding Observations: Venezuela, 
E/2002/22, New York and Geneva: 2001, para. 84.  
100 See for example Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations: Lebanon, 
CRC/C/114, Geneva: 2002, para. 82. 
101 Nevertheless, the human rights framework does appear to provide new avenues for enforcing the 
right to documentation as espoused under the 1954 Statelessness Convention – the human rights treaty 
bodies may simply remind states of their commitments under this instrument in the same way as they 
have taken to referring to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. We will be looking 
more closely at the opportunities for enforcement of the various norms for the protection of 
statelessness in chapter XIII, section 4.  
102 Recall for example Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding observations: Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, CRC/C/15/Add.259, Geneva: 2005, para. 33; Committee on the Rights of the Child, 
General Comment No.6: Treatment of unaccompanied and separated children outside their country of 
origin, Geneva: 1 September 2005, para. 12; and article 29 of the Migrant Workers Convention. 
103 Recall in this respect UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General 
Recommendation 21: Equality in marriage and family relations, A/49/38 (1994) at para. 39; Committee 
on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Concluding Observations: Namibia, 






the situation with human rights norms. But to date, this question has yet to be raised 
and it is fair to conclude that the 1954 Statelessness Convention retains its value on 
this point. 
 
3 SPECIAL NEEDS FOR WHICH THE 1954 STATELESSNESS CONVENTION HAS NOT 
PROVIDED 
 
So far in this chapter we have seen that in drafting the 1954 Statelessness 
Convention governments not only considered the access of the stateless to various 
(human) rights, but also took notice of certain special needs which arise from the 
very circumstances of this vulnerable group. However, there is one issue that can be 
considered to fall within this category of “special needs” for which the statelessness 
instrument neglected to provide: diplomatic protection. As we introduced the 
concept and function of nationality in chapter IX, we already broached the subject 
of diplomatic protection as one of the areas of law for which citizenship has 
particular importance. Indeed, we discovered that an exceptional element of the 
bond of nationality is the right that it creates on the part of the state to seek redress 
for any injury committed against one of its citizenry.104 If local remedies have not 
provided adequate means for redressing the injury, diplomatic protection provides a 
route to nevertheless guaranteeing that the situation is correctly resolved.105 
Diplomatic protection is thus an important mechanism in ensuring that nationals 
receive fair and proper treatment abroad.  
Although, with the advent of human rights law - espousing rights to the benefit 
of everyone and introducing various enforcement mechanisms - there is a reduced 
need for diplomatic protection, it is of enduring relevance to the protection of the 
interests of non-nationals.106 And there are certainly conceivable scenarios, even 
real-life cases, in which diplomatic protection could play an important role in 
helping stateless persons to assert their rights. For instance, following the partition 
and independence of Eritrea from Ethiopia and the accompanying hostilities, 
property confiscations and expulsions, a Claims Commission was established to  
 
decide through binding arbitration all claims for loss, damage or injury by one 
Government against the other, and by nationals […] of one party against the 
                                                           
104 Yaffa Zilberschats, "Chapter 2 - Citizenship and International Law" in The Human Right to 
Citizenship, Transnational Publishers, Ardsley, NY: 2002, page 36; Guy Goodwin Gill, "The rights of 
refugees and stateless persons" in Saksena (ed) Human rights perspectives & challenges (in 1900's and 
beyond), Lancers Books, New Delhi: 1994, page 392; Ruth Donner, "Chapter 1: Nationality Law in the 
Context of Public International Law" in The Regulation of Nationality in International Law, 
Transnational Publishers, New York: 1994, page 19. Recall, as noted in chapter IX, that diplomatic 
protection is generally considered to be aright of the state, rather than a right of the individual. 
105 For a discussion of the exhaustion of local remedies as a precondition to the exercise of diplomatic 
protection, see Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 
2003, pages 472-481. 
106 Carmen Tiburcio, "Conclusion" in The human rights of aliens under international and comparative 
law, Kluwer Law International, The Hague: 2001, page 267; International Law Commission, Report to 
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Government of the other party or entities owned or controlled by the other 
party.107  
 
Since the same circumstances of hostilities, expulsions and state succession also 
contributed to nationality disputes and cases of statelessness, ensuring that such 
persons were also able to benefit from diplomatic protection was fundamental to 
making sure that all individuals who were wronged by the conflict were able to 
benefit from the facilities offered by this Claim Commission.108  
The difficulty is that the long-standing doctrine of diplomatic protection is 
such that states may only exercise it with respect to their nationals.109 This approach 
would exclude stateless persons outright, yet international tribunals have, in the 
past, often elected to follow this route of caution and dismiss any claim where the 
bond of nationality is either not present or insufficiently proven. In a particularly 
remarkable ruling in 1931, the Dickson Car Wheel Company v. United Mexican 
States case, an international arbitration panel even declared that 
 
a state […] does not commit an international delinquency in inflicting 
an injury upon an individual lacking nationality, and consequently, no 
State is empowered to intervene or complain on his behalf either before 
or after the injury.110  
 
In other instances, most notably the widely-cited Nottebohm ruling, courts have 
taken this matter further still, by asking not only if nationality is present but also 
testing the substance of that nationality: Friedrich Nottebohm’s factual ties with 
Liechtenstein were determined to be insufficient for his Liechtenstein nationality to 
                                                           
107 Article 5, paragraph 1 of the Agreement Between the Government of the Federal Democratic 
Republic of Ethiopia and the Government of the State of Eritrea, signed in Algiers, 22 December 2000. 
108 See also Human Rights Watch, The Horn of Africa War: Mass Expulsions and the Nationality Issue, 
30 January 2003. 
109 “A normal and important function of nationality is to establish the legal interest of a state when 
nationals […] receive injury or loss at the hands of another state. The subject-matter of the claim is the 
individual and his property: the claim is that of the state. Thus if the plaintiff state cannot establish the 
nationality of the claim, the claim is inadmissible because of the absence of any legal interest of the 
claimant”. Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 
2003, pages 459-460. See also Permanent Court of International Justice, Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway 
case, P.C.I.J. Series A/B, No. 76, 28 February 1939; Haro van Panhuys, "Chapter VIII: The Traditional 
Function of Nationality in International Law (A Digest)" in The Role of Nationality in International 
Law, A.W. Sijthoff's Uitgeversmaatschappij, Leiden: 1959, pages 182-183; Paul Weis, Nationality and 
Statelessness in International Law, Kluwer Academic Publishers Group, Dordrecht: 1979, pages 32-35; 
Carmen Tiburcio, "Chapter III. Development of the Treatment of Aliens from Diplomatic Protection to 
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be recognised for the purposes of international law and the exercise of diplomatic 
protection.111 The International Court of Justice hereby ruled in favour of 
statelessness – at least for the purposes of international relations – and against 
protection. This finding “underlines how deeply rooted, for the admissibility of 
diplomatic protection, is the requirement that the person involved must be a full-
fledged member of the population of the complainant state”.112 
 However there are understood to be some exceptions to the general rule 
requiring the presence of a bond of nationality, resting on a “genuine link”, for the 
exercise of diplomatic protection. In particular, “a right to protection of non-
nationals may arise from treaty or an ad hoc arrangement establishing an 
agency”.113 Or in other words: 
 
Protection may be accorded and is in fact granted to non-nationals, but 
the exercise of such protection need be recognised by other states only 
if it is consistent with international custom or treaties. Protection of 
nationals is distinct from any such protection accorded to non-nationals 
in that it is unconditional, and unlimited as to time.114 
 
From the outset, the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons had 
the potential to provide just such a special arrangement. During the drafting of the 
document a Belgian proposal would have resulted in an explicit reference to the 
diplomatic protection of stateless persons, in the following terms: “Each 
Contracting State shall be entitled to ensure the protection of both the property and 
the person of stateless persons domiciled or resident in its territory”. If adopted this 
amendment would have established the legal basis for the exercise of diplomatic 
protection by states on behalf of stateless persons – thus in the absence of the bond 
of nationality. The proposal received a mixed review and was eventually narrowly 
rejected by vote.115 In the end, the 1954 Statelessness Convention mentions 
                                                           
111 International Court of Justice, "Nottebohm Case" (Liechtenstein v. Guatamala), 1953. See also Ruth 
Donner, "Chapter 2: The Principle of the "Link" in Nationality Law" in The Regulation of Nationality 
in International Law, Transnational Publishers, New York: 1994, pages 59-64; Ian Brownlie, Principles 
of Public International Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 2003, pages 396-406. 
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Digest)" in The Role of Nationality in International Law, A.W. Sijthoff's Uitgeversmaatschappij, 
Leiden: 1959, page 187. 
113 Richard Lillich, The human rights of aliens in contemporary international law, Manchester 
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question Nehemiah Robinson, Convention relating to the status of stateless persons - Its history and 
interpretation, UNHCR, Geneva: 1955, page 92. 
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diplomatic protection only in the context of the issuance of travel documents where 
it declares that the delivery of such a document “does not in any way entitle the 
holder to the protection of the diplomatic or consular authorities of the country of 
issue, and does not ipso facto confer on these authorities a right of protection”.116 
The Convention thereby defers the question back to the states involved, neither 
providing a legal basis for, nor necessarily outlawing, the exercise of diplomatic 
protection.117 The time was clearly not yet ripe for more decisive action on this 
point. Nor do contemporary human rights instruments offer any answers to this 
dilemma.118  
 Nevertheless, today there are signs that the doctrine of diplomatic protection is 
developing to be more conducive to the needs of the stateless. This is especially 
evident in the work that has been taken up by the International Law Commission 
over the last decade. Commencing in 1997, the ILC has undertaken a (renewed) 
attempt to codify the customary norms that relate to diplomatic protection.119 
Throughout its work, the ILC clearly acknowledges the importance of nationality as 
the principle link through which jurisdiction to exercise diplomatic protection is 
created. However, it also confirms the existence of exceptions to this rule of thumb 
and gives substantial thought to the position of the stateless (and refugees). In 
particular, the ILC recalls the 1931 ruling cited above where it was “held that a 
stateless person could not be the beneficiary of diplomatic protection” before going 
on to declare that “this dictum no longer reflects the accurate position of 
international law for both stateless persons and refugees”.120 From the outset, the 
                                                           
116 Paragraph 16 of the Schedule to article 28 of the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless 
Persons. 
117 “While the issue of a travel document by the authorities of a state does not per se authorise the 
consular or diplomatic representatives of that state to provide protection to the stateless person abroad 
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the stateless person travels do not object thereto”. Nehemiah Robinson, Convention relating to the 
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nationals. See article 23 of the Migrant Workers Convention. Recall further that the human rights 
regime has developed its own monitoring and enforcement mechanisms – that are not dependent on 
state intervention – and is, therefore, not reliant on the system of diplomatic protection. 
119 The International Law Commission placed the subject of diplomatic protection on its agenda in 
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previous, unsuccessful attempts by the ILC to codify the rules relating to diplomatic protection – as 
well as the elaboration of draft norms relating to state responsibility generally - see Carmen Tiburcio, 
"Chapter III. Development of the Treatment of Aliens from Diplomatic Protection to Human Rights" in 
The human rights of aliens under international and comparative law, Kluwer Law International, The 
Hague: 2001, pages 53-57. 
120 Commentary to article 8 of the Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, International Law 
Commission, Report of the work of its 58th Session, UN General Assembly Official Records, 61st 
Session, Supplement No. 10, A/61/10, New York 2006, page 48. Interestingly, this vision of the current 
state of international law is founded in particular on the development of instruments to protect the rights 
and interests of the stateless (and refugees), such as the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of 





ILC has therefore included a provision dealing with access to diplomatic protection 
for the stateless in the draft articles that it prepared on the subject.121 The article, as 
adopted by the ILC and submitted to the UN General Assembly for consideration 
reads: 
 
A state may exercise diplomatic protection in respect of a stateless person 
who, at the date of injury and at the date of the official presentation of the 
claim, is lawfully and habitually resident in that state.122 
 
The ILC correctly recognises that “lawful and habitual residence” is a stringent 
condition and that some individuals will subsequently still go without protection but 
considers this to be a legitimate requirement in view of the exceptional position of 
this “new” rule with regard to the overall doctrine of diplomatic protection. This is a 
regrettable, but indeed perhaps currently necessary, constraint on the protection 
offered. 
Once lawful and habitual residence is attained, the article will effectively place 
such stateless persons on a par with nationals. Firstly, the same temporal 
requirement must be met: the connection of nationality, or in this case lawful and 
habitual residence, must be present at both the time that the injury is committed and 
the time that the claim is made. And secondly, it remains within the discretion of 
states to decide whether or not to actually accord diplomatic protection 
(encapsulated by the use of the word “may”).123 To date, the response of 
governments to this “progressive development of the law”124 have been 
unanimously positive and encouraging.125 So if the articles are formally adopted in 
their present state, for example as recommended by the ILC in the form of a 
Convention on Diplomatic Protection,126 this particular provision is unlikely to 
meet much resistance. But until such a time, the question of access to diplomatic 
protection for the stateless will remain uncertain. Just as the 1954 Statelessness 
Convention declared: there is nothing to stop states presenting a claim in reaction to 
an injury suffered by a stateless person, but there is also nothing to stop the 
respondent state from attempting to have the claim dismissed on the grounds of the 
                                                           
121 The first draft of this provision can be found in International Law Commission, Report on the work 
of its 52nd Session, UN General Assembly Official Records, 56th Session, Supplement No. 10, A/55/10, 
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122 Article 8, paragraph 1 of the Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, International Law 
Commission, Report of the work of its 58th Session, UN General Assembly Official Records, 61st 
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126 International Law Commission, Report of the work of its 58th Session, UN General Assembly 
Official Records, 61st Session, Supplement No. 10, A/61/10, New York 2006, page 15. 
 
 
Protecting the Special Needs of the Stateless 
 385 
absence of the legal connection of nationality. Considering the support expressed 
for the draft article on diplomatic protection of stateless persons (as discussed 
above), we can assume that it will become increasingly uncommon for states to 
object to the exercise of diplomatic protection by a state on behalf of their resident 
stateless population.127 Yet as it stands, there is no rule of international customary 





As an instrument purposefully crafted to address the difficulties that arise for 
individuals who find themselves without a nationality, expectations were high 
going into this chapter that the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless 
Persons would offer appropriate solutions to the “special needs” of the stateless. In 
the end, the convention receives a mixed report in this respect. On the one hand, 
this chapter identified an area in which the 1954 Statelessness Convention very 
clearly retains its value, even in the light of contemporary international (human 
rights) law: it decisively addresses the problem of obtaining various forms of 
documentation and this, in turn, can have a positive knock-on effect on the 
enjoyment of many other rights and facilities. On the other hand, the 1954 
Statelessness Convention missed two important opportunities: dealing hesitantly 
with the question of naturalisation – and thereby the very resolution of statelessness 
- and failing to tackle the issue of diplomatic protection. Let us reflect briefly upon 
(the implications of) these observations. 
It has long been acknowledged that “the problem of existing statelessness 
has so many grave political, social and even racial aspects that it should be treated 
with utmost care”.128 Thus, addressing the statelessness of stateless persons or 
attributing a right to (be considered for) naturalisation is a complex matter. We 
found evidence of this in the discovery that not only did the international 
community decline an initiative to set down specific rules relating to the resolution 
of existing cases of statelessness, but the standard on the naturalisation of stateless 
persons delineated by the 1954 Statelessness Convention is largely vague and 
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Expulsions and the Nationality Issue, 30 January 2003. 
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discretionary. Meanwhile, although it is possible to find evidence of the 
development within the human rights field of a right to (facilitated) naturalisation 
for the stateless, this issue is, as yet, far from settled. Human rights standards do 
already prevent states from deliberately targeting the stateless with a restrictive 
naturalisation policy or from upholding manifestly unreasonable impediments. 
However, there are no universally accepted, palpable, positive rules establishing the 
conditions under which the stateless can claim a right to naturalisation and which 
additional requirements may or may not be set by the state in this context. 
Moreover, since the current trend is towards recognition of a right to commence 
naturalisation proceedings that is contingent upon attaining (a certain period of) 
lawful and habitual residence, for this to provide a real answer to existing cases of 
statelessness, something must be done to address the enduring issue of access to a 
lawful immigration status.129 
So, where to from here? In order to provide an effective response to the 
“special need” of the stateless that is their very lack of nationality, more will have 
to be done to develop a truly credible solution. In view of the finding that efforts to 
prevent statelessness are not yet fool-proof and what is now known about the 
protracted nature of statelessness, it is clear that such a solution is overdue. Now is 
therefore the time to reflect upon the advances that human rights law has made over 
the last 50 years in dealing with access to naturalisation and to revive discussion on 
the resolution of existing statelessness by building upon these foundations. The 
most promising source of concrete standards for naturalisation is the European 
Convention on Nationality and this could be used as a basis for further developing 
stateless-specific norms. Renewed thought must also be given to the questions 
raised by the problem of access to residence as a basic prerequisite for access to 
naturalisation and consideration should be given to the elaboration of norms that 
allow other “genuine links” to be translated into the bond of citizenship.130 In 
addition, new avenues could be investigated, as we now see in the context of 
avoiding statelessness in the event of state succession,131 such as the possibility of 
introducing international consultation or even arbitration132 as a tool to identifying 
an appropriate connection to open up a route to naturalisation. Keep in mind that at 
all times, these possibilities should be seen in parallel to the opportunities offered 
by the standards relating to the prevention of statelessness for tackling existing 
cases of statelessness through the (retrospective) conferral or reinstatement of 
nationality. 
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The other concern that the tailor-made statelessness instrument neglects to 
tackle with sufficient vigour is diplomatic protection. It is deeply regrettable that a 
provision that would have provided the legal basis needed for states to exercise 
diplomatic protection on behalf of a stateless person was excluded from the final 
text of the 1954 Statelessness Convention. As it stands, the Convention simply does 
not pronounce either way on the matter. Presently, international law does not allow 
states to rely on an unequivocal right to exercise diplomatic protection in respect of 
an injury committed against a stateless person and the claim may simply be quashed 
on the grounds of the absence of the connection of nationality. This is a pity since 
diplomatic protection can be a helpful addition to the arsenal of available remedies 
for the protection of individual rights. The draft article presented by the 
International Law Commission would rectify this situation in favour of the 
protection of the stateless - at least for those who can establish lawful and habitual 
residence – by establishing a legal basis for the claim. Therefore, if other 
considerations (further) delay the adoption of an instrument dealing with diplomatic 
protection in its entirety,133 it would be advisable for the international community to 
push ahead with the codification of at least the basic contours of these norms and 
specifically approve the provision dealing with stateless persons. Alternatively - or 
indeed additionally - the issue of diplomatic protection of the stateless could be 
taken up elsewhere, for example within an instrument updating and supplementing 
the protection offered to the stateless under the 1954 Statelessness Convention.134   
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, the 1954 Statelessness 
Convention fares much better on the matter of documentation. The instrument 
offers a basic guarantee of identity papers for all stateless persons – documents to 
attest not only to the personal particulars of the holder, but also to his or her 
stateless status. In addition, stateless persons may be able to obtain travel 
documents under the provisions of the 1954 Statelessness Convention – lawfully 
staying stateless persons can even invoke a right to such documents – and these 
papers again serve both to facilitate travel and to vouch for the statelessness of the 
individual. Moreover, thanks to the same Convention the stateless can also rely on 
their state of residence for the issuance of any other forms of documentation or 
certification that they require. In sum, the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of 
Stateless Persons offers a comprehensive set of guarantees that, together, ensure 
that the stateless are issued with the basic documents needed to access any rights 
and facilities - related to their status or otherwise. And even though human rights 
law recognises the importance of documentation and may even provide a route to 
claiming various types of papers, to date these developments in no way negate the 
relevant provisions of the statelessness-specific instrument. This is because the 
1954 Statelessness Convention establishes a concrete entitlement to the different 
documents. Plus it identifies which state is mandated to issue them as well as 
calling into being the status of “stateless person” and ensuring the documentation of 
individuals accordingly. Nevertheless, there is no escaping the fact that what the 
statelessness instrument fails to do – and this will present a major practical obstacle 
                                                           
133 See note 118. 
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in chapter XIII upon reflection on the full set of observations drawn from the analysis in chapters X, XI 





to the enjoyment of a right to documentation and to subsequently unlocking the 
further protection granted – is to provide guidance on how to identify cases of 
statelessness and actually establish a person’s status as a stateless person. In this 
respect, the 1954 Statelessness Convention is a serious let-down and this is an area 
that will need much greater consideration in future if the instrument is to be truly 
effective in its aims. With this serious issue in mind, it is time to progress to the 
overall evaluation of the value of the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of 
Stateless Persons and consider – in light also of what contribution human rights law 
has been found to make – to what extent supplementary instruments or guidelines 
are necessary if the stateless are to enjoy adequate protection of their rights and 
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One of the most frequently cited descriptions of nationality and how much it 
matters is the assertion that citizenship amounts to “the right to have rights”.1 When 
statelessness is considered in this light we face the worrying possibility that, 
without any nationality, the stateless are deemed to have no right to have rights and 
can be (mis)treated accordingly, without consequence. Just how dire the picture of 
statelessness then becomes was painted very powerfully by Arendt: 
  
The prolongation of their lives is due to charity and not to right, for no 
law exists which could force the nations to feed them; their freedom of 
movement, if they have it at all, gives them no right to residence which 
even the jailed criminal enjoys as a matter of course; and their freedom of 
opinion is a fool’s freedom, for nothing they think matters anyhow.2 
 
Fortunately over the course of the last three chapters it became clear that this 
gloomy scenario is not (any longer) a true reflection of the status of this vulnerable 
group. The 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons establishes a 
minimum standard of treatment for the stateless - elaborating and conferring a 
catalogue of basic rights – while the development of human rights norms has 
heralded the progressive advance of “humanity” over “nationality” as the 
foundation of the right to have rights.  
 So, the position of the stateless today is simultaneously less ominous and more 
complex. While they are certainly not entirely right-less, their lack of any 
nationality does continue to raise difficulties – not just in practice, but even 
according to the letter of international law as it now stands. The purpose of the 
investigation conducted in the foregoing chapters was to shed some light on the 
intricacies of this issue in order to answer the following research question:  
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which pronounced states free to inflict injuries upon stateless persons without this amounting to an 





How can the way in which international law deals with the legal status and 
entitlements of stateless persons be improved so as to ensure optimal 
protection of the individual’s rights in the absence of nationality? 
 
On the one hand then, we weighed up the contribution made by the 1954 
Statelessness Convention to assuring the stateless the enjoyment of the full range of 
human rights. On the other hand, we considered the progress made within the 
broader human rights field towards guaranteeing that the stateless are not 
disadvantaged by their lack of a nationality. The following pages offer a reflection 
upon the observations made in the preceding chapters; establish the independent 
value of the tailor-made statelessness instrument and the role of human rights law in 
protecting the stateless; ponder any gaps identified in the protection offered that call 
for a (further) response from the international community; and pause once more to 
consider the potential for the implementation and enforcement of the relevant 
standards before drawing to an overall conclusion. 
 
1 VALUE OF THE 1954 CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF STATELESS 
PERSONS IN THE PROTECTION OF STATELESS PERSONS 
 
The process of systematically deliberating upon each right and guarantee housed in 
the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons allowed us to pick 
up on particular points of interest and proceed gradually towards an overall 
assessment of the effectiveness of the instrument’s approach to appeasing the 
situation of the stateless. One of the foremost observations to be made about this 
instrument is that in order to better understand its content a basic concept of its 
origins and drafting history is absolutely indispensable. The development of the text 
in parallel to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees has left an 
indelible impression on the approach taken to the problem of statelessness. We 
found that debate on the appropriateness of particular paragraphs or details within 
the specific context of statelessness - as a problem very much distinct from refugee-
hood - was regrettably minimal. The provisions of the statelessness instrument 
largely echo those of the Refugee Convention even though this has not always 
proven to be the most suitable route to alleviating the specific difficulties faced by 
the stateless. Nevertheless, we also discovered a number of significant 
modifications to the guarantees offered: some subtle, such as a change in standard 
of protection and some dramatic such, as the deletion of the provision on non-
punishment for unlawful entry. In each and every case, however, the upshot of the 
amendment was a deterioration of the protection offered. We are thus forced to 
conclude that this drafting process had an irreversibly detrimental impact upon the 
effectiveness of the 1954 Statelessness Convention – a fact that was evidenced time 
and again as we reflected upon the scope and content of each individual provision.  
As we ran through the provisions of the 1954 Statelessness Convention one 
by one, it became increasingly apparent that the instrument’s characteristic 
approach to the elaboration of rights is in fact its greatest weakness.3 Firstly, the 
Convention attributes the majority of rights not to all stateless persons within the 
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jurisdiction of a state party, but to a smaller subset of this group: for example only 
to those who are lawfully present or even only to those who are lawfully resident. 
The level of attachment required as a precondition for the enjoyment of protection 
under the instrument is of clear concern for a substantial number of the rights 
espoused. Achieving entitlement to the various economic, social and cultural rights 
housed in the 1954 Statelessness Convention is particularly endangered by this 
formula since the majority require at least lawful presence if not an even more 
substantial connection with a state.4 And since the Convention itself does not 
address the question of access to a state’s jurisdiction or to a particular status, 
contracting states are under no obligation to promote stateless persons to a higher 
level of attachment and thereby ensure that they are (gradually) entitled to the full 
set of rights promulgated.5  
The second major trait – and flaw - of the 1954 Statelessness Convention’s 
approach to the protection of the stateless is the elaboration of a contingent rather 
than an absolute standard of protection. A handful of provisions do contain absolute 
rights or guarantees, such as the right of access to courts and the articles that deal 
with the “special needs” of the stateless.6 However, the majority of articles declare 
that the stateless must enjoy either treatment on a par with nationals or, much less 
helpfully, “treatment at least as favourable as aliens generally”. This technique was 
found to be a major drawback in relation to both the civil and political and the 
economic, social and cultural rights that the 1954 Statelessness Convention sets out. 
Indeed, rather than providing an immediate and enforceable standard of its own, 
this approach effectively defers the question of the content to be given to the 
respective rights back to the states concerned or to other international norms such as 
the human rights standards that were subsequently investigated. In particular, the 
elaboration of a series of rights for which the stateless may rely only upon treatment 
on a par with non-nationals generally is an irrefutable shortcoming because it 
ignores the crux of the issue: the stateless are non-citizens everywhere and can thus 
never rely on rights beyond those offered to foreigners generally unless special 
provision is made to that effect. Instead, those provisions that offer the stateless 
national treatment are much better suited to the realisation of the purpose of the 
instrument – to overcoming problems associated with the specific circumstances of 
statelessness, characterised by the absence of any nationality. With this in mind, it 
is perhaps unfair to be overly critical of those rights that are promulgated at this 
standard. Still, it can be questioned whether this approach is appropriate in the 
contemporary human rights environment because it does not compel states to 
guarantee any of these rights, just to treat stateless persons and citizens equally 
(well or badly). Other areas of international law - in particular relevant human 
rights norms - will still need to be invoked, in conjunction with the relevant 
                                                           
4 See, among others, articles 15, 17, 23 and 24 of the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless 
Persons. 
5 As noted in chapter X, section 2.2, this approach to the elaboration of rights was transposed from the 
1951 Refugee Convention which, through the inclusion of the principle of non-refoulement does at least 
provide some basis for moving up through the various levels of attachment and achieving a 
progressively closer connection with the host state which in turn serves to open the door to the 
enjoyment of the full spectrum of rights. 
6 See, among others, article 16, paragraph 1 and article 27 of the 1954 Convention relating to the Status 





provisions of the 1954 Statelessness Convention, to give this standard of treatment 
any true meaning. 
It is the combination of these two trademark techniques that serves an 
especially severe blow to the effectiveness of the 1954 Statelessness Convention. 
For example, the freedom of association and the right to housing are guaranteed 
only to those stateless individuals who have reached an advanced – often 
unattainable – level of attachment (lawful stay) and even then, the actual substance 
of the right attributed is made contingent upon the standard enjoyed by non-
nationals generally. So, while the 1954 Statelessness Convention appears to tackle 
a wide range of concerns, each provision must be read very carefully. Through this 
approach to standard-setting, the instrument stops sadly short of reaching its full 
potential. Moreover, even if we set to one side the problems related to the 
conditional attribution of contingent rights, many of the provisions are still 
substantively inadequate. In some cases the terminology is vague or ambiguous,7 in 
others it is simply not thorough or forceful enough to ensure that the needs or 
interests of the stateless are optimally protected.8 A prime example of this failure to 
elaborate appropriately clear and decisive norms is article 32 on naturalisation: this 
crucial “right of solution” is formulated in awkwardly imprecise, open and 
facultative language with the result that it is doubtful whether the stateless can 
claim any benefit from it at all.  
 As well as expressing serious discontent about the existing content of the 1954 
Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons on a number of counts, we 
were forced to admit that the instrument’s deficiencies are further compounded by 
the oversights that it commits. By structuring this study such that we considered one 
category of guarantees at a time, identifying the topics that have been overlooked 
entirely by the 1954 Statelessness Convention was relatively straightforward. In 
each chapter we came across at least one issue that the instrument failed to address 
whereas, with a view to offering the stateless a comprehensive protection regime, it 
arguably should have. From among these concerns, four particular subjects stand 
out. The first is international freedom of movement or, more precisely, the right to 
enter, remain in and return to the territory of a state. Being without any nationality, 
the stateless cannot rely on the automatic right of entry and residence that this status 
brings with respect to the country of citizenship.9 Meanwhile as mentioned above 
the ability to attain or retain a certain status (or level of attachment) within a state is 
crucial for accessing a great number of the 1954 Statelessness Convention’s 
benefits and, equally importantly, for rescuing the stateless from becoming part of 
                                                           
7 For example, the ambiguous relationship between the provision relating to “administrative 
assistance”(article 25) and that dealing with “social security” (article 24) may cause difficulties in 
implementation, to the detriment of the protection offered.  
8 Consider the limited scope of, among others, the right of access to courts (chapter X, section 4.1) and 
the freedom of association (chapter XI, section 3.1).  
9 Remember that the importance of the right to enter lies not in the fact that stateless persons necessarily 
desire to travel or migrate, but to ensure that they are entitled to live somewhere and indeed ideally in 
that place with which they have a real connection. So, the right to enter ensures that expulsion cannot 
follow denationalisation; that if the stateless are forced to flee or migration has been part of the problem 
leading up to statelessness they are ensured a right to return; and that they are not just ‘tolerated’ 
forever but are able to enjoy a regular immigration status which may allow them to enjoy additional 
rights and benefits. Recall chapter X, section 2.2. 
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an international “ping-pong” match whereby they are forever shunted back and 
forth while their status remains in limbo. Yet the document does not tackle the 
problem of gaining (lawful) entry into or residence in a state. This oversight has a 
severe knock-on effect for the enjoyment of so many of the other rights elaborated 
in the 1954 Statelessness Convention – because these are linked to lawful presence 
or residence - that it jeopardises the effectiveness of the entire instrument. The 
second and related omission is a set of guarantees to protect stateless persons from 
arbitrary or indefinite detention – including in the context of the difficulties relating 
to their immigration status. Meanwhile, just as the right to enter or remain in a state 
is a traditional function of nationality - and is, as such, precisely the type of issue 
that we would expect an instrument addressing the position of the stateless to touch 
upon - the last two topics that are very notably absent from the 1954 Statelessness 
Convention are also matters that are inherent in concept of citizenship: political 
rights (or indeed even quasi-political rights) and diplomatic protection.10  
 At the time that the instrument was being drafted states were clearly not 
prepared to prescribe measures that would circumvent nationality entirely and 
attribute such rights and privileges to the stateless as would normally be founded 
upon the bond of citizenship. So, although tailor-made to redress the protection gap 
presented by the specific circumstance of statelessness, the 1954 Convention 
relating to the Status of Stateless Persons had to limit its ambition to the protection 
of a basic, minimum standard of treatment. The idea was not that the measures 
prescribed by the instrument would replace the need for a nationality, but that the 
stateless would not suffer too much hardship or indignity while awaiting the 
definitive resolution of their plight through the attribution or restoration of 
nationality. The 1954 Statelessness Convention even manages to enunciate a “right 
of solution” to encourage this process. However, as mentioned in chapter XII 
(section 1.1), access to naturalisation as a right of solution is put forward in such 
vague and discretionary terms that even here the instrument fails to really grasp the 
issue with sufficient vigour. I contend that the 1954 Statelessness Convention 
cannot be forgiven on both counts: it must either present an effective route towards 
resolving cases of statelessness – in which case it can be excused for pursuing a 
minimum standard of treatment as an interim status – or it must deal resolutely with 
all those difficulties that the stateless face by virtue of their statelessness by 
prescribing something far better than treatment on a par with non-nationals 
generally (preferably national treatment or even absolute rights) across the board. In 
contrast, it has become apparent over the course of the foregoing chapters that 
international (human rights) law has moved on in great strides since the adoption of 
the 1954 Statelessness Convention and today it is possible to trace the necessary 
starting-points from which to develop a more appropriate response to statelessness 
through either or both of these routes.  
 After such stern critique, we must ask: has the 1954 Convention relating to the 
Status of Stateless Persons no positive attributes? On balance I would have to 
conclude that the instrument has two main plus points. First and foremost of these is 
the fact that the document defines statelessness and establishes the international 
                                                           
10 See on political and quasi-political rights chapter X, section 7 and on diplomatic protection chapter 





status of “stateless person” to which certain rights can be attached.11 The 
Convention thereby focuses states’ attention on the vulnerability of those who lack 
any nationality and the importance of responding to their particular protection 
needs. Just as “refugees” and “migrant workers” have also become categories of 
special concern to the international community, by formally introducing 
“statelessness” to international legal terminology the instrument provides a vital 
reference point for discussing the issue at hand, implementing measures addressed 
towards the persons concerned and monitoring their treatment. The second and 
closely related pro of the 1954 Statelessness Convention is that it not only 
introduces the status of stateless person but also provides for the documentation of 
stateless persons as stateless persons. A strong and thorough set of guarantees 
elaborated in the closing provisions of the convention  
 
- ensures that the stateless have access to at least basic identity papers which 
establish both the personal particulars and the statelessness of the 
individual; 
 
- mandates contracting states to also provide any other basic documentation 
which may be required to access rights or services; and 
 
- offers the possibility of a travel document to function in lieu of a 
passport.12  
 
In this way, the 1954 Statelessness Convention provides the basic building blocks 
of a system that has the potential to offer the stateless the protection that they need. 
And the instrument does go on to detail a selection of civil and political and 
economic, social and cultural rights for the stateless to enjoy. Had the content of 
these provisions been clearer, more forceful and taken the specific plight of the 
stateless into greater consideration, the conclusion as to the overall effectiveness of 
the Convention would have been very different. 
 If the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons existed in 
isolation it could be considered a valuable instrument, warts and all, precisely 
because it does lay down the elementary foundations of a protection regime 
purposely geared towards this vulnerable group – bearing in mind, nonetheless, the 
limitations inherent in offering a contingent standard of treatment. However, the 
1954 Statelessness Convention is just one small cog in the vast machine that is 
international law today. When situated within its proper context, much of the added 
value of the document fades away. Since its adoption in 1954, the Convention has 
been largely outmanoeuvred by developments in the human rights field. Ratification 
of the 1954 Statelessness Convention therefore amounts to little more than a 
reaffirmation that the stateless enjoy the various rights that are elaborated elsewhere 
and to which states have therefore already committed. In effect, this means that 
there is also nothing in the content of the 1954 Statelessness Convention that states 
could consider contentious or objectionable and prevent them from becoming a 
party to the instrument – a finding that may be useful in campaigning for 
                                                           
11 See chapter IX, section 3. 
12 See chapter XII, section 2.1. 
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ratification of the text since any concerns that may be raised by states with respect 
to particular norms can be readily pacified through reference to the corresponding 
human rights standards that the state has already acknowledged.13  
 However, in view of all of the criticism expressed at the content on the 1954 
Statelessness Convention, would it in fact be a useful exercise to attempt to boost 
the number of state parties of this largely outdated instrument with the help of the 
observations that have just been made? Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, in my view, 
the answer to this question is: yes, advocating for wider acceptance of this 
instrument is still worthwhile. This is because it puts the stateless on the map as a 
group who hold a particular status and are entitled to treatment that caters for their 
specific needs, be it on the basis of the 1954 Statelessness Convention itself or 
broader human rights norms, as well as guaranteeing the acquisition of 
documentation that can be the key to claiming these exclusive (and any other) 
benefits. Meanwhile, it is important to be forever conscious of the limitations of the 
1954 Statelessness Convention. Rather than seeing it as the definitive answer to the 
conundrum of the protection of stateless persons, we should be aware of what the 
document can and cannot contribute to addressing their plight. And where the 
instrument is let down by vague terminology or references to contingent standards 
of treatment, rather than casting the text aside we should not be afraid to utilise 
developing human rights standards to bring more clarity or body to the guarantees.  
This does not detract from the fact that serious contemplation will have to be 
given to a number of outstanding issues identified over the course of this 
investigation that seriously jeopardise the effectiveness of any efforts to attribute 
rights to the stateless on the basis of the 1954 Statelessness Convention. In 
particular the problem of ensuring a right to reside somewhere,14 but also the 
difficult question of identifying cases of statelessness on the basis of the definition 
as a precursor to setting in motion all of the guarantees that accompany that status15 
and the overall challenge of enforcement.16 We will return to these residual issues 
in the upcoming sections as we take a conclusive look at the contribution made by 
human rights law to the protection of stateless persons, the remaining normative 
gaps and the potential for implementation and enforcement of all of the standards 
traced.  
 
2 THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL (HUMAN RIGHTS) LAW IN THE PROTECTION OF 
STATELESS PERSONS 
 
For numerous decades now, the progressive development of human rights standards 
has been eroding the foundations of the notion that nationality is the right to have 
rights and replacing it with a concept of humanity or human dignity as the basis for 
the enjoyment of rights: 
 
                                                           
13 For example through their acceptance of the International Covenants or the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child  – all of which count many more state parties than the 1954 Statelessness Convention. 
14 Recall chapter X, section 2.2.1. 
15 See in particular chapter II, section 1 and chapter IX, section 3. 





With the passage of time, it became evident that the nationality regime was 
not always sufficient to provide protection under any and every 
circumstance (as evidenced, for example, by the situation of stateless 
persons). Throughout the twentieth century and to date, international 
human rights law has sought to remedy this deficiency or vacuum, by 
denationalising protection (and thus including every individual, even 
stateless persons).17 
 
Thanks to this development, human rights law now forms a second important 
source of norms for the protection of the rights and interests of the stateless - 
alongside the stateless-specific instrument discussed above. But, although 
citizenship is not (any longer) that relevant for the enjoyment of basic rights, the 
foregoing chapters have made clear that it would be premature to assert that 
nationality is entirely irrelevant in the contemporary human rights environment. In 
fact, modern human rights law – just like the 1954 Statelessness Convention – 
receives a mixed report when its response to the particular plight of the stateless is 
put under the microscope.  
On the one hand, human rights norms have achieved a breadth of scope and an 
intensity of detail that far outreaches the 1954 Statelessness Convention: many 
topics that were absent from the statelessness instrument are dealt with in universal 
and regional human rights documents alike and thanks to the efforts of human rights 
institutions like the UN treaty bodies, each entitlement has been worked out in 
considerable depth. Since the vast majority of the rights espoused are attributed to 
“everyone”, the stateless should also be able to benefit from the protection offered 
in the human rights field. Indeed, on numerous occasions, human rights bodies have 
considered and remarked upon the enjoyment by non-nationals – including stateless 
persons – of rights such as the right to (enjoy) property, the right to education and a 
plethora of others. On the other hand, human rights law continues to admit the 
possibility that non-nationals be treated differently to nationals. Distinctions 
between citizens and non-citizens are not necessarily outlawed under the principles 
of equality and non-discrimination. This contributes a tinge of uncertainty to the 
position of the stateless and the exact extent of the protection offered to them. 
Moreover, some human rights norms are actually better described as citizen’s rights 
since they can ordinarily be relied upon only with respect to the state of nationality, 
to the apparent exclusion of the stateless. 
So there remain a number of key areas in which international (human rights) 
law has yet to satisfactorily address the vulnerable situation of the stateless – 
although there are also markedly positive developments, the potential of which 
should not be underestimated. To begin with, where we saw that international law 
acknowledges that the right to enter and remain in a state is still reserved, in 
principle, to nationals, there are numerous norms on which stateless individuals 
may nevertheless be able to rely in a bid to gain (re)admission to a state, 
regularisation of status or protection from expulsion. These included the principle 
of non-refoulement, the right to family and private life, the prohibition of collective 
or arbitrary expulsion and, with arguably the greatest potential to help stateless 
                                                           
17 Separate opinion of Judge A.A. Cancado Trindade, Inter-American Court on Human Rights, Case of 
Yean and Bosico v. Dominican Republic, Series C, Case 130, 8 September 2005. 
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persons in a wide variety of situations, the expanding interpretation of the right to 
enter his own country.18 Nevertheless, the human rights regime has yet to offer 
concrete standards that will enable all stateless persons to secure a right of entry and 
residence in an appropriate state and put an end to related problems of indefinite 
detention or serial expulsion.19  
Similarly, human rights law guarantees to everyone, including stateless 
persons, the basic building blocks for political empowerment that were omitted 
from the 1954 Statelessness Convention: the freedom of opinion, expression and 
assembly. Any measures that states impose that encroach upon these freedoms - 
whether geared towards the stateless, all non-nationals or everyone - must fall 
within the scope of the permissible limitations that the human rights instruments 
themselves delineate. Moreover, we found evidence of an increasing generosity 
towards the attribution of true political rights (the right to vote, stand for election or 
work in public service) to certain categories of non-nationals. EU citizenship is one 
example where the link between national citizenship and political rights has become 
less direct, but we found other cases of “denizenship” where the uncoupling of 
nationality and political participation is even more apparent. And the human rights 
community has reacted very positively to such developments. Yet, in spite of this 
interesting progression and the various arguments that could easily be brought in 
favour of special treatment for the stateless – as a distinct group - where political 
rights are concerned, this has nonetheless so far failed to generate any 
corresponding international norms. According to human rights law as it stands 
today, political rights are still guaranteed to everyone, but only in respect of their 
country of citizenship, and any more charitable or liberal policy on the part of states 
is welcomed rather than obliged.20   
The assessment of the human rights framework uncovered much the same 
picture in respect of many other issues. For instance, while stateless persons are to 
benefit, along with everyone else, from economic, social and cultural rights, the 
nature of these guarantees (commonly directed towards progressive rather than 
immediate realisation) and the explicit authorisation to developing countries to 
restrict the economic rights of non-nationals in the interest of their domestic 
economy complicate the picture. States may thereby be accorded a much wider 
margin of appreciation in determining the appropriateness of distinctions between 
nationals and non-nationals in respect of these rights, putting the stateless in a 
delicate position.21 Meanwhile with regard to a right of solution, although 
international law does not dictate the conditions for naturalisation, it does appear 
that a window of opportunity has opened within the human rights framework for the 
assertion of a right for stateless persons to (be considered for) naturalisation under 
given circumstances. It is certainly clear that unreasonable impediments to 
naturalisation are to be avoided as well as that the fact of statelessness must be 
taken into account and may oblige states to facilitate procedures or lower 
                                                           
18 See chapter X, section 2.2.2. 
19 Although we also found that the human rights framework provides both some substantive and some 
procedural guarantees against arbitrary or indefinite detention. See chapter X, section 7. 
20 These issues were discussed in depth in chapter X, section 7. 





requirements.22 There are even signs of change in relation to diplomatic protection 
where the so-called “nationality of the claims” has traditionally been an inescapable 
pre-condition for a state to assert its right to diplomatic protection. In fact, if the 
international community pushes ahead with the rules elaborated on this issue by the 
International Law Commission, the legal basis for states to exercise diplomatic 
protection over stateless persons - on the grounds of the connection of habitual 
residence rather than nationality – will be assured. This will transform the shape of 
the doctrine of diplomatic protection to the benefit of the stateless as a specific, 
vulnerable category of non-nationals.23  
Overall then, what is perhaps most interesting about the role of contemporary 
international (human rights) law in the protection of stateless persons is the 
incredible potential afforded by advancements achieved over the course of the past 
few decades. Already, the general human rights framework offers equal, if not 
stronger, guarantees to those elaborated in the 1954 Statelessness Convention on 
virtually all issues. And the foundations have now been laid for protection that 
would go much further and come much closer to the ideal of filling the gaps in the 
enjoyment of rights that stateless persons would otherwise face due to their lack of 
a nationality. The difficulty is that the interpretation of human rights standards in 
such a way as to be progressively more sympathetic to the position of the stateless 
has not necessarily been guided by concern for the particular quandary of this 
group. To solidify these developments in favour of the protection of stateless 
persons it will therefore be necessary to (re)focus attention on their specific plight 
and (re)evaluate how these individuals can be assisted through a pro-active 
application of existing trends. Some suggestions as to how this could be achieved 
are submitted in the next section. 
 
3 NORMATIVE GAPS IN THE PROTECTION OF STATELESS PERSONS UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SUGGESTED REMEDIES 
 
It is strict but fair to conclude that, to date, international law has failed to fully 
remedy any of the core difficulties that are presented by the situation of 
statelessness. Yes, there is a specially devised instrument that offers a minimum 
standard of treatment to be enjoyed by the stateless. And yes, human rights law has 
progressively denationalised protection with the result that the “rights gap” into 
which the stateless tumble is narrowing. Yet the “big issues” remain outstanding. 
Those rights and entitlements that traditionally belong to the very heart and function 
of citizenship still generally hover just beyond the reach of the stateless: the right to 
enter and remain in a state, the right to participate in government and the 
opportunity to enjoy diplomatic protection. Moreover, there are many – less 
sensitive - areas in which the exact treatment owed to stateless persons remains 
uncertain and a clarification of the scope and content of the various norms, as they 
apply to the stateless, would be hugely beneficial. And it would be similarly 
invaluable to reaffirm and elucidate a decisive right of solution for stateless persons. 
I therefore feel that in order to offer the stateless an appropriate answer to their 
plight, a new international instrument is needed in which all of these questions are 
                                                           
22 As discussed in chapter XII, section 1.2. 
23 See chapter XII, section 3. 
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brought together and codified. Although this would be a major project, the 
necessary foundations can already be found in existing (human rights) texts, 
decisions and comments, as well as in the 1954 Statelessness Convention itself. 
Plus, within the human rights field there is a growing body of instruments directed 
towards the protection of particular vulnerable groups, for example migrant 
workers, persons with disabilities and indigenous persons.24 It would therefore be in 
keeping with this pattern to elaborate a full catalogue of international norms relating 
specifically to the treatment of stateless persons – based on standards that have 
already been developing independently within the human rights context since the 
inception of the 1954 Statelessness Convention - in a new human rights instrument. 
An internationally-recognised definition of statelessness was already brought 
into being by the 1954 Statelessness Convention and has been repeated in various 
other instruments, so this definition could simply be copied across to any new 
document addressing statelessness, thereby delineating the scope of application of 
the norms. After opening with the question of definition, the new instrument should 
also pause to address the problem of actually identifying cases of statelessness and 
reaffirm the guarantees that are set out in the 1954 Statelessness Convention with 
respect to basic identity documentation, vouching for both status and other personal 
details.25 Immediately thereafter, another definitional problem must be tackled. The 
text will need to assert some means of establishing which state, for the purposes of 
the instrument, is to be regarded as the stateless person’s “own country” even in the 
absence of the formal bond of nationality. This is undoubtedly the most challenging 
and contentious matter to be dealt with because this determination can subsequently 
be used to identify the state in which the stateless person is owed a number of 
important rights – the most crucial of which is the right to enter (and thereby reside 
in) the state’s territory. 
 The pronouncements of the Human Rights Committee are arguably the most 
fruitful source of guidance in this delicate matter. In the context of interpreting the 
scope of a person’s own country for the purposes of the right to enter, the 
Committee made a start with the task of delineating which state, in the absence of 
nationality, can nevertheless be considered connected to an individual in such a way 
as to warrant recognition. The crux of the matter seems to be in establishing which 
state is “responsible” for an individual’s statelessness. This requires the application 
of the norms relating to the prevention of statelessness, which are themselves in 
need of some further crystallisation and clarification.26 As it stands, it will not 
necessarily always be possible to identify one particular state that is responsible. 
                                                           
24 Recall the Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their 
Families (entered into force in July 2003), the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
(not yet in force) and the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (adopted in September 
2007). 
25 See article 27 of the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons. Note that where I 
have proposed to transpose various useful provisions of the 1954 Statelessness Convention to the new 
instrument devised to improve and update the protection offered to the stateless, it would also be 
possible to simply refer to the relevant articles of the “original” Convention. The reason that I have 
suggested that the new instrument start from scratch and include all aspects of the protection of the 
stateless is that this route would not be reliant on states’ concurrent ratification of the 1954 
Statelessness Convention for its own effectiveness. 





There are obviously some clear-cut cases, as the examples given by the Committee 
itself has illustrated. Thus, in the event of the denationalisation of an individual in 
contravention of international norms on arbitrary deprivation of nationality it is the 
state which withdrew citizenship that should be regarded as the person’s own 
country.27 Where the situation is less straightforward and there is perhaps more than 
one state that could be deemed to be the stateless person’s own country, the most 
appropriate solution would be to assure the individual concerned the right to opt for 
one or the other of the states to function as his own country. 
 Having dealt with this final question of definition, the instrument can begin to 
elaborate the rights that are to be enjoyed by stateless persons generally and in 
relation to the state that has been identified as their own country. To begin with 
then, the instrument should reaffirm the full application of existing international law 
and human rights standards to the situation of the stateless. This could be achieved 
through a restatement of the entire catalogue of relevant rights, a technique 
employed in other instruments such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 
the Migrant Workers Convention and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities. By taking each right in turn, the instrument can clarify the scope of 
everything from the right of access to courts to the right to work for the specific 
context of statelessness, building upon developments in the field of non-citizens 
rights generally and taking into account the very special circumstance of the lack of 
any nationality that afflicts the beneficiaries of protection.28 In some cases, the 
technique of offering stateless persons treatment on a par with nationals may still be 
useful – an approach that is also employed in the Migrant Workers Convention - 
especially in elucidating the privileged position of stateless persons with regard to 
their own country. Thus, all states should assure the stateless person the right to 
education or to legal personhood, but the right to enter a state need only be 
guaranteed with respect to the stateless person’s own country, whereupon he should 
be treated equally to that state’s nationals. Another area in which the guarantees 
may focus on the protection to be offered by the stateless person’s own country 
include the right to participate in government. The stateless person could be assured 
full political rights, on a par with nationals, with respect to his own country or, if 
this is a too radical step, at least offered the right to participate in local government 
while the state is also encouraged to extend national-level political rights.29 In 
                                                           
27 Recall that the other examples offered by the Committee involved situations where nationality was 
refused in the context of state succession or where stateless long-term residents were arbitrarily 
deprived of the right to acquire nationality. 
28 The text can continue the ambitions of the 1954 Statelessness Convention by addressing both civil 
and political as well as economic, social and cultural rights. Such instruments as the Migrant Workers 
Convention and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities again provide a model for 
this approach by showing how a subtle adjustment of the wording can achieve the desired result. Thus, 
some provisions (in particular the traditional civil and political rights) are formulated such that the right 
is attributed directly to the stateless person  while others (in particular those that would be classed as 
typical ESC rights) are worded along the following lines: “state parties recognise the right…” or “state 
parties shall take effective and appropriate measures to enable…”. 
29 In fact, another helpful system generally, again also evident in the Migrant Workers Convention, 
would be to adopt a dual approach, elaborating mandatory and then facultative elements for some of the 
rights and issues addressed. This would allow a balance to be struck between the need to move forward 
in the quest to better elucidate the (already widely acknowledged) rights of the stateless and the 
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addition, the instrument should lay down clear guidelines on the access of stateless 
persons to naturalisation30 and could also establish the required legal basis for the 
exercise by a state of diplomatic protection on behalf of a stateless person.31  
If these suggestions were to be implemented and stateless persons were to 
enjoy the right to (re)enter and remain in a state, the right to participate in the 
government of that state and even diplomatic protection, all in the absence of the 
legal bond of nationality, then the question arises whether citizenship retains any 
meaning once it can be bypassed so comprehensively. As we begin to uncouple 
nationality from those rights and privileges that are traditionally attributed to this 
bond of membership – that are inherent to the very function of nationality – then are 
we in fact attacking the very concept of citizenship which plays such a central role 
in the world as it is currently organised? I would argue that no, we are not negating 
the need for and purpose of citizenship, we are simply devising a pragmatic, tailor-
made solution for the situation of those who find themselves without any 
nationality. The enduring existence of statelessness already runs counter to the 
general right of everyone to a nationality and the principle that statelessness should 
be avoided, so the exclusion of such individuals from the enjoyment of other rights 
should, as far as possible, be avoided. The stateless, as a closed group, would be the 
beneficiaries of such a policy and the rights would only be recognised in relation to 
the particular state that is identified as answerable for their plight – the state that 
should have allowed the individual to obtain or retain citizenship in the first place. 
In this manner, the state in question is prevented from shirking its responsibilities 
towards individuals or groups within its population by way of its nationality policy. 
The logic of the human rights regime as a whole, whereby the inclusion of “citizens 
rights” is only justified because the right to be a citizen is also guaranteed, would 
support such a response to the plight of the stateless as a means to maintain its 
asserted universality (human rights as the rights of all persons, everywhere). The 
approach suggested would also have the added benefit of discouraging states from 
misusing their citizenship policy in order to exclude people from political rights and 
the right to (re)enter or reside on state soil. The denial of these rights, even in the 
absence of the formal bond of nationality, would still amount to a violation of the 
applicable norm and the state could still be held accountable, rendering the denial of 
citizenship immaterial.  
 For these proposals to come to fruition, a significant commitment on the part 
of the international community to the protection of stateless persons is called for. It 
may take some time to muster up support for such a drastic step as the elaboration 
of a new instrument – and indeed there is likely to be some resistance to the very 
idea of devoting a second text to the protection of stateless persons, particularly in 
view of existing criticism regarding repetition in and proliferation of international 
                                                                                                                                               
ultimate challenge of achieving progress in respect of the more controversial or sensitive issues that 
face the stateless. See, for instance, article 42 of the Migrant Workers Convention. A similar result can 
also be achieved through the specification of where reservations may and may not be elaborated. 
30 This should include an elucidation, on the one hand, of what may be considered unreasonable 
impediments, and what, on the other hand, is deemed to satisfy the call for facilitated naturalisation. 
31 This could follow the standards currently being developed by the International Law Commission and 
allow diplomatic protection to be exercised on the basis of habitual residence (rather than citizenship) 
in the case of the stateless. Alternatively, the instrument could accord the state that is identified as the 





conventions. If the latter concerns win out over the need to further elucidate the 
standards relating to the protection of stateless persons, or until such a time as a 
new or revised instrument can be adopted, a number of less radical measures should 
be considered. The human rights community has already taken a clear interest in the 
problems faced by non-citizens generally – and in some cases by the stateless 
specifically. But, as we have seen, the treatment that is owed to the stateless must 
presently be gleaned from a whole variety of instruments and corresponding reports 
and jurisprudence. Moreover, human rights bodies have not always been 
consistently thorough in considering the treatment specifically enjoyed by or owed 
to stateless persons, as opposed to other (categories of) non-nationals. There is 
therefore a need to focus and indeed mainstream attention to the plight of the 
stateless within the existing human rights system. The UN treaty bodies could, for 
instance, lead the way by elaborating upon the relevant stateless-specific standards 
in a joint general comment and should certainly commit to paying greater attention 
to the problems faced by the stateless when considering state party reports. Another 
possibility would be to establish, under the auspices of the UN Human Rights 
Council, a Special Rapporteur on the rights of the stateless to give impetus to this 
objective of mainstreaming attention to their plight and realising a harmonised 
approach to their rights.32 Such measures would help to consolidate recent 
developments and facilitate the identification and application of standards relevant 
to the specific situation of statelessness. 
 
4 PROSPECTS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF NORMS FOR 
THE PROTECTION OF STATELESS PERSONS 
 
Despite uncovering various areas in which there is undoubtedly room for 
improvement, the international standards relating to the protection of the stateless 
that were discussed over the course of the preceding chapters do offer many 
opportunities to tackle the plight of this group. Nevertheless, on the basis of reports 
describing the enduringly poor treatment of stateless persons we are forced to 
concede that the implementation and enforcement of these norms presents greater 
difficulties than the content of the standards themselves. So the time has come to 
consider the potential that the overall international legal framework offers for the 
application and supervision of the relevant standards – a similar quest to that which 
was undertaken in part 2 in the context of the prevention of statelessness. Here we 
find, once again, that the challenges inherent in the identification of statelessness to 
a large extent underlie both problems of implementation and enforcement.  
 The identification of statelessness, the very determination or recognition of 
stateless person status, is not addressed in the 1954 Convention relating to the 
Status of Stateless Persons. And as a result of states being left to their own devices 
                                                           
32 See also Guy Goodwin-Gill, "The Rights of Refugees and Stateless Persons" in Saksena (ed) Human 
Rights Perspectives & Challenges (in 1900's and beyond), Lancers Books, New Delhi: 1994, pages 
400-401; Maureen Lynch, Lives on hold: The human cost of statelessness, Washington: 2005, page 26; 
Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, “The Rights of Non-citizens”, prepared by David 
Weissbrodt, Geneva 2006; and David Weissbrodt, "The Protection of Non-Citizens in International 
Human Rights Law" in R. Cholewinski (ed) International Migration Law, TMC Asser Press, The 
Hague: 2007, page 233.  
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in addressing the problem of identification, we saw that there is no unified approach 
to this task (and indeed, in many instances, the authorities have failed to ensure that 
there is a mechanism in place for tackling it at all).33 In fact, there is even a 
divergence in the definition of a stateless person at the domestic level – including 
between state parties to the 1954 Statelessness Convention.34 This, in spite of the 
warning that 
 
if, however, States do not approach article 1 with a common interpretation or 
application, it will be impossible to harmonise implementation of the 
Convention overall or, indeed, for decisions taken by one State party to be 
recognised as between State parties. This could mean that a single case will 
arrive at varying results depending on the State in which the stateless person 
makes an application. As one key objective of the 1954 Convention is to 
promote the acquisition of a legal identity for a stateless person in one State, 
which will be widely recognised by other states, a lack of harmonised 
interpretation and implementation of article 1 risks limiting the benefits of this 
instrument for both States and individuals concerned.35 
 
Clearly then, the proper identification of cases of statelessness is key to the 
implementation of the standards relating to the protection of stateless persons. The 
absence of any concrete guidelines to states results not only in the lack of a 
harmonised approach but also, inevitably, in some persons being unable to access 
the protection that they deserve. Yet such guidelines have never developed, not 
even in the form of an agreed advisory handbook or toolkit.36 This stands in marked 
contrast to the detailed elaboration of standards relating to Refugee Status 
Determination (RSD) which help states and UNHCR to establish whether a person 
is a refugee under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees – a 
similar type of legal status to that of stateless person.37 Even within the European 
                                                           
33 See chapter IX, section 3. 
34 See for example the discussion of the definition of statelessness under domestic law in the member 
states of the Council of Europe in Roland Schärer, Promoting acquisition of citizenship as a means to 
reduce statelessness – feasibility study, prepared for the Bureau of the European Committee on Legal 
Co-operation of the Council of Europe, CDCJ-BU (2006) 18, Strasbourg: 2006, pages 13-14; see also 
UNHCR and IPU, Nationality and statelessness. A handbook for parliamentarians, 2005, pages 19-20. 
35 Carol Batchelor The 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons: Implementation 
within the European Union Member States and Recommendations for Harmonisation 2004, para. 28. 
36 At most, UNHCR’s Executive Committee has called upon the agency to “actively disseminate 
information and, where appropriate, train government counterparts on appropriate mechanisms for 
identifying, recording, and granting a status to stateless persons”. UNHCR Executive Committee, 
Conclusion on Identification, Prevention and Reduction of Statelessness and Protection of Stateless 
Persons, No. 106, 57th Session, Geneva, 2006, para. (t). And in the Handbook for Parliamentarians on 
the issue of statelessness there are some basic suggestions as to who should be empowered to make the 
determination of stateless person status and what types of procedural guarantees should be in place. 
UNHCR and IPU, Nationality and statelessness. A handbook for parliamentarians, 2005, pages 19-21.  
37 See in particular UNHCR, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status 
under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, 
HCR/IP/Eng/Rev.1, 1979 (re-edited 1992); UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection, No. 1-7, 





Union for instance, where many states have acceded to the 1954 Statelessness 
Convention and extensive agreements have been elaborated for a harmonised 
approach to RSD in order to implement the 1951 Refugee Convention,38 the 
recognition of stateless person status remains a highly uncoordinated area of 
policy.39 
Nor has the broader human rights framework been able to offer much to stem 
the wide divergence of practices in relation to the identification of stateless persons. 
It is not possible to readily extract any general instructions as to procedures, 
competences or the burden of proof from the comments or jurisprudence concerning 
the protection of the stateless. This is not to say that human rights bodies have never 
been faced with the task of assessing a person’s claim to a certain nationality or 
indeed to stateless person status for the purposes of deciding a case. For instance, in 
a case brought before the European Court of Human Rights, the citizenship of the 
applicant was again a crucial factor in the appraisal of the situation and its 
compliance with human rights law. In Tatishvili v. Russia, the state’s defence 
against an alleged violation of the right to free movement within the country rested 
on the assertion that the applicant was unlawfully present in Russia because she 
held Georgian nationality and did not hold the requisite entry visa. After 
considering the facts and the relevant laws submitted to the court, it ruled that 
 
in so far as the Russian authorities claimed that the applicant needed an entry 
visa as a Georgian citizen, the Court observes that the applicant maintained as 
her citizenship that of the former USSR. She denied that she had ever acquired 
Georgian citizenship. Neither in the domestic proceedings nor before the Court 
did the Russian authorities produce any evidence in support of their claim that 
the applicant had been a Georgian citizen. The registration of the applicant’s 
residence in Tbilisi dating back to early 1990s had no automatic bearing on 
determination of her citizenship under either Russian or Georgian laws […] 
The Government’s allegation that the applicant was of Georgian citizenship 
has no evidentiary basis.40  
 
The court clearly considers itself competent to weight up the evidence of nationality 
brought before it, just as it is competent to consider other facts. However, since the 
court does not entirely elucidate the steps taken to reach its decision it is difficult to 
distil principles or rules on the appropriate procedures or standards of proof for the 
establishment of nationality from this case. The court plainly recognises that the 
relevant citizenship laws are indispensable in determining a person’s nationality and 
has examined the content of these laws accordingly. What the court fails to describe 
                                                                                                                                               
International Protection; and UNHCR, Self-study module 2: Refugee Status Determination. Identifying 
who is a refugee, September 2005. 
38 See Council Directive 8043/04 of  27 April 2004 on minimum standards for the qualification and 
status of third country nationals and stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need 
international protection and content of the protection granted. 
39 Carol Batchelor The 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons: Implementation 
within the European Union Member States and Recommendations for Harmonisation 2004, paras. 49-
82. 
40 Emphasis added, European Court of Human Rights, Case of Tatishvili v. Russia, Application No 
1509/02, Strasbourg, 22 February 2007, paragraph 40. 
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is what “supporting evidence” the Russian authorities could have provided in order 
to come to a different conclusion about the position of the individual in question 
under the relevant citizenship laws.  
Meanwhile, in the previously discussed case of Yean and Bosico v. Dominican 
Republic, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights began by ascertaining that the 
state denied the claimants nationality and 
 
placed them outside the State’s juridical system and kept them stateless, which 
placed them in a situation of extreme vulnerability, as regards the exercise and 
enjoyment of right.41 
 
In this case, the court based the identification of statelessness on the rejection of 
their application for late birth registration, going on to explain that when the 
Dominican Republic did eventually grant the children birth certificates, this resulted 
in the conferral of citizenship.42 The court hereby confirms that birth registration 
and the details recorded through this process is one means of certifying a person’s 
nationality – a fact that we came across earlier when considering the importance of 
birth registration in staving off statelessness.43 However, it is important to realise 
that in the Dominican Republic there is a particularly close connection between 
birth registration and nationality, thanks to the state’s ius soli laws,44 and neither the 
initial refusal of a birth certificate or the resulting temporary statelessness were in 
fact disputed by the state in this case. The fact that the court based its assessment of 
the children’s nationality solely on their lack of birth registration cannot therefore 
be seen to suggest that birth registration is anything more than one type of proof of 
nationality that can be brought forward. Again, the message is that international 
human rights bodies are able to rule on the nationality status of an individual where 
this is relevant to the facts of the case – and are sometimes called to do so – but the 
limited jurisprudence that exists fails to reveal more than a very basic insight into 
how this determination must be made. 
 Nevertheless, this brings us neatly to the broader issue of the enforcement of 
the rights of the stateless. At the outset, it is important to realise that enforcement 
has always been something of a dilemma where international human rights norms 
are concerned. When the first major human rights instruments were being prepared 
                                                           
41 Inter-American Court on Human Rights, Case of Yean and Bosico v. Dominican Republic, Series C, 
Case 130, 8 September 2005, operative paragraph 166. Thereafter, the court went on to rule that the 
circumstance of statelessness contributed to the violation of a number of further rights, including article 
3 (right to legal personhood), article 18 (right to a name) and article 19 (rights of the child) and article 
of the American Convention on Human Rights. See paragraphs 167-187 of the judgement. 
42 Inter-American Court on Human Rights, Case of Yean and Bosico v. Dominican Republic, Series C, 
Case 130, 8 September 2005, operative paragraph 147. The court also based this finding on the 
Constitution of the Dominican Republic where the rules for the attribution of citizenship at birth are 
laid down. See paragraph 109 of the decision. 
43 See the references to the connection between birth registration and nationality in chapter VII, section 
1. 
44 Laura van Waas, Is Permanent Illegality Inevitable? The Challenges to Ensuring Birth Registration 
and the Right to a Nationality for the Children of Irregular Migrants - Thailand and the Dominican 





after the Second World War, “measures of implementation” (supervisory 
mechanisms) were a contentious issue:  
 
While the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted as early as 
December 10, 1948, it took until 16 December 1966 for the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to be adopted by the General 
Assembly of the United Nations. The controversial views on the nature of 
measures of implementation which would be incorporated into the 
Covenants was one of the major reasons for this delay.45  
 
To this day, the supervisory machinery within the international human rights 
framework continues to evolve and debate on new developments remains 
impassioned.46 And, as we saw, the 1954 Statelessness Convention failed to create 
an accompanying supervisory mechanism to assist or compel state parties to comply 
with their obligations or to arbitrate in individual cases.47  
Yet we also saw that the right to an effective remedy, as promulgated under 
numerous human rights instruments, provides a useful, broad guarantee that 
stateless persons will be able to present a claim where they feel that their rights 
have been violated. States are thereby committed to helping with the enforcement of 
rights within their jurisdiction by ensuring the availability of complaints procedures 
or judicial review within their own domestic legal system.48 Moreover, there are 
now many enforcement procedures and mechanisms in place under both universal 
and regional human rights instruments. Whatever the method or focus of these 
mechanisms - whether they are directed towards monitoring and ensuring state-
wide compliance with human rights commitments or handling individual cases – 
the fact that stateless persons benefit generally under human rights law means that 
they are also afforded an opportunity, through these procedures, to ensure that they 
receive the protection that they are due. Generally speaking then, stateless persons 
can simply rely on the same supervisory apparatus as non-stateless persons for the 
protection of their rights. The only current exception to this rule is the availability 
of diplomatic protection as an additional option for the realisation of treatment in 
accordance with their rights – as we have seen, there is as yet no firm legal basis for 
the exercise by a state of diplomatic protection on behalf of a stateless person, 
although this possibility is not outlawed entirely.49 
So the enforcement dilemma for the protection of stateless persons is arguably 
less severe than the challenge of monitoring the prevention of statelessness. The 
rights that stateless persons seek to invoke in the context of protection are familiar 
human rights norms that the supervisory machinery is highly familiar and 
                                                           
45 Paul Weis, “Diplomatic protection of nationals and international protection of human rights” in 
International Journal of Refugee Law, 1991, p. 654.  
46 Consider the ongoing debate on the possibility of establishing an indifidual complaints mechanism 
for the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. See the work of the Open-
Ended Working Group to consider options regarding the elaboration of an Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
47 See chapter IX, section 3. 
48 See chapter X, section 4. 
49 See chapter XII, section 3. 
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comfortable with. The fact of statelessness is not necessarily even relevant - for 
example when finding a violation of the freedom of religion or the right to 
education. And indeed, over the course of the foregoing chapters we have become 
aware of the role that is already being played by a variety of human rights bodies 
and institutions in delineating and supervising the rights of the stateless. We have 
seen that the protection of stateless persons has been taken into account in country 
reporting procedures and that stateless persons have been able to access individual 
complaints mechanisms.50 If the protection owed to stateless persons as stateless 
persons under existing human rights instruments such as the ICCPR and ICESCR is 
further elucidated and the question of how to identify situations of statelessness is 
clarified, then the current human rights framework provides adequate opportunity 
for the enforcement of these rights. If, on the other hand, a new universal instrument 
that concentrates on the rights of the stateless were to be elaborated, careful thought 
would have to be given to the question of enforcement. In that case, and in keeping 
with the development of treaty bodies within the United Nations system,51 a new 
committee could be created and tasked with monitoring compliance with – as well 




The stateless are, in some respects, uniquely vulnerable. The human rights system 
itself seems to abhor their very existence since it severely challenges the ambition 
of the universal enjoyment of human rights: stateless persons are, by definition, 
unable to enjoy those rights that are accorded only in relation to the state of 
citizenship. And although nationality is no longer a pre-condition for the attribution 
of most human rights, in practice it is often still a requirement for the exercise of 
such rights, for example due to problems in relation to documentation and the lack 
of any official “home country” in which residence rights are guaranteed: 
 
A person without a passport or nationality [...] faces the horrifying prospect of 
spending literally his entire life being shunted from one frontier to another in 
the desperate hope that some State for some reason may be induced to accept 
him.52 
  
The legal or even physical limbo that threatens stateless persons is perhaps the 
greatest challenge to their protection. It is therefore of utmost importance that their 
right to live somewhere is assured – hence the pointed focus on the right to enter 
“one’s own country” as the key to the instigation of a comprehensive protection 
                                                           
50 In particular, over the past decade, the European Court of Human Rights has seen numerous 
procedures brought before it by stateless persons against different states. For example Slavov v. Sweden, 
Application No. 44828/98, 29 June 1999; Okonkwo v. Austria, Application No. 35117/97, 22 May 
2001; Al-Nashif v. Bulgaria, Application No. 50963/99, 20 June 2002. In each of these cases, the court 
opens the description of the facts by noting that the applicant is a stateless person. This finding clearly 
has no direct influence on the admissibility of the claim since it is the jurisdiction of the state – not 
nationality – that is relevant. 
51 Each of the major UN human rights instruments has its own committee or treaty body. 
52 Richard Lillich, The human rights of aliens in contemporary international law, Manchester 





regime. Once this issue is resolved, the human rights system and even the 1954 
Statelessness Convention itself offers much greater scope for effectively protecting 
the rights of the stateless and access to naturalisation as a right of solution also 
becomes a more workable possibility. 
Meanwhile, the challenge of protecting stateless persons rests on the enduring 
notion, apparent even within the modern human rights framework, that states may 
legitimately treat nationals and non-nationals differently. Indeed, it has been noted 
that the scope and content of the protection offered to non-nationals has been 
strongly influenced by the perception that non-citizenship is by and large a 
voluntary choice: 
 
The less-developed nature of the prohibition against discrimination on the 
grounds of citizenship reflects public opinion in many countries. A broad 
consensus disfavours differential treatment based on immutable characteristics 
such as race and ethnicity. By contrast, not withstanding the reality of forced 
migration, refugees fleeing persecution and persons made stateless against their 
will, status as a non-citizen is considered the product of voluntary choice – 
something which states may properly take into account in rationing the 
distribution of rights and benefits.53 
 
So, while absolute non-discrimination between citizens and non-citizens is 
admittedly neither realistic nor appropriate - nationality is an existing and relevant 
legal status in today’s world - the specific circumstance of statelessness does 
require a moderated approach. In striving to ensure that everyone enjoys the full 
spectrum of rights, the stateless may be owed some form of positive discrimination 
that takes into account the particular conundrum presented by their lack of 
nationality: differential treatment towards non-nationals that may generally be 
considered legitimate requires renewed reflection and assessment where the 
stateless are affected by it. Of course, with this in mind, the identification of 
situations of statelessness remains an absolutely critical task and one that deserves 
far greater consideration than it has achieved to date. 
Meanwhile, since there is a noticeable progression towards the recognition of 
links other than nationality as a basis for the exercise of even those rights that have 
traditionally belonged to the very function of nationality (right to enter, diplomatic 
protection, even political rights), where is it more appropriate to take advantage of 
these developments if not to the benefit of stateless persons who would otherwise 
be left out? Nevertheless, it is important to remember that the ultimate form of 
protection that stateless persons can enjoy is the resolution of their plight. To this 
end, alongside a pro-active application of the norms relating to the prevention of 
statelessness,54 naturalisation can be a indispensible tool. States and the 
international community alike should recall that, whatever the protection extended 
to stateless persons, the “lack or denial of citizenship creates conditions for human 
                                                           
53 Open Society Justice Initiative, Racial Discrimination and the Rights of Non-Citizens. Submission to 
the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the occasion of its 64th Session, 
New York: 2004. 
54 Discussed in part 2. 
 
 
International Law and the Protection of Stateless Persons 
 409 
insecurity”.55 So within the challenge of the protecting stateless persons lies the task 






                                                           
55 Advisory Board on Human Security (prepared by Constantin Sokoloff), Denial of Citizenship: A 













Roughly half a century ago, in an important study on nationality and statelessness 
prepared for the International Law Commission, statelessness was described as a 
“deep-rooted evil”.1 These are troubling words indeed. Equally so, is an account of 
similar vintage by the US Supreme Court of the “destruction” caused by the 
withdrawal of nationality and resultant statelessness: 
 
There may be involved no physical mistreatment, no primitive torture. There is 
instead the total destruction of the individual’s status in organised society. It is 
a form of punishment more primitive than torture for it destroys for the 
individual the political existence that was centuries in the development. The 
punishment strips the citizen of his status in the international political 
community. His very existence is at the sufferance of the country in which he 
happens to find himself. While any one country may accord his some rights, 
and presumably as long as he remained in this country he would enjoy the 
limited rights of an alien, no country need do so because he is stateless. 
Furthermore, his enjoyment of even the limited rights of an alien might be 
subject to termination at any time by reason of deportation. In short, the 
expatriate has lost the right to have rights.2 
 
Invoking, as it does, such imposing language, it is little wonder that the 
international community has taken an active – if, at times, uneven – interest in 
tackling statelessness.3 The last 400-odd pages have been devoted to assessing this 
international response and thereby refreshing the picture of statelessness. In 
particular, through a detailed study of the relevant international legal framework we 
have considered the following question:  
 
                                                           
1 Roberto Córdova, Nationality, Including Statelessness. Third Report on the Elimination or Reduction 
of Statelessness by Roberto Córdova, Special Rapporteur, A/CN.4/81, New York: 11 March 1954, page 
28. 
2 US Supreme Court, Trop v. Dulles, Secretary of State et. al., 1958. Recall also chapter III, section 1. 
3 For a concise overview of the international response to statelessness since World War II, see chapter 





How can the way in which international law deals with the issue of 
statelessness be improved so as to ensure optimal protection of the individual 
and his rights? 
 
We focused first on the actual avoidance or prevention of statelessness – as the 
most favourable outcome – and later on the protection of the rights of those persons 
who nevertheless find themselves stateless. This approach led to two sets of 
conclusions, to be found in chapters VIII and XIII respectively. The task for this 
closing chapter is to recap some of these findings (section 1) as well as to offer 
some broader reflections on the direction in which international law relating to the 
issue of statelessness has developed and on the challenges that remain to be fully 
answered (sections 2 to 4).  
 
1 NATIONALITY AND STATELESSNESS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 
 
In the fifty years that have elapsed since the US Supreme Court ruling cited above, 
and indeed since the adoption of the two Statelessness Conventions, the 
international legal framework relating to nationality and statelessness has 
undergone a rather major evolution. According to the letter of international law, as 
it stands today, statelessness is no longer tantamount to the “total destruction of an 
individual’s status in organised society” or the loss of the “right to have rights”.4 
Nor are states as free as they once were to leave an individual without any 
citizenship or withdraw his only nationality.5 Many of the necessary normative 
tools are now in place to prevent statelessness and, failing that, to protect the 
fundamental rights of the stateless. These are provided not only - indeed no longer 
even chiefly - by the tailor-made Statelessness Conventions, but also by a plethora 
of human rights and human rights-inspired instruments. Based on the findings in 
foregoing chapters, what follows below is a brief reflection upon the main strengths 
and weaknesses of the international response to questions of nationality and 
statelessness in the 21st century.  
 International law today reflects a mounting intolerance for statelessness. There 
are two main principles that are gaining ever more ground: the avoidance of 
statelessness at birth and the avoidance of denationalisation resulting in 
statelessness. Ultimately, these two standards are all that is needed to secure the 
prevention of statelessness since they focus on ensuring that every individual 
                                                           
4 Recall the discussion of the impact of human rights law on the role of citizenship versus humanity in 
underpinning the “right to have rights”. See chapter IX, section II. 
5 As illustrated by the fundamental change in perspective on the influence of international law in 
limiting states’ freedom to attribute nationality as they deem fit, from the 1923 Tunis and Morocco 
Nationality Decrees Case of the Permanent Court of International Justice to the Case of Yean and 
Bosico v. Dominican Republic, settled by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in 2005. The 
adoption of the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions relating to the Conflict of Nationality 
Laws marked the beginning of an ongoing process of concretisation of the principle of the avoidance of 
statelessness. Later, the inclusion of the right to a nationality among the articles of the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights provided fresh momentum for the battle to limit or indeed eradicate cases 
of statelessness. The provision, article 15, provided the inspiration for the elaboration of the right to a 
nationality in many other human rights instruments as well as for the formulation of the 1961 





acquires a nationality at the start of his lifetime and that this nationality is not lost 
unless another nationality is acquired. And both principles are reflected in the 1961 
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness and numerous human rights 
instruments. In the former, the principles have been transformed into a series of 
intricate provisions that detail which state is responsible for conferring nationality 
or for refraining from withdrawing citizenship and under which circumstances.6 In 
the latter, we traced mainly more broadly stated norms, such as the right of every 
child to acquire a nationality and the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of 
nationality.7 But the 1961 Statelessness Convention clearly limits its ambitions to 
reducing the incidence of statelessness - thereby failing to provide for the 
unequivocal bestowal or retention of nationality where statelessness threatens - and 
fails to deal with a number of issues either persuasively or indeed at all.8 Meanwhile 
the wider human rights framework offers sweeping standards that, in places, lack 
the detail that is required to ensure their full, correct and harmonised application – 
and the truly interesting and innovative developments that were traced are still in 
their infancy.9 So, neither approach turned out to be infallible. Nor is the combined 
impact of the two sets of standards a guarantee that all causes of statelessness will 
be nipped in the bud. 
 As we moved on to look at the international legal framework for the protection 
of stateless persons, we found a similar story. The development of human rights law 
has resulted in an increasing move away from citizenship as the right to have rights, 
as described by the US Supreme Court, and towards the “denationalisation” of 
protection. Yet the recognition of the right to a nationality as a human right also 
reaffirmed the enduring relevance of nationality: the human rights system can only 
maintain its aspiration of universality with the guarantee that every human will also 
hold a nationality. Although then, there is perhaps less need for a stateless-specific 
instrument today than there was prior to the advent of the major human rights 
instruments, it has not become redundant. The 1954 Statelessness Convention 
attempts to answer to this need, but falls short on quite a number of counts - in 
particular thanks to the trademark technique of offering different rights at different 
“levels of attachment” and often only to a weak, contingent standard.10 Meanwhile, 
within the human rights framework itself, standards have begun to develop that 
address the situation of non-nationals or even stateless persons specifically. But the 
exact treatment owed to these groups under contemporary human rights law is still 
hazy in many areas, for example with respect to economic, social and cultural rights 
and in particular in developing countries.11  
                                                           
6 See, in particular, the discussion of the 1961 Statelessness Convention’s response to the technical 
causes of statelessness in chapter IV. 
7 Only in such instruments as the European Convention on Nationality, the Council of Europe 
Convention on the avoidance of statelessness in relation to State succession and the ILC Draft Articles 
on Nationality of Natural Persons in relation to the Succession of States – those documents that are 
geared specifically to nationality questions – was the same level of detail traced as that found in the 
1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness.  
8 See chapter VIII, section 1. 
9 See chapter VIII, section 2. 
10 See chapter XIII, section 1. 





 Unmistakably then, a number of challenges remain – not least of which is to 
ensure the full implementation and enforcement of all of the existing norms.12 But 
numerous gaps were also found in the normative frameworks for the prevention of 
statelessness and protection of stateless persons.13 Consequently, various 
suggestions were raised for the further clarification and elaboration of standards 
with a view to improving the way in which international law deals with the issue of 
statelessness so as to ensure optimal protection of the individual and his rights.14 In 
the context of both prevention and protection, we were able to trace certain current 
and relevant developments that helped to show the way forward. For instance, 
where the prevention of statelessness is concerned, the recently formulated texts 
addressing nationality and statelessness in the context of state succession were 
found to provide inspiration for standards that could be applied much more broadly 
and to great effect. Thus, it was suggested that the procedural guarantees elaborated 
and the notion of a right of option as a way of preventing ongoing disputes on 
nationality attribution - and promoting the acquisition of the most appropriate 
nationality - be implemented across the board as general tools in the prevention of 
statelessness.15 Then, for the protection of stateless persons, instruments such as the 
Migrant Workers Convention offer an example of how the current international 
framework for the protection of stateless persons could be revisited and a new 
document elaborated to build upon the standards set by the 1954 Statelessness 
Convention.16 
 One of the most pervasive issues to be dealt with is the nexus between 
inclusion and exclusion on the basis of nationality, and inclusion and exclusion on 
the basis of immigration status. An enduring, fundamental function of nationality is 
providing the holder with a “home”, a state to which they can always return and in 
which they have an irrefutable right to reside. On the one hand, this implies that 
stateless persons have no undisputed right to live anywhere – and indeed we saw 
that gaining and retaining lawful access to the territory of a(ny) state presents 
serious difficulties to the stateless.17 This, in turn results in problems relating to 
detention, family separation and access to rights and services - including many of 
those elaborated in the 1954 Statelessness Convention - as the connection of 
habitual or permanent residence is increasingly recognised as an alternative basis to 
citizenship for the enjoyment of rights.18 On the other hand, we discovered a 
connection between statelessness and displacement,19 as well as the fact that the 
possession of an unlawful or ambiguous immigration status can contribute to the 
                                                           
12 See chapter VIII, section 4 and chapter XIII, section 4 and sections 3 and 4 of this chapter below. 
13 See chapter VIII, sections 2 and 3 and chapter XIII, sections 2 and 3. 
14 The overall research question for this study, as cited at the beginning of this chapter. See for the full 
discussion of ways to improve the normative framework for the prevention of statelessness chapter 
VIII, section 3 and, for the protection of stateless persons, chapter XIII, section 3. 
15 See chapter VIII, section 3. 
16 See chapter XIII, section 3. 
17 See chapter X, the introduction to section 2.2.  
18 Consider the example of diplomatic protection where the “nationality of the claim” has for a very 
long time been critical and where the possibility is now being considered of recognising habitual 
residence as a sufficient connection with a state, in lieu of nationality, for the stateless. See chapter XII, 
section 3. 





creation and perpetuation of statelessness.20 This underlines the urgency of securing 
the stateless a right to live somewhere. Of all of the potential, supplementary 
standard-setting activities that I have discussed, this is the area that is at once one of 
the most imperative and the most complex. As explained in chapter XIII, there is 
ample scope to build upon the UN Human Rights Committee’s efforts to identify an 
individuals own country, regardless of the question of citizenship, for the purposes 
of the enjoyment of the right to enter and reside.21 The stateless are evidently the 
group par excellence to benefit from the further development of this notion as 
without this construction, they will continue to lack an own country and the very 
basic security that this offers. Remember though, that a further crystallisation and 
clarification of the norms relating to the prevention of statelessness is absolutely 
indispensable to this quest of ascertaining which state is to be considered a stateless 
person’s own country – because this quest is tantamount to establishing which 
country is “responsible” for an individual’s statelessness, in violation of 
international standards.22 
Subsequently, once a stateless person’s own country is established, there is 
great scope for ensuring that they enjoy the full spectrum of human rights. Indeed, 
this process can be likened to the creation of an international concept of nationality 
for the purpose of applying international legal protections. Support for this 
approach can be found in the jurisprudence relating to international claims. In 
determining whether a state is entitled to exercise diplomatic protection in a 
particular case – thus, in establishing whether the bond of nationality is present – 
international tribunals have been known to disregard the municipal finding of 
nationality. Where the tribunal determines that nationality has been acquired by 
fraud or in a manner that is “inconsistent with the provisions of international treaties 
governing questions of nationality [or] contrary to the general principles of the Law 
of Nations on nationality”,23 it has discounted this nationality for the purposes of 
applying international law relating to diplomatic protection. And  
 
in doing so, [the tribunals] deviated from the general rule of international law that 
questions of nationality are determined by the State concerned under its own 
law.24 
 
In such cases, by disregarding the municipal finding of nationality, the tribunals 
have created a kind of “functional statelessness” for the purpose of international 
law.25 In contrast, in order to offer optimal protection to the stateless, it may be 
possible to use the broadening concept of own country to create a kind of 
                                                           
20 See in particular chapter VII, section 2. 
21 See chapter XIII, section 3. 
22 See chapter X, section 2.2.2. 
23 Paul Weis, Nationality and Statelessness in International Law, Kluwer Academic Publishers Group, 
Dordrecht: 1979, page 212. 
24 Paul Weis, Nationality and Statelessness in International Law, Kluwer Academic Publishers Group, 
Dordrecht: 1979, page 220.  
25 Recall also the “Nottebohm Case” where the International Court of Justice ruled that the 
naturalisation of the applicant was to be disregarded for the purposes of applying international law and 
thereby the exercise of diplomatic protection. International Court of Justice, "Nottebohm Case" 





“functional nationality” for the purposes of international law. Thus, where a state 
has denationalised an individual, rendering him stateless, in a manner that is 
inconsistent with the provisions of international treaties governing questions of 
nationality [or] contrary to the general principles of the Law of Nations on 
nationality, the denationalisation could be disregarded and the state held fully 
accountable for the treatment of the individual as though he were a national. The 
identification of a stateless person’s own country could thereby procure him access 
to the full range of rights that are to be enjoyed by citizens, including those linked 
to political participation, on the basis of non-discrimination with all other nationals 
of the state. If this approach were to be adopted, it would help to promote not only 
the protection of stateless persons, but also the prevention of statelessness. Any 
state policy that would deliberately render a person or group stateless – in disregard 
of the relevant international norms - with a view to restricting their exercise of 
rights (i.e. subsequently denying them the right to remain and expelling them or 
preventing them from participating in an election) would become a futile exercise. 
The state would still be fully accountable for the subsequent treatment of the 
individual or group on the basis of the “functional nationality” attributed for the 
purposes of international law. So, the 21st century international legal framework 
relating to nationality and statelessness offers enormous potential for tackling even 
the more demanding issues relating to prevention and protection, if existing 
developments such as those described in this section were to be pursued further. But 
an effective response to statelessness may demand more than prevention and 
protection measures, as will be discussed next.  
 
2 PREVENTION, PROTECTION AND MORE 
 
The opening paragraphs of this book described how the phrase “nationality 
matters”, the book’s title, offers a superb depiction of the dual nature of the 
response to statelessness: prevention and protection. Thereafter, the discussion has 
indeed been focused either on nationality matters - on what contemporary 
international law has to say about the freedom of states to set their own rules on the 
attribution of nationality (part 2); or on the extent to which nationality matters - on 
the enduring importance of nationality within the current international legal setting 
(part 3). Having arrived at the stage of offering some final reflections on the 
findings from this investigation, it is time to also reconsider this basic premise of a 
two-dimensional response to statelessness. In fact, it is time to admit that an 
effective response to statelessness may equally be deemed to demand not two, but 
four complimentary strategies. Firstly, within both the context of the prevention of 
statelessness and the protection of stateless persons, we uncovered an underlying 
need for the identification of cases of statelessness or situations where statelessness 
threatens. And secondly, we found that where prevention strategies have failed, the 
protection of stateless persons as stateless persons should be seen only as an 
intermediate response, with the resolution of statelessness through the 





 The notion of a four-dimensional response can actually be traced in UNHCR’s 
current policy towards its statelessness mandate.26 In the most comprehensive 
Conclusion on statelessness to date, adopted by UNHCR’s Executive Committee in 
2006, the four elements are clearly enunciated: the identification, prevention and 
reduction (i.e. resolution of cases) of statelessness and the protection of stateless 
persons.27 This Conclusion sets out the contours of UNHCR’s strategy towards 
statelessness for the years to come, describing what it considers to be the agency’s 
main tasks under each of these four components of the overall response.28 The 
question is, how do we reconcile this new, four-dimensional concept of the problem 
of statelessness with the apparently two-dimensional approach taken to the issue 
under international law and indeed reflected in this manuscript?  
It is true that there are just two universal, tailor-made statelessness 
instruments, the 1961 and 1954 Statelessness Conventions, and that these 
Conventions address prevention and protection respectively. It is also true that this 
manuscript echoed the dualistic approach by dividing the overall research question 
in two and offering first an analysis of the international legal framework for the 
prevention of statelessness and then of the framework for the protection of stateless 
persons. Yet we saw that even when following the structure of the Statelessness 
Conventions, the other two aspects naturally become part of the discussion. The 
question of identification was actually raised very early on when we considered the 
initial dilemma of defining statelessness for the purposes of establishing the scope 
of application of the specialised legal regime that addresses the issue.29 Thereafter, 
the challenge of identifying cases that call for the application of international norms 
relating to statelessness came up for discussion again when drawing conclusions on 
the effectiveness of the legal regime for both prevention30 and protection.31 
Meanwhile, in accordance with the way in which this book is structured - to put the 
Statelessness Conventions centre stage throughout the investigation - the resolution 
or reduction of statelessness was flagged as an issue in the chapter on the “special 
needs” of the stateless.32 The reduction of statelessness, i.e. the opportunity to 
                                                           
26 As we have seen, the history of UNHCR’s involvement in the issue of statelessness dates back to 
1974, when the UN General Assembly bestowed UNHCR with various tasks in relation to the 
supervision of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. In the decades since, UNHCR’s 
mandate on statelessness gradually expanded, on the basis of subsequent General Assembly resolutions, 
to include all states and an increasing array of activities and responsibilities. See chapter III, section 3 
and chapter IX, section 3. 
27 UNHCR Executive Committee, Conclusion on Identification, Prevention and Reduction of 
Statelessness and Protection of Stateless Persons, No. 106, 57th Session, Geneva, 2006. 
28 The agency is expected together with states and other international partners, to pursue “targeted 
activities to support the identification, prevention and reduction of statelessness and to further the 
protection of stateless persons”. The idea is that all four dimensions will be included in future planning, 
strategy-setting and reporting materials and reflected in the agency’s operational response to 
statelessness around the world. See UNHCR Executive Committee, Conclusion on Identification, 
Prevention and Reduction of Statelessness and Protection of Stateless Persons, No. 106, 57th Session, 
Geneva, 2006, paragraph (a). 
29 See chapter II, section 4. 
30 See chapter VIII, section 4. 
31 See chapter XIII, section 4. 
32 In assessing the international legal framework for the protection of stateless persons, we discussed 





(re)acquire a nationality, was thus largely discussed as an element of the overall 
protection response since it was the 1954 Statelessness Convention that put forward 
a right of solution.33 So, what this study has shown is that, in practice, whether you 
categorise the international response to statelessness as two or four-dimensional is 
neither here nor there.34 The only question of any consequence remains whether 
international law provides an appropriate answer to the “additional” challenges of 
identification and resolution of statelessness. 
 As far back as chapter II, concerns were raised that the international legal 
framework may provide insufficient guidance for the identification of statelessness. 
We saw, for instance, that the lack of (uniform) procedures for the identification of 
cases of statelessness was hampering the collection of data on the scale of the 
phenomenon.35 And we noted that the debate on the aptness of the international 
definition of “stateless person” could in fact be answered through a comprehensive 
framework for the identification of statelessness – without touching the definition 
itself.36 Therefore, in the process of discerning the global magnitude of statelessness 
and discussing the contention that surrounds the definition of statelessness, we 
found evidence to suggest that the appropriate tools for the arduous task of 
identifying statelessness may be lacking. Later, we tested this speculation when we 
looked for principles, procedures or guidelines relating to the identification of (the 
threat of) statelessness within the international legal framework for the prevention 
of statelessness and the protection of stateless persons.  
Disappointingly, we found the prediction to be largely accurate. Neither of the 
Statelessness Conventions offers any suggestion as to how to identify stateless 
persons or cases in which the individual would “otherwise be stateless” – precisely 
those situations that call for the application of the norms espoused. Meanwhile, the 
broader field of international human rights law provided only a few very basic clues 
as to how states are to go about the process of identification of statelessness and 
what types of evidence of nationality – or of statelessness – can be taken into 
account. Thus, in the context of prevention we discovered that the European 
Convention on Nationality obliges state parties to cooperate and exchange 
information,37 two techniques that can assist in the challenge of identification.38 We 
also noted with interest the innovative provision in the Council of Europe 
Convention on the avoidance of statelessness in relation to State succession that 
calls upon states to lower the standard of proof in order to facilitate the prevention 
                                                                                                                                               
“special needs”. This last set of norms relates to certain rights or facilities that the stateless require by 
virtue of their very statelessness. See chapter XII. 
33 See chapter XII, section 1. 
34 In other words, whether you view identification as a given - as inherent in both prevention and 
protection - and reduction as an element of protection or whether you deem each of these aspects to be 
a strategy or response in its own right. 
35 See chapter II, section 2. 
36 See chapter II, section 4. 
37 Articles 23 and 24 of the European Convention on Nationality.  
38 See chapter VIII, section 4. Note that the duty to cooperate internationally would be beneficial not 
only for the identification of statelessness and of situations where statelessness threatens, but also in 





of statelessness in the context of state succession39 – although the same instrument 
does not describe how the standard of proof should generally be established.40 In 
the context of protection, we discovered that even though international courts have 
undertaken the task of identifying an individual’s nationality or statelessness for the 
purposes of deciding a case on a protection issue, such jurisprudence is limited and 
offers only a minor insight into the question of proof of nationality or statelessness. 
The courts looked at the pertinent domestic law and considered the “evidence” 
relating to the position of the applicants under this law – one element of which may 
be birth registration – but did not discuss what kinds of evidence may generally be 
admitted or where the burden of proof lies.41 The only conclusion that can be drawn 
on the basis of these observations is that the international legal framework does not 
adequately address the challenge of identification that is critical to the prevention 
(and reduction) of statelessness and the protection of stateless persons. Until more 
effort is put into this aspect of the response to statelessness, the actual 
implementation and enforcement of all of the existing standards in this field is 
likely to continue to suffer. In the following section, I will offer some thoughts on 
how to progress on this matter. 
 In the meantime, we can note that the findings with regards to the resolution or 
reduction of statelessness were more encouraging. Although the international 
community rejected a proposal for a convention devoted to the reduction or 
elimination of “present” statelessness,42 both the international legal framework on 
the prevention of statelessness and that which addresses the protection of stateless 
persons offer some standards that are relevant to the resolution of existing cases. On 
the one hand, the norms that have been espoused for the purposes of the prevention 
of statelessness - in the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness and 
elsewhere - can be used, by extension, to resolve situations of statelessness. In fact, 
the distinction between prevention and reduction is not finite. For instance, where a 
state withdraws an individual’s citizenship, for whatever reason, only to discover 
afterwards that this was the person’s only nationality, the subsequent reinstatement 
of nationality in order to avoid statelessness - perhaps following a successful appeal 
of the decision - could rightly be described as either prevention or reduction.43 
Similarly, if a state adopts legislation to correct the gender imbalance in its jus 
sanguinis laws in order to prevent statelessness from arising where the father’s 
nationality is absent or unknown, by providing for retroactive application, the new 
law that is geared towards prevention can also achieve the resolution of cases of 
                                                           
39 Article 8 of the Council of Europe Convention on the avoidance of statelessness in relation to State 
succession. 
40 See chapter VIII, section 4. 
41 See chapter XIII, section 4. 
42 See chapter XII, section 1.1. 
43 Consider the example of the man who was rendered stateless in the Netherlands through the 
withdrawal of his Dutch citizenship on the premise that he had failed to fulfil his commitment to 
renounce his Egyptian nationality, even though he had in fact managed to lose this other citizenship. 
The domestic court subsequently found the withdrawal of Dutch citizenship to be contrary to the law, 
thereby ensuring the reinstatement of the mans nationality. This example is discussed in chapter IV, 
section 4 (on loss of nationality as a cause of statelessness) and chapter V, section 2 (on illegal 
deprivation of nationality). The case is also cited in chapter X, section 4 when the access to courts for 





statelessness that have arisen in the past.44 On the other hand, where a pro-active 
application of the standards relating to the prevention of statelessness is not possible 
or offers no solace in a particular case, international law also offers some scope for 
the acquisition by a stateless person of a nationality through a newly formed bond 
with a state. Within the protection framework of the 1954 Convention relating to 
the Status of Stateless Persons, alongside the provisions prescribing a certain 
standard of treatment to be enjoyed by stateless persons during their statelessness, 
we found an article addressing a “right of solution”. The 1954 Statelessness 
Convention thereby adds facilitated naturalisation to the toolbox for the reduction of 
statelessness.45 And the broader field of international (human rights) law confirms 
that this option should be available to stateless persons - at least to the extent that 
states may not uphold unreasonable impediments to naturalisation as well as that a 
person’s statelessness must be taken into account and may call for facilitation of 
procedures or relaxation of criteria for naturalisation.46  
Thus, in spite of the lack of a specialised instrument on the reduction of 
statelessness, the international legal framework does provide some highly relevant 
norms that may assist with the resolution of cases. However, neither of the routes 
described above - using the international legal standards relating to prevention or 
protection – offers a sure-fire solution, as is arguably evidenced by the enduring 
existence of statelessness on a large scale. To begin with, in part 2 we found that the 
norms relating to the prevention of statelessness still exhibit a number of gaps and 
ambiguities with the result that the task of pinpointing the “responsible” state and 
“reversing” the situation may not always be straight forward.47 And this problem 
clearly grows more acute the longer statelessness endures since the details 
surrounding the origins of statelessness may become (further) obscured and the 
population in question may, through displacement or migration, develop an 
increasingly close connection with another – perhaps previously uninvolved – state. 
Then the adoption of a law or policy of (re)instatement of nationality for the 
reduction of statelessness that is based on international standards relating to 
prevention is neither a simple avenue to pursue, nor necessarily one that is in the 
best interests of the persons concerned. Nor would it be appropriate to rely entirely 
on naturalisation as the means of resolving cases of statelessness. A major 
impediment for many stateless persons in seeking naturalisation in order to resolve 
their situation is the need to first secure lawful residence in a state.48 As we have 
repeatedly discussed, this is no easy feat.49 Even when lawful residence has been 
attained, notwithstanding what has been said above about the prohibition of 
unreasonable impediments to naturalisation and the clear call for states to facilitate 
the naturalisation of stateless persons, states are still largely free to set the 
                                                           
44 The legislative changes in 2007 in Morocco were given as an example of this type of combined 
strategy of prevention and reduction. See chapter XII, section 1. 
45 Article 32 of the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons. Note, however, that this 
provision is formulated in vague and facultative language whereby its added value can be questioned. 
See chapter XII, section 1.1 and chapter XIII, section 1. 
46 See chapter XII, section 1.2 and chapter XIII, section 2. 
47 See on the remaining gaps in the normative framework for the prevention of statelessness chapter 
VIII, in particular section 3. 
48 See chapter XII, sections 1 and 4. 





conditions for naturalisation and so it is not always a real possibility for the stateless 
population. Moreover, naturalisation – even if facilitated – is by definition a less 
powerful tool than a policy of automatic conferral of nationality for the qualifying 
population:  
 
Typically naturalisation procedures contain an element of discretion and tend to 
be lengthy, whereas the right of option into the nationality can take place 
immediately through registration and is, in principle, not possible to reject on 
discretionary grounds.50 
 
The clarification of standards concerning the prevention of statelessness51 as well as 
of those that relate to access to naturalisation for stateless persons52 would 
undoubtedly help to further guide reasonable and appropriate strategies to address 
existing cases of statelessness around the world.53 In addition, it would be hugely 
beneficial to explore other avenues for the reduction of statelessness. In particular 
the increased use of a right of option should be promoted as a means of tackling any 
ongoing dispute between states on the ultimate “responsibility” for a certain 
situation of statelessness and as an alternative to facilitated naturalisation.54 
Nevertheless, in practice, before any existing or future standards for the prevention 
or reduction of statelessness and the protection of stateless persons can be applied, 
renewed efforts must be made to identify those situations in which the norms are 
applicable, which brings us back to the “fourth dimension”, identification.   
 
3 MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF IDENTIFICATION 
 
One of the major challenges that was raised early on in this study, and has been a 
recurring concern throughout, is the identification of statelessness. Identifying 
situations where statelessness threatens is obviously a fundamental preliminary step 
towards applying any norms that seek to prevent statelessness. And identifying 
                                                           
50 Carol Batchelor, “Transforming international legal principles into national law: the right to a 
nationality and the avoidance of statelessness” in Refugee Survey Quarterly, 2006, pages 15-16. 
51 See suggestions raised in chapter VIII, section 3. 
52 See chapter XIII, section 3. 
53 Note that the further enhancement of the international legal framework to guide the resolution of 
cases of statelessness is not, of itself, a quick-fix answer to existing stateless situations. Much also 
depends on the political and practical realities, including the willpower of the government to adopt any 
necessary legislative changes, the availability of the required resources for the implementation of a 
perhaps large-scale reduction strategy and the attitude of the population towards the “solution” that is 
presented to them. For some notion of the complexities involved in a (large-scale) project to resolve 
statelessness, see the description of the campaign to reduce statelessness in Sri Lanka in Sulakshani 
Perera, “Sri Lankan Success Story”, in Refugees Magazine, Number 147, Issue 3, 2007, pages 20-23 
and “Statelessness in Sri Lanka”, specially devoted UNHCR webpage, accessible via 
http://www.unhcr.org.  
54 A right of option is currently prescribed within the context of state succession but is a valuable tool 
for the prevention and reduction of statelessness across the full spectrum of cases and should therefore 
be pursued further. A right of option assures not only that a nationality is genuinely acquired (lacks the 
discretionary characteristic of naturalisation), but also helps to ensure that the individual ends up with 
the nationality of the state with which he is most closely connected. See chapter VI, section 3 and 





cases of statelessness is evidently a critical precursor to promoting the enjoyment of 
standards relating specifically to the protection of stateless persons as well as the 
reduction of statelessness – and indeed to identifying other individuals who are at 
risk of statelessness through their connection to a stateless person. As such, the task 
of identification forms an inherent part of any response to statelessness. Yet, as 
explained,55 identification is also the activity for which the least guidance is 
provided by the international legal framework relating to statelessness. As a result, 
we found cases in which individuals have failed to rely on back-up clauses that 
were in place to prevent statelessness56 and discovered a wide divergence – or even 
lack – of procedures for the determination of “Stateless Person Status” for the 
purposes of accessing the relevant rights and benefits.57 Therefore, arguably the 
greatest threat to the whole system that has developed for the prevention (and 
reduction) of statelessness and the protection of stateless persons is the inability to 
identify the situations in which these specialised norms are to be applied. 
Fortunately, if we expand our search for clues, there are some avenues that could be 
pursued in an effort to build upon the meagre set of suggestions for undertaking the 
task of identification of statelessness that has been extracted from the international 
legal framework relating to statelessness.58 Indeed, there are two main areas in 
which to seek further, valuable guidance or information in order to meet the 
challenge of identification: the principles and guidelines for Refugee Status 
Determination and jurisprudence relating to international claims (diplomatic 
protection).  
 Refugee Status Determination (RSD) is the process whereby an individual 
gains recognition as a refugee under the terms of the 1951 Refugee Convention, 
thereby unlocking access to the rights bestowed on the basis of this instrument. It is 
the subject of various detailed handbooks and guidelines.59 In the absence of similar 
guidelines on - or a harmonised approach to – “Stateless Person Status 
Determination”, we can fall back on some of the instructions relating to RSD to 
gain an understanding of how to tackle the identification of statelessness. A first 
lesson that can be extracted relates to the burden of proof – the question as to whose 
responsibility it is, in principle, to establish evidence of refugee or stateless person 
status. Recalling that “it is a general legal principle that the burden of proof lies on 
the person submitting a claim”, UNHCR’s Handbook on RSD determines that “the 
                                                           
55 In section 2 of the present chapter. 
56 Recall the “Baby Andrew” case presented in chapter III, section 3 and the case of Karassev v. 
Finland, discussed in chapter VIII, section 4.  
57 See chapter XIII, section 4. 
58 See section 2 above. 
59 These include UNHCR, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status 
under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, 
HCR/IP/Eng/Rev.1, Reedited January 1992; UNHCR, Refugee Status Determination – Identifying who 
is a refugee, Self-study module No. 2, September 2005; A series of UNHCR Guidelines on 
International Protection that deal with specific aspects of the refugee definition, including on Gender-
Related Persecution (HRC/GIP/02/01, 7 May 2002), Membership of a particular social group 
(HRC/GIP/02/02, 7 May 2002), Internal Flight or Relocation Alternative (HRC/GIP/03/04, 23 July 





relevant facts of the individual case will have to be furnished in the first place by 
the applicant himself”.60  But then, the Handbook goes on to admit that 
 
often, however, an applicant may not be able to support his statements by 
documentary or other proof […] thus, while the burden of proof in principle 
rests on the applicant, the duty to ascertain and evaluate all the relevant facts is 
shared between the applicant and the examiner. Indeed, in some cases, it may 
be for the examiner to use all the means at his disposal to produce the 
necessary evidence in support of the application.61  
 
The task of establishing statelessness is arguably similarly arduous: to prove 
statelessness “the individual must demonstrate something that is not there”.62 The 
applicant for stateless person status may therefore be unable to furnish, of his own 
accord, satisfactory evidence that he is not considered a national by any state under 
the operation of its law. Therefore, the approach to the burden of proof that is 
outlined above could also be adopted in Stateless Person Status Determination as 
well as in cases where statelessness threatens (i.e. to establish the fact that the 
person would “otherwise be stateless”). The applicant would be required to 
cooperate fully by presenting all relevant facts and documents, while the authority 
that is charged with assessing the application would also be obliged to take an 
active role in ascertaining the status of the applicant.63 The importance of 
international cooperation and consultation in the identification of statelessness is 
thereby reaffirmed - a course that should be initiated, if necessary, by the authority 
charged with Stateless Person Status Determination.  
Another important point is that, in the context of Refugee Status 
Determination, states are also compelled to consider the nationality of the person in 
question. One element of the definition of a refugee is displacement and in order to 
determine whether the individual is outside his country of nationality, that 
nationality must first be identified. Moreover, stateless persons may also fall within 
the definition of a refugee, whereby the displacement and well-founded fear of 
persecution must be established with respect to his country of former habitual 
residence – necessitating both a finding of statelessness and the identification of 
said country. So, since the adoption of the 1951 Refugee Convention, government 
(immigration) authorities and UNHCR have indirectly been called upon to establish 
the nationality of many millions of people.64 Yet relatively little guidance has been 
                                                           
60 UNHCR, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 
Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, HCR/IP/Eng/Rev.1, Reedited 
January 1992, paragraphs 195 and 196. 
61 UNHCR, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 
Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, HCR/IP/Eng/Rev.1, Reedited 
January 1992, paragraph 196. 
62 Carol Batchelor The 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons: Implementation 
within the European Union Member States and Recommendations for Harmonisation 2004, page 13. 
63 See also Carol Batchelor The 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons: 
Implementation within the European Union Member States and Recommendations for Harmonisation 
2004, page 15. 
64 In fact, it is within the context of Refugee Status Determination that many cases of statelessness are 





provided on how to undertake this aspect of the RSD65 - the real crux of the issue in 
RSD being the identification of a well-founded fear of persecution on one of the 
grounds enumerated in the 1951 Refugee Convention.66 Various materials produced 
by UNHCR on RSD nevertheless offer a few helpful tips. The first is that the 
determination that a person is outside his country of nationality or, if stateless, is 
outside his country of habitual residence – and thereby, by default, the identification 
of that nationality or statelessness – is 
 
to be established on the basis of documents, statements or any other information 
submitted by the applicant or obtained from other sources.67 
 
The UNHCR Handbook on RSD then explains that  
 
nationality may be proved by the possession of a national passport. Possession of 
such a passport creates a prima facie presumption that the holder is a national of 
the country of issue, unless the passport itself states otherwise.68 
 
For Refugee Status Determination then, the individual’s passport is the clear port of 
call in establishing nationality. This is unsurprising in view of what has been said 
about the contemporary role of the passport in vouching for a persons nationality 
and thereby his right to re-admission to the issuing state.69 In the context of 
identifying (a threat of) statelessness, the prima facie presumption of nationality 
created by a passport can help to establish the position of the individual and those 
connected to him or her under the relevant domestic laws. For instance, it will help 
to determine whether any descendents run the risk of statelessness in view of the 
applicable laws and the further circumstances of their birth. Regrettably, the 
Handbook does not delineate what evidence of nationality should be considered in 
the absence of a passport. Nor is it suggested that the simple inability to produce a 
passport creates a prima facie presumption of statelessness. Such a policy may in 
fact be highly undesirable as it could open the door to abuse, with individuals 
                                                                                                                                               
identification of statelessness. UNHCR and IPU, Nationality and statelessness. A handbook for 
parliamentarians, 2005, page 19. 
65 This may explain the fact that, notwithstanding what was said in the previous note, when surveyed, 
almost 50% of respondent states reported that within their Refugee Status Determination procedures 
they had no way of identifying stateless applicants. UNHCR, Final report concerning the 
Questionnaire on statelessness pursuant to the Agenda for Protection, Geneva: March 2004, page 27. 
66 Note that, for the same reason, the literature also pays little attention paid to the assessment of the 
fact of being “outside the country of nationality”. See for instance James Hathaway, The Rights of 
Refugees Under International Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 2005; and Guy Goodwin-
Gill; Jane McAdam, The refugee in international law, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 2007. 
67 UNHCR, Refugee Status Determination – Identifying who is a refugee, Self-study module No. 2, 
September 2005, page 29. 
68 UNHCR, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 
Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, HCR/IP/Eng/Rev.1, Reedited 
January 1992, paragraph 93. 
69 See chapter X, section 2.2 and chapter XII, section 2. Moreover, Weis confirms that the 
administrative practice of states is such that “a foreign national passport is, as a rule, accepted as prima 
facie evidence of the holder’s nationality”. Paul Weis, Nationality and Statelessness in International 





deliberately destroying or refusing to present their passport in order to access 
protection as a stateless person. 
Meanwhile, if a person in possession of a passport nevertheless asserts a claim 
to statelessness, he must “substantiate his claim, for example, by showing that the 
passport is a so-called ‘passport of convenience’ (an apparently regular national 
passport that is sometimes issued by a national authority to non-nationals)”.70 Just 
what evidence can be brought forward is not discussed.71 However, some pertinent 
comments can be found in a separate paragraph on the position of a person who 
appears to hold more than one nationality: 
 
In examining the case of an applicant with dual or multiple nationality, it is 
necessary […] to distinguish between the possession of a nationality in the legal 
sense and the availability of protection by the country concerned. There will be 
cases where the applicant has the nationality of a country in regard to which he 
alleges no fear, but such nationality may be deemed ineffective as it does not 
entail the protection normally granted to nationals. In such circumstances, the 
possession of the second nationality would not be inconsistent with refugee 
status. As a rule, there should have been a request for, and a refusal of, 
protection before it can be established that a given nationality is ineffective. If 
there is no explicit refusal of protection, absence of a reply within reasonable 
time may be considered a refusal.72 
  
Admittedly, this notion of discounting an individual’s second nationality if it is 
deemed to be “ineffective” can be considered to be very specific to the refugee 
context.73 Nevertheless, the steps described for the establishment of an “ineffective 
                                                           
70 UNHCR, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 
Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, HCR/IP/Eng/Rev.1, Reedited 
January 1992, paragraph 93. 
71 The Handbook does foresee a role for the issuing authority in clarifying the situation, but, depending 
on the response, this is not necessarily decisive: “In certain cases, it might be possible to obtain 
information from the authority that issued the passport. If such information cannot be obtained, or 
cannot be obtained within reasonable time, the examiner will have to decide on the credibility of the 
applicant’s assertion in weighing all other elements of his story”. UNHCR, Handbook on Procedures 
and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating 
to the Status of Refugees, HCR/IP/Eng/Rev.1, Reedited January 1992, paragraph 93. According to 
Weis, the proof of nationality provided by a passport “can be rebutted by other evidence that the holder 
does not possess the nationality indicated by his passport, in particular if there is good reason to believe 
that he obtained the passport by fraud or misrepresentation”. Paul Weis, Nationality and Statelessness 
in International Law, Kluwer Academic Publishers Group, Dordrecht: 1979, page 228. 
72 UNHCR, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 
Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, HCR/IP/Eng/Rev.1, Reedited 
January 1992, paragraph 107. The self-study module on RSD explains that the second nationality is 
only relevant “if it carries with it the full range of rights normally enjoyed by citizens of the country 
[…] this is not always the case, and decision-makers must distinguish between the possession of 
nationality merely in a legal sense and the actual availability of protection in the country, or countries, 
concerned”. UNHCR, Refugee Status Determination – Identifying who is a refugee, Self-study module 
No. 2, September 2005, page 29. 
73 It has to do with the fact that “national protection takes precedence over international protection”, so 





nationality” in the context of RSD may be used, by extension, as a tool in the 
identification of statelessness. Thus, if there has been “a request for, and a refusal 
of, protection” or the “absence of a reply within reasonable time”, this may be 
factored in as evidence towards substantiating an individual’s claim that - perhaps 
even despite the possession of a passport - he is not considered by that state to be a 
national.74 Batchelor has followed this line of reasoning in her reflections on the 
standard of proof in identifying statelessness and suggests that  
 
from a practical perspective, it might be assumed that if a State refuses to 
indicate that a person is a national, this itself is a form of evidence which could 
have a bearing on the claim because States normally extend diplomatic services 
and protection to their nationals.75  
 
Such facts would obviously have to be weighed up alongside any other relevant and 
available evidence.  
 Another area of law that requires the determination of an individual’s 
nationality is the settlement of international claims, whereby the “nationality of the 
claim” - the basis for the exercise of diplomatic protection by a state - must 
generally be established before the case can be considered on its merits.76 
Jurisprudence relating to such international claims is therefore a further useful 
source of information about how nationality can be established. Weis has conducted 
a detailed study of such cases and his findings are of great interest.77 According to 
his research, there is no significant uniformity in the way in which international 
tribunals deal with this problem.78 He did, however, discover that such tribunals 
admitted (at least) four types of evidence: 
 
(1) proof of facts from which the possession of nationality follows according 
to municipal law; […] 
 
(2) direct proof, usually by documentary evidence, that the competent 
authority had determined the person to be a national or had certified his 
nationality with conclusive effect; […] 
 
                                                                                                                                               
individual cannot rely on international protection. UNHCR, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for 
Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of 
Refugees, HCR/IP/Eng/Rev.1, Reedited January 1992, paragraph 106. Moreover, keep in mind that the 
finding that national protection is lacking is only one basic element of the refugee definition, the 
individual must also exhibit a well-founded fear of persecution on one of the grounds listed in the 1951 
Refugee Convention in order to be considered a refugee. 
74 Recall, once again, the comments made in chapter II, section 4 on the role that the establishment of 
an ineffective nationality can play in identifying cases of statelessness under the official definition.  
75 Carol Batchelor The 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons: Implementation 
within the European Union Member States and Recommendations for Harmonisation 2004, page 15. 
76 See on the doctrine of diplomatic protection and the role of nationality chapter XII, section 3. 
77 Paul Weis, Nationality and Statelessness in International Law, Kluwer Academic Publishers Group, 
Dordrecht: 1979, Chapter 13 on “Proof of Nationality, pages 204-236. See also chapter II, section 4. 
78 Paul Weis, Nationality and Statelessness in International Law, Kluwer Academic Publishers Group, 





(3) evidence, as a rule documentary, that an authority of the State concerned 
was satisfied that the person possessed the nationality of that State; [and] 
 
(4) proof of facts from which it could be inferred that the person was 
considered as a national by a competent of authority of the State.79 
 
Weis hereby leads the way to many concrete sources of evidence relating to a 
person’s nationality and thereby potentially also to where to look for proof of (the 
threat of) statelessness.80  
First on the list above is proof of facts that are relevant to the establishment of 
nationality under the applicable domestic law. A clear example is birth registration, 
which provides evidence of place and date of birth and of parentage, all of which 
can be key to the (failure of) acquisition of nationality under domestic law.81 Based 
on what we have learned about the way in which nationality is attributed, other 
types of documentary evidence that attest to potentially key facts include marriage 
registration (proof of the bond between husband and wife and of the legitimacy of 
children born to the union)82, adoption certificates83 and civil, residence or 
household registration (proof of place and duration of residence).84 According to 
Weis, witness testimony or affidavits have also been accepted as proof of relevant 
facts, either “in the absence of other evidence or as corroborative evidence”.85 The 
second kind of evidence, direct proof of nationality status, is comprised of an 
attestation by the competent authority that the individual in question is – or is not – 
a national.86 Obvious examples are naturalisation or citizenship certificates or 
documents attesting to the withdrawal or renunciation of nationality, issued by the 
                                                           
79 Paul Weis, Nationality and Statelessness in International Law, Kluwer Academic Publishers Group, 
Dordrecht: 1979, page 221. 
80 Again, recall that in order to establish that an applicant would “otherwise be stateless” if nationality 
is withheld or withdrawn by the state, the identification of the individual’s present nationality status 
and/or that of those persons with whom he is connected is critical. See chapter VIII, section 4. 
81 The importance of birth registration in certifying a child’s claim to nationality and indeed in lowering 
the very risk of statelessness is something that was raised many times over the course of this study. See 
in particular chapter VII, section 1 and chapter XIII, section 4. 
82 On the role of marriage and the registration of marriage in issues of statelessness, see chapter IV, 
sections 1 and 3 as well as chapter VII, section 1. 
83 See chapter IV, section 3. 
84 Tracing residence in a state back beyond a certain date can be of particular importance when a state 
introduces new legislation, establishing its initial body of citizens, for example following state 
succession. See chapter VI, section 1. 
85 Paul Weis, Nationality and Statelessness in International Law, Kluwer Academic Publishers Group, 
Dordrecht: 1979, page 216. 
86 Domestic law delineates not only the rules for the attribution of nationality but also sets out which 
organ of the state is competent to apply these rules and to confirm the nationality status of individuals. 
Weis offers a number of examples, looking at the United Kingdom, the United States and France. See 
Paul Weis, Nationality and Statelessness in International Law, Kluwer Academic Publishers Group, 
Dordrecht: 1979, pages 215-216. A highly contemporary example can be found in the Interim 
Constitution of Nepal 2063 (2007), where article 11 determines that a “Citizenship Distribution Team” 
shall have the authority to “provide citizenship to the persons eligible to acquire citizenship as provided 
for in the laws in force”. A document issued by this team, attesting to the Nepali nationality of the 





authority in question. Evidence of the third type may consist of documents or 
statements emanating from any other state body that attest to a person’s nationality 
status. Weis offers the example of a consular certificate: a document that is issued 
by a state’s consular officers abroad, certifying that the person has been “entered in 
the register of nationals resident within the area for which the consulate is 
competent”.87 Inclusion in a state’s electoral roll or entry as a national in a 
population census or civil register may also be considered to be evidence of this 
sort. Thus, the refusal to enter an individual in a consular register or on an electoral 
roll, or to record him as a national in a census or civil register, may contribute 
important evidence for the identification of statelessness.88 Meanwhile, a passport 
could be deemed to contribute evidence of the second or third type listed, 
depending on the competence of the issuing authority under municipal law – 
although its special status as establishing prima facie evidence of nationality should 
not be overlooked. Finally, the fourth type of evidence discussed by Weis is the 
proof of certain facts from which nationality status may be inferred, “such as voting 
in elections, holding public office, etc”.89 As suggested in chapter II, it is 
conceivable that statelessness could be proven – or at least corroborated in part – by 
a clear denial of these and any other privileges that are granted to nationals under 
the state’s domestic law.90 On the basis of this overview, it becomes apparent that 
there are many possible sources of evidence on a person’s nationality, statelessness 
or risk of statelessness. 
  Now is the time to draw together the findings on identifying (the threat of) 
statelessness that were discussed over the course of this section and the rest of the 
study. Thus, the following ideas should be incorporated into any future guidelines 
on how to meet the challenge of identification:  
 
- The burden of proof lies, in principle, with the applicant seeking 
recognition of Stateless Person Status. The authority charged with status 
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Dordrecht: 1979, page 230. 
88 Note that the value of existing data collections such as birth, marriage and other civil registers, 
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89 Paul Weis, Nationality and Statelessness in International Law, Kluwer Academic Publishers Group, 
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determination must also, if necessary, take an actively engage in the 
collection of evidence.91  
 
- The content of domestic nationality law is central to the identification of 
(persons at risk of) statelessness.92 Upon request, states should provide 
information on the content, interpretation and application of their 
nationality law to other states and international bodies.93 
 
- A passport or document issued by the state authority competent to 
determine nationality matters that attests to the nationality of the holder is 
to be considered prima facie evidence of nationality.  
 
- Upon receipt of a request from an individual, another state organ, an 
international body or a third state, the state authority competent to 
determine nationality matters shall confirm whether the individual in 
question holds the nationality of the state. In the event of a refusal or 
prolonged lack of response to such a request, this fact shall be admitted as 
prima facie evidence that the individual in question is not a national of the 
state concerned.   
 
- Official data collections such as birth, marriage or other civil registers, 
electoral rolls, consular registers and population censuses – and the details 
recorded – can be admitted as secondary evidence of the position an 
individual under domestic nationality law. 
 
- Documentation or witness testimony attesting to any relevant fact can be 
admitted as secondary evidence of the position of an individual under 
domestic nationality law. This includes documentation or witness 
testimony relating to the (in)ability to exercise those rights and privileges 
that are accorded to nationals under municipal law. 
 
- States should consider relaxing the usual standard of proof in nationality 
matters when the prevention or resolution of statelessness and the 
protection of stateless persons is at stake.94 
 
What concrete step forward should now be envisaged? The most ideal measure at 
this stage would therefore be the formulation of a handbook on the question of 
identification, taking the aforementioned issues into account. The handbook should 
consist of a number of principles relating to establishing proof of nationality and 
identifying statelessness and these principles should be accompanied by detailed 
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guidelines that describe how they should be implemented in practice. With 
statelessness now firmly anchored into the mandate of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees, it is this agency that is best placed to compose, 
disseminate and promote the use of such a handbook. By doing so, the prospects for 
the implementation and enforcement of the existing international legal framework 
in response to statelessness would receive an immediate and much-needed boost. 
Since identification is a necessary precursor to implementing standards relating 
either to prevention, reduction or protection, the elaboration of an identification 
handbook will help states to pinpoint situations that call for the application of their 
stateless-related obligations – be that under the 1961 Convention on the Reduction 
of Statelessness, the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons or 
otherwise. The same handbook will also assist existing supervisory bodies, such as 
the human rights courts and UN treaty bodies, in their task of overseeing the 
implementation by states of their commitments in this field. 
Meanwhile, as explained in chapter XIII, there is a need for a new 
international instrument to update and further consolidate the regime for the 
protection of stateless persons and to clarify the question of access to nationality as 
a right of solution (i.e. reduction of statelessness).95 There it was suggested that one 
of the main tasks of this instrument would be to elucidate how cases of (potential) 
statelessness are to be identified. Admittedly, such a step is not likely to be 
attainable short-term as the adoption of a new international agreement demands a 
serious investment of both time and government willpower. However, ultimately, 
this would be a highly appropriate way of formally codifying the basic contours of 
procedures and principles for the establishment of nationality and the identification 
of (the threat of) statelessness. This would help to ensure a harmonised approach to 
the application of the new instrument. Moreover, if the creation of a new human 
rights convention for the protection of stateless persons were to be accompanied by 
the creation of a specially-designated supervisory committee, as suggested in 
chapter XIII,96 then the elaboration of standards relating to identification would also 
lend a hand towards the effective monitor of the implementation of the instrument’s 
norms by this body. 
 
4 WHAT FUTURE FOR THE STATELESSNESS CONVENTIONS? 
 
The reality of today’s world, a reality that cannot simply be brushed aside or 
ignored, is that we have organised ourselves into communities of states, with 
nationality the badge of membership: 
 
Citizenship is derived from the division of the world into States. Division into 
States reflects a reality in which diverse human societies are positioned 
alongside each other. In this reality, it is not possible for everyone in the world 
to be a stranger to the other or for everyone in the world to be a member of a 
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single society. In the reality of the existence of States, a division exists between 
citizens who are members of a State and foreigners who are not.97 
 
And in this same reality, the existence of statelessness appears almost inevitable. 
With inclusion comes the possibility of exclusion, and with the possibility of 
exclusion from one state comes the possibility of exclusion from each and every 
state. This is not a fact to which we must resign ourselves, but it is a truth of which 
we must be aware. At the same time, we must acknowledge another important truth: 
 
Nationality did not always exist. It is an invention of lawyers, philosophers and 
politicians. An invention which only emerged four centuries ago […] We are 
free to redefine nationality. It is our own invention.98 
 
So, nationality is not a static concept. Our approach to nationality - the way in 
which nationality can be gained and lost and the substance of this bond of 
membership - can be remoulded to reflect emerging interests and values. A 
fundamental, contemporary interest is the avoidance of statelessness (i.e. the 
enjoyment of the right to a nationality) or, failing that, the minimisation of the 
consequences of statelessness for the individual (i.e. the enjoyment of the full 
spectrum of human rights by everyone, everywhere). And these are the values that 
we see reflected in the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness and the 
1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons as well as elsewhere in 
international law today.  
 The problem that we were forced to acknowledge back in the introductory 
chapters to this book is that the system for the prevention of statelessness and the 
protection of stateless persons is breaking down somewhere between the general 
enunciation of these lofty ideals and the actual situation on the ground. There are 
still vast numbers of stateless persons around the world and the treatment that they 
experience continues to range from minor annoyances to severe rights violations - 
enough reason to question the international response to statelessness. On the basis 
of the findings of this study, it is fair to conclude that these difficulties arise both 
from gaps and ambiguities in the normative framework and from the substantial 
challenge of implementation and enforcement of the existing standards. And from 
within the overall international legal setting for the response to statelessness, the 
Statelessness Conventions stood out. Not as the mainstay or strength of the system, 
but as instruments that, despite their ambitions, lack the forcefulness and foresight 
to really address the issues - or even, in places, to make any clear contribution to 
tackling statelessness over and above the content of the broader human rights 
framework.  
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 I have already discussed, in some detail, what can be done to improve the 
overall international legal framework for addressing statelessness.99 The question 
with which I would like to draw this manuscript to a close is this: what future is 
there for the Statelessness Conventions? After all, these are the tailor-made 
instruments with which the international community proposed to deal with 
statelessness. And, with the growing realisation that statelessness is a phenomenon 
of some consequence that will not resolve itself, it is to the Statelessness 
Conventions that many bodies and organisations are again turning in their renewed 
aspirations to tackle the issue.  
As stated in chapter VIII, “it is not easy to offer one, all-encompassing answer 
to this question”.100 It is, of course, easy to point to the situation on the ground as 
evidence that the Statelessness Conventions have been failing to do their job 
adequately for the past half-century. There are also a number of clear gaps in the 
protection offered by the instruments against and in statelessness.101 Moreover, as 
suggested above, it would be fair to say that the overall impression of the 
Statelessness Conventions is of two catalogues of provisions that lack strength102 – 
are at times even sloppy103 – and have clearly suffered from being a product of the 
(now outdated) conceptions of nationality, statelessness and sovereignty that 
presided at the time of their adoption.104  
Nevertheless, we determined that both of the Statelessness Conventions retain 
some value, even in the contemporary international legal setting. We saw that the 
1961 Statelessness Convention is the only universal instrument to deal in 
purposeful detail with the prevention of statelessness. With regard to the so-called 
“technical causes” of statelessness, the instrument was even found to have clear 
added value. As we move into the future, the measures prescribed for the avoidance 
of statelessness arising from technical causes will continue to be of importance, in 
particular for the prevention of statelessness at birth and thereby also the further 
perpetuation of statelessness within existing populations.105 Meanwhile, the 1954 
Statelessness Convention firmly places the stateless on the map as a specific 
vulnerable group, with very particular needs to which the international community 
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must respond. It offers the opportunity for recognition and documentation of 
Stateless Person Status as the basis for protection. And it reminds states that the 
resolution of the plight of the stateless through the acquisition of nationality must 
remain the “right of solution” to which efforts should ultimately be devoted.106  
 Looking ahead then, I would say that the two Statelessness Conventions do 
have a future. Indeed, by advocating for increased accession to these instruments, 
one of their shared flaws would be resolved: the pitifully low number of state 
parties that have been attracted to date. With an increased acceptance of the 
Statelessness Conventions comes increased scope for their implementation around 
the world – an objective that would be further stimulated by the elaboration of 
guidelines addressing the challenge of identification.107 The uncertainty that 
surrounds the task of identifying stateless persons and situations where an 
individual would “otherwise be stateless” is currently hampering the effective 
implementation of both Statelessness Conventions. Furthermore, with renewed 
efforts to implement the terms of the Statelessness Conventions, across a broader 
spectrum of countries and with the assistance of a handbook on identification, there 
will be greater scope to consider or review the remaining normative gaps and the 
residual question of enforcement (again, an issue for both instruments).108 Neither 
Convention should be seen, in isolation, to be the definitive answer to statelessness 
- to prevention and protection respectively - and the other avenues for improving 
the international response to statelessness that were outlined over the course of this 
study should also be pursued. In the meantime though, boosting the number of state 
parties to the Statelessness Conventions is a worthwhile cause and one that is 
decidedly easier today than half a century ago, since in the current international 
legal setting the content of the instruments can no longer be considered to be radical 
or objectionable.    
 Let me finish by saying that the incentives for dealing with statelessness, 
whether by following the suggestions outlined in this study or otherwise, are as 
persuasive as ever. It is a matter of justice, of human dignity and of peace and 
stability. As one scholar eloquently explains, 
 
global justice does not necessarily imply a duty on States to open their borders 
to whomsoever wishes to enter and become a citizen of the State. But global 
justice does imply that it is the duty of every State to see that citizenship, full 
membership in society, should be granted to each and every person, if not by 
that State then at least by another […] Membership of a society is a basic 
human need. Societies are organised under a system of States. Regimes cannot 
act arbitrarily or fail to act at all in the allocation of such membership. Indeed, a 
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person’s dignity is violated if he leads his life knowing that he will never 
become a full member of the state in which he resides.109  
 
Over the course of this book, it has become evident that statelessness is a 
quintessential human rights issue, putting the human in “human rights” to the 
ultimate test. In some ways, the very legitimacy of the human rights framework 
rests upon its capacity to either ensure that everyone does enjoy the right to a 
nationality (prevent statelessness) or to ensure that those who do not are not 
unreasonably disadvantaged by their plight (protect stateless persons). Moreover, 
there is an important flip-side to the “justice” argument: unless we find a way to 
deal fairly and appropriately with the issue of statelessness, there is the potential for 
abuse - not just by states that are seeking to shirk their responsibility over an 
undesirable individual or segment of the population, but also by individuals seeking 
to take advantage of the possibilities offered by the status of stateless person. It is 
not unheard of, for instance, for individuals to renounce their only nationality after 
migrating to a new country in order to obstruct their deportation and thereby create 
an opportunity to remain.110  Nor is it inconceivable that individuals will “choose” 
statelessness in order to avoid military conscription, take advantage of a regime that 
provides for facilitated naturalisation of stateless persons or even avoid 
prosecution.111 With effective guarantees in place for the prevention of statelessness 
and a carefully considered response to the protection of stateless persons, the scope 
for abuse on the part of states and individuals is minimised. And finally, we must 
not forget the stark warning that came early on in this investigation – that 
statelessness and nationality issues can escalate into a matter of national or even 
international security if left to fester. With all of these considerations in mind, there 
is no disputing the need to reinvigorate prevention and protection – or indeed 
prevention, protection, identification and reduction – efforts. I hope that this study 





                                                           
109 Yaffa Zilberschats, "Chapter 2 - Citizenship and International Law" in The Human Right to 
Citizenship, Transnational Publishers, Ardsley, NY: 2002, pages 67 and 179. 
110 For example, in the case of Slavov v. Sweden, the European Court of Human Rights found the 
complaint to be inadmissible because “the applicant lost his Bulgarian citizenship after his latest 
conviction and after his expulsion had been ordered. It appears that his application to have his 
citizenship repealed was made in an attempt to obstruct his expulsion. In these circumstances, it was not 
unreasonable for the Swedish authorities to secure that the applicant would be received in Bulgaria”. 
European Court of Human Rights, Slavov v. Sweden, Application No. 44828/98, Decision on 
admissibility, 29 June 1999. See also the case of Mogos and Krifka v. Germany before the European 
Court of Human Rights, Application No. 78084/01, Decision on admissibility, 27 March 2003. 
111 See, for instance, the discussion of the impact of statelessness on the potential for prosecution under 
the statute of the International Criminal Court in Zsuzsanna Deen-Racsmany, “The Nationality of the 
Offender and the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court”, in The American Journal of 
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Considering it desirable to reduce statelessness by international agreement, 
 
Have agreed as follows: 
 
Article 1 
1. A Contracting State shall grant its nationality to a person born in its territory who 
would otherwise be stateless. Such nationality shall be granted: 
(a) At birth, by operation of law, or 
(b) Upon an application being lodged with the appropriate authority, by or on behalf 
of the person concerned, in the manner prescribed by the national law. Subject to 
the provisions of paragraph 2 of this article, no such application may be rejected. A 
Contracting State which provides for the grant of its nationality in accordance with 
subparagraph (b) of this paragraph may also provide for the grant of its nationality 
by operation of law at such age and subject to such conditions as may be prescribed 
by the national law. 
2. A Contracting State may make the grant of its nationality in accordance with 
subparagraph (b) -of paragraph I of this article subject to one or more of the 
following conditions: 
(a) That the application is lodged during a period, fixed by the Contracting State, 
beginning not later than at the age of eighteen years and ending not earlier than at 
the age of twenty-one years, so, however, that the person concerned shall be 
allowed at least one year during which he may himself make the application without 
having to obtain legal authorization to do so; 
(b) That the person concerned has habitually resided in the territory of the 
Contracting State for such period as may be fixed by that State, not exceeding five 
years immediately preceding the lodging of the application nor ten years in all; 
(c) That the person concerned has neither been convicted of an offence against 
national security nor has been sentenced to imprisonment for a term of five years or 
more on a criminal charge; 
(d) That the person concerned has always been stateless. 
3. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs I (b) and 2 of this article, a child 
born in wedlock in the territory of a Contracting State, whose mother has the 






4. A Contracting State shall grant its nationality to a person who would otherwise 
be stateless and who is unable to acquire the nationality of the Contracting State in 
whose territory he was born because he has passed the age for lodging his 
application or has not fulfilled the required residence conditions, if the nationality 
of one of his parents at the time of the person's birth was that of the Contracting 
State first above-mentioned. If his parents did not possess the same nationality at 
the time of his birth, the question whether the nationality of the person concerned 
should follow that of the father or that of the mother shall be determined by the 
national law of such Contracting State. If application for such nationality is 
required, the application shall be made to the appropriate authority by or on behalf 
of the applicant in the manner prescribed by the national law. Subject to the 
provisions of paragraph 5 of this article, such application shall not be refused. 
5. The Contracting State may make the grant of its nationality in accordance with 
the provisions of paragraph 4 of this article subject to one or more of the following 
conditions: 
(a) That the application is lodged before the applicant reaches an age, being not less 
than twenty-three years, fixed by the Contracting State; 
(b) That the person concerned has habitually resided in the territory of the 
Contracting State for such period immediately preceding the lodging of the 
application, not exceeding three years, as may be fixed by that State; 
(c) That the person concerned has always been stateless. 
 
Article 2 
A foundling found in the territory of a Contracting State shall, in the absence of 
proof to the contrary, be considered to have been born within that territory of 
parents possessing the nationality of that State. 
 
Article 3 
For the purpose of determining the obligations of Contracting States under this 
Convention, birth on a ship or in an aircraft shall be deemed to have taken place in 
the territory of the State whose flag the ship flies or in the territory of the State in 
which the aircraft is registered, as the case may be. 
 
Article 4 
1. A Contracting State shall grant its nationality to a person, not born in the territory 
of a Contracting State, who would otherwise be stateless, if the nationality of one of 
his parents at the time of the person's birth was that of that State. If his parents did 
not possess the same nationality at the time of his birth, the question whether the 
nationality of the person concerned should follow that of the father or that of the 
mother shall be determined by the national law of such Contracting State. 
Nationality granted in accordance with the provisions of this paragraph shall be 
granted: 
(a) At birth, by operation of law, or 
(b) Upon an application being lodged with the appropriate authority, by or on behalf 
of the person concerned, in the manner prescribed by the national law. Subject to 
the provisions of paragraph 2 of this article, no such application may be rejected. 
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2. A Contracting State may make the grant of its nationality in accordance with the 
provisions of paragraph I of this article subject to one or more of the following 
conditions: 
(a) That the application is lodged before the applicant reaches an age, being not less 
than twenty-three years, fixed by the Contracting State; 
(b) That the person concerned has habitually resided in the territory of the 
Contracting State for such period immediately preceding the lodging of the 
application, not exceeding three years, as may be fixed by that State; 
(c) That the person concerned has not been convicted of an offence against national 
security; 
(d) That the person concerned has always been stateless. 
 
Article 5 
1. If the law of a Contracting State entails loss of nationality as a consequence of 
any change in the personal status of a person such as marriage, termination of 
marriage, legitimation, recognition or adoption, such loss shall be conditional upon 
possession or acquisition of another nationality. 
2. If, under the law of a Contracting State, a child born out of wedlock loses the 
nationality of that State in consequence of a recognition of affiliation, he shall be 
given an opportunity to recover that nationality by written application to the 
appropriate authority, and the conditions governing such application shall not be 
more rigorous than those laid down in paragraph 2 of article I of this Convention. 
 
Article 6 
If the law of a Contracting State provides for loss of its nationality by a person' s 
spouse or children as a consequence of that person losing or being deprived of that 




1. (a) If the law of a Contracting State entails loss or renunciation of nationality, 
such renunciation shall not result in loss of nationality unless the person concerned 
possesses or acquires another nationality; 
(b) The provisions of subparagraph (a) of this paragraph shall not apply where their 
application would be inconsistent with the principles stated in articles 13 and 14 of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights approved on 10 December 1948 by the 
General Assembly of the United Nations. 
2. A national of a Contracting State who seeks naturalization in a foreign country 
shall not lose his nationality unless he acquires or has been accorded assurance of 
acquiring the nationality of that foreign country. 
3. Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 4 and 5 of this article, a national of a 
Contracting State shall not lose his nationality, so as to become stateless, on the 
ground of departure, residence abroad, failure to register or on any similar ground. 
4. A naturalized person may lose his nationality on account of residence abroad for 
a period, not less than seven consecutive years, specified by the law of the 
Contracting State concerned if he fails to declare to the appropriate authority his 





5. In the case of a national of a Contracting State, born outside its territory, the law 
of that State may make the retention of its nationality after the expiry of one year 
from his attaining his majority conditional upon residence at that time in the 
territory of the State or registration with the appropriate authority. 
6. Except in the circumstances mentioned in this article, a person shall not lose the 
nationality of a Contracting State, if such loss would render him stateless, 




1. A Contracting State shall not deprive a person of his nationality if such 
deprivation would render him stateless. 
2. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1 of this article, a person may be 
deprived of the nationality of a Contracting State: 
(a) In the circumstances in which, under paragraphs 4 and 5 of article 7, it is 
permissible that a person should lose his nationality; 
(b) Where the nationality has been obtained by misrepresentation or fraud. 
3. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph I of this article, a Contracting State 
may retain the right to deprive a person of his nationality, if at the time of signature, 
ratification or accession it specifies its retention of such right on one or more of the 
following grounds, being grounds existing in its national law at that time: 
(a) That, inconsistently with his duty of loyalty to the Contracting State, the person: 
(i) Has, in disregard of an express prohibition by the Contracting State rendered or 
continued to render services to, or received or continued to receive emoluments 
from, another State, or 
(ii) Has conducted himself in a manner seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of 
the State; 
(b) That the person has taken an oath, or made a formal declaration, of allegiance to 
another State, or given definite evidence of his determination to repudiate his 
allegiance to the Contracting State. 
4. A Contracting State shall not exercise a power of deprivation permitted by 
paragraphs 2 or 3 of this article except in accordance with law, which shall provide 




A Contracting State may not deprive any person or group of persons of their 
nationality on racial, ethnic, religious or political grounds. 
 
Article 10 
1. Every treaty between Contracting States providing for the transfer of territory 
shall include provisions designed to secure that no person shall become stateless as 
a result of the transfer. A Contracting State shall use its best endeavours to secure 
that any such treaty made by it with a State which is not a Party to this Convention 
includes such provisions. 
2. In the absence of such provisions a Contracting State to which territory is 
transferred or which otherwise acquires territory shall confer its nationality on such 
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The Contracting States shall promote the establishment within the framework of the 
United Nations, as soon as may be after the deposit of the sixth instrument of 
ratification or accession, of a body to which a person claiming the benefit of this 
Convention may apply for the examination of his claim and for assistance in 
presenting it to the appropriate authority. 
 
Article 12 
1. In relation to a Contracting State which does not, in accordance with the 
provisions of paragraph I of article I or of article 4 of this Convention, grant its 
nationality at birth by operation of law, the provisions of paragraph I of article I or 
of article 4, as the case may be, shall apply to persons born before as well as to 
persons born after the entry into force of this Convention. 
2. The provisions of paragraph 4 of article I of this Convention shall apply to 
persons born before as well as to persons born after its entry into force. 
3. The provisions of article 2 of this Convention shall apply only to foundlings 
found in the territory of a Contracting State after the entry into force of the 
Convention for that State. 
 
Article 13 
This Convention shall not be construed as affecting any provisions more conducive 
to the reduction of statelessness which may be contained in the law of any 
Contracting State now or hereafter in force, or may be contained in any other 




Any dispute between Contracting States concerning the interpretation or application 
of this Convention which cannot be settled by other means shall be submitted to the 
International Court of Justice at the request of any one of the parties to the dispute. 
 
Article 15 
1. This Convention shall apply to all non-self-governing, trust, colonial and other 
non-metropolitan territories for the international relations of which any Contracting 
State is responsible; the Contracting State concerned shall, subject to the provisions 
of paragraph 2 of this article, at the time of signature, ratification or accession, 
declare the non-metropolitan territory or territories to which the Convention shall 
apply ipso facto as a result of such signature, ratification or accession. 
2. In any case in which, for the purpose of nationality, a non-metropolitan territory 
is not treated as one with the metropolitan territory, or in any case in which the 
previous con sent of a non-metropolitan territory is required by the constitutional 
laws or practices of the Contracting State or of the non-metropolitan territory for the 
application of the Convention to that territory, that Contracting State shall 
endeavour to secure the needed consent of the non-metropolitan territory within the 





Contracting State, and when such consent has been obtained the Contracting State 
shall notify the Secretary General of the United Nations. This Convention shall 
apply to the territory or territories named in such notification from the date of its 
receipt by the Secretary-General. 
3. After the expiry of the twelve-month period mentioned in paragraph 2 of this 
article, the Contracting States concerned shall inform the Secretary-General of the 
results of the consultations with those non-metropolitan territories for whose 
international relations they are responsible and whose consent to the application of 
this Convention may have been withheld. 
 
Article 16 
1. This Convention shall be open for signature at the Headquarters of the United 
Nations from 30 August 1961 to 31 May 1962. 
2. This Convention shall be open for signature on behalf of: 
(a) Any State Member of the United Nations; 
(b) Any other State invited to attend the United Nations Conference on the 
Elimination or Reduction of Future Statelessness; 
(c) Any State to which an invitation to sign or to accede may be addressed by the 
General Assembly of the United Nations. 
3. This Convention shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification shall be 
deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 
4. This Convention shall be open for accession by the States referred to in 
paragraph 2 of this article. Accession shall be effected by the deposit of an 
instrument of accession with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 
 
Article 17 
1. At the time of signature, ratification or accession any State may make a 
reservation in respect of articles 11, 14 or 15. 
2. No other reservations to this Convention shall be admissible. 
 
Article 18 
1. This Convention shall enter into force two years after the date of the deposit of 
the sixth instrument of ratification or accession. 
2. For each State ratifying or acceding to this Convention after the deposit of the 
sixth instrument of ratification or accession, it shall enter into force on the ninetieth 
day after the deposit by such State of its instrument of ratification or accession or on 
the date on which this Convention enters into force in accordance with the 
provisions of paragraph I of this article, whichever is the later. 
 
Article 19 
1. Any Contracting State may denounce this Convention at any time by a written 
notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Such 
denunciation shall take effect for the Contracting State concerned one year after the 
date of its receipt by the Secretary-General. 
2. In cases where, in accordance with the provisions of article 15, this Convention 
has become applicable to a non-metropolitan territory of a Contracting State, that 
State may at any time thereafter, with the consent of the territory concerned, give 
notice to the Secretary-General of the United-Nations denouncing this Convention 
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separately in respect to that territory. The denunciation shall take effect one year 
after the date of the receipt of such notice by the Secretary-General, who shall 
notify all other Contracting States of such notice and the date of receipt thereof. 
 
Article 20 
1. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall notify all Members of the 
United Nations and the non-member States referred to in article 16 of the following 
particulars: 
(a) Signatures, ratifications and accessions under article 16; 
(b) Reservations under article 17; 
(c) The date upon which this Convention enters into force in pursuance of article 
18; 
(d) Denunciations under article 19. 
2. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall, after the deposit of the sixth 
instrument of ratification or accession at the latest, bring to the attention of the 
General Assembly the question of the establishment, in accordance with article 11, 
of such a body as therein mentioned. 
 
Article 21 
This Convention shall be registered by the Secretary-General of the United Nations 
on the date of its entry into force. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this 
Convention. 
DONE at New York, this thirtieth day of August, one thousand nine hundred and 
sixty-one, in a single copy, of which the Chinese, English, French, Russian and 
Spanish texts are equally authentic and which shall be deposited in the archives of 
the United Nations, and certified copies of which shall be delivered by the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations to all members of the United Nations and 





THE 1954 CONVENTION RELATING TO THE 




The High Contracting Parties, 
 
Considering that the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights approved on 10 December 1948 by the General Assembly of the 
United Nations have affirmed the principle that human beings shall enjoy 
fundamental rights and freedoms without discrimination, 
 
Considering that the United Nations has, on various occasions, manifested its 
profound concern for stateless persons and endeavoured to assure stateless persons 
the widest possible exercise of these fundamental rights and freedoms, 
 
Considering that only those stateless persons who are also refugees are covered by 
the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees of 28 July 1951, and that there are 
many stateless persons who are not covered by that Convention, 
 
Considering that it is desirable to regulate and improve the status of stateless 







Article 1.-Definition of the term "stateless person" 
1. For the purpose of this Convention, the term "stateless person" means a person 
who is not considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law. 
2. This Convention shall not apply: 
(i) To persons who are at present receiving from organs or agencies of the United 
Nations other than the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees protection 
or assistance so long as they are receiving such protection or assistance; 
(ii) To persons who are recognized by the competent authorities of the country in 
which they have taken residence as having the rights and obligations which are 





(iii) To persons with respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering that: 
(a) They have committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against 
humanity, as defined in the international instruments drawn up to make provisions 
in respect of such crimes; 
(b) They have committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of their 
residence prior to their admission to that country; 
(c) They have been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the 
United Nations. 
 
Article 2.-General obligations 
Every stateless person has duties to the country in which he finds himself, which 
require in particular that he conform to its laws and regulations as well as to 
measures taken for the maintenance of public order. 
 
Article 3.-Non-discrimination 
The Contracting States shall apply the provisions of this Convention to stateless 
persons without discrimination as to race, religion or country of origin. 
 
Article 4. -Religion 
The Contracting States shall accord to stateless persons within their territories 
treatment at least as favourable as that accorded to their nationals with respect to 
freedom to practise their religion and freedom as regards the religious education of 
their children. 
 
Article 5. - Rights granted apart from this Convention 
Nothing in this Convention shall be deemed to impair any rights and benefits 
granted by a Contracting State to stateless persons apart from this Convention. 
 
Article 6. - The term "in the same circumstances" 
For the purpose of this Convention, the term " in the same circumstances" implies 
that any requirements (including requirements as to length and conditions of 
sojourn or residence) which the particular individual would have to fulfil for the 
enjoyment of the right in question, if he were not a stateless person, must be 
fulfilled by him, with the exception of requirements which by their nature a 
stateless person is incapable of fulfilling. 
 
Article 7. - Exemption from reciprocity 
1. Except where this Convention contains more favourable provisions, a 
Contracting State shall accord to stateless persons the same treatment as is accorded 
to aliens generally. 
2. After a period of three years' residence, all stateless persons shall enjoy 
exemption from legislative reciprocity in the territory of the Contracting States. 
3. Each Contracting State shall continue to accord to stateless persons the rights and 
benefits to which they were already entitled, in the absence of reciprocity, at the 
date of entry into force of this Convention for that State. 
4. The Contracting States shall consider favourably the possibility of according to 
stateless persons, in the absence of reciprocity, rights and benefits beyond those to 
which they are entitled according to paragraphs 2 and 3, and to extending 
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exemption from reciprocity to stateless persons who do not fulfil the conditions 
provided for in paragraphs 2 and 3. 
5. The provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3 apply both to the rights and benefits 
referred to in articles 13, 18, 19, 21 and 22 of this Convention and to rights and 
benefits for which this Convention does not provide. 
 
Article 8. - Exemption from exceptional measures 
With regard to exceptional measures which may be taken against the person, 
property or interests of nationals or former nationals of a foreign State, the 
Contracting States shall not apply such measures to a stateless person solely on 
account of his having previously possessed the nationality of the foreign State in 
question. Contracting States which, under their legislation, are prevented from 
applying the general principle expressed in this article shall, in appropriate cases, 
grant exemptions in favour of such stateless persons. 
 
Article 9. - Provisional measures 
Nothing in this Convention shall prevent a Contracting State, in time of war or 
other grave and exceptional circumstances, from taking provisionally measures 
which it considers to be essential to the national security in the case of a particular 
person, pending a determination by the Contracting State that that person is in fact a 
stateless person and that the continuance of such measures is necessary in his case 
in the interests of national security. 
 
Article 10. - Continuity of residence 
1. Where a stateless person has been forcibly displaced during the Second World 
War and removed to the territory of a Contracting State, and is resident there, the 
period of such enforced sojourn shall be considered to have been lawful residence 
within that territory. 
2. Where a stateless person has been forcibly displaced during the Second World 
War from the territory of a Contracting State and has, prior to the date of entry into 
force of this Convention, returned there for the purpose of taking up residence, the 
period of residence before and after such enforced displacement shall be regarded 
as one uninterrupted period for any purposes for which uninterrupted residence is 
required. 
 
Article 11. - Stateless seamen 
In the case of stateless persons regularly serving as crew members on board a ship 
flying the flag of a Contracting State, that State shall give sympathetic consideration 
to their establishment on its territory and the issue of travel documents to them or 
their temporary admission to its territory particularly with a view to facilitating their 











Article 12. - Personal status 
1. The personal status of a stateless person shall be governed by the law of the 
country of his domicile or, if he has no domicile, by the law of the country of his 
residence. 
2. Rights previously acquired by a stateless person and dependent on personal 
status, more particularly rights attaching to marriage, shall be respected by a 
Contracting State, subject to compliance, if this be necessary, with the formalities 
required by the law of that State, provided that the right in question is one which 
would have been recognized by the law of that State had he not become stateless. 
 
Article 13. - Movable and immovable property 
The Contracting States shall accord to a stateless person treatment as favourable as 
possible and, in any event, not less favourable than that accorded to aliens generally 
in the same circumstances, as regards the acquisition of movable and immovable 
property and other rights pertaining thereto, and to leases and other contracts 
relating to movable and immovable property. 
 
Article 14. - Artistic rights and industrial property 
In respect of the protection of industrial property, such as inventions, designs or 
models, trade marks, trade names, and of rights in literary, artistic and scientific 
works, a stateless person shall be accorded in the country in which he has his 
habitual residence the same protection as is accorded to nationals of that country. In 
the territory of any other Contracting State, he shall be accorded the same 
protection as is accorded in that territory to nationals of the country in which he has 
his habitual residence. 
 
Article 15. - Right of association 
As regards non-political and non -profit- making associations and trade unions the 
Contracting States shall accord to stateless persons lawfully staying in their territory 
treatment as favourable as possible, and in any event, not less favourable than that 
accorded to aliens generally in the same circumstances. 
 
Article 16. - Access to courts 
1. A stateless person shall have free access to the courts of law on the territory of all 
Contracting States. 
2. A stateless person shall enjoy in the Contracting State in which he has his 
habitual residence the same treatment as a national in matters pertaining to access to 
the courts, including legal assistance and exemption from cautio judicatum solvi. 
3. A stateless person shall be accorded in the matters referred to in paragraph 2 in 
countries other than that in which he has his habitual residence the treatment 
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Article 17. - Wage-earning employment 
1. The Contracting States shall accord to stateless persons lawfully staying in their 
territory treatment as favourable as possible and, in any event, not less favourable 
that that accorded to aliens generally in the same circumstances, as regards the right 
to engage in wage-earning employment. 
2. The Contracting States shall give sympathetic consideration to assimilating the 
rights of all stateless persons with regard to wage-earning employment to those of 
nationals, and in particular of those stateless persons who have entered their 
territory pursuant to programmes of labour recruitment or under immigration 
schemes. 
 
Article 18. - Self-employment 
The Contracting States shall accord to a stateless person lawfully in their territory 
treatment as favourable as possible and, in any event, not less favourable than that 
accorded to aliens generally in the same circumstances, as regards the right to 
engage on his own account in agriculture, industry, handicrafts and commerce and 
to establish commercial and industrial companies. 
 
Article 19. - Liberal professions 
Each Contracting State shall accord to stateless persons lawfully staying in their 
territory who hold diplomas recognized by the competent authorities of that State, 
and who are desirous of practising a liberal profession, treatment as favourable as 
possible and, in any event, not less favourable than that accorded to aliens generally 







Article 20. - Rationing 
Where a rationing system exists, which applies to the population at large and 
regulates the general distribution of products in short supply, stateless persons shall 
be accorded the same treatment as nationals. 
 
Article 21. - Housing 
As regards housing, the Contracting States, in so far as the matter is regulated by 
laws or regulations or is subject to the control of public authorities, shall accord to 
stateless persons lawfully staying in their territory treatment as favourable as 
possible and, in any event, not less favourable than that accorded to aliens generally 
in the same circumstances. 
 
Article 22. - Public education 
1. The Contracting States shall accord to stateless persons the same treatment as is 
accorded to nationals with respect to elementary education. 
2. The Contracting States shall accord to stateless persons treatment as favourable 





generally in the same circumstances, with respect to education other than 
elementary education and, in particular, as regards access to studies, the recognition 
of foreign school certificates, diplomas and degrees, the remission of fees and 
charges and the award of scholarships. 
 
Article 23. -Public relief 
The Contracting States shall accord to stateless persons lawfully staying in their 
territory the same treatment with respect to public relief and assistance as is 
accorded to their nationals. 
 
Article 24. - Labour legislation and social security 
1. The Contracting States shall accord to stateless persons lawfully staying in their 
territory the same treatment as is accorded to nationals in respect of the following 
matters: 
(a) In so far as such matters are governed by laws or regulations or are subject to the 
control of administrative authorities; remuneration, including family allowances 
where these form part of remuneration, hours of work, overtime arrangements, 
holidays with pay, restrictions on home work, minimum age of employment, 
apprenticeship and training, women's work and the work of young persons, and the 
enjoyment of the benefits of collective bargaining; 
(b) Social security (legal provisions in respect of employment injury, occupational 
diseases, maternity, sickness, disability, old age, death, unemployment, family 
responsibilities and any other contingency which, according to national laws or 
regulations, is covered by a social security scheme), subject to the following 
limitations: 
(i) There may be appropriate arrangements for the maintenance of acquired rights 
and rights in course of acquisition; 
(ii) National laws or regulations of the country of residence may prescribe special 
arrangements concerning benefits or portions of benefits which are payable wholly 
out of public funds, and concerning allowances paid to persons who do not fulfil the 
contribution conditions prescribed for the award of a normal pension. 
2. The right to compensation for the death of a stateless person resulting from 
employment injury or from occupational disease shall not be affected by the fact 
that the residence of the beneficiary is outside the territory of the Contracting State. 
3. The Contracting States shall extend to stateless persons the benefits of 
agreements concluded between them, or which may be concluded between them in 
the future, concerning the maintenance of acquired rights and rights in the process 
of acquisition in regard to social security, subject only to the conditions which 
apply to nationals of the States signatory to the agreements in question. 
4. The Contracting States will give sympathetic consideration to extending to 
stateless persons so far as possible the benefits of similar agreements which may at 
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Article 25. - Administrative assistance 
1. When the exercise of a right by a stateless person would normally require the 
assistance of authorities of a foreign country to whom he cannot have recourse, the 
Contracting State in whose territory he is residing shall arrange that such assistance 
be afforded to him by their own authorities. 
2. The authority or authorities mentioned in paragraph I shall deliver or cause to be 
delivered under their supervision to stateless persons such documents or 
certifications as would normally be delivered to aliens by or through their national 
authorities. 
3. Documents or certifications so delivered shall stand in the stead of the official 
instruments delivered to aliens by or through their national authorities and shall be 
given credence in the absence of proof to the contrary. 
4. Subject to such exceptional treatment as may be granted to indigent persons, fees 
may be charged for the services mentioned herein, but such fees shall be moderate 
and commensurate with those charged to nationals for similar services. 
5. The provisions of this article shall be without prejudice to articles 27 and 28. 
 
Article 26. - Freedom of movement 
Each Contracting State shall accord to stateless persons lawfully in its territory the 
right to choose their place of residence and to move freely within its territory, 
subject to any regulations applicable to aliens generally in the same circumstances. 
 
Article 27. - Identity papers 
The Contracting States shall issue identity papers to any stateless person in their 
territory who does not possess a valid travel document. 
 
Article 28. - Travel documents 
The Contracting States shall issue to stateless persons lawfully staying in their 
territory travel documents for the purpose of travel outside their territory, unless 
compelling reasons of national security or public order otherwise require, and the 
provisions of the schedule to this Convention shall apply with respect to such 
documents. The Contracting States may issue such a travel document to any other 
stateless person in their territory; they shall in particular give sympathetic 
consideration to the issue of such a travel document to stateless persons in their 
territory who are unable to obtain a travel document from the country of their 
lawful residence. 
 
Article 29. - Fiscal charges 
1. The Contracting States shall not impose upon stateless persons duties, charges or 
taxes, of any description whatsoever, other or higher than tho se which are or may 
be levied on their nationals in similar situations . 
2. Nothing in the above paragraph shall prevent the application to stateless persons 
of the laws and regulations concerning charges in respect of the issue to aliens of 






Article 30. - Transfer of assets 
1. A Contracting State shall, in conformity with its laws and regulations, permit 
stateless persons to transfer assets which they have brought into its territory, to 
another country where they have been admitted for the purposes of resettlement. 2. 
A Contracting State shall give sympathetic consideration to the application of 
stateless persons for permission to transfer assets wherever they may be and which 
are necessary for their resettlement in another country to which they have been 
admitted. Article 31. - Expulsion 
1. The Contracting States shall not expel a stateless person lawfully in their territory 
save on grounds of national security or public order. 
2. The expulsion of such a stateless person shall be only in pursuance of a decision 
reached in accordance with due process of law. Except where compelling reasons of 
national security otherwise require, the stateless person shall be allowed to submit 
evidence to clear himself, and to appeal to and be represented for the purpose before 
competent authority or a person or persons specially designated by the competent 
authority. 
3. The Contracting States shall allow such a stateless person a reasonable period 
within which to seek legal admission into another country. The Contracting States 
reserve the right to apply during that period such internal measures as they may 
deem necessary. 
 
Article 32. - Naturalization 
The Contracting States shall as far as possible facilitate the assimilation and 
naturalization of stateless persons. They shall in particular make every effort to 
expedite naturalization proceedings and to reduce as far as possible the charges and 







Article 33. - Information on national legislation 
The Contracting States shall communicate to the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations the laws and regulations which they may adopt to ensure the application of 
this Convention. 
 
Article 34. - Settlement of disputes 
Any dispute between Parties to this Convention relating to its interpretation or 
application, which cannot be settled by other means, shall be referred to the 
International Court of Justice at the request of any one of the parties to the dispute. 
 
Article 35. - Signature, ratification and accession 
1. This Convention shall be open for signature at the Headquarters of the United 
Nations until 31 December 1955. 
2. It shall be open for signature on behalf of: 
(a) Any State Member of the United Nations; 
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(b) Any other State invited to attend the United Nations Conference on the Status of 
Stateless Persons; and 
(c) Any State to which an invitation to sign or to accede may be addressed by the 
General Assembly of the United Nations. 
3. It shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations. 
4. It shall be open for accession by the States referred to in paragraph 2 of this 
article. Accession shall be effected by the deposit of an instrument of accession 
with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 
 
Article 36. - Territorial application clause 
1. Any State may, at the time of signature, ratification or accession, declare that this 
Convention shall extend to all or any of the territories for the international relations 
of which it is responsible. Such a declaration shall take effect when the Convention 
enters into force for the State concerned. 
2. At any time thereafter any such extension shall be made by notification addressed 
to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and shall take effect as from the 
ninetieth day after the day of receipt by the Secretary-General of the United Nations 
of this notification, or as from the date of entry into force of the Convention for the 
State concerned, whichever is the later. 
3. With respect to those territories to which this Convention is not extended at the 
time of signature, ratification or accession, each State concerned shall consider the 
possibility of taking the necessary steps in order to extend the application of this 
Convention to such territories, subject, where necessary for constitutional reasons, 
to the consent of the Governments of such territories. 
 
Article 37. - Federal clause 
In the case of a Federal or non-unitary State, the following provisions shall apply 
(a) With respect to those articles of this Convention that come within the legislative 
jurisdiction of the federal legislative authority, the obligations of the Federal 
Government shall to this extent be the same as those of Parties which are not 
Federal States; 
(b) With respect to those articles of this Convention that come within the legislative 
jurisdiction of constituent States, provinces or cantons which are not, under the 
constitutional system of the Federation, bound to take legislative action, the Federal 
Government shall bring such articles with a favourable recommendation to the 
notice of the appropriate authorities of States, provinces or cantons at the earliest 
possible moment; 
(c) A Federal State Party to this Convention shall, at the request of any other 
Contracting State transmitted through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, 
supply a statement of the law and practice of the Federation and its constituent units 
in regard to any particular provision of the Convention showing the extent to which 
effect has been given to that provision by legislative or other action. 
 
Article 38. - Reservations 
1. At the time of signature, ratification or accession, any State may make 
reservations to articles of the Convention other than to articles 1, 3, 4, 16 (1) and 33 





2. Any State making a reservation in accordance with paragraph I of this article may 
at any time withdraw the reservation by a communication to that effect addressed to 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 
 
Article 39. - Entry into force 
1. This Convention shall come into force on the ninetieth day following the day of 
deposit of the sixth instrument of ratification or accession. 
2. For each State ratifying or acceding to the Convention after the deposit of the 
sixth instrument of ratification or accession, the Convention shall enter into force on 
the ninetieth day following the date of deposit by such State of its instrument of 
ratification or accession. 
 
Article 40. - Denunciation 
1. Any Contracting State may denounce this Convention at any time by a 
notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 
2. Such denunciation shall take effect for the Contracting State concerned one year 
from the date upon which it is received by the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations. 
3. Any State which has made a declaration or notification under article 36 may, at 
any time thereafter, by a notification to the Secretary- General of the United 
Nations, declare that the Convention shall cease to extend to such territory one year 
after the date of receipt of the notification by the Secretary-General. 
 
Article 41. - Revision 
1. Any Contracting State may request revision of this Convention at any time by a 
notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 
2. The General Assembly of the United Nations shall recommend the steps, if any, 
to be taken in respect of such request. 
 
Article 42. - Notifications by the Secretary-General of the United Nations 
The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall inform all Members of the 
United Nations and non-member States referred to in article 35: 
(a) Of signatures, ratifications and accessions in accordance with article 35; 
(b) Of declarations and notifications in accordance with article 36; 
(c) Of reservations and withdrawals in accordance with article 38; 
(d) Of the date on which this Convention will come into force in accordance with 
article 39; 
(e) Of denunciations and notifications in accordance with article 40; 
(f) Of request for revision in accordance with article 41. 
IN FAITH WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this 
Convention on behalf of their respective Governments. 
DONE at New York, this twenty-eighth day of September, one thousand nine 
hundred and fifty-four, in a single copy, of which the English, French and Spanish 
texts are equally authentic and which shall remain deposited in the archives of the 
United Nations, and certified true copies of which shall be delivered to all Members 
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∗ With the proviso that under article 17, paragraph 2 the contracting states are required to 
“give sympathetic consideration to assimilating the rights of all stateless persons with regard 
to wage-earning employment to those of nationals”. 
 
** This article addresses the question of legal jurisdiction in regulating the “personal status” 
of stateless persons and deals only implicitly with the right to legal personhood. 
 
*** Although this provision does not demand (lawful) residence or even physical presence, 
nothing in this article restricts the rights of states to set the condition of (a certain period of) 
lawful and habitual residence for eligibility to naturalisation, although it does encourage a 
lowering of such conditions for stateless persons. 
 
**** This right has been categorised under those enjoyed through physical presence in a 
contracting state since it deals with assets that a stateless person has “brought into its 
territory”. Under paragraph 2 contracting states are also called upon to “give sympathetic 
consideration to the application of stateless persons for permission to transfer assets 
wherever they may be” which would require only jurisdiction of the state over the assets and 







It is a familiar and irrefutable fact that the world we live in today is marked with 
divisions. Border posts, frontier patrols and even elaborate fencing establish the 
dividing lines between the territory of one state and the next. Meanwhile, partitions 
have also been created between people. Individuals do not (just) exist as isolated 
beings, they are connected to one state or another through the legal bond of 
membership, nationality. But these divisions are not watertight. Just as there is the 
occasional slither of no-man’s land between two countries, so too, are there 
individuals who remain unclaimed by any state. These are the world’s stateless 
persons – also variously described as outcasts, legal-ghosts and non-persons in 
recognition of their precarious position as outsiders in this modern, well-ordered 
world. It is their anomalous situation which formed the subject matter of this book. 
In the opening chapters it quickly became apparent that the issue of 
statelessness is neither theoretical nor trifling – it is a very real and pressing 
problem, afflicting as many as 15 million people worldwide. It stems from a wide 
variety of causes, leaving no region untouched. More often than not, statelessness 
proves to be a highly persistent problem with individuals spending years, decades or 
even their whole lives in this legal limbo. Statelessness can also be self-
perpetuating, passed on helplessly from one generation to the next. And even a brief 
perusal of reports on stateless populations is enough to reveal that, while the impact 
that the lack of a nationality has on these individuals’ lives varies, the overall 
picture is sincerely troubling. Statelessness impairs a person’s ability to effectuate a 
wide range of rights and lays him or her bare to abuse in both the public and private 
sphere. The individual insecurity and marginalisation experienced by stateless 
persons can also have a dramatic knock-on effect on the individual’s family and the 
wider community. Furthermore, nationality disputes and statelessness can be a 
major contributing factor to forced displacement, domestic or international 
instability and even conflict.  
At the turn of the millennium, a deepening understanding of the severity and 
potential implications of statelessness – as well as the emergence of several large, 
new caseloads of stateless persons – spurred the international community to renew 
its attempts to tackle the issue. Half a century previously, statelessness also 





ended, it left a mammoth humanitarian crisis in its wake. One of the many 
challenges involved the vast numbers of people who had, in one way or another, 
become uprooted and were in need of protection. A series of studies and debates 
eventually led to the adoption of three independent legal instruments to respond to 
this problem of the “unprotected”: the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees, the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons and the 
1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. While the 1951 Refugee 
Convention quickly gained wide acceptance and, to this day, forms the cornerstone 
of international refugee protection, the Statelessness Conventions suffered a long 
period of neglect. Indeed, generally-speaking, interest in statelessness went into 
swift decline, only to be re-ignited in the 1990s as alluded to above.  
By then, however, several decades had elapsed since the Statelessness 
Conventions were adopted – or indeed, since any comprehensive study was made of 
the phenomenon. As the international community turned its attention back to 
statelessness, it gained new insights into this complex problem, raising the question 
of whether the Statelessness Conventions that had fallen into disregard still – or had 
in fact ever – offered an appropriate response. Moreover, with the realisation that 
the overall international legal setting had changed significantly, thanks especially to 
the advent and development of human rights law, came the question as to the 
enduring value of the antiquated statelessness-specific instruments.  
More fundamentally, the concern is whether the international community has 
the necessary tools at its disposal to respond effectively to the issue of statelessness. 
The current, growing preoccupation with the plight of the stateless offered an 
opportune moment to reflect upon this question, to pin-point the gaps in the 
international legal framework and to submit suggestions as to how these may be 
remedied. In short: 
 
How can the way in which international law deals with the issue of 
statelessness be improved so as to ensure optimal protection of the individual 
and his rights? 
  
To facilitate and structure this research, the approach taken in the Statelessness 
Conventions, whereby prevention and protection are dealt with separately, was 
mimicked. Thus, part 2 was devoted to an analysis of the international norms 
relating to the prevention of statelessness (with a particular focus on the 1961 
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness) and part 3 looked at the standards 
relating to the protection of stateless persons (with a particular focus on the 1954 
Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons). Thereafter, part 4 reflected 
on the overarching lessons learned, considered what future lays ahead for the 
Statelessness Conventions and discussed some of the remaining challenges.  
In order to assess the international legal framework for the prevention of 
statelessness, each of the causes of statelessness was considered in turn: technical 
causes (i.e. administrative practices and conflicts of laws), arbitrary deprivation of 





statelessness (those that were recognised after the 1961 Statelessness Convention 
was drafted). In the end, it was concluded that international law today reflects a 
mounting intolerance for statelessness, with two main principles gaining ever more 
ground: the avoidance of statelessness at birth and the avoidance of 
denationalisation resulting in statelessness. Ultimately, these two standards are all 
that is needed to secure the prevention of statelessness since they focus on ensuring 
that every individual acquires a nationality at the start of his or her lifetime and that 
this nationality is not lost unless another nationality is acquired. Both principles are 
reflected in the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness and numerous 
human rights instruments. In the former, the principles have been transformed into a 
series of intricate provisions that detail which state is responsible for conferring 
nationality, or for refraining from withdrawing citizenship, and under which 
circumstances. In the latter, mainly more broadly stated norms were traced, such as 
the right of every child to acquire a nationality and the prohibition of arbitrary 
deprivation of nationality. But the 1961 Statelessness Convention clearly limits its 
ambitions to reducing the incidence of statelessness – thereby failing to provide for 
the unequivocal bestowal or retention of nationality where statelessness threatens – 
and fails to deal with a number of issues either persuasively or indeed at all. 
Meanwhile the wider human rights framework offers sweeping standards that, in 
places, lack the detail that is required to ensure their full, correct and harmonised 
application – and the truly interesting and innovative developments that were traced 
are still in their infancy. So, neither approach turned out to be infallible. Nor is the 
combined impact of the two sets of standards a guarantee that all causes of 
statelessness will be nipped in the bud. 
 This finding reaffirmed the importance of norms for the protection of stateless 
persons, which were next to go under the microscope – first civil and political 
rights, then economic, social and cultural rights and, lastly, the “special needs” of 
the stateless. The result was a similarly mixed story to that uncovered for the 
prevention of statelessness. The development of human rights law has resulted in an 
increasing move away from citizenship as the right to have rights, as famously 
described by the US Supreme Court, and towards the “denationalisation” of 
protection. Yet the recognition of the right to a nationality as a human right also 
reaffirms the enduring relevance of nationality: the human rights system can only 
maintain its aspiration of universality with the guarantee that every human will also 
hold a nationality. So although there is perhaps less need for a stateless-specific 
instrument today than there was prior to the advent of the major human rights 
instruments, it has not become redundant. The 1954 Statelessness Convention 
attempts to answer to this need, but falls short on quite a number of counts. The 
instruments is particularly let down by its own trademark technique of offering 
different rights at different “levels of attachment” (for example, only to stateless 
persons who are lawfully present or lawfully staying) and often only to a weak, 
contingent standard (for instance, only to the same extent as enjoyed by non-





standards have begun to develop that address the situation of non-nationals or even 
stateless persons specifically. But the exact treatment owed to these groups under 
contemporary human rights law is still hazy in many areas, for example with 
respect to economic, social and cultural rights and in particular in developing 
countries. 
Unmistakably then, a number of challenges remain – not least of which is to 
ensure the full implementation and enforcement of all of the existing norms. 
However, numerous gaps were also found in the normative frameworks for the 
prevention of statelessness and protection of stateless persons. Consequently, 
various suggestions were raised for the further clarification and elaboration of 
standards with a view to improving the way in which international law deals with 
the issue of statelessness so as to ensure optimal protection of the individual and his 
rights. In the context of both prevention and protection, it was possible to trace 
certain current and relevant developments that helped to show the way forward.  
One of the most pervasive issues to be dealt with is the nexus between 
inclusion and exclusion on the basis of nationality, and inclusion and exclusion on 
the basis of immigration status. An enduring, fundamental function of nationality is 
providing the holder with a “home”, a state to which they can always return and in 
which they have an irrefutable right to reside. On the one hand, this implies that 
stateless persons have no undisputed right to live anywhere – and indeed gaining 
and retaining lawful access to the territory of a(ny) state was found to present 
serious difficulties to the stateless in practice. This, in turn, results in problems 
relating to detention, family separation and lack of access to rights and services,  
including many of those elaborated in the 1954 Statelessness Convention. On the 
other hand, statelessness has been found to lead to displacement. Plus, the 
possession of an unlawful or ambiguous immigration status can contribute to the 
creation and perpetuation of statelessness. These facts underline the urgency of 
securing the stateless a right to live somewhere. Thus, of all of the potential, 
supplementary standard-setting activities discussed, this is the area that is at once 
one of the most imperative and the most complex. It was suggested that the most 
appropriate avenue to pursue in this regard is to build upon the UN Human Rights 
Committee’s efforts to identify an individuals own country, regardless of the 
question of citizenship, for the purposes of the enjoyment of the right to enter and 
reside. The stateless are evidently the group par excellence to benefit from the 
further development of this notion as, without this construction, they will continue 
to lack an own country and the very basic security that this offers. It was also noted 
that a further crystallisation and clarification of the norms relating to the prevention 
of statelessness is absolutely indispensable to the quest of ascertaining which state 
is to be considered a stateless person’s own country – because this quest is 
tantamount to establishing which country is “responsible” for an individual’s 
statelessness, in violation of international standards. 
A second, even more fundamental, challenge that has yet to be met with an 
adequate response is the identification of stateless persons and individuals at risk of 
statelessness. This is a necessary precursor to the application of standards relating to 
the prevention of statelessness, the protection of stateless persons and, ultimately, 
the resolution of existing cases of statelessness. Yet this matter is wholly 





attention from the international community to date. Even the most recent, highly 
progressive examples of international instruments dealing with questions of 
nationality and statelessness barely touch upon the problem of identification. And 
where human rights bodies have been called upon to ascertain the nationality or 
statelessness of an applicant in a case, they have done so in an ad hoc  – and, at 
times, somewhat inaccessible – fashion, without attempting to elaborate rules or 
procedures for future or general use. In order to nevertheless begin to piece together 
such guidelines, in the closing chapter of this study, the search for any relevant 
international practice was widened and lessons were extracted from the areas of 
Refugee Status Determination and international claims jurisprudence. In order to 
provide people with a real opportunity to benefit from international norms relating 
to statelessness, this initial input for guidelines for identification will have to be 
further elucidated and laid down in an appropriate document – an identification 
handbook, to begin with, but later, potentially, a supplementary international 
instrument that also addresses other existing gaps in the international legal 
framework.    
Looking ahead, it was submitted that the two Statelessness Conventions do 
have a future. Indeed, by advocating for increased accession to these instruments, 
one of their shared flaws would be resolved: the pitifully low number of state 
parties that have been attracted to date. With an increased acceptance of the 
Statelessness Conventions comes increased scope for their implementation around 
the world – an objective that would be further stimulated by the elaboration of 
guidelines addressing the challenge of identification. Furthermore, with renewed 
efforts to implement the terms of the Statelessness Conventions, across a broader 
spectrum of countries and with the assistance of an identification handbook, there 
will be greater scope to review the remaining normative gaps and to consider what 
additional measures are needed to facilitate the enforcement of these standards. 
Neither Convention should be seen, in isolation, to be the definitive answer to 
statelessness – to prevention and protection respectively – and the other avenues for 
improving the international response to statelessness that were outlined over the 
course of this study should also be pursued. In the meantime though, boosting the 
number of state parties to the Statelessness Conventions is a worthwhile cause and 
one that is decidedly easier today than half a century ago, since in the current 
international legal setting the content of the instruments can no longer be 
considered to be either radical or objectionable. It is also an unmistakeably 
worthwhile pursuit, from the individual, the state and the international community’s 
standpoint, especially in view of the realisation that statelessness and nationality 
issues can escalate into a matter of national or even international security if left to 











Het is een bekend en onbetwistbaar feit dat de wereld waarin wij leven bepaald 
wordt door scheidslijnen. Grensposten, grenspatrouilles en zelfs uitgebreide 
afscheidingen bakenen het territorium van staten af ten opzichte van hun buurstaten. 
Ook tussen mensen zijn scheidsmuren opgeworpen. Mensen bestaan niet (alleen) 
als afzonderlijk individu: ze zijn aan een bepaalde staat verbonden door het wettig 
lidmaatschapsverband van hun nationaliteit. Toch zijn deze afscheidingen niet 
waterdicht. Net zoals er zo nu en dan een strook niemandsland tussen twee landen 
bestaat, zijn er ook personen die bij geen enkele staat horen. Zij zijn de staatlozen 
van deze wereld – ook wel omschreven als verschoppelingen, juridische spoken en 
onpersonen, gezien hun hachelijke positie als buitenstaanders in deze moderne, 
goedgeordende wereld. Hun abnormale situatie vormt het onderwerp van dit boek.  
In de eerste hoofdstukken wordt het al spoedig duidelijk dat de 
staatloosheidsproblematiek noch theoretisch, noch verwaarloosbaar is: staatloosheid 
vormt een hoogst acuut en urgent probleem dat over de hele wereld zo’n 15 miljoen 
mensen direct aangaat. Er vallen verschillende redenen voor staatloosheid aan te 
wijzen en er is geen regio die er niet mee te maken heeft. Meestal blijkt 
staatloosheid een bijzonder hardnekkig probleem, waarbij mensen (tientallen) jaren 
of zelfs hun hele leven in dit juridische niemandsland doorbrengen. Staatloosheid 
heeft ook het vermogen zichzelf in stand te houden en machteloos van de ene op de 
andere generatie overgedragen te worden. Vluchtige lezing van rapporten over 
staatloze bevolkingsgroepen is al genoeg om aan te tonen dat, ofschoon het effect 
van het ontbreken van een nationaliteit op de levens van individuele personen 
verschilt, het algehele beeld zeer verontrustend is. Staatloosheid beperkt het 
vermogen van mensen om aanspraak te maken op een hele reeks rechten en maakt 
hen kwetsbaar voor misbruik in de publieke en private sfeer. De individuele 
onveiligheid en marginalisatie die door staatlozen ondervonden wordt kan ook een 
dramatische kettingreactie teweegbrengen in hun familie en de gemeenschap 
waartoe zij behoren. Verder kunnen geschillen over nationaliteit en staatloosheid in 
ernstige mate bijdragen aan gedwongen migratie, nationale of internationale 
instabiliteit en zelfs conflicten.  
Rond de eeuwwisseling werd de internationale gemeenschap, als gevolg van 





staatloosheid – en doordat zich enkele grote, nieuwe golven staatlozen voordeden – 
ertoe aangespoord om zijn pogingen de kwestie op te lossen te hervatten. Vijftig 
jaar daarvoor stond staatloosheid ook bij de internationale gemeenschap in de 
belangstelling. In de nasleep van de Tweede Wereldoorlog was er een gigantische 
humanitaire crisis ontstaan. Een van de vele uitdagingen waarvoor men zich gesteld 
zag betrof de enorme aantallen mensen die op de een of andere manier ontworteld 
geraakt waren en bescherming nodig hadden. Een hele reeks onderzoeken en 
debatten leidde uiteindelijk tot het aannemen van drie onafhankelijke verdragen die 
een antwoord moesten bieden op het probleem van de “onbeschermden”: het 
Verdrag inzake de Status van Vluchtelingen van 1951, het Verdrag betreffende de 
Status van Staatlozen van 1954 en het Verdrag tot Beperking van Staatloosheid van 
1961. Terwijl het Vluchtelingenverdrag van 1951 snel in brede kringen aanvaard 
werd en tot op vandaag de hoeksteen voor de internationale 
vluchtelingenbescherming vormt, raakten de staatloosheidsverdragen lange tijd in 
de vergetelheid. Over het algemeen kan gezegd worden dat de belangstelling voor 
staatloosheid snel afnam om, zoals hierboven al aangestipt, pas in de jaren negentig 
van de vorige eeuw weer toe te nemen.  
Tegen die tijd waren er echter enkele tientallen jaren verstreken sinds de 
verdragen over staatloosheid gesloten waren - en sinds er enige diepgaande studie 
van het fenomeen gemaakt was. Toen staatloosheid bij de internationale 
gemeenschap opnieuw in de belangstelling kwam te staan, werden er nieuwe 
inzichten in dit complexe probleem ontwikkeld, waarbij de vraag rees of de 
staatloosheidsverdragen die destijds terzijde gelegd waren nog een passend 
antwoord op de problematiek boden, of ooit geboden hadden. Bovendien kwam met 
het bewustzijn dat de internationale juridische omstandigheden, met name door de 
opkomst en ontwikkeling van de mensenrechtenwetgeving, in het algemeen sterk 
gewijzigd waren, de vraag op naar de blijvende waarde van de verouderde 
verdragen over staatloosheid.  
Op een meer fundamenteel niveau bestaat de zorg of de internationale 
gemeenschap beschikt over de noodzakelijke middelen om effectief op het 
staatloosheidsprobleem te kunnen reageren. De huidige, toenemende zorg over het 
lot van de staatlozen vormde een geschikt moment om deze kwestie te onderzoeken, 
de lacunes in de internationale juridische structuren aan te wijzen en voorstellen te 
doen over hoe deze lacunes gedicht zouden kunnen worden. Kort samengevat is de 
vraag: 
 
Hoe kan de manier waarop internationaal recht met de kwestie van 
staatloosheid omgaat zodanig verbeterd worden dat het individu en zijn/haar 
rechten optimaal beschermd worden? 
  
Om dit onderzoek te vergemakkelijken en er structuur aan te geven, is gekozen voor 
de benadering die ook in de staatloosheidsverdragen wordt toegepast, waarbij 
preventie en bescherming apart behandeld worden. Deel 2 is derhalve gewijd aan 





staatloosheid (met speciale aandacht voor de het Verdrag tot Beperking van 
Staatloosheid van 1961) en deel 3 geeft een beschouwing over de richtlijnen met 
betrekking tot de bescherming van staatlozen (met bijzondere nadruk op het 
Verdrag betreffende de Status van Staatlozen van 1954). In Deel 4 worden 
vervolgens de overkoepelende resultaten van het onderzoek besproken, alsmede de 
toekomst van de staatloosheidsverdragen en enkele overige uitdagingen.   
Om het internationale juridische stelsel voor de preventie van staatloosheid te 
beoordelen is iedere oorzaak voor staatloosheid afzonderlijk besproken: technische 
oorzaken (d.w.z. bestuurlijke praktijken en wetsconflicten), willekeurige ontneming 
van nationaliteit, staatloosheid in het verband van staatsopvolging en de “nieuwe” 
oorzaken van staatloosheid (oorzaken die na het opstellen van het 
staatloosheidsverdrag van 1961 erkend zijn). De uiteindelijk conclusie is dat het 
huidige internationaal recht een groeiend gebrek aan acceptatie van staatloosheid 
vertoont, waarbij twee centrale principes steeds meer terrein winnen: het vermijden 
van staatloosheid bij de geboorte en het vermijden van denationalisatie die leidt tot 
staatloosheid. Uiteindelijk vormen deze twee richtlijnen alles wat nodig is om te 
bewerkstelligen dat staatloosheid voorkomen wordt, aangezien zij erop gericht zijn 
te verzekeren dat ieder individu aan het begin van zijn/haar leven een nationaliteit 
verwerft en dat deze nationaliteit niet verloren gaat tenzij een andere  nationaliteit 
verworven wordt. Beide principes zijn genoemd in het Verdrag tot Beperking van 
Staatloosheid van 1961 en talrijke verdragen aangaande mensenrechten. In het 
Verdrag tot Beperking van Staatloosheid van 1961 zijn de principes vertaald in 
zorgvuldig geformuleerde bepalingen waarin in detail uiteengezet wordt welke staat 
verantwoordelijk is voor het verlenen van nationaliteit of voor het afzien van het 
intrekken van burgerschap, alsmede onder welke omstandigheden. In de 
mensenrechtenverdragen zijn vooral algemeen geformuleerde normen te vinden, 
zoals het recht van ieder kind om een nationaliteit te verwerven en het verbod op 
willekeurige ontneming van de nationaliteit. Het staatloosheidsverdrag van 1961 
beperkt zijn ambities echter duidelijk tot het terugbrengen van het aantal gevallen 
van staatloosheid, zonder te voorzien in bepalingen over de ondubbelzinnige 
verlening of het behoud van nationaliteit wanneer staatloosheid dreigt, en geeft op 
een aantal kwesties geen overtuigend antwoord of behandelt deze kwesties zelfs 
helemaal niet.  Intussen worden in het algemene kader van de mensenrechten breed 
geformuleerde normen aangereikt die hier en daar de verfijning missen die 
noodzakelijk is om ze volledig, correct en uniform toe te passen – en de werkelijk 
interessante en innovatieve ontwikkelingen die opgemerkt zijn staan nog in de 
kinderschoenen. Zo blijkt geen van beide benaderingen onfeilbaar. Ook biedt het 
gecombineerde effect van de twee sets normen geen garantie dat alle oorzaken van 
staatloosheid bij de wortel aangepakt zullen worden.  
 Deze bevinding bevestigde opnieuw het belang van normen ter bescherming 
van staatlozen, en deze zijn vervolgens onder de loep genomen: allereerst civiele en 
politieke rechten, vervolgens economische, sociale en culturele rechten en tenslotte 





net als de resultaten die aan het licht kwamen bij de bespreking van het voorkomen 
van staatloosheid. De ontwikkeling van de mensenrechtenwetgeving heeft in feite 
geleid tot een steeds verdergaand afdrijven van staatsburgerschap als het recht om 
rechten te hebben (zoals door het Amerikaanse Hooggerechtshof in een beroemde 
uitspraak aan het licht is gebracht) in de richting van ‘denationalisatie’ van 
bescherming. De erkenning van het recht op een nationaliteit als mensenrecht 
bevestigt echter ook opnieuw het blijvend belang van nationaliteit: het 
mensenrechtensysteem kan zijn aspiratie universeel te zijn alleen handhaven door 
de garantie dat ieder mens ook een nationaliteit heeft. Ofschoon derhalve de 
noodzaak tot een verdrag specifiek voor staatlozen tegenwoordig wellicht geringer 
is dan voor de komst van de grote mensenrechtenverdragen, is dit niet overbodig 
geworden. Het  Staatloosheidsverdrag van 1954 tracht aan deze noodzaak tegemoet 
te komen, maar schiet op op veel punten tekort. Het grootste manco aan het verdrag 
is de methode die het zelf voorschrijft, waarbij verschillende rechten worden 
toegekend op grond van verschillende “hechtingsniveaus” (bijvoorbeeld alleen aan 
staatlozen die wettig in het land aanwezig zijn, of er wettig verblijven) en vaak 
slechts op een laag, incidenteel niveau (bijvoorbeeld niet meer rechten dan aan niet-
onderdanen in het algemeen toegekend worden). Intussen worden binnen de 
mensenrechtenstructuur zelf richtlijnen ontwikkeld die specifiek gericht zijn op de 
situatie van niet-onderdanen of zelfs staatlozen, maar welke behandeling deze 
groepen volgens de huidige mensenrechtennormen precies verschuldigd is is op 
vele gebieden, bijvoorbeeld ten aanzien van economische, sociale en culturele 
rechten, nog steeds onduidelijk, in het bijzonder in ontwikkelingslanden. 
Het is derhalve onmiskenbaar dat een aantal uitdagingen blijft bestaan, niet in 
het minst de uitdaging om toe te zien op de volledige implementatie en handhaving 
van alle bestaande internationale normen. Er zijn echter ook talrijke lacunes in de 
normatieve kaders voor de preventie van staatloosheid en bescherming van 
staatlozen gevonden. Als gevolg daarvan worden verschillende voorstellen gedaan 
ter nadere verduidelijking en uitwerking van richtlijnen die de bedoeling hebben de 
manier waarop internationaal recht met de kwestie van staatloosheid omgaat 
zodanig te verbeteren dat het individu en zijn/haar rechten optimaal beschermd 
worden. In het kader van zowel preventie als bescherming is het mogelijk geweest 
bepaalde actuele en relevante ontwikkelingen op het spoor te komen die ertoe 
bijgedragen hebben de weg voorwaarts te wijzen.  
Een van de meest wijdverbreide problemen waar op ingegaan dient te worden 
is de samenhang tussen in- en uitsluiting op basis van nationaliteit, alsmede in- en 
uitsluiting op basis van immigratiestatus. Een voortdurende, essentiële functie van 
nationaliteit is dat deze de bezitter van de nationaliteit een “thuisbasis” verschaft, 
een staat waarnaar hij/zij altijd terug kan keren en waar hij/zij een onbetwistbaar 
verblijfsrecht heeft. Aan de ene kant impliceert dit dat staatlozen geen 
onbetwistbaar recht hebben om ergens te wonen, en in de praktijk is inderdaad 
gebleken dat het verwerven en behouden van wettige toegang tot het territorium van 





problemen met hechtenis, gescheiden leven van familie en het ontbreken van 
toegang tot rechten en diensten, waaronder een groot aantal rechten en diensten die 
in het Staatloosheidsverdrag van 1954 beschreven zijn. Aan de andere kant is 
duidelijk geworden dat staatloosheid tot ontheemding leidt. Daarenboven kan een 
onwettige of onduidelijke immigratiestatus bijdragen aan de totstandkoming en 
voortzetting van staatloosheid. Deze feiten versterken de urgentie waarmee 
staatlozen verzekerd moeten worden van het recht om ergens te wonen. Aldus is dit 
van alle potentiële, aanvullende normatieve activiteiten die besproken zijn, een van 
de meest dwingende en tegelijkertijd meest complexe gebieden. Er wordt gesteld 
dat de meest geëigende weg voorwaarts in dit opzicht is om voort te bouwen op de 
inspanningen van de Mensenrechtencommissie van de VN om, onafhankelijk van 
de vraag naar  staatsburgerschap, het eigen land van een individu vast te stellen met 
het doel het toegangs- en verblijfsrecht te genieten. Staatlozen vormen duidelijk bij 
uitstek de groep die baat zou hebben bij een nadere uitwerking van dit begrip, 
aangezien zij zonder deze constructie blijvend een eigen land en de basisveiligheid 
die daarmee gepaard gaat zullen ontberen. Er is ook opgemerkt dat verdere 
kristallisatie en verheldering van de richtlijnen die betrekking hebben op preventie 
van staatloosheid absoluut onontbeerlijk is voor de poging vast te stellen welke 
staat als het eigen land van een staatloze beschouwd moet worden, omdat dit gelijk 
staat aan het vaststellen welk land “verantwoordelijk” is voor de staatloosheid van 
dit individu en derhalve de internationale normen geschonden heeft. 
Een tweede, nog fundamentelere uitdaging, waarop nog geen passende respons 
gevonden is, bestaat in de identificatie van staatlozen en personen die het risico 
lopen staatloos te worden. Dit is een noodzakelijke stap in voorbereiding op het 
toepassen van regels die betrekking hebben op preventie van staatloosheid, 
bescherming van staatlozen en, uiteindelijk, het oplossen van bestaande gevallen 
van staatloosheid. Toch wordt deze kwestie in de twee staatloosheidsverdragen 
volledig over het hoofd gezien en heeft hij tot nu toe bedroevend weinig aandacht 
gekregen van de internationale gemeenschap. Zelfs de meest recente, zeer 
vooruitstrevende voorbeelden van internationale verdragen betreffende vragen  van 
nationaliteit en staatloosheid raken nauwelijks aan het identificatieprobleem. Waar 
op mensenrechtenorganen een beroep gedaan is om in een bepaalde zaak de 
nationaliteit of staatloosheid van een aanvrager vast te stellen, hebben zij dit op een 
ad hoc – en soms tamelijk onnaspeurlijke – wijze gedaan, zonder te trachten regels 
of procedures voor algemeen gebruik of gebruik in de toekomst op te stellen. Om 
niettemin een begin te maken met het samenstellen van dergelijke richtlijnen, wordt 
in het laatste hoofdstuk van dit onderzoek de zoektocht naar relevante internationale 
praktijken verruimd en wordt lering getrokken op het gebied van het vaststellen van 
de vluchtelingenstatus en de jurisprudentie betreffende internationale aanspraken. 
Om mensen een reële kans te geven om van internationale normen betreffende 
staatloosheid te profiteren, moet deze aanzet tot identificatierichtlijnen nader 
verhelderd worden en in een toepasselijk document vastgelegd worden: om te 





internationaal verdrag dat daarnaast ook andere bestaande lacunes in het 
internationale rechtssysteem dicht.    
Vooruitblikkend naar de toekomst wordt gesteld dat de twee 
staatloosheidsverdragen wel toekomst hebben. Pleiten voor verbeterde toegang tot 
deze verdragen zou ook aan één van hun gemeenschappelijke manco’s 
tegemoetkomen, namelijk het armzalige aantal staten dat zich er tot op heden aan 
verbonden heeft. Een toenemende acceptatie van de staatloosheidsverdragen zal 
hand in hand gaan met hun toenemende reikwijdte en toepassing wereldwijd, en het 
bereiken van dit doel zou nog worden versneld door het opstellen van richtlijnen om 
de identificatiekwestie op te lossen. Verder zullen er met hernieuwde inspanningen 
om, in een groter aantal landen en met behulp van een identificatiehandboek, 
uitvoering te geven aan de  staatloosheidsverdragen, meer mogelijkheden komen 
om de overblijvende normatieve lacunes  te herzien en te overwegen welke 
aanvullende maatregelen nodig zijn om de tenuitvoerlegging van deze instrumenten 
te bevorderen. Geen van beide verdragen zou afzonderlijk als het definitieve 
antwoord op staatloosheid moeten worden beschouwd – op respectievelijk preventie 
en bescherming – en de andere wegen tot verbetering van de internationale respons 
op staatloosheid, die in de loop van dit onderzoek zijn geschetst, zouden ook 
moeten worden bewandeld. Intussen is het echter de moeite waard om te streven 
naar een toename van het aantal staten dat de staatloosheidsverdragen ratificeert; dit 
is nu beslist gemakkelijker dan een halve eeuw geleden, aangezien de inhoud van 
de verdragen in de huidige internationale juridische situatie niet meer als radicaal of 
laakbaar bestempeld kan worden. Dit streven is ook ontegenzeggelijk de moeite 
waard vanuit het oogpunt van het individu, de staat en de internationale 
gemeenschap, in het bijzonder met het oog op het besef dat kwesties omtrent 
staatloosheid en nationaliteit kunnen escaleren tot een zaak van nationale of zelfs 
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